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Dawei Ding

"Deconstructing Japan’s Military Globalism: The March to ‘Normal’ Nationhood"
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"The Sound of Silence: The Current Buraku Issue in Tokyo and Its Solutions"
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Berkeley Student Journal of Asian Studies

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Special Thanks: The Berkeley Student Journal would like to thank Martin Backstrom, Sharmila Shinde, Bonnie Wade, Catherine Lenfestey, Rochelle Halperin, Elizabeth Fein, Nosheen Ali, T.J. Pempel, Steven Vogel, and Keiko Yamanaka. Without your support and contributions, this journal would not have been possible. We truly appreciate all of your hard work and encouragement.
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Introduction

Dear Reader,

We are pleased to present the second volume of the Berkeley Student Journal of Asian Studies. The journal developed as an effort to provide a forum to showcase, connect, and enrich young scholars studying issues related to Asia at UC Berkeley.

In this issue, Dawei Ding asks how new policies on residential permits and migrant laborer insurance in Shanghai have exacerbated class stratification. Tara Yarlagadda interrogates how tensions between Pakistan and India were shaped by the ideologies embedded in their respective education systems. Muyang Chen writes about current policies enacted towards the *burakumin*, an all but invisible minority group in Japan, and offers readers a lens to a side of human rights in the country. Benjamin Knight writes about the relationship between increasing Japanese militarization and China's changing geopolitical position.

These papers are only the beginning of the conversation, which will continue at our annual symposium on April 6th at the Institute of East Asian Studies. We invite you to join us at this event, which is open to the public.

The journal endeavors to encourage the emergence of strong scholarship of Asia. It is a unique bridge between undergraduate and graduate scholars, and we hope to continue this tradition through your future submissions and support.

The Editors
Inching Open the City Gates: A Sociopolitical and Economic Analysis of Recent Shanghai Policies on Hukou and Migrant Worker Insurance

Dawei Ding

Abstract

This paper aims to analyze the social, political, and economic impacts of recent Shanghai policies relating to residence permits and migrant worker insurance. The hukou system is a population and social control mechanism that strictly regulates internal population movement. Recently, in order to attract “more productive” citizens, the Shanghai government has implemented policies to ease the transition from “Residency Permit” to “Permanent Hukou” status for skilled workers. However, economic growth cannot be sustained without a large pool of unskilled labor, namely poor workers from the countryside. Furthermore, as a global city, Shanghai is in a sense a vanguard of worker’s rights policies in China and was one of the first to legalize mandatory insurance for migrant workers in 2002. Unfortunately, access to a hukou in Shanghai is still very restricted for these unskilled workers, revealing a conflict between demand for skilled workers who are allowed to stay and unskilled workers who are not. The main problem is one of population. According to the 2009 census, Shanghai has 19 million permanent residents, of which 13 million are Shanghai hukou holders. Clearly, Shanghai cannot sustain a large population flow from the countryside that would follow the liberalization of the hukou system. This is a familiar feature of a global guest-worker phenomenon, but Shanghai is a city, not a country, and so this prejudice will undoubtedly have profound consequences. Reform is needed, but Chinese officials are proceeding with caution.

Introduction

When one steps into Shanghai, a bustling and extravagant metropolis discloses itself. Towering skyscrapers, glowing nightlights, a flourishing of wealth and development fills one’s view. The human development index, an internationally-used standard of measuring social development in terms of health care, education, and per capita income, of this city is 0.908, on par with developed countries such as Canada (0.908) and even the United States (0.910). It is quite difficult to believe that a few hours’ drive takes one to rustic Anhui Province, a relatively backward and rural area with an HDI of 0.750, two classes lower than that of Shanghai.

This is the picture of China’s great social experiment, a legacy of millennia-old policies today known as the hukou system. Formally called huiji, this social control machine originated from the Xia Dynasty (circa 2000 BC) as a system of taxation,
conscription, and social regulation.Traditionally, it has always been used to legally separate people from different parts of the country. Under the modern hukou system, China has developed a strongly segmented dual-economy structure, with rapidly industrializing cities in the east and static agrarian societies in the west. This gigantic and growing divide has developed to a point where people from different areas are socially and even legally treated as if they are from different countries, something Professor Fei-Ling Wang calls “Circumventing the Lewis Transition.” The Lewis Transition here refers to the stage of economic development at which the urban sector absorbs all the surplus labor flowing in from the agricultural sector through urbanization and modernization of farming. The Chinese government, Wang claims, is attempting to skip this stage by legally separating the urban and agricultural sectors via the hukou system. It is a type of institutional exclusion based on one’s geographic location, a definition of citizenship that makes a citizen feel as if he/she belongs to different countries. By strictly regulating internal migration, the Chinese government efficiently focuses development efforts in select, privileged cities known as zhixiashi, such as Shanghai and Beijing, hoping they will carry the whole country into prosperity.

However, such a biased restriction on the rights of the rural people, which, as of 2007, comprised 56 percent of the population, carries with it severe consequences. In 2005, China had a dangerously high Gini coefficient, a measurement of income inequality, of 0.447. Urban households were on average making 3 times more money than rural ones. These numbers are probably even higher today, making this an urgent problem for the government. Furthermore, since this exclusion is solely based on geographical location, even the talented and educated have limited access to housing and employment in large cities. However, such talent is in high demand in the cities. Hence, urban municipal governments such as Shanghai’s face the daunting task of changing their policies to only allow the entry of skilled workers. On the other hand, cheap and unskilled labor is still necessary. Rural migrants, desperate for work and tantalized by incomes unattainable in the countryside, are in demand for this kind of labor. Thus, the governments made clever adjustments to the hukou system which allowed them to adopt policies reminiscent of the guest-worker and skilled worker attraction programs popular in many developed countries extensively described in Castles and Miller’s The Age of Migration. Like developed countries, city governments found a way to tap into the pool of cheap and temporary labor to meet the gap in employment that city residents are unwilling to fill in themselves through these programs.

This article seeks to analyze two specific policies the Shanghai government implemented to address the above issues. The first policy is a direct reform of hukou

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5 See Note 4.
6 This issue of citizenship and belonging is a recurrent theme in the book, The Age of Migration (Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009) in which the social impacts of citizenship laws explored by the authors closely parallels those discussed in this paper.
7 Literally, cities directly governed by the central government.
8 This project was started by Chinese President Deng Xiaoping as part of his series of revolutionary economic reforms in the 1980s.
13 Stephen Castles and Mark J. Miller: The Age of Migration.
policy. Over the first decade of the twenty-first century, the Shanghai municipal government adopted a series of policies opening up access to the coveted Shanghai *hukou* for state-defined "excellent persons."\(^{14}\) Such persons include the highly educated, the wealthy, the talented, and their immediate families. By offering social services in the form of health care, education, and welfare, Shanghai is attracting all kinds of skilled workers. The other policy is concerned with worker insurance and addresses the issue of rural migrants. In 2011, Shanghai implemented the "July 1st 2011 Insurance Policy Reform," mandating equal basic insurance for all employees with urban *hukou*.\(^{15}\) This is a reform of the 2002 law that required minimum insurance for all workers, but with a different definition of "minimum" for non-local workers. This blatant discrimination was greatly unpopular, and the Shanghai government has now decided to take on a more egalitarian stance towards worker insurance. These two policies are sure to have dramatic consequences for Shanghai society. Socially, they affect the workplace and the geographically-based identity that is so integral to traditional Chinese society. Economically, they strongly influence the cost of labor and certain market sectors. Politically, they enhance stability by favoring the powerful, appeasing the masses, and creating a good international image. All of these government "attempts" to liberalize the *hukou* notwithstanding, in the end the policies still strongly favor the wealthy and educated. It is a product of various sociopolitical forces and perhaps too the basic foundations that underlie all modern societies.

**Methods**

This paper depends on interviews, as well as online news reports, and legal analyses. The sources were primarily used for official statistics and statements on new policies. For background information on the *hukou* system the book *Organizing through Division and Exclusion: China’s Hukou System* by Fei-Ling Wang\(^{16}\) was extensively studied.

The interview was conducted with Mrs. Wenzhi Song, a Shanghai businesswoman and general manager of a small technology firm.\(^{17}\) This was done to shed some light on the new migrant insurance policy, to clarify and inform on how this has impacted Shanghai businesses, as well as to obtain some background information on Shanghai insurance policy.

**Analysis 1: Hukou Reform**

As mentioned above, the *hukou* system has existed in some form starting circa 2000 BC. Since then, Chinese were isolated residents whose movement was restricted to their cities of birth, and were oblivious to life in other parts of the country. Now, with modern advances in communication and transportation, people from opposite corners of China can meet each other for the very first time, often in metropolises like Shanghai. Although they are all citizens of China, they retain a conception of heterogeneity. They have different dialects, cultures, and even written character types (simplified or traditional). Furthermore, there is a distinction made at the institutional level: discrimination in *hukou* that prevents outsiders from sharing the same legal rights.

According to one of the latest legal documents on the Shanghai *hukou*, *hukou*
holders are entitled to benefits such as subsidized health insurance, pension, housing, and unemployment benefits. Outsiders must pay extra fees just to send their children to school and often are unable to take up higher positions in locally-owned companies. This creates what is known as a horizontal stratification, a hierarchy of people of the same financial status but with different hukou. The series of twenty-first century reforms Shanghai adopted to attract the talented and educated from other areas of China intends to eliminate that disparity. Under these new policies, only citizens satisfying certain criteria will have a chance of successfully applying for the Shanghai hukou. These include but are not restricted to: having made some significant contribution or some award winning work, having a technical or otherwise high-skill occupation, having a salary of two times the city average for three consecutive years, and having graduated from a prestigious foreign university. Clearly, this is advantageous for the wealthy and educated, by eliminating horizontal stratification at the middle and higher classes.

Hence, this results in great social ramifications. For one, it reduces the distance between people of the same class. The middle and higher classes from Shanghai and other places are now treated more equally under law since they now have access to the Shanghai hukou. No longer will outsiders and their children experience prejudice from public institutions. According to a press release in 2009, the changes in hukou policy were warmly welcomed by the beneficiaries and the rest of society: "A large number of excellent persons have started to feel belongingness, grateful to be able to settle in as a full-fledged citizen in Shanghai." There is a clear affective appeal to these policies, as beneficiaries start to feel that they belong after attaining the Shanghai hukou. In other words, a transition in hukou has also led to a transition in emotional attachment.

However, this offer is only available for "excellent persons," and so while the upper classes enjoy social mobility, the lower classes are left in neglect. By creating legal criteria of what constitutes an "excellent person," non-locals are now vertically stratified, strongly differentiated based on their wealth. Those who do not qualify for the selective process of hukou application realize that there are now two obstacles to attaining "full citizenship": geographical origin and money. Furthermore, there may be increased competition for this privilege. According to the press release mentioned above, there is an annual quota for the number of new hukou registrations. Non-local workers realize that they are not only working to earn a living, but are also competing for official legal status.

By attracting only skilled workers, Shanghai is creating a large brain drain in other areas of China. In addition to the wealthy and powerful, the system steals talented students. Every year there are students from the countryside who, through hard work and academic prowess, break family precedence and make their way into college and graduate school. Under the new policies, hukou priority is given to those with masters and doctorate degrees, and so this rare group of talented students will be tempted to leave their hometowns for a chance at attaining a Shanghai hukou. Even for the relatively wealthy areas such as neighboring Zhejiang and Jiangsu Provinces, the affluent and educated leave their hometowns in search of higher quality living with a Shanghai hukou. This is very similar to the economic strategies delineated in The Age of
Migration, in which industrialized countries offer citizenship to skilled workers, thereby causing severe brain drains in countries and regions such as India and Africa.

Next are economic consequences. By opening the city gates to skilled workers, Shanghai has acquired an enormous amount of human capital. According to the new policies outlined in the press release, the hukou application favors those who have directly invested or hired a certain number of Shanghai employees for three consecutive years. The resulting flow of money and the greater productivity in labor is an enormous boon for the already ballooning Shanghai economy. This is partly reflected by Shanghai’s continual GDP growth, shown in Figure 1 of Appendix 1. Another significant economic effect is the influence on certain markets. Clearly, the specific requirements for hukou applications will have a powerful role in shaping demands for certain goods. One such good is housing. The housing bubble of the twenty-first century has coincided with the implementation of these new policies. In the legal document on the reformed hukou policy mentioned above, hukou applicants must own a house in Shanghai. This dramatically increased the demand for houses, and may be partly responsible for the dramatic price increases shown in Figure 2 of Appendix 1. However, in a recent 2011 press release, the government nullified this requirement. The resulting impacts on the housing market are yet unclear.

These policies also carry political overtones. The Chinese government today faces political instability from many sides. Examples include riotous areas such as Tibet and Xinjiang, politically autonomous areas such as Taiwan, Macau, and Hong Kong, as well as the discontent of rural populations unable to share in the mountain of wealth China has acquired over the past decades. In response, the government designed policies like these to promote stability. In this case, the Shanghai government achieves this through articulate, yet also vague, news reports. News agencies are all state-run, and so press releases are all carefully worded. For instance, when implementing the 2009 hukou reforms, the government made it a statement to change the hukou system from a form of "statistic management" to one of "contextual management." Paraphrased in another way, the hukou application will no longer be strictly based on data such as incomes and education level, but instead will leave room for other "relevant factors," this term intentionally being left ambiguous.

Another political strategy used here is the carefully directed government favoritism. As was discussed above, this policy exacerbates financially-based institutional exclusion. At first glance, it appears that this should do anything but promote stability, but there is more to it. With limited room in the cities, the government cannot cater to everyone. It is a lesson painfully learned in the disaster of The Great Leap Forward, a movement during which the government did away with the hukou system, causing an overwhelming influx of rural people into the cities that led to widespread hunger and country-wide economic collapse. Henceforth, the government realizes the necessity of restricting the movement of a certain sector of the population. From these policies, it is clear that this sector consists of the poor, the uneducated, the

25 See Note 18.
27 See Note 14.
28 It should be noted that the central government directly governs large cities such as Shanghai, so in this article, the term "government" is generally interchangeable with "Shanghai government."
29 See Note 20.
30 Fei-Ling Wang, Organizing Through Division and Exclusion: China’s Hukou System, p. 45. An official in a press release explicitly expressed this problem: "Shanghai, in the short run, cannot immediately liberalize the hukou system, for its resources cannot possibly sustain such a large influx of people."
untalented, the isolated, and the rural. These are the politically weak. Meanwhile, cities like Shanghai are scrambling to please the politically strong, the intellectuals, the talented and powerful with the irresistible lure of social benefits and high-end living. A political scientist summed up this stratagem as "regulate the masses, save the talented."³¹ By appeasing those who pose a realistic threat, the government can promote stability. The brain drain phenomenon mentioned above also achieves this effect by further weakening the rural population of its intellectual and financial resources.

Analysis 2: Policies on Migrant Insurance

Of course, the government cannot possibly overlook the fact that 56% of the population is rural. Hence, it must have some complementary policies. In a capitalist system of haves and have-nots, the rural population is neglected by economic and developmental "necessities,"³² particularly affecting those who come to the cities as migrant workers. The hukou system furthers this discrimination, especially during its inception as a two-category system separating those with chengshi (urban) hukou and those with nongcun (rural) hukou. Presently some provinces have eliminated this distinction, but it still pervades Chinese internal policy.

