China, Taiwan, and Rising Asia

DATES: May 1–2, 2015

LOCATIONS: Friday, May 1, 2015: 180 Doe Library
Saturday, May 2, 2015: 1995 University Avenue — Room 508

SPONSORS: Institute of East Asian Studies, Center for Chinese Studies, and Asia Society of Northern California



Taiwan's relationship to the Chinese mainland has been the island's foremost foreign policy issue since the leadership of the Republic of China took refuge on the island after ceding the mainland to the victorious Red Army. Taiwan and China have since that time been one of four divided nations, split not precisely by the Cold War but by the civil war that preceded it (but since the civil war was based on the same ideological cleavage it was quickly subsumed by the Cold War). In certain respects the nature of the issue has remained the same: it is both a question of national sovereignty or legitimacy and a national security issue, as the mainland has always competed with Taiwan to represent China to the rest of the world, and one way of resolving this contest has been for one side to defeat and absorb the other (in the first decade or two, that threat was reciprocal). The legitimacy issue was initially exacerbated by an ideological division that split the two camps during the Cold War, but the developmental path taken by People's Republic of China since the 3rd Plenum of the 11th Party Congress (viz., "Reform and opening to the outside world") has gradually narrowed the ideological gulf between them. At the same time the worldwide demise of ideology in the wake of the Cold War unleashed nationalism on both sides as well, yet Chinese nationalism failed to unite but only created new grounds for cross-Strait tension.

This conference was made possible with the generous support of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Taiwan; Taipei Economic and Cultural Office, San Francisco; Chiang-ching Kuo Foundation; and Taiwan Foundation for Democracy

Free and open to the public. Wheelchair accessible.


Friday, May 1, 2015

Location: 180 Doe Library

9:00 – 9:30 am
Continental Breakfast

9:30 – 9:45 am
Opening Remarks by Lowell Dittmer

9:45 – 10:45 am
SESSION I. Taiwan Strait Détente and its Strategic Implications

Wu Yu-shan, Academia Sinica
Pivot, Hedger, or Partner: Strategic Choice by Lesser Powers Caught between Hegemons

Huang Jing, National University of Singapore
Box Taiwan in a Strategic Framework of Reunification: China's Taiwan Policy Under Xi Jinping

Scott Kastner, University of Maryland
A Relationship Transformed? Rethinking the Prospects for Conflict and Peace in the Taiwan Strait

Ku Samuel C.Y., National Sun Yat-sen University
China's Expansion and Taiwan's Survival Strategies in Southeast Asia: A Comparative Perspective


11:00 – 12:00 pm
Discussant: Ni Ting, Political Science, UC Berkeley

General Discussion

12:00 – 2:00 pm
Luncheon Break

2:00 – 3:00 pm
SESSION II. The Political Economy of Cross-Strait Détente

Leng Tse-kang, Academia Sinica
Cross-Strait Economic Relations in the Context of China's Grand Strategy

Liou Chih-shian, National Cheng-Chi University
State Capitalism in China and Taiwan: A Comparative Perspective

Tsai Chung-min, National Cheng-Chi University
The Transition of Taiwanese Investment in China 2000–2014

Hsing You-tien, UC Berkeley
Social Networks Across the Straits: Social Entrepreneurialism of Post-Developmental State Taiwan


3:15 – 5:00 pm
Kevin O'Brien, Political Science, UC Berkeley

General Discussion

Saturday, May 2, 2015

Location: IEAS, 1995 University Ave, Berkeley

9:00 – 9:30 am
Continental Breakfast

9:30 – 10:45 am
SESSION III. National Identity under Détente
Keng Shu & Lin Emmy Rui-hua, School of Public Economics and Administration, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
Why Taiwanese Communities Could Easily Blend in But Refuse to Be Melted in the Chinese Society?

