Berkeley Student Journal of Asian Studies

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Introduction

The Berkeley Student Journal of Asian Studies grew out of a desire to encourage scholarly discussions of Asian affairs among students, and to highlight new student research. In that spirit, we are delighted to take part in penning a new chapter in the university’s long history of dedication to Asian Studies. With this inaugural issue, we present insightful and original content from some of the campus’s brightest young scholars.

James Lin discusses the political indoctrination program implemented in officer training at the Whampoa Military Academy in China under the Kuomintang (KMT) (*guomindang* 國民黨: Nationalist Party) during the 1920s. Drawing from recently opened archival sources and new scholarship, Lin shows that the indoctrination program, historically rooted in a KMT-Soviet alliance, drew not only from Nationalist leader Sun Yat-sen’s *Three Principles of the People*, but also from Leninist thought. The incorporation of Leninist ideology, and the motivations behind grounding the Whampoa indoctrination system in ideology as opposed to loyalty to a region or a province, provoke broader historical questions on nation building in Republican China.

While discussions of Taiwanese identity are often framed within the context of the historico-political struggle between Nationalist Taiwan and Communist China, Alessandro Tiberio examines the legacy of Japanese colonialism in the construction of Taiwan’s island-based identity. Delineating Taiwan’s experience under Japanese imperialism leading up to the retrocession of 1945 to the Republic of China, Tiberio interrogates the present perception of Taiwanese consciousness by studying the tensions between Chinese nationalism, the effects of historical efforts to assimilate the Taiwanese people into the Japanese nation, and contemporary political rhetoric from Taiwanese leaders.

Andrea Horbinski examines the ethics of the Tokyo Tribunal, the 1946-1948 trials that put the former Empire of Japan on the stand for war crimes. Horbinski separates these ethics into two categories: the expressed objective ethics of the defense and of Justice Radhabinod Pal of India, and unexpressed feminist, Buddhist, and Shinto ethics. In her analysis, Horbinski concludes that this second, largely unexplored category of unexpressed ethics is essential to understanding the nature of the trials.

Lastly, we include a student conducted interview with Lanchih Po, visiting associate professor at the Institute of International and Area Studies and the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures at UC Berkeley. Professor Po shares some of her insights regarding her personal academic journey, teaching, and differences between the academic environments in China and the U.S.

We encourage future submissions from undergraduate and graduate students to our journal, the details of which can be found in the Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) section. We hope that this first issue will be one in a long series that will foster intellectual exchanges within the campus community of Asian Studies scholars and beyond.
Soviet Internationalism, Chinese Nationalism, and Early Kuomintang Struggles: The Origins of Political Indoctrination at Whampoa Military Academy, 1924-1926

James Lin

Abstract

With the establishment of the Whampoa Military Academy in 1924, KMT planners implemented a curriculum of political education for officer training. The inclusion of political indoctrination reflects the influence of the Soviet party-military organization model. Stemming from their frustration from allying with unreliable military generals, Sun and others in the KMT sought a military solution to reunify a divided China. The early KMT was in a particularly feeble position with limited means by which to accomplish its goal of reunification. Sun found the Communist International a willing ally with financial support and technical assistance, and the Soviet experience was appealing as a revolutionary roadmap. Chiang and other KMT leaders also found the Soviet model suitable, and eventually Sun’s Three Principles of the People became integrated with a Soviet-style curriculum to produce a revised political ideology that came to be implemented at Whampoa.

Under Chiang Kai-shek’s Kuomintang (KMT) (guomindang 國民黨: Nationalist Party) regime, effectively in control of China from 1928 until 1937 (nominally 1912 to 1949, and thereafter on Taiwan), the military reunification by the KMT was integral to the nationalist narrative of the emergence of modern China.¹ That part of the narrative proceeds roughly in this fashion: after the fall of the Qing dynasty in 1912, the Republic of China (ROC) was declared, but soon lost legitimacy as China dissolved into regional factions, each led by corrupt and power hungry warlords wielding armies independent of the central government. However, from his base in Guangdong province in south China, Sun Yat-sen, founder and leader of the Kuomintang until his death in 1925, established the groundwork for a new “revolutionary” army. This army, led by Sun’s protégé Chiang Kai-shek, would march north and save China from “warlordism.”

Beginning in 1926, this became known as the Northern Expedition, and by 1928, the Republic of China was reaffirmed, ushering in peace and prosperity for the next decade. Over 80 years since the end of the Northern Expedition, traces of this story still linger in the historiography. This narrative is partially responsible for obscuring the influence of Leninist ideology, presented to the early KMT leadership by Soviet-led Comintern representatives. I will explain why the KMT decided to follow a Leninist model of party-military structure that came to define the KMT during the 1920s.

The history of the Chinese Nationalist Party Army Officer Academy (zhongguo guomindang lujun jinguan xuexiao 中國國民黨陸軍軍官學校), more commonly known from 1924 to 1928 by its toponym, Whampoa Academy (huangpu junxiao 黃埔軍校),² is

¹ For this paper, I follow the pinyin Romanization system, except in those cases where non-pinyin Romanization has been widely accepted in scholarship (i.e. Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek, Kuomintang, Canton, Whampoa, etc.).
² The toponym is derived from the island on which the academy resides, Whampoa (huangpu 黃埔) island, a short distance from Canton.
an integral part of this narrative. The Academy (hereafter referred to as Whampoa) was established in 1924 by the leaders of the Kuomintang near the city of Canton (Guangzhou) to train officers for the Kuomintang National Revolutionary Army. Whampoa graduated 4,981 cadets in its first four classes, from 1924 until 1926. These cadets, who would lead the Northern Expedition as officers, were deemed crucial for the success of the Northern Expedition. Some Whampoa graduates would later serve in high-ranking posts in the Nationalist Party, the military, and the government of the Republic of China. The Superintendent (教長 xuézhǎng) of Whampoa, Chiang Kai-shek, would serve as President of the Republic of China after Sun Yat-sen’s death in 1925 until Chiang’s death in 1975 in Taiwan. Furthermore, since Whampoa Academy was established during the First United Front between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communists from 1923 to 1926, under guidance from the Comintern, important future leaders of the People’s Republic of China graduated from or were otherwise involved with the Academy. Zhou Enlai, future Premier and Foreign Minister of the PRC, was a Deputy Director of the Political Education Department at Whampoa. Lin Biao, People’s Liberation Army general, close associate of Mao Zedong, and named successor to Mao during the Cultural Revolution, was a cadet who graduated in 1925 from Whampoa.

Although Whampoa has been the subject of numerous studies in the PRC and the ROC, these studies have, for the most part, not challenged the orthodox narrative of the Academy. On the other hand, in American scholarship, relatively little has been written in the past twenty-five years on Whampoa. The more extensive studies on the Academy were doctoral dissertations, the majority being written in the 1970s, particularly those by Richard Landis, Richard Gillespie, and Thomas Williamsen. In the years since those dissertations were written, new primary sources have emerged from the People’s Republic of China, the Republic of China, and the Soviet Union. These include primary documents from Whampoa Academy published in the PRC in 1982 and 1994, Nationalist Party archives declassified from 1960 to 1980, and newly discovered or translated primary materials on the relationship between the Soviet advisers to the Nationalists and the Communists published in the US. Revisionist accounts from Western scholarship on traditional Chinese figures, notably Sun Yat-sen and Chiang Kai-shek, have also prompted new questions regarding Whampoa Academy and the early Kuomintang.

The emergence of the Soviet archival documents brings to light the involvement of non-Kuomintang actors in the early history of the Kuomintang. These documents demonstrate the significant influence of Soviet aid, financial and technical, and more

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3 Huangpu Junxiao Shiliao [Huangpu Military Academy Historical Materials], (Guangzhou: Guangdong Renmin Chubanshe [Guangdong People’s Publishers], 1982), 93.
5 Huangpu Junxiao Shiliao [Huangpu Military Academy Historical Materials]; Huangpu Junxiao Shiliao [Huangpu Military Academy Historical Materials], (Guangzhou: Guangdong Renmin Chubanshe [Guangdong People’s Publishers], 1994).
importantly, Leninist party-military structure and ideology. Scholars writing on Whampoa Academy have debated the origins and reasons for the formal political education emphasizing nationalist ideology in the training curriculum, which was a novel practice in China. Curriculum in Whampoa sought to instill loyalty to a political ideology, the Three Principles of the People. Such dedication to nationalistic principles was largely absent in the formal military training of officers in the rest of the world, with the exception of the Soviet Union. I argue that the integration of a politically-based military training is evidence of a greater Soviet influence among the KMT leadership than revealed by prior historiography on Whampoa.

The involvement of the Soviet Union in the early Kuomintang would have posed a number of problems for the KMT in this historical narrative. The aforementioned orthodox narrative essentially equated the Northern Expedition, which began under the First United Front between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), with a revolutionary campaign that “rescued” China and made possible the modern Chinese nation. Following periods of “hyper-colonialism” under the West, Manchu rule, and “warlordism,” the KMT was viewed as the savior of China and the Chinese people. Its rise to power appeared miraculous given the immense odds it faced during the Northern Expedition, and this success narrative was crucial for modern Chinese nationalism because it emphasized that the KMT was able to unite China behind a uniquely Chinese ideology, Sun’s Three Principles of the People. The revelation that Soviet internationalism played an active role in the early KMT and was integral to the success of the Northern Expedition would have undermined the success of the Northern Expedition and its importance to the story of the emergence of a strong, sovereign China.

In contrast with the orthodox narrative of the early KMT, I argue that Soviet internationalism played a crucial role in the KMT rise to power. The Kuomintang, between the years of 1912 and 1921, was limited in military power and economic resources and suffered successive failures after relying upon fickle domestic allies to expand their control outside of south China. They realized the need for a strong, loyal military to achieve their goal of reunifying China. Then, between 1921 and 1923, I will argue that the Soviet model, as transmitted to the KMT leadership by means of Soviet diplomatic envoys Hendrics Sneevliet and Adolf Joffe, provided a solution that was both feasible and ideologically appealing to the Kuomintang leadership, including Sun Yat-sen, finance commissioner of Guangdong and Sun’s close confidant Liao Zhongkai, and Chiang Kai-shek. As a result, Soviet advice readily took hold from 1923 and accelerated development of military planning that culminated in the implementation of a political indoctrination curriculum with the founding of a military academy in 1924.

**Problem Identified**

In 1911, an uprising in Wuchang prompted a chain reaction of revolts throughout China. Provinces began to declare independence from the Qing court, and military forces loyal to the Qing suffered a string of defeats. Revolutionaries demanded a provisional national assembly, which the Qing court conceded. Just months later, Yuan Shikai, who had risen to power as the general of the powerful Qing Beiyang Army (beiyangjun 北洋軍), used his influence over the Beiyang Army to be appointed Premier by the Qing. In 1912, Sun Yat-sen’s Revolutionary Alliance (tongmenghui 同盟會), which played a crucial role in many of the revolts, reformed into the Kuomintang and helped establish a republican government in Nanjing with Sun Yat-sen as Provisional President
of China. Yuan, representing the Qing court, negotiated a compromise with Sun Yat-sen and the Revolutionary Alliance, in which Sun would forfeit his title as Provisional President to Yuan in exchange for the abdication of the Qing emperor and the establishment of a republican government. However, in 1913, when the Guomindang was elected as a majority to the parliament and sought to limit Yuan’s executive powers, Yuan broke his alliance with Sun and began to openly oppose the Guomindang.

Four years later in 1916, after a failed attempt to declare himself the new emperor, Yuan died and his government subsequently collapsed. China was split into regions led by “warlords.”10 Between 1916 and 1928, these warlords effectively ruled China by exercising military control over roughly provincial-sized territories of the former Qing Empire. Many warlords were former generals of Yuan’s Beiyang Army, governors under Yuan Shikai’s presidency, or simply former bandit leaders who had acquired a local base of power and would sell their military services as mercenaries.11 Even those who were former military officers often led armies consisted not of professional soldiers but of conscripted men who were often no better disciplined than bandits.12 Many waged constant warfare and condoned pillaging during military campaigns. Allegiances switched rapidly among the factions, resulting in the uncertainty of regional power and a great amount of corresponding military conflict.13

From 1912 until 1926, after its withdrawal into Guangdong in South China, the KMT was merely one of these provincial regimes vying for power. Aside from its political legacy, the KMT was largely indistinguishable from the other military factions of China. Hans van de Ven has argued that some warlord factions were arguably as idealistic as the Nationalists or the Communists. In fact, the Kuomintang was not unique in advocating a republican system of governance characterized by liberal ideals.14 Numerous other factional leaders claimed to represent democracy, republicanism, socialism, utopianism, or some combination of these.15

Perhaps the most frustrating for Sun and the KMT leadership were the setbacks suffered after having relied upon other militarists for the survival of the KMT. In 1917, Sun received the help of governor-generals Tang Jiyao and Lu Rongting in the Constitution Protection Movement (huifa 護法) and was named Grand Marshal of the military government in Canton. But when his two allies had expanded their power, they became content with their possessions and no longer were interested in marching on Beijing or aiding Sun. Thus, in 1918 Sun, unhappy with his marginalized role, left Canton under the control of his former allies for Shanghai to begin a period of writing before returning to Canton in 1920.16 In another occasion in 1922, after being ousted from Guangzhou by Chen Jiongming, the general of the Guangdong Army formerly loyal to Sun, Sun paid 400,000 Chinese dollars to the Yunnan Army, nominally under Yang Ximin. Although formerly a disciplined army opposed to Yuan Shikai’s regime,

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9 Hans van de Ven, Hsi-Sheng Ch'i, and C. Martin Wilbur have all noted that ‘warlord’ was a pejorative term used by contemporaries who wished to portray rivals in a negative manner. A more accurate term would be ‘regional militarism,’ ‘factional militarism,’ or ‘provincial militarism,’ all of which describe a system where political power is wielded among different military factions. Hsi-Sheng Ch'i, Warlord Politics in China, 1916-1928 (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1976), 1. van de Ven, War and Nationalism in China: 1925-1945, 72.

10 Jonathan D. Spence, The Search for Modern China (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1990), 288-89.


12 van de Ven, War and Nationalism in China: 1925-1945, 78.

13 Nonetheless, the Nationalists and the Communists characterized warlords as barbaric, corrupt, and greedy. van de Ven prefers the term “regional militarism” over “warlordism” for this reason. Ibid., 72.


15 Bergère, Sun Yat-Sen, 274-75.
by 1922 the Yunnan Army had deteriorated into a mercenary army that exploited territories it controlled to sustain themselves. Only with the aid of the Yunnan army, the army of Xu Chongzhi, a Guangdong Army general who had remained loyal to Sun, and the Guangxi militarist Liu Zhenghuan, was Sun able to seize control of Guangzhou once again in 1923.

Confidential documents from Soviet military advisers to the KMT confirm the precarious and feeble position of the KMT regime. Seized in the 1927 raid of the Soviet embassy by the Beijing government, controlled at the time by Zhang Zuolin, of the Soviet embassy, the Soviet documents were supposedly authored by Soviet generals Vasili K. Bliukher and N.V Kuibyshev. Naturally this document should be considered carefully, because by portraying the KMT as weak and in a perilous position, the Soviet observers who eventually came to aid the KMT were reinforcing their own generosity and goodwill by helping the Kuomintang. But C. Martin Wilbur notes that these documents were meant to be distributed only among Soviet advisers aiding the Kuomintang, the Chinese Communists, and to the embassy in Beijing, so it was unlikely that these documents were meant to be publicized for propaganda purposes. Also, the 1927 raid of the Beijing embassy was secret and the Soviets did not edit the document prior to its seizure, increasing the likelihood that its contents were accurate. The content of the document confirms the dire military situation of the Kuomintang in the winter of 1923 to 1924, just prior to the establishment of Whampoa military academy. The Russians observed that:

Only Dr. Sun Yat-sen’s personal bodyguard (numbering about 150-200 bayonets) could be called a unit, which was entirely subordinated to Dr. Sun. The other numerous troops, which were then in the territory of [Guangdong] and which constituted the so-called Allied Army, were nothing more than quite independent armies of individual generals. These generals were, to a greater or lesser degree, subordinated to Dr. Sun. Some of them were Chinese militarists of the common type. Being expelled from their native provinces, they usually entered the territory of [Guangdong], the richest province in South China, in order to improve there their own financial condition and then return to their provinces. Owing to the growing popularity of Dr. Sun, they declared themselves as a matter of form to be his allies, returning to their own provinces, and even overthrowing the Canton Government (after their own position had been strengthened) and...seizing [Guangdong]...In addition, [Guangdong] province was literally ‘inundated’ by several ‘petty armies’ of individual generals, who often had less than 100 soldiers under their command.