Now, as cities like Shanghai get richer and begin to fall under the scrutiny of the rest of China and the entire world, changes in migrant worker policies must be made. In 2002, Shanghai took the lead in migrant worker rights by mandating minimum basic insurance for migrant workers. However, there was still clearly a disparity between non-local and local workers, and so, in July 2011, the government implemented a new policy. Under this policy, companies and workers are to negotiate on basic insurance plans shown in the tables of Appendix 2.³³ Although it now includes all urban hukou holders, there is still a glaring difference for rural hukou holders. Nevertheless, it is still a large step towards liberalization.

The most obvious social consequence is the greater security for workers. As seen in the tables of Appendix 2, workers will be insured for pension, health care, and work-related injuries. Furthermore, with legal backing, workers in the same firm will be more equal in social status. As previously mentioned, prior to 2011, Shanghai already had a mandatory insurance policy, but it was differentiated for those with Shanghai hukou and those without. Now, the only difference is between urban and non-urban. Of course, one may doubt the enforcement of these policies. Shanghai businesswoman Wenzhi Song asserts that it is difficult for large and medium-sized firms to evade penalties for not enforcing this policy. However, it is clear that small businesses, such as barber shops and street-side restaurants, may be able to hide their proceedings with employees from the government.

There are certainly some negative social consequences as well. Similar to the previously mentioned policy, this will cause a schism in the non-local worker population, since those with urban hukou are favored. In addition, as seen in the tables, there is a certain range of incomes for which this policy is applicable. Those with incomes higher than the maximum limit provided clearly do not need company subsidies, but those with incomes lower than the minimum limit are excluded. According to the state-run news agency Xinhua, Shanghai’s minimum monthly wage is around 1,280 RMB,³⁴ which is equivalent to around 203 US dollars. Those with incomes

³¹ See Note 20.
³³ See Note 15.
³⁴ “4 Yue 1 Ri Qi Shang Hai Yue Zui Di Gong Zi Da 1280 Yuan” (From April 1st: Shanghai’s Minimum Monthly Wage Reaches 1,280 RMB): <news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2011-03/03/c_121144546.htm>.
between 1,280 RMB and 2,338 RMB (371 US dollars), the poorer end of the spectrum, are not entitled to insurance. Of course, this is assuming one trusts that the minimum wage policy is enforced. Furthermore, as mentioned, informal enterprises such as street-side restaurants and hair salons, many of which are run by migrants, do not strictly adhere to these policies. As seen in the tables, companies now must pay around 40% more for each insurance-eligible worker. This is sufficient incentive to drive many small firms underground, hence enlarging the market for unregistered labor.

As for economic impacts, it is clear that this policy directly affects the Shanghai economy by driving up labor costs. As most economic models would predict, an increase in labor costs would be reflected in higher prices of goods. Song, as a major shareholder of her firm complained, "Because of this new policy, our products' prices nearly doubled. We lost many customers to other companies in Malaysia and Indonesia who don't have such labor laws." Now, with the implementation of this law, foreign companies are starting to look elsewhere. From the angle of employment, this may be an impediment for many non-local workers who may be laid off to keep prices down.

One such political incentive is to eliminate horizontal stratification. Workers with urban hukous from other areas are to be insured like locals, hence promoting equality in the workplace. Furthermore, many of these urban hukou holding workers are highly skilled or talented since only a select few can find a job in Shanghai’s competitive labor market. The insurance policy explicitly states that the insurance cannot be transferred from Shanghai, meaning the workers must stay in Shanghai for it to remain valid. Here, then, is another brain drain mechanism.

A second political incentive concerns image. Shanghai, as a global city, must live up to some international expectations. As of 2009, the registered international resident population was 152,000. In addition, with all the large multinationals with branches located in Shanghai, the city hosts a large and growing traffic of people from around the world. Thus, the government has found it strategic to create a good image of Chinese labor by making Shanghai the vanguard of migrant rights policies.

Perhaps the most important political incentive is again the promotion of stability. To reduce risks of political revolution, the government is working to appease the masses. Once more, that tactic of "regulate the masses, save for the talented" appears as urban hukou holders are more favored in the new policy. However, it is interesting to note how three other tables in Appendix 2 are devoted to rural hukou holders. In the words of the legal document, such migrant workers are to "negotiate" with their employers on a suitable insurance plan. However, since rural workers are often readily available and hence disposable, the employer will choose the cheapest plan or even none at all and threaten termination if resisted. Furthermore, most rural workers will probably be too grateful for the insurance to care too much for small differences. It is a quintessential example of subtle political appeasement, a heavily invested enterprise in Chinese politics.

Conclusion

The late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries have seen exponential growth of the city of Shanghai. As the financial capital of China, making 172 Billion US Dollars in GDP in 2007, it has become extremely attractive for people from all over the world.

35 See Note 15.
37 This is the literal translation. See Note 15.
38 A quick calculation shows that the disparity in total company and personal burden between the two plans is up to 3.5% of worker income.
39 Starmass:
It has become a testing ground for liberal policies such as the *hukou* application and migrant insurance policy reforms. All eyes are on Shanghai as it revolutionizes its policies towards outsiders and as it inches open the city gates to the rest of the country. As one can see in the analyses, the policies are structured such that for now it is only open to the wealthy and educated, creating vertical stratification of the non-local population, influencing markets such as those of insurance and real estate, and promoting political stability by pacifying the powerful. However, upper classes prosper with state privileges, whereas the lower classes, through various mechanisms, are excluded from state benefits.

Appendix 1: Indicators of Shanghai’s Economy

Figure 1: Changes in Shanghai GDP and Fixed Asset Investment, 1980-2008

Figure 2: Shanghai Housing Prices, 2001-2009

RMB/Square meter
Table 1: Urban *Hukou* Holders (Same as Shanghai *hukou* holders)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>项目 (Types of insurance)</th>
<th>缴费基数下限 (Minimum monthly income)</th>
<th>缴费基数上限 (Maximum monthly income)</th>
<th>公司比例 (Company burden as percentage of income)</th>
<th>个人比例 (Worker burden as percentage of income)</th>
<th>小计：(Sub-total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>养老 (Pension)</td>
<td>2338</td>
<td>11688</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>医疗 (Health care)</td>
<td>2338</td>
<td>11688</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>失业 (Unemployment)</td>
<td>2338</td>
<td>11688</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>1%</td>
<td>2.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>生育 (Pregnancy)</td>
<td>2338</td>
<td>11688</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>工伤 (Work-related injuries)</td>
<td>2338</td>
<td>11688</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>合计：(Total)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>11%</td>
<td>48%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Employees in this category can negotiate with employers and choose from the two options given.

### Table 2: Non-urban *hukou* holders\(^{40}\)

**Option 1**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>项目</th>
<th>缴费基数下限</th>
<th>缴费基数上限</th>
<th>公司比例</th>
<th>个人比例</th>
<th>小计：</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>养老</td>
<td>2338</td>
<td>11688</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>医疗</td>
<td>2338</td>
<td>11688</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>工伤</td>
<td>2338</td>
<td>11688</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>合计：</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>34.5%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>44.5%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Option 2**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>项目</th>
<th>缴费基数下限</th>
<th>缴费基数上限</th>
<th>公司比例</th>
<th>个人比例</th>
<th>小计：</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>养老</td>
<td>2338</td>
<td>11688</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>医疗</td>
<td>2338</td>
<td>11688</td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>2%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>失业</td>
<td>2338</td>
<td>11688</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
<td>0%</td>
<td>1.7%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>生育</td>
<td>2338</td>
<td>11688</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>工伤</td>
<td>2338</td>
<td>11688</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>合计：</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>37%</td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>47%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{40}\) Employees in this category can negotiate with employers and choose from the two options given.
Table 3: Transition Period Plan for Non-urban *hukou* holders\(^{41}\)

|------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>缴费基数 (Monthly income)</th>
<th>上限 (Maximum)</th>
<th>上年社平月工资 (Previous year's city-wide average income)</th>
<th>下限 (Minimum)</th>
<th>上年社平月工资 45%</th>
<th>上年社平月工资 50%</th>
<th>上年社平月工资 55%</th>
<th>上年社平月工资 60%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>养老保险 (Pension)</td>
<td></td>
<td>上年社平月工资 300%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>单位比例</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>22%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>个人比例</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>8%</td>
<td>8%</td>
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\(^{41}\) Non-urban *hukou* holders who cannot come into agreement with employers can enter a "transition period" outlined in the given table.
Education and Ideology:
An Analysis of State-based Narratives in Pakistani and Indian Textbooks

Tara Yarlagadda

Abstract

This paper focuses on the portrayal of India’s independence movement and subsequent creation of the state of Pakistan within the two nations’ textbooks. In particular, it examines how both the Indian and Pakistani governments have utilized the education system and children’s textbooks to impose a subjective, single state-sponsored narrative of the 1947 Partition, ignoring alternate versions of history that contradict this top-down version. Both skew the facts in order to portray the opposite side, be it Hindu or Muslim, in a negative manner, thus dangerously indoctrinating children into a dialogue of hatred against the “Other” and contributing to renewed tensions between the two countries. In Pakistan, the state often uses textbooks to cast an anti-Hindu sentiment and implement its national doctrine of “Islamization.” In India, textbooks have become a battleground between secular and communal forces, each trying to imprint their own agenda through schoolbooks. What both states have in common is their manipulation of texts for purely political purposes, without regard for the disastrous effects this distortion of history has on the children themselves. Ultimately, the paper seeks to answer the following question: Is deep-seated conflict between Muslims and Hindus, and Pakistan and India, an inevitable result of long-standing cultural and religious divides, or is it something engineered by textbooks, the state, and the education system? It accomplishes this by explaining the common theories surrounding the causes of 1947, scrutinizing the texts themselves, drawing upon the testimonies of those who survived through the freedom struggle, and observing essays written by schoolchildren from the two nations about Partition.

Introduction

August 15, 1947 marked both the greatest day in the contemporary history of the Indian subcontinent and the worst. The British transferred full control to the Congress Party in charge of India and left the subcontinent, and a homeland was founded for millions of Muslims in the new state of Pakistan. In the process, however, hundreds of thousands of Hindus, Sikhs, and Muslims were killed, raped, converted and abducted, and millions more were forcibly uprooted from their homes as they fled the violence. Ever since, both Pakistan and India struggle to determine how to fit the tragic events surrounding Partition into their nations’ histories.

Distinguished South Asian scholar Ayesha Jalal discusses how the state-sponsored Pakistani narrative attributes the cause of Partition to the “two-nation theory,” which assumes that Muslims have always constituted a separate nation and resisted assimilation into the Hindu culture of India. This point of view portrays Partition as not only an inevitable consequence of long-standing divides between Muslims and Hindus, but also desirable for Muslims. Indians frequently take the opposite view, blaming British colonial policies of “divide-and-rule” for creating divisions between two groups that had previously coexisted peacefully in order to
solidify their own rule.¹ These static, starkly contrasting views are often held up in state-sponsored documents and policies as the official history of Partition, ignoring alternative views that do not mesh with or even contradict these narratives.

Notably, these state-directed narratives of history are an attempt by the government to create a strong, unifying national ideology to impose on its people and project to the world. South Asian historian David Gilmartin quotes Van de Veer in his work on Partition, stating "history is the grand narrative of the modern nation-state."² Education is one of the most instrumental assets that states use to imprint a national ideology into the minds of those who are impressionable to outside influence, specifically, children. As a result, the two states have paid particular attention to the portrayal of the freedom struggle in textbooks, as that event serves as the basis on which the national ideology is shaped. One of the foci of this paper is to showcase how elites use textbooks for their own purposes, be it to shape the nation according to their own desires or to invent a national ideology that binds all citizens of the state.

One tool that the states wielded to impose this national ideology was the education system. Each nation took a different approach to its development, yet it is crucial to note that at some point or another, both countries utilized textbooks and the education system in order to foster a rigid dogma, often based on hatred. History was seen as a device to be manipulated by the state for its own purposes in contemporary politics. The content of school curriculum was subject to the whims and ideologies of whoever held political office at the time; thus an uneasy and dangerous overlap between politics and curriculum reform emerged, allowing for religious groups to change the content to match their version of the histories of India and Pakistan. In Pakistan, it was frequently the means used to emphasize the Islamization of Pakistan and forge a strong sentiment based around a single religion, in order to contrast itself from India. In India, two varying perspectives of history emerged—the secular and the communal—both of which have tried to dominate the education curriculum, though the secular version of history has prevailed most often.³

However, as Gilmartin, mentions, it is hard to narrow an event as complex as Partition into a single story from the top, as that excludes the plethora of perspectives surrounding the freedom struggle: “Yet partition presents a story that cannot easily be narrativized simply within the frame of the territorial nation-state’s history. Nor, with civil violence at its heart, is the story easy to assimilate to the search for a narrative history linking a ‘history from below’ with a broader state-oriented vision. For all the concern by historians to bridge the dividing line of 1947, partition has generally eluded effective incorporation into larger narrative.”⁴ The freedom struggle is not a historical event that can be boiled down into a “master narrative” for the entire nation, yet that is precisely what textbooks and teachers in India and Pakistan aim to do. As a result, they entirely neglect to consider how perceptions of Partition varied dramatically based on factors such as gender, ethnicity, and region. In an attempt to establish a single history from above, the nation forever loses the perspectives of everyday citizens who suffered during the chaos of Partition, and that is the greatest tragedy of the textbook dilemma.

The state-manufactured versions of history dismiss the multiplicity of narratives from the individual’s viewpoint, instead focusing almost entirely on top-down, elite perspectives and blaming one another for the wrongs of Partition. They therefore

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⁴ Gilmartin, 1070.
prevent both victims and oppressors from coming together to make sense of the violent chaos caused by the Partition and pave the way for future hatred. South Asian historian and author Yasmin Saikia deftly discusses the concept of “multiple narratives” in her recent book on gendered partition and the 1971 war in Bangladesh, in which each side—Pakistan, Bangladesh, and India—viewed the conflict differently. For Pakistan, it dealt a crippling blow to the morale of the nation, as it was perceived as a betrayal by Bangladesh. For India, it was a matter of righting the wrongs of Partition and enacting justified retribution against Pakistan. For Bangladesh, it marked the victorious founding of their homeland and freedom from the injustices perpetrated by West Pakistan. As a result, “The tendency of national histories in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan is to partition the memories of 1971, allowing for blame to be relegated to the Other; nearly four decades later the binary memories of ‘us’ as a good versus the Other as evil produces simplistic narratives without addressing the complexities of the conditions and circumstances that produced horrific outcomes in the war and the impact of violence and terror on people’s lives.”

Her discussion of multiple narratives is relevant to this analysis of 1947 and the subsequent portrayals of Hindus and Muslims in schoolbooks, as the same tendency to promote the “self” and castigate the “Other” as a villain, be it India, Pakistan, Hindu, or Muslim, exists in the texts that schoolchildren read every day. Following the theme of “multiple narratives,” I will trace the portrayal of Partition in Indian textbooks, and vice versa in Pakistan, and seek an answer to the following question: Is deep-seated conflict between the Muslims and Hindus, and Pakistan and India, an inevitable result of long-standing cultural and religious divides, or is it something engineered by textbooks, the state, and the education system?