Chen Rou-lan, National Tung Hua University
Chinese Nationalism in a Pressure Pot: An Analysis of China's Raging Youth Phenomenon

Jiang Yi-huah, Professor of Political Science
National Taiwan University and former Premier of the Republic of China, Taiwan's Identity and Its Relations to Cross-Strait Relations

Lin Gang, Shanghai Jiaotong University
Chinese National Identity in Reconstruction

Jean-Pierre Cabestan, Hong Kong Baptist University
Changing Political Identities in Taiwan under Ma Ying-jeou


11:00 – 12:00 pm
Discussant: Thomas B. Gold, Sociology, UC Berkeley

General Discussion

12:00 – 1:30 pm
Lunch Break

1:30 – 3:30 pm
SESSION IV. Final Discussion

Jean-Pierre Cabestan, Hong Kong Baptist University
Huang Jing, National University of Singapore
Jiang Yi-huah, Professor of Political Science, National Taiwan University and former Premier of the Republic of China
Scott Kastner, University of Maryland
Wu Yu-shan, Academia Sinica


3:45 – 4:45 pm
SESSION V. Publication Meeting
Discussion of Plans for Revision & Publication

4:45 – 5:00 pm
Closing Remarks by Lowell Dittmer

Download the schedule here.




WU Yu-Shan, Academia Sinica
Pivot, Hedger, or Partner: Strategic Choice by Lesser Powers Caught between Hegemons
Squeezed by two great powers in competition, the medium and small countries between them have limited choices. They can play pivot and keep equidistance to the competing hegemons. They can side with one and hedge against the other by adopting an engagement-cum-balancing strategy. Finally they can decisively tilt towards one great power by playing its junior partner and oppose the other. One finds counties in the East Asian and South East Asian regions going for different solutions as they witness increasing tension between the United States and the PRC. Taiwan is one of the countries caught between the colliding titans and forced to adopt a position from the limited options. What is the logic behind Taipei's strategy? Will a change of ruling party swing the pendulum to the other end? This paper offers an answer that integrates both international and domestic factors, and gauges the possibility of a radical shift of Taipei's position vis-à-vis Beijing after 2016.

HUANG Jing, National University of Singapore
Box Taiwan in a Strategic Framework of Reunification: China's Taiwan Policy Under Xi Jinping
Since President Ma Ying-jeou came to power in 2008, the cross-strait relationship has been stabilized based on the 1992 consensus (with Beijing emphasizing 'one China' and Taipei sticking to 'two interpretations'). With this backdrop, the top priority in China's Taiwan policy has again shifted from 'anti-independence' under Hu Jintao to reunification since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012. While carrying on the momentum generated by ECFA to draw Taiwan deeper into China's economic orbit, Xi Jinping has been pushing for a 'political agreement' between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. The aim is not necessarily to achieve reunification in the near future, but to establish a one-China framework for cross-strait relations (without two interpretations), so as to 'box Taiwan in' for eventual reunification. The success of this ambitious strategy depends not just on China's capability of sustaining its development and stability, but essentially on the extent to which Beijing and Washington could come to terms with each other on a 'new type of major power relations' (or G2, as some in America would have it ). Given the US rebalance on the one hand and lingering tension between China and Japan on the other, Taiwan is again at crossroads in its relationship with mainland China. The ultimate dilemma for Taipei is that no matter which party — KMT or DPP — is in power, it cannot, and will not, surrender its sovereignty to Beijing, yet Taiwan's economy can hardly sustain any restructuring to decrease its dependence on mainland China.

Scott L. KASTNER, University of Maryland
Rethinking the Prospects for Conflict and Peace in the Taiwan Strait
After long being viewed as a potential flashpoint, relations across the Taiwan Strait have stabilized tremendously in recent years, reflecting moderation in the approaches both Beijing and Taipei have taken with regard to the cross-Strait sovereignty dispute. I consider whether this new-found stability in the Taiwan Strait is likely to persist. To do so, I discuss at some length how a conflict in the Taiwan Strait could occur, and I then consider how fundamental trends in cross-Strait relations — such as rapidly growing Chinese military power and deepening cross-Strait economic exchange — are affecting the likelihood of conflict. I argue that the relationship across the Taiwan Strait is likely to be more stable in the years ahead than was the case in the years preceding 2008; this conclusion holds even if there is a change in the ruling party in Taiwan. But I also emphasize that the cross-Strait relationship has not been fundamentally transformed, and that the potential for serious conflict remains. I suggest in particular that a rapidly shifting cross-Strait balance of power has the potential to be highly destabilizing, if it comes to dominate other, more stabilizing, trends in China-Taiwan relations.