The first important point is that the Russian observers only seemed to believe that Sun’s personal bodyguards were absolutely loyal to him. The rest of the KMT military force was dependent upon the specific army leader’s relation with the KMT at that point in time. In 1923, these alliances were swelling in number but the Russians believed their

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16 Ibid., 311.
17 C. Martin Wilbur identifies Bliukher and Kuibyshev as the likely authors. Bliukher was more commonly known by his nom de guerre, “Galen.” His name has also been spelled Blyukher and Bluecher in various sources.
19 Ibid., 480.
motives were opportunistic in nature. They also noted the large numbers of “petty armies” which had occupied Guangdong province, and it is likely many of these were comparable to bandits.

In the same document, the Soviet observers also noted the methods by which militarists exercised power:

All these “allies” are ruining the material well-being of [Guangdong] province. Having divided the whole territory into regions, each army strives to get out of them as much as possible. The generals themselves who were allied to Dr. Sun Yat-sen, after enrichment of their armies, become gradually more independent, and, after establishing civil authorities in the regions which are directly subordinated to them, they gradually become actual masters of the province. In consequence of their predatory policy toward the population, the latter began to hate the army itself, as well as the government and the party, under the banner of which these armies were operating.\(^{20}\)

The “predatory policy” practiced by allied militarists prevented income from increasing the revenue of the Kuomintang and instead increased the wealth of allied militarists, who used the money for personal gain. Furthermore, civil authority exercised by allied warlords was in the name of the Kuomintang, which tarnished their image from the viewpoint of the people without benefiting the KMT.

The feeble position of the KMT forced Sun and other KMT leaders to seek different solutions in order to accomplish their goal of reunification. Sun sought to overcome the fact that the KMT was almost entirely reliant on unpredictable allied militarists and mercenaries. Sun’s association with mercenary allies became a liability for him as they sought self-enrichment under the banner of the KMT, simultaneously weakening Sun’s support base and tarnishing the reputation of the KMT. When fickle allies abandoned Sun, the KMT was not only unable to exert any power in its base in Guangdong, its political existence was at risk. Finally, Sun realized that the collapse of the Yuan presidency and the entrenchment of former generals and governors into factionalism caused deep divisions in China. If any military solution were to be used to reunify China, the solution needed to permanently centralize control under the KMT regime. China could not relapse again into military factions as it did under Yuan.

Enter the Soviets

In 1923, Sun and the KMT had re-established power in the province of Guangdong. By then Sun was convinced more than ever of the necessity of national reunification through military means. Sun believed that military force could accomplish his goals where political means were insufficient to prevent the collapse of the Republic of China under Yuan. However, the KMT had no considerable army of its own, and Sun needed funds to raise new troops. The KMT also suffered from the same economic problems as other regions – it was difficult to raise funds for the government, and even more so for military campaigns.

Thus, Sun sought desperately for funds from other sources. Sun had already sold off KMT property in Guangzhou and raised levies, much to the distaste of the Guangzhou merchants. He then turned to external sources. Sun Yat-sen sought assistance from foreign powers, either through direct grants or indirectly through

\(^{20}\) Ibid., 481.
planning aid and technical advisers, and often took advantage of the rivalry foreign powers to extract more funding. However, the major foreign powers did not consider the Kuomintang a viable destination for aid. In an illustrative example, the Washington Naval Conference, held between the US, Britain, France, Japan, Italy, Portugal, Belgium, and Holland, agreed to respect China’s sovereignty under the central Beijing government nominally led at the time by Xu Shichang but under heavy influence from the Zhili clique, not the KMT. Western powers were aware of the political scenario in China and believed that the central Beijing government represented the best bet for reunification. The US, under the Harding administration, believed Sun to be impractical and unscrupulous, especially after he opposed Chinese entrance into WWI on the side of the Allies. Furthermore, the US government refused to recognize loans by private corporations to the KMT since it was not recognized as the government representing China. Although the British were not particularly opposed to the KMT regime, they feared Sun’s revolutionary schemes would further destabilize an already weak China. Furthermore, due to the close proximity of the KMT regime in Canton to Hong Kong, the British were afraid of any possible threats to their prized colony. During the reign of Yuan Shikai, Sun obtained financial aid from the Japanese. The Japanese had hoped that Sun and the KMT would oppose Yuan, who was on poor terms with the Japanese. However, after the fall of Yuan, this aid was discontinued after the Japanese decided to negotiate with the governor-general of northeast China, Zhang Zuolin, as its interests had shifted to Manchuria in the northeast.

Sun then sought aid from the Germans and the Soviets, who were more receptive to his overtures, and felt marginalized in China as they were excluded from the Washington Conference. The Soviet Union viewed the KMT especially favorably, partially due to its ideological potential to support the Communist goal of an international revolution, but also because Stalin believed that the KMT had a fair chance to reunify China. Driven by financial necessity and repeated frustration, Sun began a partnership with the Soviet Union, which offered not only financial support but also military support in terms of armaments and advisers.

In order to understand the presence and motives of the Soviet advisers, it is first necessary to examine Soviet foreign policy beginning in 1917. Lenin, as the leader of the first communist state in history, viewed himself also as the leader of the international communist movement. To accomplish the ultimate goal of overthrowing all capitalist regimes, Lenin believed it was the duty of the Soviet Union, as the “vanguard” communist state, to spread the revolution worldwide and aid the cause of the proletariats internationally. To this end, the Soviet Union established the Communist International (Comintern) in 1919. Comintern was designed to bypass the governments of foreign countries and directly aid revolutionary forces in other countries, so long as they had potential to accomplish a proletarian revolution. Using Comintern, the Soviet Union sent several representatives to negotiate with the Kuomintang as a potential agent of proletarian revolution in China and the international struggle against foreign imperialist powers. Furthermore, from a realist perspective, the Soviets had security and economic interests in the Far East as early as the Qing dynasty, including the Trans-Siberian railroad, the concession at Port Arthur,

21 Spence, *The Search for Modern China*, 380.
22 Bergère, *Sun Yat-Sen*, 300.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid., 300-01.
and the buffer state of Outer Mongolia. Maintaining influence in China became a primary foreign policy concern of the new Soviet government especially since Japan had been rapidly ascending as a regional rival since the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905.

Next, it is necessary to understand why the Soviet Union chose to aid the Kuomintang. Initially, Soviet strategy had hoped for communist revolutions to follow in industrialized nations. When this did not occur, the Soviets sought to enact revolution among non-industrialized nations. The primary agent by which the Soviet government eventually sought to lead a proletarian revolution in China was the Chinese Communist Party. However, in 1920, the CCP was a weak force of approximately 60 revolutionaries with no real political base to speak of. The CCP operated under the guidance of Comintern with policy dictated primarily by the Soviet Union. As part of the greater revolutionary goal, many in the Soviet Union, especially Stalin, believed that they should negotiate and join forces with bourgeois revolutionary forces – a pragmatic short-term tactic – then later infiltrate their ranks and overthrow them from within. As Lenin stated, “The Communist International must enter a temporary alliance with bourgeois-democracy in colonial and backward countries, but not merge with it, and must unconditionally preserve the independence of the proletarian movement even in its most rudimentary form.”

Finally, it is necessary to consider the nature of political education in the Soviet Union as advisers Sneevliet and Joffe might have explained it, since no detailed written accounts exist of their discussions on this matter. The Soviet Union recently emerged from a four year civil war, between 1917 and 1921, in which Bolshevik forces (Reds) fought a coalition of anti-Communist forces (Whites) consisting of the less radical Mensheviks and Social Revolutionaries, foreign troops, and former Tsarists and aristocrats. In a situation resembling the Chinese Revolution of 1911, the Bolsheviks seized power after the fall of the Romanov Tsar and after the February Revolution of 1917 that placed Kerensky in charge of a democratic Provisional Government. However, unlike the Kuomintang which failed to wrest control of the government from Yuan Shikai from 1911 to 1915, the Bolsheviks established and secured power between 1917 and 1921. In light of the similarities between the geopolitical situations of Russian in 1917 and China in 1923, it was not surprising that the Russians recommended their military model as the basis for training the new Kuomintang army. And in light of the Soviet success, Sun viewed this recommendation favorably.

In part because of the experience of the Russian Civil War, the Soviets integrated political indoctrination in military training and party organization. First, Soviet leaders wanted the army to be a “party army” as opposed to an independent professional army.

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26 Today this is simply the country of Mongolia. The term “Outer Mongolia” (wai menggu 外蒙古) is used to differentiate this region from “Inner Mongolia” (nei menggu 内蒙古), which is a province in present day PRC.
27 Bergère, Sun Yat-Sen, 306.
28 This policy led to the First United Front in 1923 between the Chinese Communists and the Nationalists, which the Soviets supported as a result of their own experiences in the Russian Civil War.
30 Wilbur and How, Missionaries of Revolution: Soviet Advisers and Nationalist China 1920-1927, 34. Also see Huangpu Junxiao Shiliao [Huangpu Military Academy Historical Materials], 11. Conversations between Sun and Joffe in 1923 were likewise not recorded, save for one telegram correspondence. Please refer to footnote 40.
31 Suny, The Soviet Experiment: Russia, the Ussr, and the Successor States, 72-73.
It was necessary to subordinate the army to the party and the ideology of Bolshevism, out of fear that the interests of the military or of powerful officers within the military would conflict with the interests of the party. To prevent this, Communist leaders sought to integrate the army within the party apparatus by prioritizing the importance of political criteria for officer promotions and training candidacy and placing civilian authorities within the military structure.33 Second, immediately after the Russian Civil War in 1921, the Red Army consisted of a mixture of former Tsarist officers impressed into service, uneducated peasants, and Communist party members.34 Political education served as a means of unifying the army under a single cause, especially for peasants whom the Communist leadership felt were particularly resistant to conscription.35 Third, political education fit under the agenda of the cultural revolution to educate soldiers to become enlightened citizens of the Soviet state.36

The first contact between Sun Yat-sen and the Comintern representatives began in 1920, when Sun met with Grigori Voitinski. This meeting did not involve detailed discussions for an alliance; Sun merely expressed interest in the Russian Revolution and establishing communications with Moscow.37 But in 1921, Comintern representative Hendricus Sneevliet, also known as Maring, began to discuss Sun’s goals for national reunification. At that point, Sun sought Soviet military interventionin Xinjiang, Mongolia, or Northeast China as part of his national reunification plan.38 The Soviet Union was unwilling to directly intervene by using military force, but instead sought to indirectly support the KMT. Not until January 1923 did the new Soviet representative, Adolf Joffe, and Sun begin to actually discuss the Kuomintang’s military plan for reunification. Sun sent Liao Zhongkai, an important KMT associate of Sun and later member of the Kuomintang Executive Committee, to negotiate with Joffe for several months in Japan. A Japanese newspaper reporter who interviewed Liao in Japan later credited both Liao and Joffe with the drafting of a plan to establish a military academy based upon Trotsky’s academy system in Russia.39 Four months later, in the telegram correspondences between Joffe and Sun, Joffe emphasized the importance of political and ideological indoctrination prior to military action. Joffe agreed to send economic aid to the KMT as well as proposing the establishment of a military school that would prepare “in a political and military sense” the national reunification campaign. Equally important, during the 1923 correspondences it was agreed that Sun would send a delegation of KMT representatives to Moscow to observe the military structure and institutions of the Soviet Union.40 The importance of this delegation will be discussed.

33 It is interesting to note that Trotsky, Commissar of Army and Navy Affairs from 1918-1925, bitterly opposed “doctrinization” of the military and viewed the lack of professionalism in the Red Army with disgust. However, Trotsky was unsuccessful in his efforts at professionalization, which were ultimately ignored after his political demotion in 1925. Roger R. Reese, Red Commanders: A Social History of the Soviet Army Officer Corps, 1918-1991 (Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 2005), 52.
34 Ibid., 28.
38 Bergère, Sun Yat-Sen, 301. See also Wilbur and How, Missionaries of Revolution: Soviet Advisers and Nationalist China 1920-1927, 34.
39 Wilbur also seems to cast some doubt on the accuracy of this fact in the tone of his footnote. He laments that archives of Japanese intelligence, which he confidently states would have monitored the conversations between Liao and Joffe, are not publicly available on this matter. Wilbur and How, Missionaries of Revolution: Soviet Advisers and Nationalist China 1920-1927, 62.
40 Adolf Joffe mentioned this to Sun Yat-sen in a telegram sent May 1, 1923. The telegram was uncovered
later, as it was headed by Chiang Kai-shek, future Superintendent of Whampoa Academy.\footnote{Wilbur and How, \textit{Missionaries of Revolution: Soviet Advisers and Nationalist China 1920-1927}, 87-88.}

\textbf{Considering a Proposition}

Many among the KMT leadership had begun to recognize the need for a new solution in order to fulfill their objective of bringing China under KMT leadership. Beginning in 1920, Zhu Zhixin, one of Sun’s revolutionary collaborators in the KMT, supported the Leninist ideal of the Red Army – an army motivated by a responsibility to an ideology and to a nation. Dai Jitao, another important KMT member, agreed that the existing military in China could not be relied upon for the future China.\footnote{Ibid., 80.} Liao Zhongkai, having negotiated the terms of the KMT-Soviet partnership and the plans for the future Whampoa, was a firm supporter of the alliance. Liao, in one political education speech given at Whampoa, likely in 1924, praised the Soviet Union by remarking that “During the years of the Russian Revolution, [the Russians] were unable to come observe China. Now that Russia’s Revolution has already finished its phase, they specially came to China to see if China has a revolution or not and who are the revolutionaries in China.”\footnote{It is likely that Shih-chen Wang, who mentions that no primary sources exist of the initial proposal for the creation of a military academy, did not read Wilbur’s uncovering in time, as she attributes Wilbur’s finding of the facts to the study by George Yu and not this specific telegram. \textit{Ibid., The Whampoa Military Academy and the Rise of Chiang Kai-Shek}, 12.} Liao painted a picture of a united revolutionary struggle, with the Russians coming to aid the Chinese now that their “phase” had been completed. Liao made this comment with a parallel situation in mind, pointing out the commonalities between the Russian Revolution and the Chinese Revolutions. Liao then blamed the failure of the KMT to secure the Republic of China on “a group of comrades only looking after themselves, not looking after the nation, and individuals who did not have the interest to take action.”\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}} This comment revealed the influence of nationalist ideology, derived from Leninist ideology and party organization, that would later form the bulk of political education curriculum.

Sun, as the leader of the Kuomintang, wielded significant influence. Sun had been known as a fundraiser who sought support regardless of its origins. And the historical record seems to reinforce the notion that Sun accepted and extolled the Soviets after the KMT-Soviet alliance had been formalized. During the inaugural speech of the opening of Whampoa Academy in 1924, at the height of Kuomintang-Soviet cooperation, Sun stated:

\begin{quote}
Six years ago, during the European War, in a neighboring country, a country larger than China, a country that shares a border of more than ten thousand li with China and that touches both Asia and Europe, a revolution broke out some six years after our revolution. What country was this? It was Russia. Despite the fact that the Russian Revolution took place six years after that of
\end{quote}

\footnote{\textit{Ibid.}, 80.}
China, they have thoroughly succeeded in obtaining revolutionary results.45

In this comparison between the revolutionary experiences of China and Russia, Sun was making an implicit suggestion that the Soviet Union would provide the roadmap for the Kuomintang’s future success. The success of the Bolsheviks in securing their regime was what mattered, and the Kuomintang would follow that same strategy.

Sun’s ideology, embodied in the Three Principles of the People (sanminzhuyi 三民主義), would become the form and content of political training at Whampoa. Before the arrival and influence of Soviet Advisers, the Three Principles was a vision, first emerging in 1905, for the future formation of a united, nationalist China, largely in response to the inability of the Qing dynasty to effectively govern China and oppose foreign aggression. The Three Principles were nationalism (minzuzhuyi 民族主義), democracy (minquanzhuyi 民權主義), and livelihood of the people (minshengzhuyi 民生主義). Its importance was emphasized by Sun in both the Revolutionary Alliance and the Kuomintang. In understanding the thought behind the Three Principles, one can understand Sun’s views on the problems of Chinese society – and more importantly, his prescription to cure its malaise. Of the Three Principles, the first two, nationalism and democracy formed the basis of and spoke of the necessity for political indoctrination.

Nationalism in the early expositions of the Three Principles meant the overthrow of the Qing dynasty and its Manchu rulers, whom Sun had considered foreign barbarians that caused the downfall of China. However, because nationalism at first mainly advocated the goal of overthrowing the Manchus, Sun rarely mentioned nationalism during his speeches after the goal was accomplished in 1912. However, by the early 1920s, nationalism once again returned to the forefront, and it had incorporated a Marxist-Leninist understanding of anti-imperialism. Marie-Claire Bergère makes the observation that Sun only began to re-address nationalism as one of Three Principles after negotiations began with Joffe and Borodin.46 Sun believed then that foreign powers practiced economic imperialism in China by controlling its exchange rates, seizing of the Maritime Customs Service, and granting special privileges for foreign companies.47 Thus, the content of the Three Principles had changed after the KMT-Soviet alliance to include a markedly Marxist-Leninist position of expelling foreign imperialist powers.