In order to answer the previous question, I will analyze the portrayals of the freedom struggle as presented in primary and secondary school textbooks in both Pakistan and India, against the records of Partition by various historians and the testimonies of those who survived through 1947, in order to assess how accurately these texts match up with the actual experiences of ordinary individuals who lived during that era. Lastly, I will conclude by discussing the impact of the educational bias on today’s youth and asking what reforms must be made in order to provide children with an education that truly benefits them, instead of serving the ideological needs of the state. The purpose of this research is not only to look at the historical portrayal of Partition; it also serves to understand how the portrayal of Partition affects, and even contributes, to the modern-day tensions between India and Pakistan.

Pakistan’s Islamic Nationalism in Text

In Pakistan, the central government is responsible for establishing the educational policies of the state. The Federal Ministry of Education sets up Textbook Boards, orders textbooks to be published, creates guidelines for the production of textbooks, chooses authors, and approves final version of each textbook. The Textbook Boards are under the jurisdiction of provincial governments, however, so they must send each textbook to Islamabad for approval by a federal review committee and receive instructions from the government for revisions. This set-up gives the central government free will to shape educational policies according to their own political beliefs, rejecting any content from the Textbook Boards that they find to be undesirable. Once the books are published, one textbook per class (between grades 1-12) becomes the only official textbook for that age group of students, and children are discouraged

After the era of General Ayub Khan, the subject of History was abolished and replaced with Mu’ashrati Ulum or ‘Social Studies’ for grades 1-8, and Mutala’a-i-Pakistan or ‘Pakistan Studies’ for grades 9-11. The elimination of history classes and subsequent replacement with Pakistani Studies courses allowed the state to establish extra years of mandatory religious education in schools, as part of a greater nation-building project to recreate a national religious identity after the fracturing of the nation in the 1971 partition. Jalal, as Krishna Kumar quotes her in his work on Partition, states that Pakistan Studies amounted to “the amalgamation of bigotry and power.” Kumar critiques that the authors of Pakistani Studies texts were told to de-emphasize the pre-Islamic past in India, thus distorting the history of the subcontinent and increasing the gap between curriculum and the everyday realities that children saw.

Centralization of textbook policies increased after the creation of the Federal Curriculum Wing in the 1970s. Under Zulfiqar-ali-Bhutto and especially Zia-ul-Haq, this policy of incorporating religion into the curriculum was intensified and reflected the national government’s wider goals of “Islamization” throughout Pakistan. Islamization became the national banner to which everyone would subscribe, and all of Pakistan’s rulers up through Musharraf have continued in that vein. Kumar attributes this to Pakistan’s constant desire and struggle to carve out a defined place for itself as a nation, and recites an excerpt from one of the government’s National Education Policies from 1998-2010 that discusses the need to “translate the Islamic ideology into our moral profile and imbibe it into our educational system.”

To illustrate the extent that political goals of nation-building have influenced the education system, Aziz cites anti-India stereotypes and quotes glorifying Muslim leaders in pre-Partition history that are embedded into textbooks. For example, in order to support the two-nation theory upon which Pakistan rests and prove that Muslims have always constituted a separate nation from Hindus, textbooks portray non-Muslims as hateful towards Muslims, as lesser beings, and Muslims as the superior people. A Social Studies textbook from Class 4 in the Northwestern Frontier Provinces (NWFP) states as follows: “The Muslims treated the non-Muslims very well [when they ruled the province]. Yet the non-Muslims nursed in their hearts an enmity against the Muslims. When the British invaded…the non-Muslims sided with them…” Hindus are even described in some circumstances as “clean” or “inferior.” The portrayal of the freedom struggle is skewed heavily towards Muslims, portraying them as victims against the powerful combined forces of the Congress Party and the British. It ignores the fact that many Muslims institutions received British support, instead viewing the British as aggressors allying with the Congress Party and falsely depicting the Congress Party as an antagonistic, all-Hindu group in order to give more credence to the two-nation theory. Muslims are further shown to be only victims through attempts by textbooks to cast blame on Hindus and Sikhs for much of the communal violence in the aftermath of Partition, ignoring the atrocities committed by Muslims.

In another example, the description of Mohammed Ali Jinnah as the sole representative of Muslims leading up to Partition—the Quaid-i-Azam—and the man

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7 Aziz, 2.
8 Kumar, 60.
10 Kumar, 56.
11 Kumar, 15.
12 Aziz, 285.
most responsible for the creation of Pakistan, is presented unquestioningly in textbooks. For example, in a Class 1 Urdu-medium textbook, the first thing children read of Partition concerns Jinnah: “Who created Pakistan? ‘The Quaid-i-Azam.’ ‘What is the Quaid-i-Azam’s actual name?’…Mohammed Ali Jinnah.” Yet, looking at discussions of Partition from the perspective of scholars, Jinnah’s status as a leader in the freedom struggle and the founder of Pakistan is much more uncertain. As Jalal mentions, although Jinnah played a pivotal role in rallying Muslims around the cause of Pakistan, others, such as Nehru and the Congress Party, as well as the British under the influence of Mountbatten, arguably played an equally crucial role in creating Pakistan. For the textbooks to present Jinnah as the sole founder of Pakistan is highly disingenuous.13

However, such biases are not contained only to the Urdu-Medium textbooks. One Class 3 English-Medium textbook discusses how the Muslim League stood as the representative for all Muslims in India.14 This idea is refuted heavily by many scholars on Partition. Jalal draws attention to how Jinnah and the Muslim League held seats in only a few minority provinces. The seats in Punjab, which constituted the “core” of Pakistan, were not held by Muslim Leaguers, but Union Party members.

There is also a dangerous overlap between the General History and Islamic Studies (Islamiat) sections of the textbooks, as noted in Enlightened Pakistan’s 2007 curriculum report. The group evaluated textbooks approved by the Punjab Textbook Board, made recommendations for improvement, and assessed the impact of recent reforms to the curriculum. It found that the texts frequently incorporated elements of Islamiat into the History sections of the books. For example, for Pakistan Studies grades 9-10, a section of the books entitled “Components of the Ideology of Pakistan” describes in-depth various tenets of the Islamic faith, law, and notions of justice and sovereignty.15 It is easy to see from this description how the goal of Islamization has been inserted into school textbooks, down to the basic learning objectives.

However, the reforms suggested by Enlightened Pakistan are hardly a step in the right direction. Many of their objections to the presentation of school curriculum rests on their belief that it does not sufficiently demonstrate how strong the need was for the separate homeland of Pakistan and that “Islam is not linked to the demand for Pakistan.” Rather, it is currently described separately from the goal of nationhood. If the textbooks recommendations were to be incorporated into the textbooks, that would only foster the two-nation theory that Muslims must always have constituted a separate nation and would exacerbate the Islamization rhetoric occupying the national discourse in Pakistan, rhetoric which has no place in children’s textbooks.16

To be fair, Pakistan has recently made significant improvements to its education system. During curriculum reforms between 2001 and 2006, the category of Social Sciences was broken up into Geography and History, mandatory religious education was shortened to one year and removed from general social science classes, and textbook publishing was taken out of state control and placed in the hands of private publishers in order to deregulate the industry. These reforms were finalized in the National Education Policy of 2007. All of these reforms, particularly the deregulation of textbook production, could create a less biased narrative from what the state currently produces and would be a step in the right direction for Pakistan’s education system.17

However, significant problems with slow implementation and lobbying from Islamic

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13 Jalal, 186-187.
14 Aziz, 70.
16 Ibid., 50.
17 Jamil, 20.
groups may put a halt to the reforms. After the new reforms were implemented, the Punjab textbook boards sent manuscripts to the federal government, though as of 2009, they had yet to be approved. A group assessing the curriculum reforms reported: “Since the 2003 critique on the curriculum, the 22 million children have moved on...Another generation has been lost because the process has taken too long.” Additionally, the Chief Minister of Punjab and others have promised the Nazria-e-Pakistan Trust that it will uphold principles of the two-nation theory in textbooks, even going so far as to donate vast sums to the Trust, demonstrating that the Islamization of textbooks will likely continue in the foreseeable future.

In short, Pakistan’s attempts to build a national identity through textbooks have not only disastrously indoctrinated children, but they may have ironically proven counterproductive to the goal of nation-building, fostering regional resentment and creating instability. As historian David Talbott notes: “The task of nation building in Pakistan has been hampered not only by unresolved conflicts between regional, religious and nationalist identity inherited from the freedom movement, but by the attempts of successive martial law regime to forcibly impose a national identity rather than achieve it by consensus.”

India: The Competing Forces of Secularism and Communalism

India, while not attempting to impose a singular Hindu ideology through its textbooks, has instead faced a battle over two reigning national ideologies: secularism and communalism. Yet, much like Pakistan, the story of Partition as described in school textbooks coincides with federal development polices and nation-building efforts undertaken by the state.

The National Council of Educational Research and Training (NCERT) is the governing body in India that regulates curriculum and prepares textbooks, similar to Pakistan’s Federal Curriculum Wing. However, while only 10-15% of children use the textbooks created by NCERT, this federal organization sets the standard for the Textbook Boards of the various states as well, which produce the vast majority of textbooks that students use in India. States can change the NCERT textbook and curriculum, so long as they stay within the same framework. While many states adopt NCERT’s curriculum without many revisions, a 1990s study of 21 state textbooks found that over half had modified their textbooks to focus on the historical perspective of the state as opposed to the national viewpoint. It is important to keep in mind these regional perspectives of Indian—and Pakistani—history that are lost when the state focuses on a national narrative.

After the Partition, the focus in India was on a Nehruvian-style modernization and secularism that engaged equally with all religions. Nehru sought to project a secular view of India, partly as a way to overcome the communal differences that had emerged as a result of Partition. In Nehru’s eyes, secularism served as a counterpoint to the Hindu nationalism that was a main factor in the communal violence that erupted during Partition. The Congress Party acted as the main vehicle for the state’s secular policies. The basis of secularism was that citizenship to the state gave one membership

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18 Ibid.
19 Ibid., 13.
22 Ibid., 5.
23 Ibid., 6.
status of that nation, in contrast to the communal or Hindu nationalist discourse, which required identification with a particular religion for membership. Modernization came to be identified alongside secularism and nationalism, as seen in the Kothari Commission of the mid-1960s. This commission “displayed greater willingness to turn nation-building into an ideology and to see education as the prime instrument of propagating it.” As a result, the NCERT textbooks inevitably reflected the nation’s vision of secularism in their contents, which in turn influenced the state Textbook Boards.

For three decades after independence, despite some backlash by Hindu nationalists, secularism remained the prevailing national discourse in Indian society and textbooks. However, with the rise of Indira Gandhi as prime minister in the 1970s, Indian politics was once again open to Hindu nationalism. Her successor, Rajiv Gandhi, helped normalize Hindu nationalism by granting concessions to both Muslims and Hindus, which brought back religious issues as a common theme in politics. This growing Hindu nationalism was reflected in the state textbooks as well. Nonetheless, the Congress’s secular views mostly held together until its fall in 1989 when the Bharatiya Janat Party (BJP), a Hindu nationalist organization, defeated Congress and rose to power. Since then, state schools have been more susceptible to Hindu revivalist propaganda, and though the official policy is to counter communalism with secularism in the textbooks, the forces of revivalism may be too strong for the secular forces to combat. Controversy erupted between 1998 and 2004 over the BJP’s supposed attempts to “saffronise” education after proclaiming that education in India must be “Indianised, nationalized, and spiritualized.”

The view of history that Hindu nationalists adopt is similar to the two-nation theory upheld by Pakistan, which focuses on long-standing divides between Muslims and Hindus. Notably in history textbooks, the Hindu nationalists portray Muslims as foreign invaders to the Indian subcontinent by glorifying the Indian Vedic past as the origins of the nation and downplaying the role of Islam in the area. In contrast, the secularists generally maintain that British policies of divide-and-rule were responsible for tensions between the groups, and all but ignore the role of communalism in Partition. An example of the tension between secular and communal forces can be demonstrated in the following textbook excerpt regarding Jinnah: “The Muslim League…propagated the unhistorical theory that Hindus and Muslims were two separate nations which could never live together.”

The secular view in the excerpt above denies the views of both Hindus and Muslims, emphasizing its impartiality to both religions, whereas in contrast, Hindu revivalists blame the Muslim League for Partition and ignore any culpability of Hindu communalism.

In addition to the BJP, volunteer groups, such as the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) have championed Hindu nationalism as their main platform through Saraswati Shisu Mandirs and Vidya Bharatiya schools they have established, espousing false notions of history, such as the idea that all non-Hindu groups are foreigners, describe Hindu religious idols as actual historical figures, and claim that the independence movement was a ‘religious war’ against Muslims. Their desire to

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24 Guichard, 18.
25 Kumar, 51.
26 Guichard, 20-21.
27 Kumar, 62.
28 Guichard, 1.
29 Ibid., 72-75.
30 Ibid., 51.
31 “Regulatory mechanisms for textbooks and parallel textbooks taught in schools outside the government system.” 2005. Committee of the Central Advisory Board of Education Ministry of Human
present Hinduism as the dominant religion and political force within India has unfortunately sometimes seeped into primary and secondary school texts, forming “a covert tendency to represent the history of India and the history of Hinduism as parallel developments” and leading to “exclusivist thinking” that fosters resentment between Hindu and non-Hindu groups. To give further examples of how communalism has pervaded the education system, see Class 4 History texts published by the government of Maharashtra government, which mention “oppression and cheating by Muslim rulers,” as well as Class 5 Social Studies guides in the state of Karnata, which maintains that Hindus were enslaved by Muslims.

However, it is important to keep in mind that the influence of the BJP, the RSS and others seeking to impose a dominant Hindu ideology in the education is still minimal, as the secular bent in textbooks remains, despite the BJP’s and the RSS’ efforts to the contrary. As a result, the involvement of religious groups within the textbook industry generally is more pernicious in Pakistan than in India, as secularism remains the reigning ideology in the Indian education system in spite of the communalists’ rise to power.

It would be easy to condemn the Hindu nationalists and represent the secular bent in textbooks as a force for good, yet it is important to keep in mind that both the Hindu nationalists and secularists attempt to use religion to impose their own views of the state as a fixed, homogenous entity. Through the imposition of this narrative, they erase the perspectives of those who are excluded from official history of Partition, such as women and ethnic minorities.

Comparing Textbooks to Reality: The Erasure of Narratives

The second part of this paper seeks to compare the depictions of Partition with the accounts of those who lived through the freedom struggle, assessing the validity of the textbook’s claims and also highlighting narratives that are lost through the state-imposed ideologies. The purpose of this is similar to Saikia’s work, which utilizes “multi-sited” ethnographic research methodology that combines oral history with archival...materials, and keeping in mind that the diverse memories...produce polyversal narratives, I explore an inner history of the war that is not circulated in the public sphere.” As Saikia describes, only through such personal testimonies can the focus be shifted from the “external” history of leaders, campaigns and tactics covered in the state textbooks to the “internal” history of ordinary individuals whose lives who were torn asunder by Partition, and whose stories have yet to be fully incorporated into the public eye. The 1947 Partition Archive has compiled an enormous collection of interviews with survivors of the Partition, which I have had the privilege of studying for the purpose of this paper. After listening to numerous Hindus, Sikhs and Muslims men and women recall their memories from 1947, I have been able to draw a few conclusions.