KU Samuel C.Y., National Sun Yat-sen University
Strategies of China's Expansion and Taiwan's Survival in Southeast Asia: A Comparative Perspective
Taiwan is not comparable with China in many ways, but Taiwan and China, two pre-dominantly Han Chinese societies, initiate different strategies in Southeast Asia, where ethnic Chinese, a sensitive ethnic group in most countries, generally dominate the local economy. China has intensified its expansion to Southeast Asia since implementation of the "Going Out" strategy in 2002, whereas Taiwan continues to strive for a strategy for the island's survival. Politically, China continues to strengthen its relations with countries in Southeast Asia by way of formal and diplomatic channels, whereas Taiwan continues to consolidate its substantial relations with friendly countries in the region despite the island's diplomatic isolation. Economically, China has expanded its trade and investment relations with most Southeast Asian countries since the beginning of the new century. Similarly, Taiwan, in order to strive for its economic survival, continues to promote economic ties with Southeast Asia, in spite of the island's declining investment in the region in recent years. Finally, China has made efforts to expand its cultural and educational influence in Southeast Asia, particularly through the popular Confucius Institutes in the region. While not comparable in scale, Taiwan is also building up its soft power through Taiwan-oriented Chinese education in Southeast Asia, as part of its survival strategy.


LENG Tse-Kang, Academia Sinica
Cross-Strait Economic Relations in the Context of China's Grand Strategy
This paper argues that the future of cross-Strait economic relations will be closely linked with China's vital national interests and grand strategies. Such linkages could be operationalized from the following aspects: (1) Integrating the domestic and international situations: From the perspective of maintaining domestic stability and growth, continuing policies to attract Taiwanese manufacturing as well as advancing research capacities will serve China's economic interests. Given the rise of China's comprehensive national power, utilizing economic leverage may achieve desired social as well as political goals under the situation of asymmetry across the Taiwan Strait. (2) All-direction diplomacy: Cross-Strait economic relations is closely linked with Chinese economic division of labor with the US and Japan. China's new economic diplomacy with EU, Africa, South American countries and the "two new silk-roads" policy may divert the existing economic interdependency and create political outcomes in the future. (3) Culture industry and diplomacy: China intends to enhance its "soft power" and international voice power in the international arena. At the same time, China plans to attract Taiwanese talent to promote the culture industry as the new flagship of global development. The culture policy will serve as a new instrument to change China's international status as well as cross-Strait relations. (4) Energy and sustainable development: Sustainable development and energy security have become major concerns of national security for Chinese leaders. Whether new rounds of Taiwanese economic dynamics could be linked with these initiatives will be vital for the positive development of cross-Strait interaction in both economic and political contexts.

LIOU Chih-shian, National Cheng-Chi University
State Capitalism in China and Taiwan: A Comparative Perspective
The Chinese central state since the late 1990s has encouraged expanding capital outflows from its state-owned enterprises (SOEs). As a result of the "Going Out" strategy, the Chinese economy has witnessed a growing surge in overseas ventures, which invites accusations of Chinese mercantilism. However, by examining transnational operations of Chinese central SOEs, the existing literature demonstrates that the driving forces behind Chinese outward foreign direct investment (OFDI) are mainly commercial interests rather than political goals. Over time, the SOEs' overseas expansion reflected more the firms' corporate strategy than the state's policy objectives. This article builds on scholarship in International and Comparative Political Economy to investigate the investment decision-making concerning Chinese OFDI in Taiwan. It asks to what extent the preceding argument applies to Chinese SOEs' operations in Taiwan? Or do Chinese SOEs' OFDI in Taiwan have a national center of gravity and act as a means of engaging with the Taiwanese government?

TSAI Chung-min, National Cheng-Chi University
The Transition of Taiwanese Investment in China 2000–2014
The economic relationship between Taiwan and China has been getting closer and closer due to increasing Taiwanese investment. Despite this, this investment environment has only gotten worse. In recent years, the Chinese government has eliminated all favorable treatment such as tax breaks and land policies that Taiwanese businessmen used to enjoy because it aims to improve the market mechanism and to build up a level playing field for all actors. With the implementation of the new Labor Law, Taiwanese businessmen have found it very difficult to continue their businesses there. Interestingly, while some have moved to neighboring countries, such as Vietnam and Cambodia, others have chosen to move to the interior regions. Also, some transformed into the service industry and increased their investments. From concentration in the electronics industry, Taiwanese investments are now found in many different industries. This article delineates the transition of Taiwanese investment in China in response to or transformation of the macroeconomic environment and illuminates how the policy shift changes the industrial configuration in China.