Democracy refers to Sun’s belief in a constitutional republic over other forms of government, such as enlightened despotism or authoritarianism. While it would not appear democracy as a principle applied to military training, Sun described democracy as the solution to the “loose sand” problem.48 Sun believed that the problem with Chinese society was not that it suffered from the tyranny of the state. Rather, its problem was the opposite – “Every person does as he pleases and has let his individual liberty extend to all phases of life, hence China is but a lot of separate sand particles.”49 Sun believed that discipline and unity was necessary in order to bring national strength: “If we add cement to the loose sand, it will harden into a firm body like a rock, in which

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46 Bergère, Sun Yat-Sen, 360.
47 Ibid., 361.
48 Ibid., 371.
the sand, however, has no freedom.” He supported the rights of a state over those of the individual. The aversion to individual liberty and the danger of disunity later became a common theme throughout the content of political education speeches given by Chiang Kai-shek in the first several classes of Whampoa. To this end, Sun outlined the stages by which national reunification would follow. First, a military government would flush out the old elements and suppress counter-revolutionaries. Then, the government would begin a transition to a republican government while educating the people in the principles of democracy. This progression where a military government would lead a revolution until a time was appropriate to transition into a democratic republic was strikingly similar to the Leninist process for revolution led by the vanguard party, and in fact later became emphasized during the KMT-Soviet alliance.

From the Three Principles, one reason for the implementation of political education was apparent – the ideology itself necessitated that it be instructed to the Chinese people. There was no reason, from Sun’s perspective, to treat Whampoa cadets any differently. The graduates of Whampoa would serve as officers of the Kuomintang army. Thus, they were carrying out Sun’s principle of nationalism in uniting the nation and driving out the foreigners. The planners of Whampoa recruited from twenty-one provinces throughout China for the first class, and would expand recruitment to twenty-six provinces and three foreign nations, including Korea, Singapore, and Vietnam, by the fifth class. These cadets did not arrive politically motivated with a revolutionary agenda like the radical students and intellectuals that constituted the Nationalist Party – recruits were mostly simply seeking a wage and a living. Ideology became ever more important as a means to bind the cadets to the cause of the Kuomintang.

Sun’s opinion became clear in 1924, during the inaugural speech given at the opening of Whampoa Academy, he explained:

[The revolution of 1911] was only partially successful...Later there was no revolutionary army to continue the goals of the revolutionary party, and therefore, although there was a partial success, warlords and bureaucrats continue today to usurp the power of the Chinese Republic...Our hope [in starting this school] is that from today on we will be able to remake our revolutionary enterprise and use the students of this school as the foundation of a revolutionary army....With such excellent cadres as soldiers of the revolutionary army, our revolutionary enterprise will definitely succeed.  

When the planning of Whampoa Academy was completed and formally launched, Sun believed he finally had built the revolutionary army he needed to eliminate the warlord-led factions and reunify China. From Sun’s speeches, it appeared that Sun was primarily concerned with reunification. Above everything else, the Kuomintang needed to retake China militarily.

It is difficult to deny the changes that Sun made in his interpretations of the

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50 Ibid.
51 Bergère, Sun Yat-Sen, 379.
52 These were Hebei, Shandong, Shanxi, Henan, Shaanxi, Gansu, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Hubei, Hunan, Sichuan, Fujian, Guangdong, Guangxi, Yunnan, Guizhou, Jilin, Heilongjiang, and Mongolia in the first class. By the fifth class, cadets from Liaoning, Ha’erbing, Rehe, Suiyuan, and Taiwan provinces, as well as Korea, Singapore, and Vietnam, had been recruited. Huangpu junxiao Shiliao [Huangpu Military Academy Historical Materials], 93.
53 Sun, “Sun Yat-Sen Opens the Whampoa Academy, 1924,” 80.
Three Principles of the People from before Soviet involvement to the height of KMT-Soviet cooperation. Sun’s Three Principles began to closely mirror Marxist and Leninist arguments for revolutionary action, and his speeches demonstrated his belief in the Soviet experience and his support for the Soviet model of party-military organization. Furthermore, Sun was a pragmatist who always kept his ultimate goal of reunification as his highest priority. Having been pushed to the Soviets as a last resort, it is very likely he embraced Soviet advice as much out of necessity as anything else.

Chiang Kai-shek, future Commander-in-Chief of the National Revolutionary Army and future President of the Republic of China, played an important role in the implementation of political indoctrination. Understanding his later beliefs and actions first requires an examination his own military training and experience. Chiang himself came from a military background similar to other high ranking generals of his age in the KMT. In 1906, he was admitted to a military academy at Baoding in Zhili, predecessor to the Baoding Military Academy (baoding junxiao 保定軍校), a Western-styled military academy fashioned by Yuan Shikai.54 Baoding included Japanese military instructors, who themselves had been influenced by German military training in the late 19th century.55 In 1907 Chiang was selected among the Baoding graduates to continue military training in Japan, where he attended the Shimbu Gakko, Preparatory Military Academy, for two years.56

After participating in the 1911 revolution, Chiang returned to Japan where he published articles in a military science magazine, Junsheng Zazhi, between 1912 and 1914.57 He wrote about the problems of armies from political and social aspects. In China, it was relatively easy to conscript troops and obtain arms, but after conflicts were resolved, armies could not be disbanded easily as veterans had difficulty reintegrating into civilian life. He analyzed the potentials of reintegration into the civilization population, continued maintenance of armies at full strength, transfer to border duties, and employment of soldiers for non-military, public development projects.58 Later these considerations would prove to be important as Chiang influenced political education in Whampoa Military Academy and its implication for the future of China. If an army were to be raised for the purpose of national reunification, ideally it would be done in a way that allowed for all of the above possibilities, including disbandment and reintegration into civilian society. A political indoctrination with a nationalist ideology similar to the Western military strategy of a citizen army levée en masse would have achieved this goal.59 But, like Sun and other nationalists, Chiang feared the power of military governors to challenge central authority and weaken national power. He noted that when civil authorities wielded military authority as well, they ruled as virtual warlords, causing fragmentation that would prevent central rule.60 He emphasized the importance of splitting civil and military – in Whampoa, this became manifested in the political doctrine of devoting oneself, by self-sacrifice and denying one’s own freedoms and desires, to the nationalistic Three Principles of the People, and not to statesmen.

55 Ibid., 14.
56 Ibid.
57 Ibid., 26.
58 Ibid., 27.
60 Tong, Chiang Kai-Shek: Soldier and Statesman, 29.
In August 1923, Chiang Kai-shek, under instructions from Sun Yat-sen, travelled with a KMT delegation to Moscow to observe military organization. There, he studied the Soviet military model and discussed plans for establishing a military academy to train officers for the Kuomintang Army.\(^{61}\) The report Chiang made upon his return to Guangzhou was not publicized, although it is believed that Chiang had developed an appreciation of the party-state Soviet model.\(^{62}\) However, Chiang also emphasized his dislike of the Russians for what he perceived as replacing the philosophies of Sun Yat-sen, whom Chiang considered the father of China, with a Marxist-Leninist interpretation of the KMT ideology.\(^{63}\)

Meanwhile, during the 7th session of the Provisional Central Executive Committee of the Kuomintang on November 19, 1923, plans to establish a military training system were drawn up, including ten instructors who would teach both military skills and party ideology.\(^{64}\) On December 9, Liao Zhongkai announced the initial steps of the creation of the new party army to the Central Cadre Council. The First National Congress of the KMT then passed the resolution establishing a military academy on January 20, 1924.\(^{65}\) Shortly after Chiang’s return to Canton, on January 24, Sun appointed Chiang to head the Preparatory Committee for the new military academy. Just a month later on February 21, 1924, Chiang abruptly departed from Canton for Shanghai, leaving Liao Zhongkai in charge of the committee.\(^{66}\) Considering the time spent with Joffe by Liao in Japan during which they supposedly discussed the military system of the Soviet Union, as well as considering Chiang’s absence in the Preparatory Committee, it is likely that Liao lent support to the importance of political indoctrination as one of the foundations of military training. However, effects of both the departure of Chiang and the position of Liao are disputed.\(^{67}\) Liao was also appointed as the Party Representative at Whampoa Academy, who was officially only directly responsible to the Central Executive Committee, not the Superintendent.\(^{68}\) This organizational structure, with the party exercising direct authority at the top of the academy hierarchy, was derived directly from the Soviet model of party representatives and civilian control of military affairs. Upon his return a few months later, Chiang was appointed Superintendent of Whampoa Academy, the highest military rank in the Academy.

Chiang’s speeches appear to lend support for implementing political training. Like Sun, Chiang had recognized the fundamental problems posed by warlords to the future prospect of a centralized regime. If regional governors retained their military powers, they would always remain a threat to a central government. Thus, Chiang would have recognized the potential in training future military leaders to be loyal to an ideology as opposed to a person. Chiang also brought military analysis beyond Sun’s considerations by recognizing the social problem of military reintegration into society.

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\(^{61}\) Ibid., 74, 77.


\(^{64}\) Wang, "The Whampoa Military Academy and the Rise of Chiang Kai-Shek", 12.

\(^{65}\) Landis, "Institutional Trends at the Whampoa Military School: 1924-1926", 22.

\(^{66}\) Wilbur mentions that reasons for Chiang’s departure are unclear. Possibilities include Chiang’s suspicions over the motives of the Communist advisers, problems over financial funding, or that Sun would choose another candidate to head the Academy over Chiang. Wilbur and How, *Missionaries of Revolution: Soviet Advisers and Nationalist China 1920-1927*, 96.

\(^{67}\) Landis, "Institutional Trends at the Whampoa Military School: 1924-1926", 23.

\(^{68}\) Wang, "The Whampoa Military Academy and the Rise of Chiang Kai-Shek", 39. See also Williamsen, "Political Training and Work at the Whampoa Military Academy Prior to the Northern Expedition", 36.
The secondary effect of a political curriculum using the Three Principles of the People was that the Three Principles also emphasized civil aspects, not just military aspects. Therefore, in the event of disbandment of soldiers, veterans could, theoretically, continue to support the revolutionary ideals of the Three Principles.

Speeches given by Chiang after his appointment at Whampoa restate his support for the importance of political ideology. The actual content of political indoctrination was intended to be delivered by the “experts” of KMT ideology, including Wang Jingwei, Hu Hanmin, and Shao Yuanchong. However, their importance in KMT affairs as members or substitute members of the Central Executive Committee often pulled them away from their political education duties at Whampoa, and, in fact, left Chiang as the primary instructor in political education.⁶⁹ Richard Landis divides Chiang’s speeches into two themes: unified spirit and organization, and the political weakness of China and ways to combat disunity from Chinese and Russian experiences.⁷⁰ The first theme stressed that Chinese people could not oppose their oppressors, who were military men and entirely unproductive in the sense that they did not contribute any economic value to society. Instead, Chiang urged Whampoa graduates to have a meaningful outlook on society, to act under discipline, and in unified spirit, purpose, and organization. Spirit meant fighting with a willingness to die, to sacrifice one’s freedoms for one’s cause, and a love for one’s comrades.⁷¹ By 1925, spirit also included adopting the Three Principles of the People and communism and abandoning everything else.⁷² Unified organization meant leading troops, attending to orders, as well as personal hygiene, which Chiang considered a sign of professionalism.⁷³ The second theme elaborated on the traditional organizational weakness of the Chinese and, in contrast to that, the strength of certain Chinese and Russian experiences. The weaknesses were the lack of national organization, absence of organized and disciplined political parties, and the presence of territorial warlord armies. To combat these weaknesses, Chiang advocated looking to Confucian, Buddhist, and Daoist principles of sacrifice and self-denial, and upholding a traditional view of relationships, i.e. between family and teachers.⁷⁴

Chiang’s speeches reflected many aspects of Sun’s thoughts. Unified spirit was an extension of one of Sun’s Three Principles and an important theme seen throughout

⁶⁹ Williamsen, "Political Training and Work at the Whampoa Military Academy Prior to the Northern Expedition", 64-65. See also Wang, "The Whampoa Military Academy and the Rise of Chiang Kai-Shek", 36-37. Williamsen has argued that, due to the lack of effort on the part of the political education department, political education as attempted by the planners of Whampoa was a failure. However, he clearly believes that political indoctrination among Whampoa graduates was a success as evidenced by the emergence of the “Whampoa spirit,” the high morale among Whampoa graduates, that subsequently led to success on the battlefield in the two Eastern Expeditions of 1925 and Northern Expedition from 1926 to 1928. It is also ironic that the “political education” aimed to instill loyalty among the cadets to the nationalistic cause of the Kuomintang instead resulted in instilling loyalty to the Superintendent, Chiang, when he took on the role of the political instructor. While the question of the success of Whampoa cadets in wartime certainly is of great importance to scholarship in Republican-era China, it is unfortunately outside the scope of this paper, and furthermore already the subject of many publications. See Jui-te Chang, “Nationalist Army Officers During the Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1945,” Modern Asian Studies 30, no. 4 (1996).

⁷⁰ Both Landis and Williamsen provide detailed analyses of nearly every speech given by Chiang at Whampoa.


⁷² The inclusion of communism as a part of “unified spirit” demonstrated the importance of the First United Front as Chiang sought to stop the growing polarization between Nationalist cadets and Communist cadets.


⁷⁴ Ibid., 139-42.
the speeches of all the Kuomintang political instructors. In both themes, Chiang stressed the problems that militarism posed for Chinese society and aimed to instill an aversion to regionalism among Whampoa cadets. Also like Sun, Chiang emphasized the importance of the Russian revolutionary experience and the potential for the Chinese to learn from it. These speeches reinforce the likelihood that Chiang had supported the implementation of political indoctrination as first introduced by the Soviets.

Conclusion

In 1924, the KMT-Soviet alliance directly contributed to the implementation of a political education program that emphasized characteristics of loyalty to a political ideology and a party representative system exercising control over the military training. The timing of Soviet involvement, with the reorganization of the KMT and the push for a revolutionary army just after the 1921 negotiations between Sun and Sneevliet and the 1923 negotiations between Sun and Joffe, is consistent with the origination of political indoctrination from Soviet advisers. Based on the changes to the Three Principles over the course of the KMT-Soviet alliance that began to reflect a Leninist influence, Sun viewed the Soviet system of political indoctrination as a useful means of ensuring loyalty among the new KMT army to his ultimate goal. Furthermore, Sun was a pragmatic negotiator and was always concerned with his his ultimate goal of reunifying China under KMT control -- it is likely under these circumstances he was content to adopt Soviet methods in order to guarantee Soviet financial and technical aid. Political education did not draw any objections from Chiang, who actually took the primary role as political educator during his tenure as Superintendent. His writings and speeches seem to reinforce an implicit acceptance of Leninist military organization and the importance of nationalist doctrine to military training. Other actors in the KMT, such as Liao Zhongkai, Zhu Zhixin, and Dai Jitao, had already enthusiastically supported adopting a Soviet model for the KMT military.

The reasons behind the adoption of political indoctrination become clear once the benefits of instilling a political belief are considered. Sun, Chiang, Liao, and others within the KMT ultimately had the power to implement political indoctrination. Given the problems China suffered under warlord-led factions and the problems that the KMT itself experienced with ideological legitimacy, political education seemed like an effective method of forging a reliable army to accomplish Sun’s goal of national reunification by military force under Nationalist rule.

Although a rift between the Chinese Communists and the KMT, followed later by the violent purge of Communists in the White Terror of 1927, ended the Second United Front, Stalin and the Soviets would later continue to support the KMT regime. By 1928, Chiang Kai-shek had seized power within the KMT, effectively establishing himself as the heir to Sun Yat-sen, and the Northern Expedition achieved the KMT’s goal of military unification. Former governor-generals pledged their allegiance to the Chiang’s new KMT regime and a strong, unified China. Chiang formally announced the new Republic of China government at its new capital in Nanjing. With the establishment of the new seat of power, Whampoa Academy was also formally relocated to Nanjing in 1928, ending this chapter of history.

75 It is also interesting to note that Chiang includes some of his own unique insight, such as expanding unified spirit for military application (under “unified organization”) and the inclusion of traditional religious doctrines of self-sacrifice and a Confucian outlook on social relationships.
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Becoming Taiwanese: Between Legacy and Memory of the Colonial Past and Their Political Manipulation

Alessandro Tiberio

Abstract

An analysis of the Japanese colonial experience in Taiwan and its legacy and memory today can answer questions about the possible future for the island’s sovereignty and identity. Messages from those years echo in today’s narratives, notably in the manipulation of collective memory towards political ends by competing parties since the advent of democratization on Taiwan.