For example, there were noticeable differences in the way Hindus and Muslims perceived the events leading up to and unfolding after Partition. Waheed Siddiqee, a Muslim who was 15 at the time of Partition, discusses violence in Hyderabad, India, and mentions the volunteer army corps known as the rajakars, which were established as part of the Muslim ruler’s attempts to retain control over Hyderabad and prevent it...
from acceding to India. Siddiquee admits “the volunteers did commit some atrocities, I am ashamed to say that,” though he does not describe the extent of the violence they committed; he also mentioned that local Hindus who were harboring grudges were partly to blame for the violence. However, I interviewed my Hindu father, Rambabu Yarlagadda, a Hindu who was not alive at the time of Partition, though he learned his information from relatives and friends who were present and also from his own studies. His perception of the Hindu-Muslim riots in Hyderabad gives far more weight to the rajakars, placing the blame on them for most of the violence that occurred in the city. There were similarities in the dialogue of both men, who attributed more violence to local Hindus and Muslims, as opposed to the Indian national army.

Interviews with Yarlagadda also reflect the national, secular policies of Indian textbooks. He stated that Indian textbooks focused on being excessively “politically correct” to the point where, as a child, he was unaware of the extent of violence and millions of deaths that had occurred as a result of the freedom struggle. This testimony reflects the dangers of omitting multiple perspectives of history in order to impose a single, state-centric narrative. Furthermore, it also relates to Kumar’s discussion of how the freedom struggle's portrayal receives considerably little attention in Indian textbooks, which suits the purposes of both the secular and communal groups. For both the secularists and the Hindu nationalists, Partition was a shameful event for the nation, although for different reasons. For the secularists, Partition was a death-blow to the pluralistic, multi-religious composition of Indian society. For the communalists, it injured the pride of Hindu civilization, which was torn apart by Muslims whose ancestors were supposedly medieval invaders. Thus both groups settled upon an unspoken compromise—the textbooks would scarcely mention Partition, for “so long as the text did not encourage children to think about the nature of the injury that Partition had caused, rival interpretations would stay buried.” This stands in stark contrast to Pakistan, for whom the event represented the birth of their nation and is gloriously celebrated in textbooks as such. The rival debates between communalists and secularists, which has led to an appallingly watered-down portrayal of the freedom struggle in Indian texts, harms the schoolchildren more so than anyone else by failing to expose them to the key historical events shaping their nation.

While the interviews do suggest some underlying tensions between Muslims and Hindus, they are neither so black-and-white as the Hindu nationalists would believe, nor so absent as the secularists would like to portray. For example, Waheed recalls that although he was friends with some Hindus, he affirms “socially and culturally, we were two different classes,” stating that he never recalled his Hindu classmates coming to the mosque with him, nor he going to a temple with them. His family migrated to Lahore, yet no one forced them to leave India—they relocated after realizing they would lose the luxuries they had once enjoyed living amongst Muslims in Hyderabad and wanted to move to the Muslim majority area of Pakistan, suggesting that religious bonds did play a strong role in the events that occurred after Partition.

However, while tensions did emerge between Hindus and Muslims, nothing in these accounts implies that there were any fundamental differences persisting between Hindus and Muslims that had existed for centuries, or at least, none so great that they could not coexist peacefully. In fact, Ravinder Kumar Chopra, a Hindu who migrated from Pakistan, lived with Muslims in the months leading up to Partition and was even given safe shelter in a Muslim man’s compartment during the dangerous train ride out.
of Pakistan and into India. Chopra is quoted as saying that prior to Partition “jointly, shoulder to shoulder, [they] fought for the nation...Muslims, Sikhs, Hindus...they were all Indians,” mentioning that there was no conception of Pakistan before 1947. Yet due to the state ideology that propagates divide-and-rule and religious divisions, these stories of friendship and support that transcend religious ties are utterly and completely lost from the official annals of history.

**Conclusion: Textbooks, Children and the Future**

After beginning with the development of the textbook controversies then transitioning to describe the stories of everyday citizens whose lives were thrown into chaos by Partition, it seems only fitting to conclude with the perspectives of the children themselves, the members of the “textbook generation” whose minds are supposedly being molded by the hateful biases expressed in Pakistani and Indian textbooks. Krishna Kumar received 60 essays on Partition and the freedom struggle from several children in Indian and Pakistani schools in Delhi and Lahore, representing all types of schools, including Urdu-Medium, English-Medium, government schools, and private schools.

The most surprising element of these schoolchildren’s essay was the remarkable diversity of views described within them. Some children’s essays reflected the traditional two-nation theory teachings of their textbooks, pinning the cause of Partition on Muslims or Hindus. Others cited British policies of divide-and-rule as the cause for the tensions emerging unfolding around 1947. Most Pakistani children viewed Partition as a good event, yet surprisingly, some expressed mixed views. One stated that Partition was a tragedy because, if India and Pakistan had stayed one nation, their hockey team would have been unsurpassable. Nearly all mentioned Kashmir as the major source of continual conflict between the two nations. The variety of views received was unexpected, given the singular narratives that state textbooks present regarding the freedom struggle, and they illustrate possible hope that despite the influence of state-imposed ideologies, students in India and Pakistan can still question and critically analyze the viewpoints thrust upon them.

One of the most overwhelming sentiments that the children expressed was a desire to look beyond history, move on from Partition, and let bygones be bygones, in stark contrast to the tensions between the two countries presented in not only the textbooks, but also in the media, government, pop culture and the home. This outlook is promising for the future of India-Pakistan relations.

Yet, it would be dangerous to put too much stock into these essays, and conclude that all is well for the future of education in India and Pakistan. In both India and Pakistan, students are taught to prepare, and that involves rote memorization of facts and dates, as opposed to real understanding of historical trends and phenomena. Not only are hateful or insufficient narratives impressed upon children, but children are also taught not to question or thoroughly understand what they are taught, only to memorize through repetition. Despite disagreeing with some of Enlightened Pakistan’s suggested reforms, I concur with their disapproval at the lack of explication within history texts, which “promotes rote learning because there is no analysis and therefore the student is unable to understand history, and can only know it.” Some of the conciliatory attitudes expressed in the schoolchildren’s essays are encouraging, but

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42 Kumar, 230.
43 Ibid., 226.
44 Ibid., 230.
45 Usmani, 53.
hardly a guarantee of a peaceful relations between Hindus and Muslims and between India and Pakistan. The education systems in the two nations can promote tolerant attitudes only through significant reform of the curriculum that offers greater focus to the violence embedded in Partition as well as the multiple perspectives of individuals of various genders, religions, and ethnicities; de-emphasizes the influence of religious forces in texts, be they Islamization policies or Hindu nationalist ones; and seeks to curtail the inflammatory rhetoric that naturally sets groups against one another.

For in this discussion of national identity and struggles over which version of history should best be portrayed, no one considers which version of history or what form of education would be best for the child. It is certainly not the current version of history as portrayed in textbooks, which teaches children one account of Partition, ignoring all others, and indoctrinating the future generation into a hatred of the “Other,” be it a Hindu, a Muslim, a Pakistani, or an Indian.

To conclude, I must agree with the notable Pakistani historian K.K Aziz, who states, “History ought to be above the laws of government and the whims of paid scholars.” History must educate children about the diverse viewpoints surrounding important events that have affected the nation, yet it must not spread propaganda or be utilized as a political tool, as textbooks now have become. For that alone, the education system India and Pakistan should face much tougher scrutiny in the coming years.

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46 Aziz, xvii.
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The Sound of Silence:
The Current Buraku Issue in Tokyo and Its Solutions

Muyang Chen

Abstract

The Burakumin, literally meaning people of the village (Buraku), are a hidden minority in Japan facing discrimination because of the low social caste of their ancestors. The Japanese government’s solution to the Buraku issue, i.e., the Dowa policies, has been grounded in the idea of integration, merging the minority into the “normal Japanese society.” Tokyo, where the Buraku communities are dispersed and the Burakumin live amongst the general populace, presents a successful example of the policies. Based on three months of fieldwork in Tokyo, with eleven personal interviews and visits to three Buraku communities and three Buraku-related agencies, this investigation reveals further problems of the Buraku situation in Tokyo and the bottlenecks of the Dowa policies. This article argues that the ideal outcome of the Buraku issue should not be complete integration. Rather, it should be society’s understanding and respect for the minority group, which, however, is in fact an even more challenging task in this era.

Buraku, Buraku History, and Buraku Issue

Burakumin, literally people of the Buraku (villages), together with the Ainu, Okinawan, and Zainichi Korean and Taiwanese, are the main social minority groups in Japanese society. Unlike other minority groups, though, Burakumin are ethnically identical to the “normal Japanese” (ippan nihonjin). Yet they are distinguished from the majority because of their descent. Origins of the Buraku can be traced back to feudal Japan, when the ancestors of the Burakumin were called discriminatory names due to their occupations. Most of them conducted religiously “unclean” jobs relating to death or carcasses, such as executors, butchers, and tanners. These people were called Eta (mass of filth). Others included Hinin (non-human): namely, vagrants, entertainers, and prostitutes. In the Edo Period when a caste system consisting of samurai, peasants, artisans and merchants (shi-no-ko-sho) was officially established, Eta and Hinin were the outcastes excluded from these four hierarchies and lived in segregated areas. This system dissolved in the Meiji Period when the government issued the Emancipation Edict and officially granted the outcastes with equal rights. Nevertheless, the Edict only transformed the discrimination from an institutionalized one to a social one, and did not eliminate it. “Normal Japanese” still regarded the “Eta-hinin” as the inferior, isolated group. In the 1900s, the word “Tokushu Buraku” (special villages) was used officially to refer to the former Eta villages, and the descendents of the former outcastes were henceforth called the Burakumin.

During the first half of the twentieth century, movements to protect the rights of Burakumin rose and developed. Among them were two main powers, the top-down Yuwa Movement (Integration Movement) and the bottom-up Suiheisha Movement (National Levelers’ Movement). Influenced by the ideology of national independence
and anti-foreignness that emerged after the Sino-Japanese War and the Russo-Japanese War, Buraku leaders launched the movement aiming at the integration of Burakumin into mainstream society by improving their living standard. Unlike the older generation of Buraku leaders, the younger generation Burakumin supported democracy and socialism. They proposed an alternative approach focusing on the criticism and denunciation of anti-Buraku discrimination, and established the National Leveler’s Association. In the postwar period, the term Yuwa was replaced by Dowa, an abbreviation for Doho Yuwa (integration of the compatriots), and the Buraku issue was referred to by the government as the Dowa Issue. Since 1969 the government implemented the Dowa Initiative Projects, providing fiscal support to improve the economic situation in the designated Dowa areas. The projects were carried on until 2002. The National Leveler’s Association reformed in 1946 and turned into the Buraku Liberation League (BLL). It is still central to many Buraku movements today. In 1998, BLL established the International Movement against All Forms of Discrimination and Racism (IMADR), which later became a United Nations-affiliated NGO.

Japan’s so-called ‘Buraku Issue’ encompasses two parts: first, the low living standard of Buraku areas, and second, anti-Buraku discrimination. The living standards in Buraku areas have remained low since the days of Eta villages being placed in less developed areas. Most Buraku communities nowadays remain at the rim of city or in enclosed rural areas. Burakumin consequently have limited access to social resources such as public transportation, medical care and education. The Dowa Initiative Projects (1969-2002) have greatly improved living conditions in Buraku areas.

The Dowa Special Measures Law primarily served to build up infrastructure in Dowa areas. It equipped mountainous area with highways and riverside area with levees, and set up public facilities such as nursing houses and childcare centers. During the 33 years of the initiative, the government spent a total amount of 5 trillion Yen (50 billion USD). In spite of the laws’ successes, it faced criticism for the large amount of money it allocated for the development of Buraku areas. This criticism points to the second component to the Buraku Issue – anti-Buraku sentiment in Japan. This criticism became one of the major reasons that the projects halted in 2002.

The Japan Communist Party (JCP) is well-known for its decades of unfriendly relations with BLL. Articles criticizing the Dowa Initiative Projects were often seen in its publication the Red Flag. JCP claimed that budget expenditure on Buraku construction will not solve problems. This favored the voters who are against Dowa budget. Other parties, generally speaking, would accept the legislative requests of BLL to enhance the human rights situation in Japan. Anti-Buraku sentiment manifests most saliently in marital discrimination. According to a governmental survey on marriage attitude of Dowa Area non-Buraku parents (1993), 4.9% of them answered “absolutely no” when asked “what if your child wants to marry a Burakumin?” 4.7% answered, “I won’t agree if my family opposes.” 30.6% answered, “I’d have to agree if my child strongly insisted.” Data provided by IMADR (2001) shows that percentages of the three answers are 5.0%, 7.1%, and 45.0%. A survey in Tottori Prefecture Dowa Areas (2005) shows that among the Buraku-non-Buraku couples married within the recent decade, 21.9% had

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2 Personal communication, Tomotsune Tsutomu, Lecturer of Tokyo University of Foreign Studies, Tokyo, May 12, 2010.
3 Personal communication, Uchino, Tokyo, April 21.
4 1993Nen (Somucho) Dowa Chiku Jittai Haaku Chosa, Tokyo no Buraku Mondai Nyumon (Buraku Kaiho Domei Tokyo Rengokai, 2010), p. 3.
experienced opposition from the non-Buraku family.⁶ Many non-Buraku families believe that marriage to a Buraku would result in their “family lineage be[ing] spoiled,” and that the “children of a mixed family might suffer discrimination and birth defects.”⁷ Marriages between Buraku and non-Buraku have often resulted in such tragedies as suicide and estrangement from family. Some Burakumin who married a non-Buraku have hidden their identities their entire lives. Fujisawa Seisuke, a half-Buraku born in the 40s, said that his mother, who is from a Tokyo Buraku, never mentioned a word about her identity until he accidentally learned of his Buraku background.⁸

Anti-Buraku discrimination also occurs in the job market. Before relevant laws were carried out, companies could ask for applicants’ honsekichi (domicile) and might refuse to recruit them if they came from a Buraku region (honsekichi is an item on the Japanese family registry [koseki]. It indicates one’s family origin and does not vary with residential address⁹). Laws have since been established to protect the privacy of Burakumin; koseki are now kept in the Ward Office, inaccessible to other people, and potential employers cannot ask for it. Some companies, however, still acquire this information by illegal means.¹⁰ This illegal investigating is called “Mimoto Chosa” (identity check). There are several ways to do it. One is to ask lawyers to access koseki under the guise of a “criminal investigation.” Another is to look at lists of names in Buraku areas. A well-known Mimoto Chosa case was the Incident of Comprehensive List of Buraku Area in Osaka (1975). A detailed list of names of Buraku areas spanning several generations was confidentially sold to companies and individuals. Checking with the list, one could easily know the background of their “target.” The Mimoto Chosa has not yet been wholly eradicated.¹¹

The Buraku Issue in Tokyo

The legacy of historical Edo is still visible in Tokyo today. Many Tokyo Burakumin reside in the districts along Sumidakawa and Arakawa River, including Taito, Arakawa, Adachi, Katsushika, Sumida, etc (indicated with arrows). This is because Edo outcastes were mainly engaged in the leather industry, which required water for its manufacturing. The Edo period trade center of these leather products was Asakusa. Many leather-product shops still stand to the North of Metro Asakusa Station. Further North, in the Imado area, an “Eta village” in Edo Japan has many private leather manufacturing shops and the Leather Industry Material Museum. On the following page,

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⁸ Personal communication, Fujisawa Seisuke, Researcher of the Eastern Japan Buraku Research Institute, Tokyo, May 8, 2010.
⁹ Personal communication, Uchino Takashi, Staff of the Buraku Liberation League Headquarter, Tokyo, April 21, 2010.
¹⁰ Personal communication, Uchino, Tokyo, April 21, 2010.
the map on the left (1858) shows an Eta village; the one on the right is how it looks now.