HSING You-tien, UC Berkeley
Community Activism in Taiwan and China
In this paper I will discuss a non-profit community planning organization in Taiwan established in 1990. In recent years this organization has received increasing attention from mainland Chinese community organizers and policy makers who are concerned with "community construction" in China. Most of these Taiwanese activists were trained as urban planners and architects. They used the techniques of participation in the process of community design and planning, touching upon not only the politics of accumulation and distribution, but also that of recognition and representation.


KENG Shu, School of Public Economics and Administration, Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
Why Taiwanese Communities Could Easily Blend in But Refuse to Be Melted in the Chinese Society?
Given their cultural affinities, the Taiwanese who settled in mainland China could have easily blended in but, as we find, almost none of them gave up their Taiwanese identity and melted into Chinese society. A pattern like this, however, is not just contrary to the traditional "melting-pot model" in immigration study but also defeats the expectations of the integrationists across the Taiwan Strait. What happened to these Taiwanese sojourners that resulted in their "refusing to be Chinese"? Based on our ten-year fieldwork and the "Lives and Attitudes of the Taiwanese in China" Survey, the authors offer a three-dimensional explanation of the dynamics of continuity and change in the political identity of the Taiwanese communities in China. To begin with, the traditional "melting-pot model/contact hypothesis" underestimates the ability of these migrants to "pick up the people 'of their own kind' to associate with" and "to keep away from the people they don't feel close to." This ability allows these trans-border communities to protect their own ethnic identity. Secondly, why do these Taiwanese want to keep a distance from their Chinese co-workers and neighbors? I argue that it is because they feel that they are very different from local Chinese, previously due to class distinction but nowadays, political ideas. Taiwanese take pride in these ideals and values, refusing to eschew them to assume a Chinese identity. Finally, the ability to make trans-border trips and communications also empower these trans-border communities to stay in touch with their motherland and not to give themselves up to mainstream society. To summarize, the study of the political identity of the Taiwanese sojourners can shed light on the limitations of immigration theories and tell us what is to be done for China to unify Taiwan peacefully.

CHEN Rou-lan, National Dong Hwa Uiversity
Chinese Nationalism in a Pressure Pot: An Analysis of China's Raging Youth Phenomenon
The first decade of the twenty-first century has witnessed an explosion of anger among Chinese youth and the flame of raging youth burns in the name of patriotism. To explore why Chinese youth movements took a nationalist turn and forcefully brought millions into motion, we must investigate how the economic transition in China brought about structural and psychological dynamics that propelled the post-1980 generation to search for a new identity. Specifically, there are three objectives of this paper. First, the paper aims to explore how the interplay of marketization and uncertainty toward the past and the future affects the attitudes of the post-1980 generation. It will examine how China's institutionalization, which lagged behind its overheated economic transition, created a state of anomie within which the young generation suffers from a crisis of faith in socialism, feelings of uncertainty regarding the market economy, and an eagerness to build a new identity aimed at redefining their position in society. Second, the paper goes further to investigate structural factors that hinder or facilitate the youth in their search for an identity. With limited organizational life, which is sanctioned or monitored by the state, how could the advent of the internet provide young people with the public space to vent their anger, circulate ideas, and facilitate civic engagement, thus aiding them in the collective pursuit of their identity? Finally, the last objective is centered on why interactions between the network of the internet and the trend of globalization precipitated the resurgence of an outraged nationalism in contemporary China and why our identity is always affirmed against a foreign enemy. To answer these questions, the study will utilize the linear structural relationships model with survey data collected from personal interviews in China by the Asian Barometer in 2012.