For the island’s inhabitants, the colonial past itself has determined a troubled relationship with Chinese Mainlanders – a conflict lying between assimilation and independence, in limbo between contrasting nationalisms. Yet it must be underscored that ‘Japaneseness’ in post-War Taiwan did not actually signify the acquisition of an exclusively Japanese identity, but the recognition of Japanese cultural and political influence in shaping an emerging Taiwanese identity and nationalism.

Repressed in the martial law years, Taiwanese collective memory of the colonial past translates today to claims for a distinctive island-based identity shaped by social experience. Though this strategy was employed by the independentist Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in its early days, it is undermined today by the necessity of converging toward the political center in order to gain the support of swing voters, hence the partial dismissal of the issue even in recent DPP mainstream political rhetoric. Still, explicit or implicit reference to Taiwan’s peculiar history as a whole – prior to and post 1945 – will continue to substantiate the claims of those upholding an island-based identity, increasingly recognized by both Kuomintang (KMT) and DPP, by ethnic Taiwanese and Mainlanders alike.

Introduction

The Japanese colonial period was an indelible experience in Taiwanese history, not only in terms of historical legacy, but also for its deep impact on the development of Taiwanese nationalism and a distinctive Taiwanese identity. The interplay between collective memory and political manipulation determines what matters and what does not in the realm of historical legacy. Ultimately, the whole experience of Japanese colonialism can be placed at the center of the political debate and emphasized in retrieving collective memory, or otherwise completely ignored, according to the interests and purposes hiding behind electoral speeches today and revolutionary messages in the past.

Taiwan occupies a unique position in the ‘Greater China’ framework, in international affairs of the East Asian region and in global power games. Having been returned to China after fifty years of Japanese colonial inter-regnum (1895-1945) and having survived the Chinese Civil War as an enclave of Nationalism thanks to American intervention, it has represented -- and to a certain extent still represents -- an outpost of anti-Communism and has been entangled in global ideological struggles for decades. In the context of the Chinese-speaking world, the ideological confrontation has translated
-- and according to some still translates -- into an arm-wrestling match for exclusive legitimacy in governing China, between the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in Beijing and the Kuomintang (KMT) in Taipei.

Since the 1980s, the advent of democracy on Taiwan allowed for the institutionalization of the clandestine tangwai (黨外; pinyin: dāngwài; literally, "outside the party") pro-independence movement into the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which today represents the second largest political party in the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan. With the emergence of an opposition advocating the detachment of Taiwan from its alleged Chineseness and promoting a separate Taiwanese identity, the political struggle soon verged on the question of independence against unification and addressed primarily issues of identity (see Kang 2007, 102 or Wachman 1994, 255). In other words, the new debate was based on arguments favoring, at one end of the spectrum, an allegedly unchallenged Chinese identity, or at the other encouraging an authentic Taiwanese one, without forgetting all the possible combinations of elements of Chineseness and Taiwanese identity. Emphasis on the former would make re-unification with the mainland inevitable, while the latter would promote Taiwanese nationalism and in turn trigger mechanisms possibly intended to achieve formal independence for the island.¹

In the last fifteen years, the KMT and the DPP each developed its own identity policy. For the former, past president Lee Teng-hui advanced the claim of a ‘New Taiwanese’ identity shared by all the inhabitants of the island, leading its party to short-term victories but leaving the debate open to different interpretations. In regards to the DPP policy, former president Chen Shui-bian aimed at the re-appropriation of Taiwanese history by de-sinifying the island’s identity, yet his mistake was not to target the whole population of the island but only already recognizable ethnic Taiwanese groups (for the KMT see Lee 1999a, 192-94, and 1999b, 9; for the DPP see Chen 2002, 9 and 69). Thus if both so far failed to gather a wide consensus, the debate over alleged ‘Chineseness’ and ‘Taiwanese identity’ is still in continuing evolution and draws from contrasting versions of history.² As a matter of fact, it is clear that when discussing identities one could argue anything and the contrary of anything, which is why political rhetoric enjoys great leverage in the manipulation of collective memory.

It is exactly in this struggle that social experience comes into play. The fifty years of Japanese domination can be used instrumentally in constructing political rhetoric: in the evolution of identity for the peoples of Taiwan and the possible development of a distinctive ‘Taiwanese’ one, the historical experience of the island matters. In fact, the memory and legacy of the Japanese colonial experience can be underscored to promote the peculiarity of Taiwanese history, as one not shared with the

¹ The possibility that Chinese and Taiwanese identities might co-exist in contemporary Taiwan must be considered. The study carried out by the Election Study Center at National Chengchi University in 2005 portrays people’s choices in terms of identity as shifting dramatically from June 1992 to December 2005. ‘Chinese’ alone plummeted from 26.2 to 7.3 while ‘Taiwanese’ alone jumped from 17.3 to 46.5. Yet the category ‘both Chinese and Taiwanese’ remained very significant, although in slight decline, from an aggregation of 45.4% to 42.0 (as in Shubert 2008, 112). These data suggest the complexity of the Taiwanese situation, where the picture is not all black and white (or blue and green, the colors of the KMT and DPP respectively), but the entanglement of different forms of nationalisms creates nuanced shades at the meeting point between contrasting versions of nationalisms and identities.

² ‘History’ with a capital initial refers here to subjective versions of history. Even better and more appropriately to the Taiwanese case, the term ‘narratives of unfolding’ seems appropriate to this study. It shall be intended here in Stevan Harrell and Melissa Brown’s terms: ‘narratives of unfolding attempt to selectively shape our understanding of the past for political purposes. Their authors may call these narratives history, but they are in fact constructed ideologies’ (Brown 2004, 5-7 and also Harrell, 1996).
mainland or with the Mainlanders who arrived on the island after the end of the Civil War. On the other hand, others could easily claim that that experience allowed for the reinforcement of Chinese nationalism on the island while separated from the Fatherland (Ching 2001, 72-73). The intersection of these manipulations of memory within the political game in a democratic Taiwan appears to be an interesting possible explanation of its dynamics. Bridging the gap between history and contemporary politics is thus one of the main aims of this study.

1945 and the period immediately after Taiwan’s retrocession to China emerge as a key moment for the development of a Taiwanese identity, as the watershed between the (colonial) experience of Japanese rule and the (colonial?) rule of the Mainlanders represented by Chiang Kai-shek’s KMT. In 1947, the ‘228’ rebellion against KMT domination revealed the frustration of Taiwanese hopes for what they had idealized as a joyous reunification with China. This frustration was maybe an early fruit of nostalgia for the Japanese period, but definitely partly an effect of colonial legacies. Steven Philipps interestingly argues that the relationship between native Taiwanese and colonial Japan was replicated after retrocession with the KMT (Philipps 2003, 3 and 14). The assertion of unique Taiwanese experience prevented a harmonious integration in both the Japanese and Chinese nations: Being part of the Chinese cultural world hindered the process of ‘becoming Japanese’ (Ching 2001) and for the inhabitants of the island the Japanese colonial experience itself determined a troubled relationship with the Chinese mainland after 1945.

As a matter of fact, the years immediately following retrocession proved determinant for the development of a ‘Taiwanese’ consciousness. In light of an undeniable historical legacy of Japanese colonialism and the indelible mark left on the islanders’ collective memory, meaningful messages from those years echo in today’s narratives.

Legacy and Memory of the Colonial Past

Robert Edmondson considers the dichotomy between past and present to be unavoidable even when attempting to emphasize continuity in historical trends and consequential relations between the ‘objective truth’ of the past and today’s aspirations (Edmondson 2002, 34). I cannot deny this inescapable dichotomy, yet bridging the gap between history and contemporary politics without falling into the ‘politically charged process of historical interpretation’ is not impossible. Completely objective reconstruction is clearly a myth that should serve more as an inspirational guideline than a predetermined goal, since biases are given constants in choosing fields of analysis, sources, down to the selection of every single word. And this is as true in academia as it is in politics. Therefore, the attempt to create a direct connection between ostensibly objective history and contemporary consciousness as expressed in political dynamics is a dangerous game, but it becomes possible by giving voice to contrasting interpretations and researching consequential linkages rather than assessing who is allegedly right and wrong.

Playing this bridging game between past and present becomes necessary in explaining today and in understanding yesterday alike. In fact, if today’s circumstances are a product of historical trends, past events are not meaningful only at a given time.

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3 ‘Mainlanders’, here and elsewhere, is appropriately spelled with a capital initial since it represents not only the people migrating to Taiwan from the Chinese mainland, but also a specific group in post-1949 Taiwanese society, as will be seen below.

4 Nicknamed ‘228’ since it took place in Taipei, Taiwan, on February 28, 1947.
and place: understanding yesterday means locating it in the stream of consciousness linking thought to action, action to thought, thought to thought. The tangible legacy of the past is the direct expression of this underlying current, making it so that ‘yesterday’ is only completed ‘today’.

In the context of Japanese colonialism and Taiwanese consciousness, the legacy of the former affected the conception of the latter operating through considerations on material interest and dialectic power struggles. The link between actual experience and its reconstruction lies in individual and ultimately collective memory. This process stems from subjective versions of colonial legacy and creates in turn malleable versions of collective consciousness. Therefore the first step is exploring the actual meaning of the colonial experience, mediating between the contrasting accounts of its history.

Clearly, the perception of Japanese colonization in Taiwan varies not only according to individual experiences, but also to the timeframe taken into account. From the late colonial period to Retrocession and KMT rule, varying circumstances shaped perceptions in a determinant fashion. In fact, oppression and discrimination as experienced before 1945 can be replaced by memories of welfare and modernity under Japanese rule in the context of post-1945 sentiments of nostalgia. Among others, Shelley Rigger reminds us of how the Taiwanese impatiently awaited retrocession but then were left with nothing but bitter disappointment after it finally happened, and seems to emphasize the disillusionment coming with retrocession and then conveyed in the explosion of the 228 anti-KMT rebellion in 1947 (Rigger 1999, 55-57). First of all, the reasons behind the eager awaiting of retrocession should be considered: Did Japanese colonialism induce nothing but frustration? Was retrocession deemed the only solution? The Taiwanese case definitely offers more complexity than that.

The Mirage of Complete Assimilation

As the first colony acquired by Japan in 1895 in the course of its race to modernity and equality with the West, Taiwan was controlled according to a traditional, militarized and top-down pattern of domination, with the installment of a Japanese ruling elite at the top and very limited inclusion of local figures in the colonial government. Colonialism for Japan meant fulfillment of economic needs, prestige and power, but was also part of a designed race towards modernity and catching up with the Western Powers already governing vast colonial empires. So if initial phases of Japanese colonialism can definitely be described as ‘adoptive’ of a Western model, later on an ‘adaptive’ side will emerge. Peculiar local circumstances and a changed international setting will in fact require an ‘adaptive’ attitude, seen in the implementation of changes to the previous model in order to acquire or maintain control (such as real or fictitious power sharing, reform government patterns or create ad-hoc political institutions). In the evolution of the Japanese model of colonialism,

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5 See in this sense the case of Korea, where locals were later partially admitted to the upper levels of government. Furthermore, a wider comparison to British India, American Philippines, Dutch Indochina or French Indochina reveals how, at least at an initial phase, the Japanese model of colonialism did not allow a great deal of power sharing (refer to Katz 2005, 31).

6 We might consider the possibility that Japanese colonialism, adopted as a Western pattern in the context of Japan’s project of modernization, might as well become a model for modernity paving the way to XX century’s neocolonialism and informal imperialism. The case of Manchukuo is emblematic: the institutions regulating fictitious independence concealed the ‘long hand’ of Tokyo’s imperialism. Also, in the context of contemporary globalization, multinational corporations could be nothing but descendants of the South Manchuria Railway Company and the like, also to the extent to which entanglement in one country’s internal affairs is perpetuated even after its formal liberation from colonial rule (for patterns of
Korea and Manchuria in its later stages testify to the development of an ‘adaptive’ form of imperialism, yet Taiwan can be seen as a colony in the most traditional sense of the term.\(^7\)

If colonialism ensured economic and military expansion for Japan, for Taiwan it primarily meant detachment from the Chinese nation, economic and social development, due to its exposure to Japanese modernity. Further, it led to a complication of the island’s identity: differences between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait existed already before 1895, by virtue for instance of Dutch colonialism on the island and the Ming loyalist regime of Zheng Cheng-gong\(^8\), but were exacerbated and expanded exponentially. From the moment it was incorporated in the Japanese Empire, Taiwan would never be the same again.

Japanese colonialism in Taiwan was guided by a rhetoric of integration starting from \textit{doka} (or assimilation) and reaching \textit{kominka} (or imperialization). In cross-cultural encounters, the adoption of some of the dominators’ cultural features by the weak or subjugated is a common process, which we can refer to as acculturation. Assimilation comes generally at a second stage, and implies a change of identity, in this sense an alleged shift from Chinese to Japanese.\(^9\) The idea of \textit{kominka} takes assimilation one step further, implying the interiorization of this change of identity to the point of being willing to fight, in this case, for the interests of Japan, in the name of the Japanese Emperor, ‘as Japanese’ (see Kerr 1974, 162 and Ching 2001, 90-97).

\textit{Kominka} was the official Japanese policy, justifying the delay in incorporating Taiwanese leaders in their ruling scheme and in allowing greater autonomy to the colony, with the claim that the process of assimilation was not completed yet. Yet this policy differs both from the actual Japanese plans and from the islanders’ actual perception of it. Explaining their imperial project with arguments supporting ‘Pan-Asianism’ and the union of Asian peoples under Japanese guidance, Tokyo pursued its national economic interest and responded to internal demands for modern development and recognition of the country as a Great Power in the global arena (see Kerr 1974, 190 and 199-200). Yet rhetoric justified their expansionism in terms of ‘Asia for the Asiatics’ and dreams of a ‘Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere’, and this translated to a promise of Taiwan’s incorporation not only in the Japanese Empire, but ultimately also in the Japanese nation. The mirage of complete assimilation was advertised chiefly to induce loyalty to Tokyo’s rule, and delay the conferral of greater autonomy and prevent pushes towards independence.

In an era when China stagnated and Japan represented the Asian model for modern development, the acquisition of a Japanese identity was certainly desirable for some Taiwanese. This was true especially for those among the educated and wealthy elites who had a chance to attend college in Japan or sometimes even to advance to prestigious posts in the colonial administration. It is undeniable that cooperation alone would grant substantial material benefits and that both the Japanese and Taiwanese elites shared legitimate concerns for a violent radicalization of the island’s political

\(^7\) Changes to the pattern of government with the partial inclusion of local elites and extension of privileges will be implemented only at the very end of the colonial period in Taiwan, well into the Pacific War years (see for instance the reforms in educational policies as described by Philips 2003, 21).

\(^8\) For a detailed account of the history of Taiwan in the XVII and XVIII centuries, see Shepherd (1993).

\(^9\) In the XIX century it is definitely too early to talk about a distinctive Taiwanese identity, hence the key role played by the Japanese colonial experience and the correspondent exposure to modernity in awakening a Taiwanese consciousness.
scene. Yet discrimination was evident in most circumstances – as seen below – and full social acceptance was for the Taiwanese nothing more than an unsatisfied ambition. When Philipps talks about the ambivalence of the Taiwanese position towards Japan during the colonial period, lying between assimilation and independence, it appears clear that most islanders did not want to or realized they did not have an actual chance to become Japanese. Skepticism towards assimilation resulted in the preference for a middle-way solution: not claiming independence but at the same time demanding greater autonomy (Philipps 2003, 23-35).

In Limbo Between Contrasting Nationalisms

From the side of the colonizers there was a clear interest in keeping the Taiwanese in this limbo halfway between independence and complete assimilation, preventing at the same time the penetration of Chinese nationalism, the formation of Taiwanese nationalism and an authentic inclusion in Japanese nationalism. If it is true that Japanese-led development benefited the island’s economy, it is also true that the integration of Taiwan in the cycle of Japanese capitalist production was primarily intended to support Tokyo’s wealth and power ambitions. If we can see how Taiwan distanced mainland China in the race towards modernity thanks to injections of Japanese capital and to the colonial establishment of effective laws and institutions, we cannot turn a blind eye to the real interests Japan had in managing an ordered colony and in exploiting local labor-force, preventing both economic and political power from falling in the hands of the colonized. If Japan became the main market for goods produced on the island and Tokyo tied its colonial subjects to the home islands economically, but also militarily, politically and culturally, full integration of the colonial subjects in the Japanese Nation would remain a mirage.