Due to frequent population migration since Meiji Restoration, destruction caused by the Great Kanto Earthquake (1923) and the Great Tokyo AirRaids (1945), Buraku communities in Tokyo have gradually merged with other residences. With reference to the official data from Tokyo-fu in 1935, Tokyo had in total 20 Buraku, with 1,378 households and 7,248 people. But after WWII, due to the municipal government's denial of the existence of Burakumin in Tokyo, there had been no official data on the Tokyo Buraku population. According to the investigation of BLL Tokyo and its 10 branch offices, Tokyo Buraku communities gathered in three areas: eastern Tokyo (Adachi, Arakawa, Edokawa, Katsushika, Koto, and Sumida Ward), southern Tokyo (Shinagawa, Oda, Minato Ward, centered in the Shibaura slaughterhouse), and western Tokyo (Nerima, Kunitachi and Hachioji Ward). Based on the statistics from the above areas, plus the number of Burakumin emigrated from other prefectures and those who do not reveal their identity, an estimation of the current Buraku population in Tokyo would be 0.4 million.

Most Burakumin nowadays are not engaged in the traditional “Buraku jobs such as leather manufacturing or shoe making. They do “normal jobs” and can easily pass as “normal Japanese.” Some of them intentionally hide their Buraku identity, but most of them simply do not mention it because most Japanese people would not ask about it.

Yet Tokyo Burakumin live in the least developed Wards of Tokyo. According to an official evaluation of the fiscal capability of the 23 Tokyo Wards (2007), Arakawa, Adachi, Katsushika, Sumida took up the bottom four; Edokawa, Koto, Nerima also located in the lower half of the ranking. Takaiwa Masaoki, a staff member of BLL Tokyo Arakawa Branch cited the words of the Arakawa Ward mayor, “The one who could restore the economy of Arakawa Ward could win Nobel Prize.”

The main industry of Arakawa used to be leather processing, but competition from abroad has driven all but five tanning factories out of business. Nearby residents

13 Matsunaga Toshio, “Tokyoto Genjo,” Buraku Mondai Jinen Jiten, <http://wiki.blhrri.org/jiten/index.php?%A1%F6%C5%EC%B5%FE%C5%BD>
14 Personal Communication, Uramoto, Tokyo, April 28, 2010.
16 Personal communication, Takaiwa Masaoki, Secretary general of Buraku Liberation League Tokyo-Araakawa Branch, Tokyo, May 26, 2010.
still complained about the smell and noise these factories emitted and complained to the Ward office about these “traditional Buraku industries.” The BLL Arakawa Branch had received consulters from both Buraku households and leather factories who encountered anti-Buraku discrimination.

That the majority of “normal Japanese” do not know about the Buraku does not mean that Tokyo Burakumin live without discrimination. In fact, most people have some degree of vague knowledge of the “eta-hinin” and the prejudice of the “dirty Buraku.” Incidents reported most frequently from 2000 onwards involve graffiti. Graffiti contain insulting words such as “Eta goes to die (Eta Shi-ne)” have been found on public facilities such as trashcans, metro stairs and vending machines in several wards, and are hurtful to the Burakumin who see them.17 Uramoto Yoshifumi was a victim of more flagrant and significant discrimination. Born in a Buraku in Hyogo Prefecture, Uramoto now works as a staff at BLL Tokyo and is a Buraku history researcher at the Eastern Buraku Liberation Research Institution. In September 2003, he started to receive anonymous letters containing offensive words attacking his Buraku identity. They said such things as “you look human but you are not,” “Burakumin do not deserve to live,” and “I will kill you.” These letters continued to arrive at his apartment every day for 17 months. Further, the anonymous letter-writer contacted Uramoto’s neighbors, telling them such things as, “there is a dangerous Burakumin living nearby; he will cause you trouble.” As a result, five of the 25 families that received the letters approached Uramoto and asked him to leave the apartment. Another two of the families asked Uramoto’s landlord to stop leasing the apartment to him. After investigation, it turned out that the criminal was not an acquaintance of Uramoto. He was imprisoned for two years for committing intimidation, vilification, and forged signature, but not for violating human rights.

Things have improved, however, for Burakumin. Fujimoto, who works for a “normal” company, said that she does not tell her Buraku identity to other people because no one asks. Neither has she had any experience being discriminated at her workplace, “nowadays most companies, especially the large and multi-national ones, do not ask for the background of the applicants.”18 Kamikawa Tami, a housewife who has a 1-year-old daughter, said that she did not receive any opposition marrying her non-Buraku husband. “Although having some worries, I told my husband that I’m a Burakumin when we were dating. But he didn’t know what Buraku is. Nowadays when people of my generation hear about the Buraku, their normal reaction would be ‘huh? What is that?”19

Strategies of NGOs, Government and the Populace

BLL is now one of the main non-governmental organizations that work for the rights of Burakumin. An anti-discrimination method it used to promote was “denunciation” (kyudan). According to BLL’s definition, denunciation refers to “Burakumin’s behavior, for the purpose of human rights protections, to request for the self-reflection of people who conduct discriminatory behaviors.” In a denunciation hearing, the discriminator would be asked to self-reflect in front of the victim and any other people who attended the hearing. However, denunciation became notorious for its “counter-violence” in several cases, including the Yata incident (Osaka, 1969), the Yoka High School Incident (Hyogo, 1974), and the Tenri-nishi Middle School Incident

18 Personal communication, Ms. Fujimoto, company employee, Tokyo, May 12, 2010.
19 Personal communication, Ms. Kamikawa, Tokyo, June 1, 2010.
in which local BLL activists violently denounced the teachers who abused Buraku students. The incidents exposed BLL to nationwide criticism. As a result, the Ministry of Justice released a notification Confirmation and Denunciation in August 1989, negating BLL’s right to engage in such activity. Nevertheless, denunciation reinforced human rights of the Burakumin and alarmed the discriminators and other hearing attendants.

Meanwhile the main work of BLL has been collaborating with other human rights organizations to improve human rights legislation in Japan. According to Fujimoto Tadayoshi, a staff member at BLL Tokyo, they proposed the establishment of an institution to deal with discriminatory incidents. The institution would be set up under the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, managing not only Buraku issues but also other human rights issues. The reason to establish such an institution is that in Japan, no institution deals directly with cases concerning human rights violation. Another objective of BLL is to establish anti-discrimination laws.

In addition, BLL draws support from international human rights organizations. In 1988, BLL established IMADR, an NGO that aims at eliminating discrimination. “IMADR has grown to be a global network with regional committees and partners in Asia, Europe, North America and Latin America. Its International Secretariat is based in Japan and maintains a UN liaison office in Geneva. It is in consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council.” As an NGO of UN, IMADR has been endeavoring to add the Buraku issue to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. In August 2000, a draft resolution on Discrimination Based on Work and Descent submitted by the delegation of Japan and India was adopted by UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. The resolution aims at eliminating caste-based discrimination against Dalit people in India and Burakumin in Japan. However, the Japanese government refused to acknowledge the resolution, claiming that Buraku discrimination is not based on descent (Sekei), but on family origin (Monchi). The government’s latest report to the Convention (2008) still did not include the Buraku issue as a human rights problem in Japan, though it did mention the Ainu and the Zainichi.

The Tokyo Metropolitan Human Rights Promotion Center is another organization working on the issue, and it operates on the principle that legislation alone is not enough to eliminate discrimination. Consultation with those who have faced discrimination and education are also integral to any solution. It holds human rights related lectures and film screenings, and provides consultation for victims via email, mail, phone call, and face-to-face talk. The Center does not exclusively focus on Dowa issue. According to its annual report 2008 fiscal year, Dowa issue accounted for only 10 out of the total 1,437 consultation cases, and 18 out of 1,184 in the previous fiscal year. The operations of this organization evidence that institutions working on Buraku rights issues tend to be focused on other issues. In fact, what has contributed most to the improvement of the Tokyo Buraku situation is neither the government nor the NGOs,

22 Personal communication, Fujimoto Tadayoshi, Staff of the Buraku Liberation League Tokyo, Tokyo, May 11, 2010.
24 Personal communication, Fujimoto, Tokyo, May 11, 2010.
but macroeconomic changes that have benefitted all Tokyo residents and the Metropolitan itself. Due to economic boom and population mobility, Tokyo has become a region that naturally achieved the Dowa goal without being designated as a Dowa Area, and Tokyo Burakumin have naturally integrated into the “normal society.” Unlike the situation decades ago when Burakumin had to cautiously hide their identity, in modern day Tokyo, they can do it by simply not mentioning their identity because hardly anyone would ask. Even if they do mention their identity, there is the high possibility that others do not know what Burakumin is.

**Bottleneck: the Remaining Dilemmas**

If the Dowa approach is the right answer to the Buraku issue, then Tokyo should be the perfect model of such approach due to its high degree of economic standard and personal mobility. However, remaining discrimination in Tokyo suggests that the Dowa approach could never solve the problem thoroughly. The voice of the Burakumin is inaudible to the populace. People might watch the demonstrations or read the news, but that is all. They hardly care about the Buraku issue, and certainly have not involved themselves in the Buraku liberation movement. “There has actually been a regression of people’s participation in the human rights activities,” said Professor Tomotsune Tsutomu, a Buraku history researcher who began his interest in Buraku by participating in the 1980s student movement. “Back in the day, students were more interested in joining social movements,” he commented. “Now the environment has been more internationalized and liberalized, but people on the contrary do not participate as much.”

Overt discrimination cases against Burakumin are no longer common in Tokyo. Yet the possibility of encountering anti-Buraku discrimination, though low, still worries the Tokyo Burakumin. “No matter 1% or 90%, as long as discrimination occurs, it hurts. I’ve always been anxious that one day it will happen to me. I don’t think Tokyo Burakumin live a more relieved life than Osaka Burakumin do.” Commented Kamikawa, “in the future, this kid might suffer discrimination too,” she pointed to her daughter. Fujiwasa, a Buraku history researcher, explained why it is impossible to integrate and forget the Buraku entirely. He demonstrated this point by sharing his personal experience.

I joined the Buraku movement when I was a student at the University of Tokyo in the 1970s, and became a Buraku history researcher after graduation. I didn’t know I’m a Burakumin until one day I met a senior BLL colleague in the office. He said there are many Buraku communities in Fuchu (Fujiwasa’s hometown, a city in western Tokyo), and asked for my surname. When I told him my mother’s surname, he replied ‘undoubtedly, that’s Buraku surname.’ I soon called my mother to confirm. This is how I learned I’m a Burakumin. It’s like a Manga story. 

Fujiwasa continued by describing the Buraku situation in Tokyo. “Simply by knowing your surname and home address, those ‘who know’ can tell your Buraku identity,” he said. “It is impossible to hide one’s Buraku identity or forget the Buraku totally; people who know will always know.” This echoes what Uchino Takashi, Kamikawa, Uramoto and many others have said about the current situation in Tokyo: people, who know,
know a lot, people who don’t know, don’t know.

When asked about what would happen if all Burakumin were integrated into “normal society,” Fujisawa replied, “then Buraku will [be] extinct! Why do I have to quit my Buraku identity? My ancestors didn’t do anything wrong.” Maybe not all Burakumin are as courageous as the Buraku activists about their identity, but Fujisawa’s opinion demonstrates the self-recognition of some Burakumin. “I will certainly tell my daughter about her Buraku background,” said Kamikawa, “I will do it myself, but it is a problem when and how to tell her about this.”

There are two barriers to finding an alternative solution to the Dowa initiative. One is the lack of an explicit trait that would demonstrate the heterogeneity of the Burakumin. This allows for official denial of the Burakumin as a minority and the populace’s ignorance of the issue. The other is the lack of a politically charged environment, so that human rights NGOs face huge difficulty raising social awareness for the issue.

There is a lack of understanding about the Buraku Issue among policy makers. The Government’s understanding of the Buraku issue denies the heterogeneity of the Burakumin. Dowa, or Doho Yuwa (integration of the compatriot), implies that Burakumin is not a heterogeneous minority. Such understanding can be traced back to the thought of ethno-historian Kita Sadakichi, whose work was significant in the beginning of the twentieth century. Kita held the proposition that the Japanese are a “mixed ethnicity” whose ancestors are various Asian people, including the Koreans and the Taiwanese. He further argued that the Burakumin are not the descendents of a foreign ethnicity; they have a complex lineage as all Japanese do. In essence, the Burakumin – entertainers, mountain folks and villagers – are the impoverished stragglers of society. The well-off should make efforts to assimilate them, she argues, and thereby the nation as a whole could achieve prosperity. Kita’s understanding of Burakumin can be better understood within the historical background of his time, during which Japan was a multi-ethnic empire that had colonized Korea and Taiwan, and developed Hokkaido where the Ainu reside. Kita’s theory coincides with Japan’s imperial identity by providing a conjunction between the multi-ethnicity of the colony and the unity of a colonial empire. Consequently, the Burakumin, who are ethnically identical with the “normal Japanese,” should obviously be considered compatriot rather than minority. Kita’s understanding of the Burakumin is significant. First, it clarified the misconception that the Burakumin were another ethnicity. Second, it pointed out that the heterogeneity of the Burakumin lies in their economic backwardness. Policy on the Buraku, based on such an assumption, should be poverty eradication. This theoretical foundation had great influence on government policies towards the Buraku issue.

Policies of prewar and wartime Yuwa Movement and of postwar Dowa Initiative Projects both aimed at the enhancement of the economic condition of the Buraku. Human rights organizations like BLL alternatively believe that the Burakumin possess heterogeneous characteristics and should not be assimilated. Uramoto stated that “we, the Burakumin, call the issue as the Buraku issue rather than Dowa issue. The term ‘Buraku’ comes from ‘Hisabetsu Buraku’ (discriminated village), which involves the meaning of discrimination, but ‘Doho Yuwa’ implies a denial of the discrimination within the Japanese nation.” In other words, Buraku activists see the Burakumin as a minority facing discrimination. This point of view is shared by all other anti-discrimination human rights organizations. However, unlike other minority groups that

30 Personal communication, Kamikawa, Tokyo, June 1, 2010.
32 Personal communication, Uramoto, Tokyo, April 28, 2010.
possess conspicuous heterogeneous features such as gender (female), ethnicity (Zainichi Korean), age (the elderly), or sexual orientation (homosexuality), the Burakumin have no explicit physical features that distinguish them from the majority. IMADR denoted such heterogeneous feature as “decent” in the UN resolution, as mentioned earlier, but such a feature, unlike gender, race, or age, is no longer visible among modern day Burakumin. In short, the heterogeneity of Burakumin is hard to demonstrate. This makes Buraku-related human right activities difficult. For example, to educate the Tokyo populace about the Burakumin, one has to first explain feudal Japanese history. Such difficulty deepens ignorance, misunderstanding, and prejudice over the Buraku.