LIN Gang, Shanghai Jiao Tong University
Chinese National Identity in Reconstruction
Soon after Mao Zedong declared that the Chinese people had stood up on the stage of Tiananmen, it seemed that China had almost finished the process of nation-building which was stimulated by one hundred years of national humiliation and periodical foreign invasions; the only exception then was Taiwan which had been under the control of Chinese Nationalists since 1945. Over the past seven decades, there have been two Chinese societies governed by different political regimes across the Taiwan Strait. From the perspective of the Chinese mainland, people living in Taiwan, or the so-called Taiwanese, are of course parts of China, including the overwhelming majority of Han Chinese as well as the tiny aboriginal population that is regarded as one of 55 minor ethnicities within the Chinese nation.

Despite peaceful development of cross-strait relations over the past seven years, the growing Taiwanese identity has highlighted the marginal effectiveness of Chinese national identity on the island. As more people on Taiwan nowadays identify themselves as Taiwanese, rather than Chinese or both, people in the mainland have worked hard to reconstruct the concept of China through political communication, economic integration, social exchange and cultural assimilation across the Taiwan Strait. New terms such as "two-shores as close members of the same family"(两岸一家亲)and "realizing the Chinese dream by both"(共圆中国梦)have been created and added into the existing political vocabularies of "a community of two-shore destinies"(两岸命运共同体), and the "great rejuvenation of Chinese nation" (中华民族的伟大复兴). Chinese national identity is both indigenous and reconstructive. The ancient concept of middle kingdom has been enriched continually, thanks to political expansion and cultural assimilation throughout history. From 1949 to 1979, amid political confrontation and military tension, Chinese people on the mainland were educated to liberate Taiwan and alleviate the misery of its people by bringing the island back to its motherland. From 1979 on, Taiwan's development experience and increasing cross-strait exchanges have expanded mainlanders' imagination of modernization and understanding of national identity. Political détente intertwined with periodic crisis, economic benefits accompanying social inequality, different understandings of modern history despite similar cultural backgrounds, and, not least, the growing Taiwanese identity regardless of power turnover between different parties, have suggested to the mainland that reconstruction of Chinese national identity across the Taiwan Strait will not be simple. It requires not only economic modernization and integration, mutually cultural exchange and assimilation, reinterpretation of contemporary Chinese history and stable political relations between the two entities prior to China's reunification, but also improvement of public governance and political engineering in the mainland. In other words, reconstruction of Chinese national identity is a long project involving all people on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.

Jean-Pierre CABESTAN, Hong Kong Baptist University
Changing Political Identities in Taiwan under Ma Ying-jeou
Since the beginning of Taiwan's democratization in the late 1980s, political identities on the island have fundamentally changed. Since Ma Ying-jeou's election as Taiwan president in 2008, the Kuomintang have embarked on an attempt to restore a more traditional Chinese and ROC political identity, both as a way to facilitate the rapprochement that they initiated with the People's Republic of China (PRC) and as a strategy to weaken their political opponent, particularly the DPP's political legitimacy. Simultaneously, economic and people-to-people relations across the Taiwan Strait have rapidly developed, intensifying interactions between ROC and PRC citizens. Can Ma Ying-jeou's and the KMT's ambition to "re-sinize" Taiwan succeed? Can the economic integration across the Strait blur the boundaries between Chinese and Taiwanese political identities?


JIANG Yi-huah, Professor of Political Science, National Taiwan University and former Premier of the Republic of China
Taiwan's National Identity and the Cross-Strait Relations
The future of cross-Strait relations is determined by many factors, among which Taiwan's national identity and its interpretation of the "one China principle" plays a pivotal role. In my article, I will examine the measurements of national identity in Taiwan, and the controversy about "one China principle."

The current stability of cross-Strait relations is based on the "1992 Consensus," an agreement between Mainland China and Taiwan on how they are to interpret the "one China" statement, with the former emphasizing on "one China" component and the latter on "different interpretations." However, the opposing Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in Taiwan has never admitted the legitimacy of the "1992 Consensus," and is likely to replace it with some other formula that reflects more precisely its pro-independence platform and the collective identity the DPP leaders believe Taiwanese people actually hold. Will Taiwanese identity inevitably collide with Chinese identity and the 1992 Consensus? Is it possible to find a better common ground for the two sides of the Taiwan Strait other than the 1992 Consensus? Will the DPP's denial of the 1992 Consensus result in a confrontation between the rising China and the US in East Asia? These are the questions to be addressed in my article.