Assimilation was nonetheless deemed necessary to ensure loyalty, and it is easy to understand how this process, as the Japanese intended it and maneuvered it, had to start from school-age children. An instrumental use of the educational system was the key for building a durable and reliable base of loyal colonial subjects. Also in the context of colonialism, education is an investment for the future. So instruction in social and literary studies was discouraged in favor of formation of skilled laborers: a technical education could provide manpower for the local economy in collaboration with the colonial plan of development, whereas a preparation in liberal arts or social sciences could form potential subversive thinkers. Ultimately, education was used as a means to ensure the perpetuation of the established order, with the Japanese colonizers at the top and the Taiwanese subjects at the bottom end of the hierarchy reinforcing colonial order (Tsurumi 1984, 308-9).

Therefore, although the most talented were admitted to prestigious imperial institutions, the bias in favor of Japanese applicants was unambiguous in schools as in employment opportunities. Although some were even educated in Japan and given an

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10 In this sense, analogies with the local attitude towards Mainland China will be explored further below.
11 With reference to the attitude adopted by colonial Japan, it is interesting to note how anti-Taiwanese discrimination continued well after 1945 in the home islands, where Japanese and ethnic minorities lived side by side for instance in the arena of the black market. Yet as Dower tells us nationality and inter-racial relationships were then taken for granted (Dower 2000, 143-147). Conversely, in colonial Taiwan they were re-negotiated on a daily basis.
12 In Tom Gold’s words, a form of ‘dependent capitalism’ was installed (Gold 1986, 36-40).
13 If a modern local entrepreneurial class managed to emerge – although marginally – in Taiwan, we can see how in Korea it completely failed to develop (Peattie 1984, 38).
illusion of full integration, the system merely formed a collaborative Taiwanese elite who could be more easily controlled from the top. Although by the end of the colonial period literacy rates had dramatically increased and the children attending school were of the vast majority, we can cynically assert the necessarily instrumental use of education by colonial authorities, striving to maintain firm control. Finally, although Chinese language soon became an optional subject, the Japanese language might have substituted for it as the language of the educated but not as the only one spoken in the streets, in which Taiwanese dialects survived and flourished.

It is clear that de-sinicization did not correspond to full Japanization. Rather, parallel to a process of limited and questionable Japanization, an island-based consciousness was emerging. This became evident at the end of the period: left without contact with the Japanese and officially deprived of their Chineseness, the Taiwanese were neither one nor the other. As Kerr puts it, ‘barbarian’ Formosa was ‘too Japanized’ to be fully Chinese, yet still ‘too Chinese’ to be considered as an equal by Tokyo (Kerr 1974, 158-59). It is in this context that the emergence of Taiwanese nationalism should be analyzed.

Thus, to answer the previous questions – did Japanese colonialism induce nothing but frustration? Was retrocession deemed the only solution? – the answer seems to be negative for both. Part of the population in Taiwan showed an implicit, and sometimes explicit, desire to be incorporated in the Japanese Nation and thus acquire a Japanese identity. If they might not have achieved full integration, Tokyo’s cultural influence was undeniable in possibly any sphere of human action, ranging from the school system to economic production, from language to home decoration, to religion. Yet kominka never actually took place. The fact that some Taiwanese fought for imperial Japan in the context of the Pacific War does not prove their complete assimilation and acquisition of a Japanese identity. Among them there were definitely those who believed in it, but back in Tokyo the satisfaction with their mobilization stemmed not from having included them in the nation, but from having recruited loyal fighters for the Japanese cause.

Also, the Taiwanese did not claim independence with the same vehemence of the Korean movements, nor was retrocession deemed the only solution. They instead requested mere autonomy from the Japanese, as they would from the Mainland Chinese Nationalists after 1945. Remembering Kerr’s identification of local Taiwanese as neither Japanese nor Chinese (Kerr 1974, 158-59), we can say that the colonial experience acted as a catalyst for developments in this sense. In fact, it served to differentiate the locals from the Japanese colonizers and also from the other Han on the Chinese mainland. Harrison gets to the point of locating the emergence of a general Taiwanese awareness in the Japanese colonial period (Harrison 2006, 113). If not already before 1945, it is undeniable that at least with Retrocession a Taiwanese consciousness distinctively emerged. As seen below, it would be also soon expressed in the violent rebellion of 228.

Edmondson, following Chen (1972) and Su (1962), lucidly depicts the KMT acquisition of Taiwan as ‘re-colonization’ rather than ‘decolonization’ (Edmondson 2002, 27). The Taiwanese were initially eager to be re-united with China; they were even ready to forget their own collaboration with the Japanese in the colonial era. Yet what

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15 Local Hoklo and Hakka populations – referred to as ethnic ‘Taiwanese’ – were Han Chinese too, having emigrated from Guangdong and the Fujian coast from the 17th century on. Yet, as explored here, their identity drifted away from ‘Chinese’ in the course of the last four centuries in virtue of intermarriage with Taiwanese Aborigines and especially social experience, such as that of Japanese colonialism (see for instance Chen, Chuang and Huang 1994, 17).
the Chinese Nationalists did in Taiwan was to take the place of the Japanese in a center-periphery dialectic, a domination pattern involving an ‘external’ ruler and a ‘domestic’ ruled.\textsuperscript{16}

In 1945 the Taiwanese realized all the benefits they acquired as part of the Japanese colonial empire, such as the infrastructures they were left with and the social and economic development they had experienced. They also contrasted their economic situation with the mainland’s comparative backwardness. They could see how parts of the population on the island were now speaking Japanese, not Chinese, as the intellectual language in addition to their own local dialects (Fukianese, or Min-nan, Hakka and aboriginal ones, see Huang 2006, 320). They acknowledged the disparities between Mainlanders and themselves not only in terms of language, but also of education, cultural features and employment opportunities.\textsuperscript{17} They witnessed the corruption of the Kuomintang, the confusion of a China torn by the Civil War.\textsuperscript{18} Furthermore, as they felt they had been abandoned by imperial Beijing in 1895, they questioned the need to renew allegiance to other rulers from the Mainland.

The Frustration of an Impossible Chineseness

The new KMT Nationalist ideology failed to represent the Taiwan of the mid-1940s, when the island had come out as a stranger to the Chinese after fifty years of Japanese inter-regnum. Sociologist Thomas Gold argues that the KMT could not represent the people of the island since its ideological lead did not take into account the actual lived experience of Taiwan, both for locals and Mainlanders (Gold 1994, 59-60). More precisely, it did, but not in the way hoped by the islanders themselves: if the locals demanded autonomy, the mainlander regime aimed at fully incorporating them in its nationalist design. It was exactly because of the peculiarity of Taiwan’s experience and its diversity from the rest of China\textsuperscript{19} in terms of levels of development and aspirations, that the Chinese Nationalists considered a tight control over the island to be necessary. Thus autonomy was out of question. Repression of dissent and imposed sinification were deemed the only possible strategy.

Therefore, ‘frustration’ is a term that better describes the years immediately after retrocession, rather than the colonial period. Driven by different interests but generally aiming at expanded self-government, the Taiwanese rose in active revolt on February 28, 1947. The incident represents the single most important event in the shaping of Taiwanese identities, especially since it embodies an early clash between Taiwanese and Mainlanders, which would be at the basis of the island’s political struggles after 1949, when the Republic of China was confined on Taiwan after the Communist Revolution on the mainland.

\textsuperscript{16} It does not seem inappropriate to use the term ‘external’ to describe the KMT at the time. This is true not only since it was based on the mainland, but also since it governed Taiwan from the mainland, with a limited inclusion of local Taiwanese. The pattern does therefore not seem very different if compared to the one employed in Japanese domination.

\textsuperscript{17} Not being proficient in Mandarin was actually another handicap, adding to the different mindsets and cultural elements, for those in Taiwan who were looking for employment in the public administration and other Mainlander-dominated institutions, hence discrimination as another common feature of KMT and Japanese rule.

\textsuperscript{18} Philipps offers an interesting depiction of Taiwanese feelings between 1945 and 1947 (Philipps 2003, 51-61), completed by Rigger’s account of Taiwanese marginalization in the new Chinese context (Rigger 1999, 55-59) and Winckler’s reference to a failed attempt of ‘reorientation’ from Japan to China – and later more successfully to America (Winckler 1994, 29-30).

\textsuperscript{19} Assuming of course that at the time Taiwan could still be considered Chinese.
Having lost the Civil War with the CCP, the Mainlander-dominated KMT fled to Taiwan and inaugurated a long period of martial law on the island, maintaining the local population under strict control while still looking overseas for both the realization of its hopes and for support. Its hopes basically aimed at regaining the mainland and, since its own survival as a ruling party was constantly at stake,20 relying on American support and protection was the only possible choice. Internally, controlling the island’s discourse over identity was therefore crucial to the KMT not only to maintain order, but also to justify the legitimacy of its rule.

It is hard to say whether a sense of nostalgia had already appeared among the islanders before 1947, but certainly the dissatisfaction with the chaotic and frustrating situation in the early years of KMT rule highlighted the benefits, rather than the problems of the colonial period. How could the peoples of the island feel Chinese again when they were so marginalized and ignored? Would the previous aspiration to become Japanese ever be matched by the embrace of a renewed Chinese identity?

Stevan Harrell and Huang Chun-chieh claim that a continuation of Chinese society outside the Mainland, a legacy of Japanese rule and an independent cultural entity are all valid characterizations of modern Taiwan (Harrell and Huang 1994, 19). The three dimensions do coexist: the dialogue among them mirrors the constant evolution of what is meant by ‘Taiwan’. Discussing the island’s identity necessarily implies taking all of them into account, as my attempt to understand Taiwan is trying to do. Although here I am focusing mainly on one of these dimensions, the key is appreciating the links it shares with the other two.

In some considerations about the island’s political future, it is actually the element relating to the Chinese civilization that is emphasized. This is clearly true as far as the voices resonating from Beijing are concerned, and also partly for the Kuomintang. The limited perspective of the former translates into the strategic choice of the latter. Thus the two historical antagonists, CCP and KMT, both share an interest in emphasizing Taiwan’s Chineseness: the former to re-gain control over the island and the latter to substantiate its claims of representing the only legitimate authority ruling over the whole of China. Yet it appears clear that this last aspiration sounds today more like a utopia than a political project, given the rise of the PRC as a possible superpower and the loss of international recognition for the KMT in favor of the Chinese Communist Party since the 1970s.

It was exactly the loss of legitimacy of the Chinese Nationalists and the international isolation of Taiwan as ruled autonomously by the KMT that allowed the emergence of a third element in Harrell and Huang’s framework: Taiwan as an independent cultural entity, an idea emphasized since the early aspirations for political independence. These were incorporated in the tangwai clandestine movement, which later evolved into the Democratic Progressive Party, legally recognized by President Chiang Ching-kuo (Chiang Kai-shek’s son) in the late 1980s, after having lifted the long-
standing martial law regime. Chineseness then seemed as only one among possible choices, not a constant that should be taken for granted. The way to democracy was finally paved (see Lee 1999a).

**Translating the Colonial Experience Today**

KMT and DPP, representing the two leading political movements in the Republic of China on Taiwan, were polarized primarily in terms of reunification with the mainland and independence from it, especially right at the inception of the political reforms in the 1980s. As seen before, this meant that the issue of identity had to be addressed explicitly, as being inextricably entangled, also in political terms, in discourses over Chineseness and Taiwaneseness. Of course the traditional KMT rhetoric verged on the former, whereas the DPP promoted the latter. Thus, going back to Harrell and Huang’s tripartite definition of Taiwan, it appears that the Nationalist stood for Taiwan as ‘a continuation of Chinese society outside the Mainland’, whereas those favoring independence clearly upheld the definition of Taiwan as ‘an independent cultural entity’.

So where shall we locate the third dimension of the island’s identity, the ‘legacy of Japanese rule’, in the context of democratic Taiwan? In the discourse on Taiwan’s identity, its collocation with respect to the concepts of independence and reunification varies, as seen earlier, according to the long-term purposes of each party – and electoral group – and to the necessities of political circumstances. Before exploring further this final point, it is necessary to clarify why it is possible to disregard most of the martial law period when discussing the memory and legacy of Japanese colonialism.

Since as early as 1945, the Japanese legacy was nothing but a dangerous liability for the ruling KMT party: not only attitudes hostile to Japanese interference were justified by the recent experience of the Pacific War, but also the collective memory of the colonial period in Taiwan determined standards for government efficiency and development achievements that the Chinese Nationalist could not hope to fulfill, especially in the course of the Civil War. Yet even after 1949 the problem remained: the question related also to the need to prevent the emergence of a Taiwaneseness consciousness based on the distinctive experience shared by the ethnic Taiwanese – and even by local aboriginal populations – but not by Mainlanders. Clearly, the most important social experience not shared by this last group was Japanese domination, hence the need to promote the island’s Chineseness and ‘insulate’ it from the former colonizers.\(^2\)

Melissa Brown claims, as I have in fact confirmed earlier, that the Taiwanese did not really assimilate under Japanese rule. She also adds that expectations of this kind emerged probably at a subsequent phase, following resistance to Mainlander rule (Brown, 2010). In this sense we can understand how collective memory did lead to sentiments of nostalgia during the martial law period: feelings of Japaneseeness were probably more authentic in the 1950s and 60s than at the apex of Japanese colonialism. Nonetheless, it must be underscored that ‘Japaneseeness’ in post-War Taiwan did not

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\(^1\) Note how the origins of the DPP are also traceable back to the influence of the Presbyterian Church and its long-time opposition to authoritarian rule over Taiwan (Harrell and Huang 1994, 11). See also Chu Yen’s and Sylvia Li-Chun Lin’s work on film in Taiwan in the context of political liberalization and freedom of representing controversial episodes such as the 228 incidents (Yen 1994, 205-7 and Lin 2007, 21-23 and 130-31).

\(^2\) Reference is to Philipps (2003, 83-88 and 107-114), Liao (2006, 13-14) and Huang (2006, 313), also for the perceived need to eradicate what was left of foreign imperialism and ‘enslavement’ also as a fruit of post-War anti-Japanese sentiments.
actually signify the acquisition of an exclusively Japanese identity, but the recognition of Japanese cultural influence in shaping an emerging Taiwanese identity developed through the social experiences of colonization and especially retrocession. Yet the point is that for decades of repressive KMT rule, before the advent of democratization, Taiwanese collective memory was not allowed existence, in the hope that it would vanish with time.23

For a long time after 1949, the Kuomintang legitimized its rule on the island by basing it on international support and fast economic development, embodied in what can be called ‘the Taiwanese miracle’ (Gold, 1986). Yet it was with the switch of international recognition from the KMT to the CCP in the 1970s that their house of cards crumbled. The external world, although still believing in the ‘One China’ principle advocated by both parties, almost unanimously chose Beijing over Taipei. ‘China’ was therefore going to translate as the People’s Republic, not the ROC. What was Taiwan going to represent then? Mainlanders were not able to justify the island’s Chineseness any longer and at the same time the domestic pushes for democracy were becoming impellent. After decades of frustration and disproportional representation, a consistent part of the local population decided to reclaim its collective memory: Taiwan’s history had to be recovered.24

Conclusions

Competing narratives are at play in the interpretation of Taiwan’s history and thus shape questions of the island’s identity. Between pure ‘Chineseness’ and pure ‘Taiwaneseness,’ the legacy and memory of the Japanese colonial experience offer a chance for questioning both. Playing with the memory of this social experience has been as a strategy to justify the diversity of Taiwan if compared to the Chinese mainland (and therefore push for their final separation) on one hand, and on the other to stimulate Chinese nationalism through the evocation of old anti-Japanese sentiments (as an attempt to connect the two sides of the Strait). Yet we have seen how ethnic Taiwanese, who had experienced Japanese colonialism on their skin, did not share anti-Japaneseness to the same extent as Mainlanders did: aspirations for assimilation were frustrated by Tokyo’s actual colonial policy (although encouraged by its kominka rhetoric), but still reveal how Chineseness alone was not explaining the island’s identity already in the first decades of the 20th century. Similarly, the opposition of those who did resist colonial rule can be seen not as an expression of Chinese nationalism, but of a nascent Taiwanese one.

Underscoring the colonial experience in Taiwan translates today in advancing claims for a distinctive island-based identity. Although this strategy has been employed by the DPP in its early days, it is undermined today by the necessity of converging to the political center in order to gain the support of swing voters. Mainlanders on Taiwan – a minority, but an influential one nonetheless – will tend to oppose the construction of a Taiwanese identity as based on the island’s social experience prior to 1945. This is why the ‘New Taiwanese’ Nationalist propaganda in the 1990s emphasized the later experience of KMT-led economic development and ideological warfare with the CCP as inserted in the global ideological struggle of the Cold War.