Despite the above mentioned discrepancy, the methods that the government and the BLL use to resolve Buraku issue are not completely incompatible. In the 1960s and 1970s, the top-down and bottom-up powers converged and brought to a peak the Buraku movement. Back then Japan was in an era of rapid economic growth and enormous societal changes. The entire Japanese society moved swiftly towards the country’s economic goal. The objective of Dowa Initiative Projects, eradicating poverty in Dowa Areas, coincided with economic nationalism. The economic boom delivered a rise in psychological problems among Japanese citizens, most prevalently stress from a competitive working environment and a sense of detachment from society. This intense environment created among the students a negative feeling of emptiness. Such feeling manifested in political movements. In the 1960s, the New Left, mainly consisting of college students, and its movement named All-campus Joint Struggle developed quickly. Students were enthusiastic to participate in various political movements against whatever they considered unjust and unfair. The Sayama Struggle, a movement against the false accusation of a Burakumin, thrived with such enthusiasm. Fujisawa’s experience well reflected this period of history – he joined the Sayama Struggle in the 1960s when he was a student of University of Tokyo, the university that had the most fierce student movement.

That spirit of political engagement has weakened, the Buraku activities have entered a state of quiescence, and the majority of the populace is silent about social issues. As many NGO members have commented, Japan is a society that is indifferent and hard to mobilize. Both Buraku and non-Buraku joined the Buraku movement from the 1960s to the 1980s via the Sayama Struggle. Moreover, pushed by such an environment, many Burakumin were encouraged to admit their identity.” He further commented that although government policies do not eliminate discrimination directly, its influence on the populace is irreplaceable by the NGOs. “Without the support of the government, social awareness cannot be cultivated.”

Conclusion

The current Buraku situation in Tokyo coincides with the government’s opinion that Dowa is the best solution to the Buraku issue. Living conditions among Buraku communities have enhanced, and anti-Buraku discrimination has decreased. However, discrimination cannot be entirely eliminated. On the contrary, as a byproduct of the Dowa policy, ignorance and prejudice give rise to sporadic discrimination cases. Thus, integration is not the solution to the Buraku issue. Nevertheless, it is hard to find an alternative solution due to the above mentioned two barriers, the lack of recognition of the heterogeneity of the Burakumin as well as the lack of a political environment that would motivate people to join Buraku movements. One thing is certain: a solution to

34 Personal communication, Tomotsune, Tokyo, May 12, 2010.
35 Personal communication, Tomotsune, Tokyo, May 12, 2010.
the Buraku issue demands a greater level of understanding from society. Until there is greater awareness of the prejudice that Burakumin face, discrimination will remain.
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Deconstructing Japan’s Military Globalism:
The March to “Normal” Nationhood

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Abstract
In this paper I argue that the turn of the millennium saw an acceleration of Japanese military engagement with the world, as Japan, Australia, South Korea, and India, all sought to expand and diversify their military relations. The common objective of these three countries produced a synergistic effect, facilitating an increase in the depth and breath of Japan’s military relations. Far from being a hedge against the U.S., this movement shows how Japan is acting more “normally”- exercising greater initiative in the pursuit of its own security interests vis-à-vis the rise of China. Moreover, this transformation continues to unfold irrespective of the DPJ’s 2009 usurpation of the LDP as majority party.

Introduction

Two decades after the passage of the 1992 Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) Law, Japan has progressed from repairing roads and bridges under the United Nations (UN) mandate in Cambodia, to semi-permanently basing Japanese Self-Defense Force (JSDF) assets in Djibouti.

I refer to this increased willingness to deploy farther from home, and in the process, forge working military relations with new security partners outside of the traditional U.S.-Japan alliance, particularly with Australia, South Korea, and India as Japanese military globalism.

This military globalism can be construed as a manifestation of Richard Samuels’ prediction of Japanese “hedging.”1 Samuels notes that alliances, while conferring benefits, also present states with the twin dangers of entrapment within another state’s policies, or abandonment by the partner state. Contrary to Samuels, I argue that this hedging behavior is not geared towards the U.S. In fact, the U.S. has in many instances facilitated laying the groundwork for Japan’s newly diversified military relations. As David Kang writes, “Japan is also deepening its alliance with the United States [italics mine] while beginning to create the domestic and international institutional and political linkages that would allow that relationship to become more of a choice than an obligation.”2 It is the rapidly improving military capabilities of a rising China, rather than the U.S., which today serve as the ongoing impetus for Japan’s expanding military globalism. Here I show that Japan is indeed widening its network of military relations and that this military globalism has undergone both qualitative and quantitative change since the late 1990s – changes that the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) has largely supported.

Qualitatively speaking, the governing impetus of Japanese military globalism

has taken three distinct forms in the past two decades; from that of U.N. enforcer during the 1990s (Cambodia (1992-1993), Somalia (1993), Rwanda (1994-1995), Bougainville (1994), and East Timor (1999-2002), to bulwark against terrorism during the early 2000s (exemplified by the 2002 Japan-Australia Joint Statement on Cooperation to Combat International Terrorism), to balancer against a rising China today.

A quantitative examination reveals that during the years leading up to and following the turn of the millennium, Japanese military globalism accelerated rapidly as a series of exogenous shocks provided first by Australia, then South Korea and India each with the incentive to either initiate or accelerate the movement towards a multilateral security framework. This movement provided the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) (later the DPJ) with an ideal environment to expand Japan’s military relations – relations that up until that time, were hardly extant outside of the U.S.-Japanese alliance.

Using news and journal articles informed by interviews with U.S. and Japanese government officials, military personnel, and policy experts, I explore the basis of the JSDF’s evolution into a globally engaged military force – one that is in the process of seeking out new security partners. I then present evidence that the newly empowered Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) is effectively continuing this policy of hedging by way of diversifying Japan’s military relations. While Prime Minister Koizumi is rightfully credited with having reinvigorated the U.S.-Japan alliance, it is under the DPJ that Japan has seen the most substantive achievements yet in Japan’s efforts to broaden its range of strategic partners.

The JSDF: The World’s Best-Funded Humanitarian Aid Organization

Japanese globalism began upon the cessation of the Cold War. Once deprived of the Soviet threat as leverage, Japan became less able to resist U.S. calls for a greater reciprocity in the alliance. In 1992, President Bush and Prime Minister Miyazawa moved to incorporate Japan into a “Global Partnership” wherein Japan would enjoy a much freer hand in establishing its own independent security framework. In the wake of the Gulf War, Japan was not only red-faced over its “checkbook diplomacy,” but was beginning to feel the peer-pressure emanating from Germany’s own military liberalization. These events conspired to force Japan to move beyond the parochial workings of the Yoshida Doctrine, and make tangible contributions to regional security.

With the experimental, but popular post-Gulf War dispatch of minesweepers to the Persian Gulf serving as justification for passing the 1992 Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) Law, the JSDF would henceforth be imbued with the authority to deploy abroad on a regular basis.

The first opportunity to utilize this new authority came in the form of the United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia (UNTAC). Yasushi Akashi, the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General, referencing the unprecedented size of the UN deployment, remarked that UNTAC presented the UN with a spectacular testing ground for determining what form post-Cold War peacekeeping operations should take, a comment that was equally applicable to Japan’s situation.3 As Aurelia George writes, “By a process of piecemeal but steady consensual evolution, it has been possible for the Japanese government to extend the range of SDF functions and capabilities in

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the postwar period” – a statement that has remained accurate in the face of the JSDF deployment to Iraq, refueling operations in the Indian Ocean, or anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden today.4

The $40 million USD facility that the JSDF opened in Djibouti this year epitomizes an important policy shift. In this new paradigm, Japan’s military is no longer exclusively performing UN missions for the purpose of accruing international prestige, but is rather looking out for Japan’s own strategic interests. It is engaging in bolder action farther away from the Japanese islands to do so. There is no question that securing the waters through which 90% of Japan’s exports pass is a truer reflection of Japanese national interest then the altruistic UNTAC deployment. Servicing two destroyers, a detachment of P-3C surveillance aircraft, and 180 permanently stationed personnel, the Deployment Air Force for Counter-Piracy Enforcement facility is a genuine first for Japan, and while the JSDF used comparable facilities as part of UNTAC, the deployment was in support of a UN Security Council resolution, and lasted no more than two years. In contrast, there is no UN mandate providing legal cover for the Djibouti facilities - facilities that the JSDF plans to use for at least ten years.5 During this twenty-year long journey from UNTAC to Djibouti, the JSDF has unquestionably expanded in scope and has established itself as an independent actor in the sphere of global security. From 1991 to 2000, the JSDF deployed approximately 985 personnel abroad, 84% of who were serving under UN mandate. During the decade from 2001 to 2010, the JSDF deployed almost triple the number, some 2720 personnel. Of those deployed, a mere 39% were assisting in UN missions (see Figure 1).

This phenomenon is unremarkable, as it represents the continuation of a trend first identified in the early 1990s. However, what is remarkable is the near absence of any impact on the part of Japan’s tumultuous politics. As Figure 2 shows, Japanese military globalism, while accelerating significantly at the turn of the century, has achieved its most tangible accomplishments in the past few years with the DPJ presiding. This is the same DPJ that refused to renew the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law in 2010, thus bringing Japanese refueling operations in the Indian Ocean to a sudden halt, and leading Defense Minister Kitazawa to remark about the “costs of democracy.”6 Tsuneo Watanabe of the Tokyo Foundation interprets this kind of intransigence as symptomatic of a “permanent opposition” mentality that until recently, allowed the DPJ to give free reign to its ideologues (i.e. former members of the Japanese Socialist Party (JSP)).

However, coming into power, the DPJ incurred political constraints. No longer faced with having to define itself against the opposition, the JSDF ceased to be a “political football.” Moreover, the geopolitical realities now confronting DPJ have largely resulted in the implicit adoption of policies initiated by the LDP. The first tangible indication of this is Hatoyama’s response to the 2010 Haiti earthquake. Japan mobilized approximately 350 personnel to support reconstruction following the earthquake, despite the widespread looting and lawlessness that pervaded the country in the wake of the catastrophe. Because of the dangerous conditions on the ground, the MOD had to take care to explain to the public that the danger did not constitute a violation of one of the five preconditions of the PKO Law (that the country must be stable with a ceasefire in place). Ironically enough, Naoto Kan had used an identical line of reasoning seven years prior in an attempt to prevent the JSDF deployment to Iraq.

The Evolving Impetus of Japanese Military Globalism
The extent to which the DPJ has reversed itself since entering office is readily...
observable within the context of U.S.-Japan relations, specifically the ongoing dilemma of the Futenma base issue, and calls for revising the current U.S.-Japan Status of Forces Agreement. In 2005, party president Katsuya Okada called for the complete removal of Futenma Air Station from Okinawa in the DPJ party manifesto. Prime Minister Hatoyama’s handling of that exact issue was sufficient to bring down his administration in 2010. Since then, Prime Minister Naoto Kan, and now Prime Minister Yoshihiko Noda, have both taken pains to “explain” the government’s position to the people of Okinawa regarding the necessity of continuing to base U.S. troops there. Talk of revising the status of forces agreements have likewise been shelved for the time being.

Geopolitical realities have confounded attempts by elements within the DPJ to deviate from the security framework laid down by their LDP predecessors. The result of this is a political party that has discreetly reneged on its platform of renegotiating key aspects of the U.S.-Japan alliance. These geopolitical realities include the Senkaku fishing trawler incident, instability on the Korean peninsula, as well as the intensified probing of Japan’s claimed territorial waters and airspace by Chinese submarines and aircraft.

Largely due to events such as these, the expanding Japanese military relations that I subsequently explore are taking place not so much as a hedge against the U.S., but rather should be construed as a hedge with the U.S. – primarily against a rising China. Daniel Sneider offers the caveat that “it would be wrong to conclude that DPJ policies, shaped during the party’s formative years by key leaders who remain largely in place, have been simply thrown aside.” Rather, I argue that the DPJ’s policy of “Asianism” remains largely intact, but with notions of diversifying Japan’s security relations away from the U.S. now largely discarded. Sneider goes on to argue that Japan’s increasingly multilateral security framework should be seen “as an opportunity to jointly, and in concert with South Korea, reshape the security order in Northeast Asia.” If one takes into account Australia and India as well, then this is precisely what is now taking place. It is to these nascent military partners and their complementary motivations to which we now turn.

Australia & Japan: Side-by-Side From Cambodia to Iraq

Just as Japan’s deployment to Cambodia was the JSDF’s first experience of deploying abroad with “boots on the ground,” coincidentally UNTAC constituted the first genuine instance of Japanese-Australian military cooperation. Under UNTAC, Australian Lieutenant General John Sanderson presided over Japan’s first ever post-

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8 The DPJ is not unique in its politicization of the JSDF. As Minister of Posts and Telecommunications, Junichiro Koizumi himself objected stridently to the deployment of the JSDF to Cambodia in 1993, a stance largely in agreement with public opinion at the time. However, during his tenure as prime minister, Koizumi authorized the deployment of the JSDF to Iraq, despite the mission’s widespread unpopularity, and the fact that Japanese fatalities would ultimately be double of those incurred in Cambodia (4 versus 2). Los Angeles Times, “Japanese Deaths in Cambodia Spur Call to Get Out,” May 15, 1993, [accessed September 30, 2011], <http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1993-05-15/news/1993135015_1_cambodia-japan-peacekeeping>.
10 Ibid.
PKO Law dispatch - a 600-member engineering contingent. However, the deployment proved to be a tumultuous one. The death of a Japanese interpreter in April of 1992, followed by that of a Japanese policeman in May, sparked a massive outcry from the Japanese public. First the Japanese Defense Minister, and then Prime Minister Kiichi Miyazawa threatened to withdraw the JSDF should further causality occur.\(^1\) While UNTAC ultimately achieved some measure of success, the Japanese casualties incurred later informed all future decisions regarding use of the JSDF abroad, lending credibility to the DPJ’s objections against future dispatches – most notably Iraq.

Following UNTAC, the Australian-Japanese defense relationship continued to deepen. On the administrative side, in 1995 the two countries upgraded the 1976 “Basic Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation” to a “Joint Declaration on Australia-Japan Partnership,” paving the way for annual ministerial level dialogue, beginning with Prime Minister Hashimoto’s visit to Canberra in 1997. In 2002 the Trilateral Strategic Dialogue was created to supplement this agreement, thus incorporating the U.S. into the discussions. Back on the ground, the International Forces in East Timor (INTERFET) presented the two militaries in 1999 with a near identical organizational structure as UNTAC had almost a decade prior, with Australian and Japanese troops working side by side in road construction under the command of Australian Major General Peter Cosgrove. Two years later, Australia reprised its role of protector of Japanese forces, as the two militaries engaged in reconstruction efforts in Samawah, Iraq.

Within the context of the U.S. “War on Terror,” we see a deepening of Japanese-Australian military relations, but more significantly, one can also perceive a qualitative change in the relationship’s focus from an emphasis on regional humanitarian intervention, to combating terrorism. In policy circles in Tokyo, Canberra, and Washington, the effect of the terrorist attacks was a forfeiture of influence by liberal camps supporting UN involvement in favor of more traditionally realist, or in the case of the U.S., neo-conservative worldviews. The chance alignment of three conservative administrations, and the bitter loss of life experienced by the U.S. and Australia during the 9/11 attacks and Bali bombings, all coalesced into a multilateral consensus in favor of military force as applied to the extirpation of terrorist networks, and the autocratic regimes perceived as backing them. Moreover, both Howard and Koizumi sought to use the war as an opportunity to achieve force transformation. Koizumi sought a JSDF that could more readily serve Japanese versus UN prerogatives,\(^1\) while Howard envisioned as early as 1996 an Australian Defense Force (ADF) less focused on independently defending Australia from attack, and instead one that placed greater emphasis on cooperation with regional allies on defense. During an interview, one Japanese defense official opined that, so far as Prime Minister Howard was able to bolster defense relations with the U.S., U.K., and Japan simultaneously, his decision to dispatch the ADF to Iraq represented a diplomatically brilliant move.\(^1\) That he was able to achieve defense budget increases to the tune of 3% per annum represents yet another domestic victory.\(^1\)

While the Bush-Koizumi-Howard consensus changed the tone of Japanese-


\(^2\) This change in \textit{modus operandi} is readily discernable if one takes into account the number of JSDF personnel who deployed for reasons other than a UN mandate. 91% of such dispatches took place \textit{after} the 9/11 attacks.