Jean‑Pierre Cabestan is a Professor in Political Science and the Head of the department at Hong Kong Baptist University. He published more than 15 books, including Political Changes in Taiwan Under Ma Ying‑jeou. Partisan Conflict, Policy Choices, External Constraints and Security Challenges (2014) and The Chinese Political System: A New Authoritarian Equilibrium (2014, in French). His research interests are Chinese politics, Chinese law and institutions, Chinese foreign and security policy, relations across the Taiwan Strait, and Taiwan politics. He has served as a member of the editorial boards of multiple journals such as Journal of Contemporary China, University of Denver and East Asia: An International Quarterly, University of Durham. Professor Cabestan received his Ph.D. in Political Science at Sorbonne University in 1982 and State Doctorate of Law at Pantheon-Sorbonne University in 1988.

CHEN Rou‑lan is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Taiwan and Regional Studies at National Dong Hwa University. She received her Ph.D. in Political Science at UC Berkeley. Her specialties are social science methodology, comparative politics, East Asian regional studies, and ethnic politics. Professor Chen published the paper “Beyond National Identity in Taiwan: Multidimensional and Evolutionary Conceptualization” in Asian Survey in 2012 and “Taiwan's Identity in Formation: in Reaction to a Democratizing Taiwan and a Rising China” in Asian Ethnicity in the same year.

Lowell Dittmer is a Professor of Political Science at UC Berkeley and editor of Asian Survey. His research interests include the study of Chinese political reform, Chinese foreign policy and its repercussions, informal politics in East Asia, and the China-Taiwan-US triangle. Professor Dittmer published the books Sino-Soviet Normalization and Its International Implications (1992), China Under Reform (1994), Informal Politics in East Asia (2000), South Asia's Nuclear Security Dilemma: India, Pakistan, and China (2005), and China's Deep Reform: Domestic Politics in Transition (2006). He received his Ph.D. at the University of Chicago in 1971.

HSING You‑tien is a Professor of Geography and the Pamela P. Fong and Family Distinguished Chair in China Studies, and Chair of Center for Chinese Studies in UC Berkeley. Her research and teaching has focused on the political economy of development in China. Professor Hsing's current project studies the cultural and environmental politics in Northwestern China through ethnographical work. She recently published the books The Great Urban Transformation: Politics of Land & Property in China (2010) and Reclaiming Chinese Society: The New Social Activism (2009). She received her Ph.D. in City and Regional Planning at UC Berkeley in 1993.

HUANG Jing is a Professor and Director at the Centre on Asia and Globalisation (CAG) at Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy (LKYSPP). As an internationally recognized expert on Chinese politics, China's foreign relations and security issues in the Asia-Pacific, Huang has written two books and numerous journal articles, book chapters, policy papers, and op-eds on Chinese politics, China's foreign policy, the military, US-China relations, and security issues in Asia-Pacific. His book, Factionalism in Chinese Communist Politics (Cambridge University Press, 2000), won the prestigious Masayoshi Ohira Memorial Prize in 2002. Huang also serves as a Senior Overseas Economic Analyst for China's Xinhua News Agency, as such, he advices China on major policy issues. Before joining the LKYSPP, Huang was a Senior Fellow at the John Thornton China Center at the Brookings Institution (2004–2008). He also taught at Harvard University (1993–94), Utah State University (1994–2004) and Stanford University (2002–2003). Huang received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Harvard University, and his M.A. in History from Fudan University.

JIANG Yi‑huah served as a Professor of Political Science at the National Taiwan University. His research interests are Western political philosophy, democratic theory, and classical liberalism. He is a former Premier of Taiwan (Feb 2013 – Dec 2014), Vice Premier (Feb 2012 – Feb 2013), Minister of the Interior (Sept 2009 – Feb 2012), and Minister of Research, Development and Evaluation (May 2008 – Sept 2009). He received his B.A. and M.A. in Political Science at National Taiwan University and his Ph.D. in Political Science at Yale University in 1993. He authored and published the book 自由民主的理路 (The Rationale for Liberal Democracy) in 2001.