24 Megan Greene (2008, 141) reminds us how ‘unlike most other parts of the world, Taiwan’s future depends to a considerable extent on interpretations of the past’. Also, in her study the attempts of both KMT and DPP to reshape the island’s history while in power are made explicit.
Emphasizing the Japanese colonial experience has the power to confer authenticity on claims for a distinctive Taiwanese identity. Conversely, a modern democratic system requires the inclusion of the largest possible electoral share, including the Mainlanders on Taiwan, hence the partial dismissal of the issue even in recent DPP mainstream political rhetoric. Yet the legacy and memory of Japanese colonialism on Taiwan did shape its history, also as manipulated for political ends, and continue to exercise a great influence on the islanders’ collective consciousness. Their incorporation in narratives of unfolding has been key in the development of a Taiwanese identity: explicit or implicit reference to Taiwan’s peculiar history as a whole – prior to and post 1945 – will continue to substantiate the claims of those upholding an island-based identity, increasingly recognized by both KMT and DPP, by ethnic Taiwanese and Mainlanders alike.
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The Tokyo Tribunal: An Ethical Review

Andrea J. Horbinski

Abstract

The International Military Tribunal for the Far East [IMTFE], known as the Tokyo Tribunal, remains a source of controversy nearly sixty years after its end. This paper offers a brief summary of the facts of the IMTFE and reviews its impact on human rights through an examination of multiple ethics pertinent to the Tribunal: the ethics of the prosecution, of the defense team and Justice Radhabinod Pal; of contemporary and of critical Buddhism; of state Shinto, and of feminism. After reviewing these ethics and their potential consequences for human rights, the Tribunal’s ramifications are considered. While imperfect, the Tribunal and the ethics according to which it was conducted were nonetheless a vast improvement over the alternative posed by the Tribunal’s critics and by some other ethics: no Tribunal at all. The substance of this improvement consists of the legal and human rights precedents that the Tokyo Tribunal established and confirmed.

Introduction

At the end of the Asia-Pacific Wars the erstwhile Empire of Japan was left with no choice but to “endure the unendurable” and surrender unconditionally to the Allies on 15 August 1945 (Dower, 1999, p. 36); among many other conditions, the surrender documents signed on 2 September made provisions for war-crimes trials. These provisions eventually resulted in the trial of thousands of individuals at dozens of locations throughout Asia lasting into the 1950s (Maga, 2001, p. xi). The centerpiece of this effort, however, was the International Military Tribunal for the Far East [IMTFE], which tried several dozen of the worst, “Class A” offenders in Tokyo between 3 May 1946 and 12 November 1948.

This Tokyo Tribunal was controversial before it began, and it has continued so in the sixty-odd years since it ended.¹ Questions debated since Japan’s surrender, if not before, include: Were the most fitting people tried for the appropriate crimes? Were the trials merely “victors’ justice”? What impact, if any, did the Tokyo Trials have on the future, especially that of global human rights? Did the tribunal do too much or too little? Examining the Tokyo Tribunal as a human rights case study offers a valuable perspective on several germane questions, including the place of human rights in Asia and how human rights tribunals may best be conducted. Moreover, ethical interpretations are key to explaining the significance of the Tribunal and what it symbolizes for contemporary Japan and for the rest of Asia.

This paper’s primary concern is not the Tribunal’s events but its ethics, and thus it will offer only a brief summary of the former before considering the latter. My ethical queries are divided into two groups: those ethical perspectives considered or expressed during the trial by its participants, and those ethics disregarded at the time, but which, I argue, prove vital to properly understanding the tribunal.² The ethics expressed during the tribunal include principally the prosecution and the judgment’s ethic of peace and

¹ Although I prefer the term “Tokyo Tribunal,” I use it more or less interchangeably with the more common “Tokyo Trials” and the generic “trials” in this paper.

² One is tempted to say “actors;” non-Japanese participants noted the Hollywood aspects of the trials almost unanimously.
justice as well as the ethic expressed by the defense and by Justice Radhabinod Pal of India, a complex viewpoint perhaps best summarized as absolute objectivity.

Unexpressed ethics are those of feminism, two competing ethics of Buddhism, and that of state Shinto as it was propounded in Japan from the Meiji Restoration until 1945. The ethics of the prosecution, of Buddhism in Japan during the imperial period, and of the defense and Justice Pal will be examined from a normative human rights perspective: do these ethics hinder, further, or have no bearing on human rights regimes? Next the ethics of “critical Buddhism,” of feminism and of state Shinto will be considered, first in light of their impact or lack thereof on the tribunal and finally regarding their implications for human rights. The paper will then conclude with a brief consideration of what relevance, if any, the Tokyo Tribunal and these ethics have in Asia today.

The Tokyo Tribunal: An Overview

Issued before the end of the war on 26 July 1945, the Potsdam Declaration was the most complete elucidation to date of what Japan could expect from an Allied occupation: Article 10 stipulated that “stern justice shall be meted out to all war criminals, including those who have visited cruelties upon our prisoners.” Article 4 mentioned specifically “self-willed militaristic advisers whose unintelligent calculations have brought the Empire of Japan to the threshold of annihilation,” while Article 6 insisted that

There must be eliminated for all time the authority and influence of those who have deceived and misled the people of Japan into embarking on world conquest, for we insist that a new order of peace, security, and justice will be impossible until irresponsible militarism is driven from the world.
(de Bary, Gluck, & Tiedemann, 2005, p. 1022)

On 19 January 1946, General Douglas MacArthur, acting in his position as Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers [SCAP], established the Tokyo Tribunal at the Allied governments’ direction to try “those persons charged individually or as members of organizations or in both capacities with offenses which include crimes against peace” (Röling & Rüter, 1977, vol. 1, p. 20). Taken with the 1943 Cairo Declaration, the Potsdam Declaration, MacArthur’s order and the Tribunal’s charter formed the legal and jurisdictional basis for the Tokyo Tribunal.

Five months later on 3 May, the Tribunal was impaneled to hear the cases of twenty-eight Japanese defendants before an international bench of eleven justices headed by Sir William Webb of Australia; no Japanese were on the bench. The prosecution indicted the defendants on fifty-five charges: thirty-six counts of “crimes against peace,” sixteen counts of murder, and three counts of war crimes and crimes against humanity (Röling & Rüter, 1977, vol. 1, p. xi; Brownlee, 1997, p. 20). MacArthur’s order of 19 January and the Tribunal charter mandated a fair trial; attempts were made to observe due process, each Japanese defendant who desired had an American lawyer as well as Japanese counsel, and a large staff of translators was employed.

Partly because the indictment covered crimes which allegedly occurred from 1928 onwards, and also due to the amount of time-consuming translation involved, the trial did not conclude until 12 November 1948, when the president finished reading the
majority judgment, signed by eight of the justices (Dower, 1999, p. 450). The judgment ruled on only ten of the fifty-five charges—eight of the thirty-six counts of crimes against peace, none of the counts of murder, and two of the three war crimes counts—and it sentenced seven defendants to death and eighteen to life imprisonment (Brownlee, 1997, p. 12; Röling and Rüter, 1977, vol. 1, p. xi). The court adjourned sine die.

Literary scholar Ushimura Kei calls the Tribunal “a revival of the Middle Ages in the very midst of modernity” and states bluntly that “the reality is that the Tokyo Trial had fatal flaws that even a fifth-grader could spot with ease” (Ushimura, 2003, p. xvi). Indeed, it was obvious even before it began that the Tribunal was irregular at best. While the Class B and C war criminals tried throughout Asia were in the dock “only” for war crimes, the accused at Tokyo were tried for crimes against peace and for plotting and carrying out a conspiracy to wage “aggressive war.” Furthermore, the Allies expressly selected the twenty-eight defendants because they were chargeable with crimes against peace; had principal leadership in or primary responsibility for the war; had negligible chances of acquittal; and were “representative” of the Japanese government and of the times (Piccigallo, 1979, pp. xiv–xv, 15). Besides allegations of prejudice and procedural irregularities, most of the justices and prosecutors have been accused variously of linguistic, professional, and personal incompetency (Beigbeder, 1999, p. 46; Totani, 2008, 16-17).

For all these reasons critics have dismissed the Tribunal as “victor’s justice” since before it began. A lynchpin of this criticism is the charge of conspiracy, which departed from Nürnberg precedent by defining conspiracy in accord with the looser Anglo-American definition rather than the Continental concept legal prevalent in Japan at the time (Pritchard & Zaide, 1981, p. 85; Ushimura, 2003, p. 135). Other arrows in the “victor’s justice” quiver include the American atomic bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and other putative Allied war crimes. The Tribunal is often dismissed as being unilaterally shaped by Americans or as “political” legal scholar Ohnuma Yasuaki declared flatly that the Tribunal was an unfair expression of “might makes right” (Beigbeder, 1999, p. 40; Hosoya, Andô, Ohnuma, & Minear, 1986, p. 46). Even the very legality of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction is questioned.

Most of these accusations could be leveled, mutatis mutandis, against the Nürnberg Trials with equal aptitude or lack thereof. But just as at Nürnberg, the Tribunal’s participants believed that their actions were within the existing framework of international law, and the actions of both trials have since been incorporated into that framework. Admittedly, before Nürnberg no one had conducted exercises such as the IMTFE within or without that framework, but Japan and Germany had been party to most of the agreements composing it, and in the surrender instruments Japan recommitted itself to “carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration in good

3 Two died during the course of the proceedings, while one was declared unfit to stand trial due to insanity. The defense appealed the judgment to SCAF and to the Supreme Court of the United States; MacArthur confirmed the entire judgment and the Supreme Court refused to hear the appeal, citing lack of jurisdiction in the case. Those sentenced to death were executed on 23 December 1948; by April 1958, the rest of the defendants had either died in prison or been released early (Röling & Rüter 1977, vol. 1, pp. xi, xvii).
4 In this paper all Japanese names are given in the traditional order of surname followed by personal name.
5 Ohnuma further declares that “the political character of the trial is manifest in the treatment of the emperor,” who was barely mentioned during the course of the trial and was neither indicted nor called as a witness (Hosoya et al., 1986, p. 45).
faith” (Lippman, 2004, p. 1009).6

Moreover, as Ohnuma noted, whether or not the Tribunal was justified “is not necessarily damaging to the assessment that the trials were legal and legitimate”: a narrow focus on what is legal can obscure what is right, and the use at Nürnberg and Tokyo of the concepts of crimes against peace and crimes against humanity was a “legal response to actions of the Axis powers that were in fact intrinsically intolerable, a reaction based on the universal sense of justice of ordinary people” (Hosoya et al., 1986, pp. 43-49).7 Sixty years after the IMTFE, it seems at best counter-productive to argue reasons it ought not have happened rather than to focus on what did happen in its course.

The Prosecution’s Natural Legal Ethic of Justice

It seems reasonable to think that the prosecutors at the Tokyo Tribunal would have agreed with Ohnuma’s characterization of Japan’s actions in the war as “intrinsically intolerable;” at any rate, the prosecution articulated in its lengthy opening statement a simple ethic of justice in accord with the idea of natural law as derived from the general Judeo-Christian tradition. Indeed, the word ‘justice’ is repeated multiple times even in the first few paragraphs:

Our broad aim is the orderly administration of justice; our specific purpose is to contribute all we soundly can toward the end—the prevention of the scourge of aggressive war. [...] They [the defendants] thought in terms of force and domination and entirely obscured the ends of justice. [...] Our purpose is one of prevention or deterrence. [...] We shall contend that it never was compatible with justice or law to initiate murders. We shall contend herein that it is no less an offense to plan and initiate the destruction of the lives of a million people than it is to plan and initiate the murder of a single individual.

(U.S. State Department, 1946, pp. 1-3)

Ethicist Robert Wargo notes that, in a highly generalized Christian worldview, culpability for a crime requires knowledge of one’s actions as well as the will and capacity to commit those actions; taking responsibility and admitting guilt is a clear acknowledgement that “one knowingly and willfully committed a morally or legally wrongful act and that one therefore deserves to be punished” (Wargo, 1990, p. 503). This concept of individual responsibility for crimes against peace was hitherto foreign to Japan, having been inaugurated in international law by Article 6 of the Nürnberg Charter, but it was to this foreign standard of responsibility that the prosecution and the assenting justices held the defendants at the Tokyo Tribunal. Indeed, as Yves Beigbeder writes, the very purpose of the Tribunal and of the Nürnberg Trials was to “assign criminality to individuals, and to reject the charge of collective responsibility as a whole” (Lippman, 2004, p. 993; Beigbeder, 1999, p. 55). Thus the majority decision found guilty of crimes of omission defendants who had not been knowingly or actively responsible for the various atrocities and military actions with which they were

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6 Perhaps the most notable of these agreements are the Versailles Peace Conference and the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, as well as the League of Nations, from which Japan withdrew in 1933.

7 Bernard Röling, the moderate Dutch justice who filed a dissenting opinion, said in 1983 that “personally, I can only note that, although I often disagreed with decisions about procedure, the unfairness never reached a point where I felt compelled to resign my position as judge” (Hosoya et al., 1986, p. 19).
charged: it was their responsibility to know and not to be passive.  

It should be noted, however, that the prosecution spoke of “law” and of “justice” rather than of “human rights,” in keeping with the Potsdam Declaration explicitly singling out “only” the maltreatment and killing of prisoners of war rather than the multitudes of atrocities carried out by the Japanese Army in Asia (Beigbeder, 1999, p. 53). The natural law espoused by the prosecution was explicitly rooted in the idea of an innate morality common to all human beings united in brotherhood under God, and in the most general Christian formulation, murder is a sin not because it is a crime against another human being but because it is a violation of this natural law: God’s (Boister and Cryer, 2008, pp. 272-74; Wargo, 1990, p. 502). In keeping with their legalistic rather than anthropocentric judicial ethics, the assenting justices made claims about human rights only within the context of defining and condemning crimes against peace and aggressive war: they declined to rule on the counts of murder and on Count 53 (that of conspiring to commit war crimes), saying that those counts were contained within those charges which they did consider; crimes against peace and aggressive war were criminal due to the harm they intrinsically wrought on innocent people (U.S. State Department, 1946, p. 61; Röling & Rüter, 1977, vol. 1, p. 440; Lippman, 2004, p. 1054). This is certainly not as dramatic a human rights claim as that of Nürnberg, which coined the term “genocide” and then convicted Nazi leaders of it, but it is in keeping with the nature of Japan’s war crimes. The Asia-Pacific Wars contained no plan to exterminate an entire people.

The Defense and Justice Pal: An Ethic Looking for the Objective

Some of the most diehard Tribunal skeptics were found on its bench. Justices Radhabinod Pal of India and Delfín Jarinilla of Indonesia made no pretense whatsoever of their opinion that the trial was worse than a farce; indeed Pal (like Webb) was notorious for taking long breaks from attendance at the proceedings. In his dissenting opinion Pal acquitted all the defendants and took extreme issue with the Tribunal and its proceedings, the indictment, and the prosecution’s construal of the charges contained therein. As his opinion has become the founding document not only for critics of the Tribunal but of an entire interpretation of history, it will be pertinent to examine the ethics he expressed.

Pal’s rejection of the Tribunal and acquittal of the defendants was based partly in his strong anti-communism and in his extensive experience in international law (in which he alone of the justices was trained); partly as a result of this training, Pal shared with the defense the general ethic of positive law, which argues that jurisprudence’s only legitimate basis is the letter of actual laws and legal decisions (Boister and Cryer, 2008, p. 276-77). For these reasons, he credited the defense’s arguments that some of Japan’s military campaigns were motivated by fear of communism in China, and adhered to a strictly literal interpretation of international law, which did not provide explicitly for tribunals such as Nürnberg and Tokyo. Yet Pal could have been quoting the defense when he declared that “whatever they [the defendants] did, they did out of

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8 Matsui Iwane, for instance, Commander-in-Chief of the Central China Area Army when it captured Nanjing and perpetrated the Nanjing Massacre in 1937, was found guilty and sentenced to death only under Count 55, that of failing to prevent the occurrence of war crimes (Röling & Rüter, 1977, vol. 1, pp. 441, 454-55).

9 A by no means exhaustive list includes torture, forced labor, institutional murder through medical, chemical, and bacteriological experimentation, disregarding the Geneva Convention and the perpetration of “scorched earth” campaigns in China (Beigbeder, 1999, p. 53).
pure patriotic motives,” agreeing with the defense’s nationalist characterization of Japanese history since the Meiji Restoration: beset by would-be colonizers, Japan undertook its military campaigns in order to protect itself and to free Asia from the scourge of Western imperialist domination (Dower, 1999, p. 632; Röling & Rüter, 1977, vol. 2, p. 940).