\(^3\) Interview with Japanese Ministry of Defense official, June 27, 2011.

Australian military cooperation, the most significant milestones in the deepening military-to-military relationship were not put into place until after Koizumi was out of office and the Japanese Iraq Reconstruction and Support Group had been disbanded. For instance, in 2007 the ADF agreed for the first time to host JSDF observers during the U.S.-Australian joint exercise TALISMAN SABER – a biennial exercise primarily centered around amphibious assault and ship defense exercises. Furthermore, 2007 also saw the enactment of the Japan-Australia Joint Declaration on Security Cooperation, as well as annualized defense minister “2+2” talks (making Australia only the second nation after the U.S. to institutionalize such dialogue with Japan).

Given that Shinzo Abe was dedicated to continuing Koizumi’s foreign policies, such consistency should not be surprising. However, what is surprising is the fact that military cooperation between Japan and Australia reached an unprecedented depth after the Japanese National Diet and Australian Parliament came under new management by the DPJ and Labor Party respectively. The 2010 signing of the Japan-Australia Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) represents a level of defense integration with Japan hereto only attained by the United States. Enabling “the provision of supplies and services between the Self-Defense Forces of Japan and the Australian Defence Force,” the 2010 ACSA paves the way for “operations to cope with large scale disasters in the territory of either Party or a third country.”

The DPJ would soon oversee a further deepening of Japanese-Australian military cooperation. The day immediately after Japan and Australia signed the ACSA, the Republic of Korea (ROK)-led group investigating the March 2010 sinking of the ROKS CHEONAN released a summary of its final report, concluding that the evidence overwhelmingly supported the theory that the CHEONAN was sunk by a North Korean torpedo attack. A week later, the media unveiled leaked UN reports accusing the DPRK of violating UN sanctions by exporting nuclear and missile technology to Iran, Syria and Burma.

Seoul’s resolve to convey a message to Pyongyang, coupled with revelations of North Korean weapons proliferation, allowed the U.S. to finally bring South Korea into the U.S.-led Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) that President George Bush established in 2003. Specifically, South Korea’s entrance into the PSI framework took the form of the ROK-led international anti-proliferation naval exercise EAST ENDEAVOR 10, in October 2010. While the exercise comprised a total of 15 states (so much the better for showing global solidarity against weapons proliferation), Japan, Australia, South Korea, and the United States were clearly the major players.

Aside from the DPJ’s own policy of engagement with Asia, two drivers of deepening Japanese-Australian military relations are readily observable: (A) Instability on the Korean peninsula, and (B) U.S. guidance. The Proliferation Security Initiative that had held so little appeal for South Korea upon its inception was invigorated after relations between North and South Korea soured. The U.S. was able to use its influence to secure broad participation in the exercise, obtaining greater international legitimacy while partially obscuring the strengthening military relations between Japan, Australia, and South Korea. Moreover, EAST ENDEAVOR 10 represents only the latest manifestation of this pattern, with Japan and Australia having participated in another U.S.-led naval exercise with India – MALABAR 2007 (see Figure 3).

The fact that it was under the auspices of the DPJ that Japan signed the ACSA...
with Australia suggests that Japan’s military relations will continue to broaden, irrespective of whatever party is ascendant in the Japanese Diet. Furthermore, the U.S.’s role as chief architect of exercises such as EAST ENDEAVOR 10 and MALABAR 2007, and the fact that the U.S. regularly urges Japan to expand its military cooperation with other countries, lends credence to the notion that Japan’s expanding military globalism, rather than constituting a hedge against the U.S., represents a new stage of strategic cooperation largely in accordance with the spirit of the U.S.-Japan alliance.

While Japanese-Australian military cooperation has most recently been premised on combating terrorism and nuclear proliferation, this relationship is beginning to encompass traditional security threats, i.e. the shift in the regional balance of power precipitated by a rising China. As T.J. Pempel writes “expansion of military exercises such as Cobra Gold, support for Australian-Japanese military cooperation, and the inclusion of India, New Zealand and Australia in the East Asia Summit were at best thinly veiled efforts to counterbalance China’s influence within the region.”

It is ironic that it was during the administration of Prime Minister Kevin Rudd, who in 2004 had delivered a speech in Beijing entitled “Australia and China: A Strong and Stable Partnership for the 21st Century,” that Australian-Sino relations fell to their lowest point in decades. The 2009 arrest of Australian mining executive Stern Hu and the Rio Tinto espionage case stoked anti-Chinese sentiment among the Australian public, turning Rudd’s fluent Mandarin and pro-Beijing record into a political liability.

Whether coincidental or not, it was during this breakdown in Australia and China’s formally amicable relations that, in 2009, the AFD published the most ostensibly anti-China Defense White Paper yet, referencing China as “the strongest Asian military power,” and declaring that “the pace, scope, and structure of China’s military modernization have the potential to give its neighbors cause for concern if not carefully explained.” Admiral Wu Shengli’s April 2009 statement that the People’s Liberation Army Navy would “move faster in researching and building new-generation weapons to boost the ability to fight regional sea wars” did nothing to allay such fears.

Desmond Ball and Richard Tanter of the Nautilus Institute diagnose the current climate of Japanese-Australian defense cooperation as being symptomatic of a classic balance-of-power politics vis-à-vis China, with Tanter predicting that for better or worse, the bilateral Australia-Japan security relationship will most likely continue to deepen for the foreseeable future:

- Australia can expect to see more Japanese bases such as the intelligence satellite ground station at Landsdale in the Perth International Telecommunications Centre. We can expect more and closer cooperation between the ADF and the SDF in maritime interdiction for both border security and the US-led Proliferation Security Initiative. We can expect more joint exercises and training with the SDF in Australia. We can expect more testing of Japanese space vehicles from Australian test ranges.

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Australia is not just increasing military collaboration with Japan, but also with the U.S. Australia’s consideration of whether or not to host U.S. forces, despite the inevitably negative response such a move would elicit from China, effectively highlights the extent to which Australia’s security concerns have evolved in response to China’s rise. It is this perceived shortage of security “goods” that continues to provide greater opportunities for Japanese military globalism today.

**South Korea: Hedging in Spite of History**

Today South Korea is considering whether to enter into an Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement (ACSA) with Japan just as Australia has. Along these same lines, a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) with Japan is also under debate. This debate is taking place a mere quarter century after (now) former South Korean Vice Minister of National Defense Yong-ok Park, pronounced in 1986 that direct military ties between Japan and South Korea were neither “possible nor desirable” (Park, 1986). Yet, as early as 1999, there has been talk of a “virtual alliance” between the U.S., South Korea, and Japan – virtual due to the fact that strong nationalist sentiment on both sides of the Sea of Japan precludes a public declaration of any defense commitment.

As a consequence of DPRK developments in missile technology and plutonium enrichment, Japanese-South Korean military relations deepened rapidly at the turn of the century from the nascent 2+2 level dialogue first begun in 1994, to a mature defense relationship encompassing counter-terrorism consultations, joint military deployments, and strategic dialogue. Specifically, the exogenous shock of revelations concerning the DPRK’s abilities to threaten Japan (and by extension, U.S. forces stationed there) forced South Korea to reevaluate their security interests, providing a window for Japanese military globalism to incorporate the Korean peninsula into its increasingly multilateral framework. Like Australia, the U.S.-led “War on Terror” provided additional impetus for this transformation, but unlike Australia, it is the DPRK rather than the PRC that is sustaining this newly forged Japan-ROK bilateral defense relationship following the “War on Terror’s” unceremonious conclusion, and will continue to do so for the foreseeable future.

While Japanese and Australian forces were working side-by-side as early as 1992, Jason Manosevitz holds that Japan-ROK military relations are a more recent phenomenon, noting, “Simply put, until 1995, one could not distinguish a military-military dimension for analysis” [in the bilateral ROK-Japan relationship]. However, this changed after the South Korean Minister of National Defense Byong-tae Lee, met with Japan Defense Agency (JDA) Director-General Kazuo Aichi in April of 1994. During this exchange, both Japan and South Korea agreed to hold annual defense policy meetings. These meetings in turn brought about the first naval port calls, information exchange protocols, personnel exchanges, and so forth, laying the groundwork for the 1998 Partnership Declaration. This agreement represented the first attempt at codifying the Japan-ROK relationship, and effectively upgraded the informal defense exchanges into annual “security policy dialogues.”

However, this joint declaration did not emerge in a vacuum. Rather, it was the DPRK that provoked Japan and South Korea into upgrading a previously informal exchange into a framework capable of supporting cooperation in matters of defense. North Korean catalyzation of Japan-ROK military relations began in 1998, as indications


mounted that the DPRK was not adhering to the criteria of the 1994 Agreed Framework. Two years prior, Hans Blix had cautioned the Atomic Energy Agency’s (IAEA) Board of Governors that the DPRK was prevaricating regarding its current stockpile of plutonium. To worsen matters, in 1998 the DPRK launched a modified Taepodong-1 missile over Japanese airspace. In response, Japan cut one billion USD from the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO), further undermining commitments made during the 1994 Agreed Framework. U.S. allegations that the DPRK was possibly constructing undisclosed nuclear facilities at Kumchang-ri, reinforced perceptions of North Korea as an unpredictable security threat.\textsuperscript{22}

It was in this environment that the 1998 Partnership Declaration was signed; a mere two months after the remnants of the DPRK’s first Taepodong-1 fell into the Sea of Japan. As such, the document was unambiguous in citing the DPRK as a primary reason for deepening the two countries’ defense relationship. Japan and South Korea reached this point out of sheer strategic necessity. From the perspective of South Korea, the DPRK’s ability to strike Japan could interfere with U.S. assistance should a second Korean War break out. Moreover, Japan might be prodded to increase defense spending, thus threatening South Korea. Defense coordination had become increasingly necessary, or as one ROK Foreign Ministry official put it, “It is inappropriate for us to shun security talks with Japan, when Tokyo is talking with Washington on security cooperation on the Korean peninsula.”\textsuperscript{23}

A year after the declaration’s signing, the closer defense relationship began to take a more concrete form via the holding of military exercises. During the first set of exercises in 1999, the two countries mobilized some 1,130 personnel over the course of three days - an impressive dedication of resources given that the entire mobilization was in service of a search and rescue (SAREX) exercise. Japan and South Korea conducted the SAREX again in 2002 – the same year that the “virtual alliance” submitted the Joint U.S.-Japan-ROK Trilateral Statement, condemning the DPRK for violating the 1994 Agreed Framework. A mere five months later, the Republic of Korea Armed Forces (ROKAF), having already sent over 3,400 troops to pacify Afghanistan, would be called upon again, this time to assist with the war in Iraq. South Korea, trapped within the obligations of alliance in the same manner as Japan, became enmeshed in the U.S. “War on Terror.”

While the ROKAF and JSDF were separated during their time in Iraq (being deployed to the northern and southern provinces respectively), the two deployed forces were united in their raison d’être courtesy of the DPRK. It was the necessity of maintaining a quid pro quo security relationship with their U.S. ally in the face of possible North Korean aggression that in the case of ROK President Roh Moo-hyun, forced the ROKAF to deploy to Iraq. Hoon Jaung notes “[The Iraq deployment] was a vital test for President Roh Moo Hyun, whose election in 2002 was evidently helped by the rising tide of anti-Americanism among the young generation, but who nevertheless needed American cooperation in resolving the second North Korean nuclear crisis.”\textsuperscript{24}

\textsuperscript{22} After several rounds of negotiations, U.S. inspectors were eventually granted access to the site in May 1999. The final report stated that Kumchang-ri contained no plutonium-production or reprocessing facilities, although the U.S. maintains that the site could have been intended for other nuclear-related uses. Brooke Milton and Gaurav Kampani, “Uncovering The Truth About North Korea’s Alleged Underground Nuclear Facility: The Kumchang-ri Controversy,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies (July 1999), [accessed October 2, 2011], <http://cns.miis.edu/archive/country_north_korea/uncover.htm >.


Similarly, Christopher Hughes argues that in the case of Japan, the same threat of abandonment to the DPRK by the U.S. served as Koizumi’s justification for the JSDF’s deployment.\(^{25}\) The “War on Terror” coupled with the perceived threat north of the 38th parallel, produced other byproducts to include annual Japan-ROK counter-terrorism consultations beginning in 2007, and the aforementioned anti-proliferation joint exercise EAST ENDEAVOR 10.

As successfully as Japanese military globalism may have incorporated South Korea, there are two important caveats. First, even if a “virtual alliance” exists, it is still a long way off from becoming formalized. Ongoing disputes over the Liancourt Rocks and Japanese textbooks continue to complicate relations across the Sea of Japan (or East Sea – the name of the body of water itself being a flashpoint of Japanese and Korean nationalism). Secondly, while Korean and Japanese military cooperation may deepen further in order to deter North Korea, such cooperation is likely to quickly plateau should Japan or the U.S. attempt to involve South Korea in any attempt to balance or contain China.

South Korea has no more interest in attempting to contain China than it does in becoming a Chinese satellite state. Forgetting for the moment that China is South Korea’s number one trading partner, a quick glance at the ROK’s own military globalism shows that wherever Japan has attempted to foster deeper defense relations, China has not been far behind. Annual trilateral summits between South Korea, Japan, and China have been in effect since 2000 - a full two years before the Joint U.S.-Japan-ROK Trilateral Statement. As of July 2011, South Korea and China have agreed to hold strategic defense talks annually. Policy-makers desirous of applying Japan-ROK military relations toward the containment of China, particular in regards to Taiwan, are likely to face an uphill battle.

**India: Emergence From Neutrality**

Not strategically engaging with Japan to any substantive degree until the administration of Japanese Prime Minister Mori in 2000, India is a relative latecomer to Japanese military globalism. The international condemnation and isolation that India incurred from its Pokhran-II nuclear tests, taken within the context of China’s growing military capabilities, ensured that once the U.S. initiated a warming of relations in 2001, India would seek new strategic partners while deepening relations with old ones at an unprecedented rate - leading many commentators to speculate that India is abandoning its penchant for Nehruvian neutrality. This foreign policy shift resonated with those of Australia, South Korea, and Japan, producing a rapid increase in Japanese military globalism.

Prior to the end of the Cold War, India’s commitment to neutrality meant that relations with Japan were inevitably limited due to Japan being integrally tied to the Western Bloc. However, this obstacle vanished following the dissolution of the Soviet Union. With the fall of the Iron Curtain, Japan found itself as one of the major beneficiaries of India’s heightened drive to engage in multilateral security dialogue and exchange. The first manifestation of this came in 1992, when Prime Minister P. V. Narasimha Rao visited Japan. While a handful of ministerial level visits did follow, the bilateral relationship remained sporadic throughout the 1990s.