Scott Kastner is an Associate Professor in the Department of Government and Politics, University of Maryland, College Park. He graduated from Cornell University (1995), and received his Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of California, San Diego (2003). Kastner's research and teaching interests include international relations, international political economy, the international politics of East Asia, and China's foreign relations. Kastner is author of Political Conflict and Economic Interdependence across the Taiwan Strait and Beyond (Stanford University Press, 2009), and co-editor (with Ming‑Chin Monique Chu) of Globalization and Security Relations across the Taiwan Strait: In the Shadow of China (Routledge, 2015). His work has also appeared in the following journals: International Security, Journal of Conflict Resolution, International Studies Quarterly, Comparative Political Studies, Security Studies, Journal of Peace Research, Foreign Policy Analysis, Journal of Contemporary China, Journal of East Asian Studies, Issues & Studies and Current History.

KENG Shu is an Associate Professor in the School of Public Economics and Administration at Shanghai University of Finance and Economics. He is also the Chair of the Department of Public Administration and the Director of the Master in Public Administration Program. He received his Ph.D. degree in Government at the University of Texas at Austin and his B.A. in Diplomacy at National Chengchi University. Keng's research interests include comparative political economy, Chinese political economy, government-business relations, regional economic development, cross-strait political economy, and study of Taishang (Taiwanese Businesspeople). Professor Keng contributed many book chapters and articles regarding cross-strait economy. He is currently working on the book projects "How to Conquer a Democracy?: The Political Consequences of China's Policy to Break the Cross-Strait Stalemate" and "Cross-Strait Relations and Taiwanese Identity: Study of Survey Data."

KU Samuel C.Y. received his Ph.D. from the Ohio State University in June 1989. Ku presently is a professor (since August 2008) and director (since August 2011) at the Institute of China and Asia-Pacific Studies, National Sun Yat‑Sen University in Kaohsiung, Taiwan. Professor Ku's major research interests include Southeast Asia's political development, comparative politics, Taiwan's relations with Southeast Asia, and China's relations with Southeast Asia. In addition to more than seventy journal articles and book chapters, he has published more than ten books on Southeast Asia in Taiwan, including Singapore: Forty Years of Change, Malaysia: Fifty Years Since Independence, Vietnam: Twenty Years of Rapid Change, The Philippines: Twenty Years of Turbulence, Thailand: Sixty Years of Rama IX, Myanmar: Fifty Years of Military Dictatorship, and Government and Politics of Southeast Asia: Continuity and Change.

LENG Tse‑Kang is a research fellow at the Institute of Political Science of Academia Sinica and Professor of Political Science at National Chengchi University. Leng received his Ph.D. degree in Government and Foreign Affairs at University of Virginia in 1995 and M.A. in International Affairs at George Washington University in 1991. His research interests include politics of globalization, urban development, political economy of China's development, and cross-Taiwan Strait Relations. Leng authored and co-edit books Chinese Model of Development: Global, Local and Comparative Perspectives (2015, with Yu‑shan Wu), Dynamics of Local Governance of China during the Reform Era (2010, with Yun‑han Chu), Governance of Biodiversity Conservation in China and Taiwan (2006, with Gerald McBeath), and Taiwan-China Connection: Democracy and Development Across the Taiwan Strait (1996).

LIN Gang is distinguished professor of political science and chairman of academic committee at the Shanghai Jiao Tong University's School of International and Public Affairs, director of Center for Taiwan Studies, and member of the University's Academic Committee (2008–2013). He served as Program Associate at the Woodrow Wilson Center (1999–2005) and President of the Association of Chinese Political Studies (1998–1999). He has authored A Study on Party Politics in Taiwan (Chinese Social Sciences Press, 2014), Taiwan's Political Transition and the Evolution of Cross-Strait Relations (Jiuzhou Press, 2010), co-edited China after Jiang (Woodrow Wilson Center Press & Stanford University Press, 2003), Transition toward Post-Deng China (Singapore University Press, 2001) and Prospects for Cross-Taiwan Strait Developments (Hong Kong: Asia Sciences Press, 2000), co-authored Taiwan's Political Transition (Hong Kong: Social Sciences Press, 1997), and contributed numerous articles and book chapters. He received his Ph.D. in political science from Pennsylvania State University (1997), MA in Taiwan studies from Xiamen University (1984), and BA in history from Fujian Normal University (1982). His research interests include comparative politics, Chinese politics, democratic theory, Sino-U.S. relations, and the Taiwan issue.