Pal’s agreement with Japan’s anti-colonialist, anti-Western stance certainly was related to his experiences as a native of colonial India, which gained its independence from Britain during the course of the Tribunal. While Pal explicitly condemned Japanese atrocities in the Asia-Pacific Wars, many times in his opinion he noted what he saw as Allied hypocrisies: that “race-feeling” was by no means exclusive to Japan; that “the domination of one nation by another” was not a crime but a fact of “international life;” and that the majority of Western interests in the eastern hemisphere “were acquired by such aggressive methods” as the Japanese used (Röling & Rüter, 1977, vol. 2, pp. 759, 680, 605). At one point he wrote that

As a program of aggrandizement of a nation we do not like, we may deny to it the terms like “manifest destiny,” “the protection of vital interests,” “national honour” or a term coined on the footing of “the whiteman’s [sic] burden,” and may give it the name of “aggressive aggrandizement” pure and simple.

Pal’s position was certainly the most pragmatic, the most contextualized, and the least normative opinion offered during the Tribunal: those actors whose own histories are checkered cannot judge anyone else, but should rather look to their own failings and hypocrisies (indeed, it is essentially a species of *tu quoque*, the logical fallacy defined as the appeal to hypocrisy). While the actions of the Japanese were certainly not faultless, in Pal’s view the Allied powers had no right to put their vanquished enemies on trial, having committed many of the same crimes themselves. These arguments are still prominent in human rights discourse today: who can fairly judge human rights violations, and who can fairly determine who can fairly judge? Regardless of whether human rights exist, according to this ethical view, there can be no normative discussion of them because no discussant has a stainless human rights record.

**Red Herring: The Ethics of Buddhism**

Many non-Japanese participants in or observers of the Tokyo Tribunal wondered what the effect of Japanese Buddhism had been on the conduct of the defendants in particular and on the actions of Japan during the war in general. Made famous outside Japan by the writings and life of D.T. Suzuki, among others, Zen Buddhism especially seemed to be a tailor-made antidote to the depredations and pressures of fascistic nationalism, with its tea ceremonies, its peaceful rock gardens, its solitary meditations. Whither Zen?

Writing in *Human Rights Quarterly*, John Peek claimed that Buddhism in Japan is “inherently antithetical to the authoritarian sociopolitical structures that have been periodically imposed on the people of Japan,” but a careful study of the modern period reveals that, initially under heavy persecution from the Meiji regime, Japanese Buddhist

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10 That India was not an independent nation when the Tribunal was impaneled has been used to question the legality of Pal’s sitting on the bench in the first place.
priests of every stripe assisted the imperial cause both materially and philosophically through the end of the war (Peek, 1995, p. 527; Ama, 2001, p. 39; Ives, 2001, p. 16).

Indeed, Christopher Ives notes that to flourish in Japan, Buddhism has adopted a pattern of co-existing with other power-holding institutions non-adversarially; after strong support from the Tokugawa government in the Edo period, persecution by the Shintoist Meiji regime aggravated this pattern so that Buddhism promoted the state’s ideology in order to preserve some of its position (Ives, 2001, p. 17).

In their preaching in this period, priests used the Buddhist doctrine of two truths (absolute and worldly) to exhort temple-goers to be loyal subjects of the emperor and to leave principles of faith beyond this world (Ama, 2001, pp. 39-40). Confucian aspects of Zen Buddhist thought such as the subject’s debt to the ruler, the “unity of Zen and the sword,” and the unilateral upward rather than mutual flow of duties, leaving no right for the subject to resist the ruler, were particularly emphasized (Ives, 2001, p. 33; Peek, 1995, p. 532). Nationalistic preaching of patriotism kicked into high gear in the years leading up to and especially during the Asia-Pacific Wars; among other things, priests told adherents that the Japanese war in Asia was a holy war, that Japanese actions in war were “expressions of compassion,” that the deaths of soldiers were expressions of the Buddhist principle of no-self, that by dying in battle subjects could repay their debt to the emperor, and that the Japanese military was attempting to create the pure land on earth—thus allowing the emperor to play the part of or even to supersede Amida Buddha (Ives, 2001, pp. 23-24, 16-17; Victoria, 2010, p. 107, 111).

Ama Toshimaro denies that Buddhism in Japan possessed social ethics before 1947 on the grounds that Japan lacked popular sovereignty until then (Ama, 2001, p. 35), but the history of the modern period in toto contradicts this statement. Buddhist social ethics could be reduced to one central pronouncement: be loyal to the emperor. Bernard Röling, no mean observer of Japan, certainly picked up on the importance of loyalty even for the most devout Buddhists:

There were Zen Buddhists among the accused, Hiranuma for instance, the Prime Minister, who was, according to [D.T.] Suzuki, one of his pupils, and certainly a man who had reached satori. But he acted as a Prime Minister, and as such according to prevailing loyalties. Enlightenment may make a man wiser, but, I think, not necessarily more moral according to your own standards. (Röling, 1993, p. 36)

While Buddhism today and throughout history has much to contribute to discussions about human rights, and to protecting them, in prewar and wartime Japan this rich tradition was suppressed. Inasmuch as they acted in obedience to the emperor, the actions of the defendants at the Tokyo Tribunal were broadly in accord with the mainstream of contemporary Buddhist ethical perspectives.

It should be noted, however, that the complicity of Buddhism in Japan in general, and of Zen in particular, with the military state has in recent years not gone entirely unchallenged. Proponents of “critical Buddhism” like Hakamaya Noriaki and Brian Daizen Victoria have charged, “controversially to be sure,” in Victoria’s words, that

…by virtue of its fervent if not fanatical support of Japanese militarism, the Zen school, both Rinzai and Sōtō, so grievously violated Buddhism’s

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11 前賢一如 kenzen ichinyo.
fundamental tenets that the school was no longer an authentic expression of the *Budhadharma*.
(Victoria, 2010, p. 105)

In the question of which ethic of Buddhism ought to have been applied at the Tokyo Tribunal, then, we confront again in miniature the dilemma of absolute or normative versus relative or situational ethics. Had the Tribunal elected to proceed according to a Buddhist ethic, would it have been more legitimately served by espousing the ethics of someone like Yamazaki Ekijū, head of the Rinzai Zen sect at the time of Japan’s surrender, who reaffirmed in 1938 that “the faith of the Japanese people is a faith that should be centered on His Imperial Majesty, the emperor” and that, as the late Zen adept Lieutenant Colonel Sugimoto Gorō had argued, Zen was “the true spirit of the imperial military” (Victoria, 2010, qtd. pp. 111, 108)? Or would the Tribunal have done better to espouse the absolute, normative ethic of critical Buddhism, which affirms that, although Buddhism like all major religions has at times and places throughout history been co-opted into militarism and endorsed or even advocated violence, this is no excuse; that its adherents’ actions must be judged by its normative tenets, chief among which, as Victoria notes, is that the obligation of compassion is not limited to any one group, and that the precept not to take any life is inviolate (Victoria, 2010, p. 116)? Inasmuch as the Tribunal itself affirmed its right to stand in judgment over the wartime actions of those it brought to trial, espousing a strict Buddhist ethic in line with the *Budhadharma* not as it was lived in modern Japan but as it is written might greatly have enhanced the Tribunal’s legitimacy in the eyes of Japan and of the world, and set a precedent that could conceivably have enabled a productive intervention into continuing Buddhist warfare throughout Asia in the years since, notably in Sri Lanka and in southern Thailand today. Unquestionably, that the Tribunal did not do so represents a great opportunity lost.

**The Forest for the Trees: The Ethic of State Shinto**

Perhaps the most noticeable gap in Tokyo Tribunal scholarship is the lack of attention paid to the social and ethical framework of imperial Japan: state Shinto. D.C. Holtom, one of the few scholars to have critically engaged state Shinto in its own time, argued that the ethical foundation of the imperial period was the 1890 imperial rescript on education, which read in part,

> Ye, Our subjects, [...] always respect the constitution and observe the laws; should emergency arise, offer yourselves courageously to the state; and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of our imperial throne coeval with heaven and earth.
> (Holtom, 1922, pp. 71-72; de Bary et al., 2005, p. 780)

The Meiji Constitution declared that “the Emperor is the head of the Empire, combining in Himself the rights of sovereignty, and exercises them, according to the provisions of the present Constitution” (de Bary et al., 2005, p. 746). Shinto, initially a social religion, was supplemented after the Meiji Restoration with neo-Confucian loyalty-based social ethics to form what Holtom called a “practical, nationalist, or better imperialistic morality” created through a national education system based on reverence for the past, respect for authority, and loyalty to state institutions, which contemporary Japanese
scholars described as a human system of ethics centered in the Japanese state (Fridell, 1976, pp. 548-51, 555, 560; Holtom, 1922, pp. 84, 71). To practice those ethics was to be loyal to the emperor; soldiers and subjects attained their moral ideal by carrying out the imperial will. This will, since state Shinto was cast as the ur-religion of all religions, was the fulfillment of the emperor’s responsibility to bring state Shinto to other lands (Holtom, 1922, pp. 92, 113, 110, 123, 109).

In all Shinto the primary ethical concern is purity, whether of intention or of the heart/mind, particularly in having an “upright heart/mind” in which the “heart reflects an existing ethical order” rather than an absolute set of inviolable principles (Furuta, 1987, pp. 39-40). Moreover, as Wargo notes, despite the importance of Shinto’s purity/pollution axis, no moral blame accrues for failing to avoid pollutants, especially if one has a pure heart (Wargo, 1990, pp. 505, 507). Thus, as Ushimura notes, Lieutenant General Kawamura Saburō was completely justified to write in his diary before his execution for command responsibility for atrocities committed during the capture of Singapore that

If this were Japan, I would naturally be found innocent with regard to this action in which I exerted myself reasonably and fairly in absolute obedience to an operational order under the prerogative of the supreme command.
(qtd. Ushimura, 2003, p. 272)

Kawamura’s indignation is perfectly consistent with the ethical framework within which he was born, educated, and fought: because he had conducted himself fairly under imperial orders, he had committed no wrong and required only purification. In that respect the IMTFE’s actual procedure dovetailed with (state) Shinto: if one is polluted one must be purified, and if a community is polluted a representative of it must undergo purification irrespective of personal culpability (Wargo, 1990, pp. 505, 507). The defendants being chosen as representatives rather than as individuals, standing in for the emperor in prison, in the dock, and ultimately on the gallows in the Tribunal’s narrative of war authority and responsibility realized this purification was imperative, albeit imperfectly.

Yet had the Tribunal truly taken state Shinto ethics into account, it would have proceeded very differently or not at all. As Ohnuma acknowledges, according to state Shinto and the Meiji Constitution the emperor manifestly bore ultimate responsibility for the war: the Meiji Constitution declared in its preamble that “the rights of sovereignty of the State, We have inherited from Our Ancestors, and We shall bequeath them to Our descendants. Neither We nor they shall in future fail to wield them” (Hosoya et al., 1986, p. 45; de Bary et al., 2005, p. 746). If the Tribunal had been conducted according to the state Shinto ethic of imperial sovereignty the emperor

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12 The question of whether to prosecute the emperor was a matter of intermittent Allied debate from before the surrender until 1951. Ironically, few believed in state Shinto’s ideal unity of the emperor and the people more fervently than General Douglas MacArthur, who held that maintaining Hirohito was essential to maintaining the stability of Japan. The general’s position eventually carried the Allied debate more or less by default: the defendants and much of the evidence in the Tokyo Tribunal were carefully, if clandestinely, vetted to ensure that the narrative of a peacenik emperor was not contradicted. General Tōjō Hideki and Chief Prosecutor Joseph B. Keenan, of all people, were the only ones who slipped up: at one point in his testimony on 31 December 1947, under Keenan’s unprepared cross-examination, Tōjō referred to the emperor’s ultimate authority, but the prosecution arranged for him later to recant that portion of his evidence. (Totani, 2001, pp. 43-62, 38-40; Dower, 1999, pp. 302, 297-98, 325)
13 Like many languages besides English, the Japanese 心 kokoro encompasses both heart and mind.
would have been found responsible, but of nothing more than fulfilling the state Shinto imperative of spreading Japanese ways to foreign countries. Moreover, since the war crimes the Japanese Army committed occurred during this enlightening campaign, these crimes were not absolutely wrong but rather situational pollutions which would have required only purification, not punishment.

By contrast, according to an early-Occupation draft imperial decree establishing war crimes trials, had the Japanese themselves been allowed to conduct trials, they would have found guilty of treason and punished with death or imprisonment those who had violated what the decree termed the emperor’s “spirit of peace,” since loyalty to the emperor could not permit his subjects to try him (Hosoya et al., 1986, p. 82).

An Ethic Disregarded: Women’s Rights and the Tokyo Tribunal

The Tokyo Tribunal emphatically did not prosecute all of Japan’s atrocities. One crime largely absent from the proceedings was the Japanese military’s system of “comfort women;” tens of thousands of women drawn from local populations forced into sexual slavery in brothels run by the Japanese military for Japanese soldiers and civilians across the Imperial Army’s operational areas (Matsui, 2003, p. 259; Dower, 1999, p. 465; Totani, 2008, p. 176).

In the six decades since the Tribunal’s end it has become a commonplace that the IMTFE ignored the Japanese military system of “comfort women” entirely, but as Yuma Totani and several other scholars have demonstrated in recent years, this view is not entirely correct. Totani in particular, having examined the microfilm archives of court exhibits presented at the Tribunal, has shown that multiple teams of prosecutors did in fact introduce evidence of widespread sexual violence and of “forced prostitution,” as it was frequently termed, into the IMTFE’s court record (Totani, 2008, p. 3-5). However, the Allied prosecutors did not account the sexual enslavement of Korean and Taiwanese women, who were Japanese imperial subjects until the end of the war, as war crimes, and due to the prosecutors’ habit of offering synopses of evidence in court, the (sometimes quite detailed) evidence they did introduce was largely neglected during and after the Tribunal; furthermore, the IMTFE’s judgment did not hold the defendants accountable for military sexual violence (Totani, 2008, pp. 13-14, 176-79).

Particularly in light of this oversight, it is legitimate to ask why the IMTFE ignored the evidence of the system of “comfort women,” and more generally of the pervasive sexual crimes the Japanese military committed virtually everywhere. Matsui Yayori, a pioneering women’s rights activist in Asia and an organizer of the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal 2000 for the Trial of Japanese Military Sexual Slavery, argued that there were several reasons for the de facto impunity granted to sexual crimes: racism (the overwhelming majority of sexual slaves were Asian, aside from some civilian Dutch prisoners in Indonesia); gender bias among the Tribunal’s participants, which included no women; and international law itself, which did not consider sexual violence a human rights crime against women, in war or otherwise (Matsui, 2003, pp. 269-70).

The participants in the Women’s Tribunal took it upon themselves to correct these deficiencies of the IMTFE. The Preamble of the Women’s Tribunal Charter reads in part:

14 Among the most flagrant were those of the notorious Unit 731, which experimented on prisoners in Manchukuo, and of other such biological, medical, and chemical experimentation units stationed throughout China. The Allies forbore to prosecute those involved in these units, particularly 731, in exchange for access to their research data (Dower, 1999, p. 445).
The Tribunal is competent to render its judgements [sic] [...] in light of the principles of law, human conscience, humanity and gender justice that were an integral part of international law at the time of and that should have been applied by the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, as well as taking into account the subsequent developments in international law [...] mindful that while the Tribunal, as a people’s and women’s initiative, has no real power to enforce its judgements [sic], it nonetheless carries the moral authority demanding their wide acceptance and enforcement [...].

(Violence Against Women in War—Network Japan, 2000)

The Charter articulated a feminist ethic, which insists that gender-based crimes are as criminal as other crimes; that sexual violence is a human rights violation; and that rather than being an ex post facto invention, these facts have always been present in international law waiting to be recognized. The Women’s Tribunal argued as well that sexual crimes and other crimes against humanity are intrinsically criminal, not because they violate the laws of a certain nation or religion. Furthermore, as Kim Puja notes, trying gender-based crimes corrects the predominating male Eurocentrism of international law (Kim, 2001, pp. 613-14). Matsui was also firmly convinced that “a twenty-first century free of violence against women cannot be realized without a response to the cries of the comfort women for justice and dignity,” and that the Women’s Tribunal was necessary “to end the cycle of impunity of wartime sexual violence against women and to prevent it from happening again in any part of the world” (Matsui, 2003, p. 259).

By claiming that sexual violence is rightly interpreted as a human rights violation even before the adoption of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women in 1981, the Women’s Tribunal sought to extend backwards in time the roots of women’s human rights and to strengthen the foundations of human rights in general and of those of women in particular. In this ethic, for the purposes both of reconciliation and of prevention the present and the future must not ignore the crimes of the past. Had this ethic been operable at the IMTFE, that trial would have been very different: more people, including the emperor (who held ultimate responsibility), would have been indicted, and the crimes enumerated in the indictment and addressed in the judgment would have included all forms of sexual violence.