Part of the problem invariably stemmed from India’s Pokhran-II nuclear tests. In May of 1998, India successfully detonated a series of nuclear devices, drawing formal condemnation from the United Nations, and infuriating the U.S., China, and Pakistan.

Aside from provoking Pakistan to demonstrate its own nuclear deterrent, the Pokhran-II nuclear tests caught the U.S. red-faced over the obvious failure of its intelligence services, as well as India’s explicit violation of the U.S. 1994 anti-proliferation law. The U.S. responded with economic sanctions, ending the exportation to India of defense-related materials and technologies. Leveraging the U.S.-Japanese alliance, Washington compelled Tokyo to respond in kind. Following the Pokhran-II tests, Japan ceased all loans and grants except for humanitarian aid. All political and defense exchanges between Japan and India likewise came to a standstill.

Sino-Indian relations were similarly affected. Taken in conjunction with Indian Defense Minister George Fernandes’ statement describing China as "India’s enemy number one,” the Pokhran-II nuclear tests brought Sino-Indian relations to one of their lowest points since the 1962 Sino-Indian War. The reappearance of bellicosity between India and China ensured that India had every incentive to hedge against China through the formation of countervailing defense relations as soon as the political fallout from the Pokhran-II tests dissipated.

It was only when U.S.-Indian relations began to thaw during President Clinton’s visit in March of 2000, that Japan was able to fully reciprocate Narasimha Rao’s 1992 overture. Eight months after Clinton’s visit, Japanese Prime Minister Mori Yoshiro visited Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee, proposing that the emerging bilateral relationship be christened the "Global Partnership between Japan and India in the 21st Century." Although China was not publicly mentioned, the fact that George Fernandes spearheaded the ministerial level talks preceding Mori’s visit, gives some indication as to the two countries’ intent. More recently, I interviewed an official from the Indian Armed forces. He explained that even today, India’s primary security threats center around Pakistan and China. While conceding “Truly speaking, Japan cannot do much” in regards to Pakistan, he did offer that being on the opposite side of China helped make Japan an attractive security partner.

The same year as President Clinton’s visit, Japan and India marked the institutionalization of defense exchanges by initiating joint Coast Guard training and exchange programs. Henceforth, a synergistic effect with South Korea’s own military globalism came into play. At around the same time that Japanese Prime Minister Mori was visiting India in 2000, South Korean Foreign Minister Lee Joung-binn, who was also in New Delhi, opined “India and South Korea are now fully conscious of the new security linkages between the subcontinent and the Korean Peninsula. There have been disturbing reports, over recent years, of nuclear and missile cooperation between Pakistan and North Korea.” Such allegations were hardly misplaced. Four years later, Abdul Qadeer Khan, the Pakistani nuclear scientist and national hero who had enabled Pakistan’s own nuclear tests in response to Pokhran-II, confessed to having assisted the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program from 1991-2000.

Asian security scholars such as Rajeev Sharma (2002), Mohan Malik (2003), and more recently David Brewster (2010), argue that the common denominator of the nuclear crises across the Pakistani-Indian border and the 38th parallel is in fact, China. Brewster argues that as early as 1949, China has sought to check the power of both India and Japan, and that more recently “The Pakistan-North Korea transactions allowed China to create low-cost, local nuclear restraints on both India and Japan while concurrently maintaining some degree of deniability.”

While not specifically naming China, the December 2006 joint statement issued

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27 Personal discussion with Indian Armed Forces official, June 30, 2011.
29 Ibid., p. 409.
by Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh and Japanese Prime Minister Abe Shinzo reaffirmed the two countries’ commitment to combating terrorism and nuclear proliferation, and was subsequently reaffirmed in 2008 in the Joint Statement on the Advancement of the Strategic and Global Partnership between Japan and India. A year later, the intent behind these statements took concrete form in the 2009 Action Plan to Advance Security Cooperation, presided over by Prime Ministers Hatoyama and Singh. As much as Koizumi is associated with making unprecedented use of the JSDF, it was under Hatoyama that Japan has annualized defense policy dialogues, military exchanges, and joint exercises with India. Moreover, it was under DPJ leadership that Japan established logistical agreements with Australia while negotiating a similar agreement with South Korea. Taken together, these stand as strong evidence of the DPJ’s continuation of Japanese military globalism initiated by the LDP.

The most tangible manifestation of Japanese-Indian defense cooperation to date is undoubtedly the MALABAR joint naval exercises between the two countries. Normally an annual joint naval exercise only held between the U.S. and India, in 2007 the Royal Australian Navy, Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force, and Singaporean Navy all participated in the exercises held in the Bay of Bengal. The significance of the event goes beyond the fact that MALABAR 07 marks the first time that the JSDF worked alongside the Indian Armed Forces as a full fledged participant rather than a mere observer. The cast of players in the Bay of Bengal exercises was (minus Singapore) identical to the strategic vision articulated by Shinzo Abe in his book, Utsukushi Kuni e (Toward a beautiful country). Interpreting the exercises as the initial framework for an anti-China containment strategy, China submitted formal protests against the new "Quadrilateral Initiative."

Given the exercises’ reiteration in 2009, Beijing’s protests likely fell on deaf ears. Instead of merely participating in MALABAR 2009, Japan hosted the exercise in Sasebo and in the waters off Okinawa. Like the ROK-hosted EASTERN ENDEAVOR 10 that took place the following year (in which Japan and Australia also participated), the various players trained for interdiction and anti-proliferation operations. The similarities of the Japan-hosted versus ROK-hosted exercises supports the notion that a similar threat environment has proved conducive to the Japanese military globalism that now links the two countries. Far from constituting mere symbolism, exercises like MALABAR represent the future of Japanese-Indian defense relations. According to one officer from the 7th Fleet flagship, USN BLUE RIDGE, the U.S. Navy looks forward to continuing such exercises, “and advancing into more complex operational and strategic areas that go beyond tactical exercises.”

So long as Japan and India remain desirous of hedging against China, the U.S. will continue to present ample opportunity to do so.

Conclusion: The Future of Japanese Military Globalism

Beginning in the late 1990s, Japanese military globalism has undergone both qualitative and quantitative change under the auspices of both the LDP and the DPJ. First cultivating military relations with Australia in 1992 during UNTAC, Japanese globalism subsequently expanded to encompass defense ties with South Korea and then India in 1994 and 2000 respectively. However, despite intensive groundwork laid during the 1990s, it was only at the turn of the century, when the threats of nuclear proliferation, terrorism, the DPRK, and a rising China simultaneously provoked all four

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nations to initiate, or deepen a multilateral security framework, did a synergistic effect take hold, accelerating Japanese globalism. This resonance between the defense policies of Japan, Australia, South Korea, and India produced the phenomena of Japan hosting a joint naval exercise typically held solely between India and the United States, and South Korea hosting an anti-nuclear proliferation exercise with Japanese and Australian participation.

Japan’s increasingly sophisticated military globalism validates Samuels’ prediction of a Japan that is strategically hedging. However, in contrast to Samuels’ prediction, Japan’s broadening defense relations are not intended to reduce Japanese dependence on the U.S.-Japan alliance, but are rather intended to complement it. Public attitudes of the threats facing Japan today have shifted markedly since the Bush Administration. Impressions of the U.S. bullying Japan into deploying to Iraq again have given way to images of U.S. service members assisting in reconstruction in the wake of the Tohoku Earthquake. The inept handling of the Futenma Base issue by Prime Minister Hatoyama has demonstrated the delicate nature of the U.S.-Japan alliance. Lastly, since 2009 the Japanese Air Self-Defense Force notes that it has had to triple the number of instances in which it has scrambled fighter jets in response to encroachment by Chinese aircraft. In light of these developments, the tone of Japan’s evolving security policy has shifted to emphasize less the danger of U.S. abandonment or entrapment, and more the issue of China’s annual double-digit defense budget increases.

The media has made much of the closer military relations between Japan, Australia, South Korea, and India, and has often attributed the construction of this multilateral framework to U.S. pressure. Certainly the U.S. has no uncertain interest in forming a coalition of states seeking to hedge against China’s growing military might. As one Pentagon official disclosed, during the annual 2+2 U.S.-Japan defense talks, the U.S. frequently advocates that Japan continue widening its array of security relations. However, there is a tendency to exaggerate the U.S. role in what is in actuality, a much wider trend.

Given the wide range of national interests at stake, U.S. pressure is an insufficient explanation for the rapid expansion of Japanese military globalism. As Japanese resistance to U.S. calls for increased defense expenditures clearly shows, policy areas as critical as defense are, short of the threat of armed conflict, notoriously difficult for outside actors to influence. Instead, the U.S. has played a facilitating role. Instead of forming defense relations from scratch, regional actors are able to utilize the preexisting bilateral relations of the U.S. “hub and spoke” model. Expressed in concrete terms, in many cases U.S.-led joint exercises have been widened to encompass more participants rather than the “new players” having to organize their own.

With Japanese military globalism progressing at such a rapid pace, and the JSDF being deployed farther and more frequently, one must ask to what extent this trend is sustainable in an increasingly stringent fiscal environment. Defense officials with whom I have spoken have expressed misgivings about how the JSDF is constantly being pressured by politicians and Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) bureaucrats alike. In a perfect world, the JSDF would be able to answer every call that issued forth from either the U.N. or the U.S., but after a certain point, constantly responding to requests for forces will prove corrosive to Japan’s core capability to defend itself. All militaries are confronted with innumerable demands and finite resources, but Japan’s unique situation exacerbates this problem.

The JSDF’s history of solely working humanitarian and peacekeeping missions

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32 Personal discussion with Pentagon official, June 3, 2011.
has produced a mindset wherein Japanese politicians and public alike far too easily conflate the JSDF and its work with that of the U.N., rather than properly conceiving of the military as a defense force existing to counter the tangible threats that face Japan today. Of course, the fact that civilians, rather than career military, ultimately decide on JSDF deployments, means that there is no guarantee that Japan’s core defense capability will not be compromised while in the pursuit of international prestige, or perhaps while seeking to display the solidarity of an alliance. However, token JSDF contributions in Timor-Leste (2 personnel in 2006), Nepal (six personnel in 2007), and Sudan (2 personnel in 2008) may be representative of a JSDF that is driven by a cost/benefit analysis that increasingly favors endeavors of immediate strategic significance over U.N. objectives.

Another potential obstacle to Japan’s expanding military globalism is Article Nine. As the author of Article Nine, the U.S.’s expectations of Japan’s contribution to the alliance are for the most part, in tune with what Japan is willing and capable of delivering. However, future non-U.S. strategic partners are likely to demand a level of reciprocity that Japan is constitutionally unable to provide. As one Indian defense official explained, Indian-Japanese military relations are already experiencing the constraining influence of Article Nine (as a former F-18 pilot, he complained that he can land Indian military aircraft in U.S. bases in Kadena and Atsugi, but not on a Japanese military base).\(^3\)

The legal barriers regarding foreign military cooperation struck a particularly bitter chord in the aftermath of the Tohoku Earthquake, during which even Indian IL-76 medium range military transport planes, tasked with providing critical lift capability as part of ongoing recovery efforts, were not authorized to land on Japanese airstrips. The fact that such legal barriers remain, despite the flurry of military-to-military exchange that has already taken place between Japan and India, shows the extent to which Japan’s non-U.S. military relations have yet to mature to a level that genuinely enhances Japan’s capability to defend itself.

\(^3\) Interview with Indian Armed Forces official, June 30, 2011.
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Works Cited


Frequently Asked Questions

What is the Berkeley Student Journal of Asian Studies?

The Berkeley Student Journal of Asian Studies serves to collect and promote the best Asia-related scholarly work from all disciplines at the University of California, Berkeley. Each fall semester, we receive and select submissions to be published in the following spring semester.

Who is eligible to submit an entry?

The Berkeley Student Journal of Asian Studies encourages submissions from graduate and undergraduate students currently enrolled at the University of California, Berkeley across disciplines on any Asia-related topic. Students with original research papers are encouraged to submit to the Spring 2013 issue.

What is the submission process?

The applicant first submits an original research paper for selection under the review of the Journal Committee.

If selected, the Journal Committee will correspond with you to involve a Berkeley faculty member, who will assist you in editing your work for final publication. Your submission(s) must be completed for publication by the semester's end, per the deadline set by the Journal Committee.

In the following semester, you will be notified of your opportunity for participation in the research symposium held by Berkeley Student Journal for Asian Studies. This symposium serves as means to recognize your academic achievement among family, friends, faculty, and students, as well as allow you an opportunity to share and present your work.

Is there a specific format for submission?

Please submit MS-Word compatible files to berkeleysjas@gmail.com. Submissions must include the author's name, discipline, and year in school.

Please submit all entries in a Microsoft Word document with one-inch margins, single-spaced and Times New Roman 12 pt. Font.

Manuscripts must be from 1750-7500 words, and must include a 250 word abstract at the beginning of the document.

Article manuscripts must use Chicago style footnote citations and a works cited page.

Students wishing to interview selected faculty, submit cover art, or a student experience, are also invited to submit.
Your entry will not be complete without your contact information. In the body of your submission email to berkeleysjas@gmail.com, you must include the following:
Name
Major / Year
E-mail Address
Telephone Number
Please title the subject: Asian Studies Journal Entry.

What determines selection and publication?

Each piece of work is evaluated by the following criteria:

Originality of work
Assertion of a clear and significant argument
Quality of the evidence provided to support claims
Organization of ideas in guiding readers’ understanding
Grammar, syntax, spelling

Moreover, while the Journal Committee chooses to evaluate each submission based on several criteria, we also approach and evaluate each entry holistically.

Who is involved in the selection committee?

The Journal Committee is consisted of student scholars involved in Asia-related studies, both undergraduate and graduate.

What if I miss the deadline for submission?

Submissions are accepted on a rolling basis throughout the semester, but committee selection does occur on a specified date chosen by the Journal Committee. Thus, it is best to enter work by the specified date in order for the committee to have the opportunity to review your submissions.

If you are unsure of the deadline, please email us at berkeleysjas@gmail.com and we will inform you.

Is work from previous semesters eligible?

Yes. In our aim to collect Asia-related work, pieces for review and selection do not have to be from the most recent past or current semester. As long as the information provided in the work remains factually correct, submissions need not be time-sensitive.

If I submitted a paper last semester for selection, should I submit it again?

Because we do accept work on a rolling basis, but we did not review it, it would be best to notify us again during the submission period in the following semester if you wish to be included in the applicant pool.

In regards to work that was reviewed but not selected, it would be best if changes were made to improve the work before submitting it once more.
How many pieces are selected?

Our journal is not currently maintained at any specified length. However, when selecting, we do take into consideration the academic level of the applicant, as well as the type of submission piece. We attempt to provide a broad perspective of Asia-related studies in the journal, but ultimately, the work is first evaluated on its literary and scholarly worth.

How often does the journal get published?

The Berkeley Student Journal of Asian Studies publishes once a year in the spring.

Thank you! If you have any questions, please email us at berkeleysjas@gmail.com
"Inching Open the City Gates: A Sociopolitical and Economic Analysis of Recent Shanghai Policies on Hukou and Migrant Worker Insurance"
Dawei Ding

"Deconstructing Japan’s Military Globalism: The March to ‘Normal’ Nationhood"
Benjamin Knight

"Education and Ideology: An analysis of state-based narratives in Pakistani and Indian textbooks"
Tara Yarlagadda

"The Sound of Silence: The Current Buraku Issue in Tokyo and Its Solutions"
Muyang Chen