LIOU Chih‑shian is an associate research fellow at the Institute of International Relations and an associate professor of the Graduate Institute of East Asian Studies at National Chengchi University, Taiwan, Republic of China. Her research interests are political economy, bureaucratic politics and political organization as well as institutional theory with a focus on the state-market nexus in China. She has co-edited a volume on China Dreams: China's New Leadership and Future Impacts (World Scientific, 2015), and her articles have appeared in Asian Survey, World Development, Taiwanese Political Science Review and other journals. She received her Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Texas at Austin, her LL.M. from the University of Pennsylvania, and her M.A., B.A., and LL.B. from the National Taiwan University.

TSAI Chung‑min is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the National Chengchi University. He has served as the Secretary-General of Taiwanese Political Science Association and the Executive Editor for The Taiwanese Political Science Review. He received his Ph.D. degree in Political Science at UC Berkeley. Tsai's research interests include comparative politics, political economy, and China studies. He recently published the book chapter “Market Development and the China Dream: State-Business Relationship and Regulatory Capacity in China,” in the book China Dreams: China's New Leadership and Future Impacts. In 2014, he published the paper “Regulating China's Power Sector: Creating an Independent Regulator without Autonomy” in The China Quarterly.

WU Yu‑Shan is Distinguished Research Fellow and Director of the Institute of Political Science, Academia Sinica, Taiwan. He is also professor of Political Science at National Taiwan University and research fellow at the Institute for Advanced Studies in Humanities and Social Sciences at NTU. His major interests are in political and economic transitions in former socialist countries, constitutional engineering in nascent democracies, and theories of international relations and Cross-Taiwan Strait relations. His area focuses are Taiwan, mainland China, Eastern Europe and Russia. He has authored and edited seventeen books and published more than 130 journal articles and book chapters. His recent books include Semi-Presidentialism and Democracy (2011), In Search of China's Development Model: Beyond the Beijing Consensus (2011), Where is Power? Semi-presidentialism in Multiple Perspectives (2012) and The Chinese Models of Development: Global, Local and Comparative Perspectives (2014).



"China, Taiwan, and Rising Asia" will be held at the following locations in Berkeley. The Friday session will be held at 180 Doe Library on the central campus. The Saturday session will be held in the IEAS conference room at 1995 University Avenue.

Friday, May 1, 2015: Doe Library

See section C4 on this large campus map.

Doe Library

To reach Doe Library via the most direct route, enter campus from Telegraph Avenue and Bancroft Way. Walk north through Sproul Plaza and Sather Gate. Doe Library will be the second building on the right after passing through Sather Gate. Turn right and walk uphill (towards the Campanile clock tower) until you come to a ground level entrance on your left. Enter there and walk down the hallway to 180 Doe on the right side of the hallway.

Saturday, May 2, 2015: 1995 University Avenue

The Institute of East Asian Studies is located on the fifth floor of 1995 University Avenue — two blocks west of the University Avenue entrance to campus at the intersection of Milvia Street and University Avenue. The building is three blocks from BART and also has a public parking garage which is accessed off Bonita Street.

Directions to the Berkeley campus

If traveling by BART, exit the Richmond-Fremont line at the Berkeley station (not North Berkeley). If going to the campus, walk east up Center Street (towards the hills) one block to the edge of campus. If going to IEAS, walk two blocks north to University Avenue, then one block west (away from the hills) to 1995 University Avenue.

From Interstate 80

To reach the campus by car from Interstate 80, exit at the University Avenue off-ramp in Berkeley. Take University Avenue east (toward the hills) approximately two miles until you reach the campus.

From Highways 24/13

To reach the campus from Highways 24/13, exit 13 at Tunnel Road in Berkeley. Continue on Tunnel Road as it becomes Ashby. Turn right at College Avenue and drive approximately one mile north to Bancroft Way.

Directions to the campus are also available at visitors/ traveling.html


There are various public parking lots and facilities near campus and in downtown Berkeley. This list includes municipal and privately owned parking lots and garages open to the public. Please consult signs for hours and fees prior to entering the facilities.

More information is available on the UC Berkeley Parking and Transportation page.