Conclusion: The Tokyo Tribunal Today

One thing that is apparent in the history of the IMTFE is that it is impossible for any international war crimes tribunal to satisfy everyone completely. This paper has explored some of the ethical viewpoints relevant to the Tribunal, and the diversity of outcomes these various ethics could have afforded is clear: contemporary Buddhism and state Shinto in the hands of the Japanese would have conducted none or very limited Tribunals, while unadulterated state Shinto would have found the emperor guilty only of doing his duty to expand Shinto to the rest of the world. The defense and Justice Pal could have agreed to some sort of tribunal with a judge who met their ethical standards of objectivity, but they would have objected to a tribunal on the grounds of a strictly literal interpretation of international law. On the other hand, a feminist or a critical Buddhist ethic would have greatly expanded the scope of the Tribunal and of
those indicted.

The goal of the ethic according to which the Tribunal actually unfolded, that of the prosecution, was explicitly deterrence, as Webb wrote in his assenting opinion:

Then as to the punishment of war crimes and crimes against humanity: It is universally acknowledged that the main purpose of punishment for an offense is that it should act as a deterrent to others.

(Röling & Rüter, 1977, vol. 1, p. 478)

By its own lights, then, the Tribunal was largely a failure in that the years after 1948 did not see a decline in crimes against humanity, whether broadly or narrowly defined: the litany of post-1948 instances of genocide, perhaps the supreme crime against humanity, of which perpetrators have been prosecuted (Cambodia, Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, Darfur) bears witness to this grim fact.15

The Tribunal did reconfirm the tribunal precedent set by the Nürnberg Trials and establish criminal liability for war crimes violations of omission (Beigbeder, 1999, p. 75), but by the time events caught up with the prosecution’s ideals of international justice and the International Criminal Court [ICC] was created in 2002, the United States, which conducted the Tokyo Tribunal in the name of international justice, refused to ratify the Court convention.16 Moreover, while the Tribunal’s reconfirmation of the crime of aggression first defined at Nürnberg and its establishment of crimes against peace as violations of international law were important components of postwar international law (crimes against peace are deplored, for example, in Article 6 of the United Nations Charter), the International Criminal Court’s Charter omits crimes both of peace and of aggression, and the prospects for their inclusion by amendment seem dim (Lippman, 2004, pp. 1054-55).

An important feature of both the Nürnberg and Tokyo Tribunals was that no nationals of the vanquished country judged their compatriots, but this precedent has since been overturned, and today most international tribunals have representatives from the country in question on the bench as well as in the dock (Meron, 2006, p. 532). For example, in the ongoing Khmer Rouge tribunal in Cambodia, eleven of nineteen justices and one of two co-prosecutors are Cambodian (Documentation Center of Cambodia, 1994-2010). Another precedent set by the tribunal, that of allowing grossly biased judges to participate in the proceedings, has also been firmly overturned in later practice (Totani, 2008, 15-17). The Tokyo Tribunal confirmed the Nürnberg precedent that lower-ranking defendants could not avoid personal responsibility by calling on a higher political authority, but in March 2009 the ICC overturned a related Tokyo precedent by issuing a warrant for the arrest of a sitting head of state, President Omar Hassan al-Bashir of Sudan, for war crimes and crimes against humanity (Meron, 2006, 35).

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15 The United Nations Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide [CPPCG] was ratified less than a month after the Tribunal’s conclusion on 12 December 1948 and came into effect in 1951; in 2006 the U.N. Security Council passed Resolution 1674, which affirms that the Council has a “responsibility to protect” populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity” (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 1996-2007; U.N. Security Council, 2006, emphasis mine). It remains to be seen whether the future actions of the U.N. and the international community will bear out the potentially revolutionary impact of the concept of the “responsibility to protect” on the international human rights regime and on the Westphalia system of states’ sovereignty.

16 Japan, Germany, and 111 other nations, however, are members as of 18 August 2010 (International Criminal Court, 2010).
A final negative precedent set by the Tribunal is the need for explicit, fair standards of evidence in international tribunals; Theodor Meron ascribes the Tokyo Tribunal’s relative anonymity to its alleged deficiencies in this area, which more recent tribunals have remedied (Meron, 2006, pp. 571-72). These deficiencies, however, have not prevented the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, in particular, from citing the Tokyo tribunal precedents in some of its decisions, especially those related to command responsibility (Boister and Cryer, 2008, pp. 303-08).

One important consequence of all three tribunals discussed in this paper was their contributing quite literally miles of documentation regarding the events they adjudicated to the global historical record (Chinkin, 2001, p. 340). If nothing else this trove of evidence of human rights violations should make it clear, as Ohnuma argued, that in a human rights dispute the accuser’s criminality does not obviate the crimes of the accused (Hosoya et al., 1986, p. 51). The hands of the Allies were anything but clean when they vanquished Japan and impaneled the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, but the Allies’ fault did not obviate Japanese crimes. This viewpoint, however, is by no means generally held in Japan; for example, by telling the story of a fictional class B war criminal sentenced to death for ordering the execution of American prisoners of war as war criminals, the 2008 film Ashita e no yuigon (Best wishes for tomorrow) argues implicitly that the Allies should have stood trial as well.

In that respect the film is emblematic of the ideological chasm that the Tokyo Tribunal fostered, partly due to perceived procedural irregularities. Many accept the Tribunal, which for them rehabilitated Japan through absolving the Japanese people of collective responsibility, although Beigbeder shrewdly suggests that this avoidance of collective responsibility may have gone too far (Beigbeder, 1999, p. 75). Yet many reject categorically the Tribunal’s judgment of Japan as a “guilty nation”; as dissident scholar and textbook writer Ienaga Saburō noted in 1983, this view asserts the legitimacy of the Asia-Pacific War while ignoring its aggression and criminality (Hosoya et al., 1986, p. 187). The prevalence of this view in Japan is related to the country’s periodic difficulties with its neighbors, who will keep harping on their concerns about a re-militarized Japan, their demands for apologies and reparations, and their objections to government officials visiting the Yasukuni shrine and Japanese school textbooks containing nationalist content: in this respect, the Tribunal’s legacy was divisive.

But the Tokyo Tribunal nevertheless suggests that in the case of so many deaths, atrocities, and human rights crimes as were committed by the Japanese military during the Asia-Pacific War it is better to address those occurrences in some fashion, even if flawed. Japan’s war crimes going unremarked or unpunished would have harmed the human rights regimes born at Nürnberg by implying that human rights crimes are not universal. Regardless of anything else, the Tokyo Tribunal was beneficial to human rights for the Nürnberg precedents it confirmed, because from them springs the vast majority of the contemporary human rights order, as proponents of a more recent view situating the Tribunal in the context of and as integral to international law and human rights have argued. And while the Tribunal fueled and contributed to a great many controversies in Japan, ranging from international relations disputes to textbook lawsuits, without the Tribunal these controversies and contested narratives of the Asia-Pacific Wars and Japan’s actions in them might not persist with such longevity. That

\(^{17}\) In its indictment of al-Bashir, the Court followed a precedent first set by the trial of former Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic for war crimes in The Hague from 2001-06 (International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 2008).
these narratives are still so passionately contested suggests that Tokyo Tribunal failed to reconcile the parties to the conflict, and indeed failed to propound an authoritative narrative about it. But justice is a human concept, highly unlikely ever to be perfect, and it is incumbent on all those who believe in human rights, particularly in Asia, to preserve the laudable aspects and ethics of the Tokyo Tribunal while working to correct its defects in their future endeavors.
Works Cited


Interview with Lanchih Po
Conducted and transcribed by Nina Tompkin

Lanchih Po is visiting associate professor at the Institute of International and Area Studies and the Department of East Asian Languages and Cultures at UC Berkeley. She received her doctorate from the Department of City and Regional Planning at UC Berkeley in 2001. She proceeded to teach at Peking University in Beijing, China from 2001 to 2006. Her research interests encompass divergent developmental paths in China’s transitional economies, including the influence of Taiwanese direct investment on local institutional change, the globalization of producer services and the formation of China’s city-regions, and the socio-economic transformations associated with China’s (sub)urbanization process. Her published works include “Repackaging Globalization: A Case Study of the Advertising Industry in China” in Geoforum, (2006); and “Redefining Rural Collectives in China: Land Conversion and the Emergence of Rural Shareholding Cooperatives.”

What initially drew you to your field of study?
Well, I got my masters degree in Taiwan, and back then the field of city planning was an interesting field because it played a very important role in the democratization movement. It was deeply involved in all kinds of social movements, like the housing movement, the environmental movement, the improvement of infrastructure, and improving of the use of urban space, [which] is about how the public resources are redistributed in society. I got very interested in these issues.

What do you hope to accomplish during your year at Berkeley?
First, I want to be a good teacher. I enjoy teaching, and I actually care about teaching very much. I want to develop a good way to communicate with this very young generation of students. Then of course I’ll continue to do my research. I’m hoping to continue to publish, and I have some research projects that I want to complete. [I’m focusing on] mostly China, because my research site is in China I have studied China since the 90s, up until I was a PhD student here. I’ve continued to be very interested in the social and spatial transformation in China. I think it’s a fascinating subject for scholars, because it’s full of social mysteries and puzzles that people don’t understand. Even if you think you understand the phenomenon, it’s an upside-down society changing very rapidly, so it’s hard to understand all the changes.

Why did you decide to come to Berkeley for your PhD?
I actually became a full time organizer in the feminist movement before I came here, in Taiwan. I was a full time activist for a few years, and it was of course very exciting and interesting, [as well as] extremely tiring and exhausting. And of course, Berkeley back then was a legendary school for its "socially progressive" students, and I actually studied the work of Manuel Castells, who later became my advisor, before I came here. I think his research was quite influential in Taiwan, and in our movement and progressive practice in Taiwan. That’s why I
applied to the teaching program here. But I felt like I wanted to learn something new. I don't really do women's studies kind of stuff anymore, but I always integrate gender issues in all of my research.

**How do student attitudes in China differ from those in the States?**
Quite different! I think the students have different backgrounds, concerns, and interests. Students in Beijing are very smart, and very ambitious. Sometimes [they are] even aggressive, because they all want to be "successful." Materially, I know that it has to do with social status. A lot of them are from rural areas, and to make it in the cities is really important for themselves and for their families. They don't really have a lot of time to be romantic—they can't really afford to. But here in the United States, I see a lot of students that have the leisure to travel, go internationally, to have different experiences, and to be able to think about they want to do in the future. I think it's a really lucky thing for students here.

**Do you use different methods of teaching depending on if you are addressing Chinese or American students?**
I tend to teach medium-sized classes, but I do my best to encourage class discussions, and I like to ask questions in classes. Ideally, I hope teaching could be more like conversations, not one-way lecturing. I expect students to have independent minds and to be active learners, not passive recipients of knowledge.

Sometimes, not all students appreciate that kind of idea. A big proportion of students expect a fascinating lecture—that's probably the thing they most want to see in the classroom. But personally, I feel that a fascinating and passionate lecture, no matter how good it is, can still be forgettable later! But if you try to think about something, and try to answer it, you probably won't forget about it very quickly.

**How do American research methods and styles of academic discourse differ from those in China? Is it hard to adjust?**
In English academic writing, there is a kind of standard style, and you do need to learn to be at good at it. And yet the standard writing style tends to be dry, so it's very challenging to make your writing on one hand follow the standard, but on the other hand be creative, charming, and interesting.

For Chinese, it is very much the same. But in Chinese society, either in Taiwan, Hong Kong, or China, it seems like academics have more outlets in terms of social participation. [For instance], intellectuals and professionals constantly write for newspapers and magazines, meaning [they use] different writing styles for different audiences, and that there are plenty of opportunities to engage in public debates. Of course here we have academic celebrities as well, but for the majority of scholars, we work privately. Newspapers and magazines tend to have their own professional writers and columnists. You don't see a lot of scholars sending in their work to newspapers here!
Do you have any advice for students interested in studying Asia or working abroad?
I think that sociological curiosity is important. If you have a chance to leave or work in a different culture, in a different country, of course it's good! I think being open-minded is the first challenge, [as well as] to challenge your own stereotypes. And I think, you know, it's important to have "sociological curiosity," simply meaning that [you should] look at the word with theoretical perspective. Actually, continue that [attitude] through your life. If you have fresh, curious eyes, you can learn a lot.

I think it's important to understand Asia, of course. But it's also important to contextualize the development of Asia in a global context. It is equally important to link the phenomenon with some theoretical issues, not just to understand the area simply to understand the region itself. [Instead], you need to think theoretically. Personally, I think it's important to understand what is going on, especially in different cultures. But it's also important to step back and think, 'Why do we care, and what are the issues here? What can we learn from these empirical cases?'
Frequently Asked Questions

What is the Berkeley Student Journal of Asian Studies?

The Berkeley Student Journal of Asian Studies serves to collect and promote the best Asia-related scholarly work from all disciplines at the University of California. Each semester, we receive and select submissions for publication.

Who is eligible to submit an entry?

The Berkeley Student Journal of Asian Studies encourages submissions on any Asia-related topic from graduate and undergraduate students currently enrolled at the University of California, Berkeley across disciplines. Students with original research papers and creative writing pieces are encouraged to submit to the Spring 2011 issue.

What is the submission process?

The applicant first submits an entry for selection under the review of the Journal Committee.

Submissions may include:

- Original research papers
- Original poetry and short stories
- Cover art

If selected, the Journal Committee will contact you to engage a Berkeley faculty member, who will assist you in editing your work for final publication. Your submission(s) must be completed for publication by the semester’s end, per the deadline set by the Journal Committee.

In the following semester, you will be notified of your mandatory participation in the research symposium held by Berkeley Student Journal for Asian Studies. This symposium serves as means to recognize your academic achievement among family, friends, faculty, and students, as well as allow you an opportunity to share and present your work.

Is there a specific format for submission?

Please submit MS-Word compatible files to calspase@gmail.com. Submissions must include the author’s name, discipline, and year in school.

Please submit all entries as a Microsoft Word document with one-inch margins, single-spaced and Times New Roman 12 pt. font.
Manuscripts
Manuscripts must be between 1750-7500 words, and include a 250 word abstract at the beginning of the document.

Article manuscripts must use Chicago style footnote citations and include a works cited page.

Creative work
Creative writing pieces must not exceed 2,500 words.

An English translation is required for any non-English language submission. Please understand that the English translation is therefore used as the entry in which we evaluate your work.

Cover Art
All cover art should be submitted in PDF format.

Miscellaneous
Students wishing to interview selected faculty or include a personal/student experience are also invited to submit.

Your entry will not be considered complete without your contact information. In the body of your submission email to calspase@gmail.com, you must include the following:
- Name
- Major / Year
- Email Address
- Telephone Number

Please title the subject: Asian Studies Journal Entry.

What determines selection and publication?

Each piece of work is evaluated on the following criteria:
- Originality of work
- Assertion of a clear and significant argument
- Quality of the evidence provided to support claims
- Organization of ideas in guiding readers’ understanding
- Grammar, syntax, spelling

Moreover, while the Journal Committee chooses to evaluate each submission based on several criteria, we also approach and evaluate each entry holistically.

Who is involved in the selection committee?

The Journal Committee consists of student scholars involved in Asia-related studies as well as those involved in the organization Students for the Promotion of Asian Studies and Education (SPASE).
What if I miss the deadline for submission?

Submissions are accepted on a rolling basis throughout the semester, but committee selection does occur on a specified date chosen by the Journal Committee. Thus, it is best to enter work by the specified date in order for the committee to have the opportunity to review your submission(s).

For deadline clarifications, please email us at calspase@gmail.com

Is work I created from previous semesters eligible?

Yes. In our aim to collect Asia-related work, pieces for review and selection do not have to be from the past or current semester. As long as the information provided in the work remains factually correct, submissions need not be time-sensitive.

If I submitted a paper last semester for selection, should I submit it again?

As we do accept work on a rolling basis, if we did not review it for the most recent publication, it would be best to notify us again during the submission period in the following semester if you wish to be included in the applicant pool.

In regards to work that was reviewed but not selected, it would be best if changes were made to improve the work before submitting it once more.

How many pieces are selected?

Our journal is not currently maintained at any specified length. When selecting, however, we do take into consideration the academic level of the applicant, as well as the type of submission piece. We attempt to provide a broad perspective of Asia-related studies in the journal, but ultimately, the work is first evaluated on its literary and scholarly worth.

How often does the journal publish?

The Berkeley Student Journal of Asian Studies publishes twice a year. There is a Fall and a Spring issue.

Thank you! If you have any questions, please email us at calspase@gmail.com