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Dear Reader,

We are pleased to present the sixth edition of the Berkeley Student Journal of Asian Studies. Every year we publish a journal to engage the Berkeley community on issues related to Asia. Our journal serves as a method for undergraduate and graduate students alike to present their insightful and creative pieces of work and to develop critical skills in writing, editing and research. This year’s pieces were selected from a competitive pool of record high submissions, and this edition’s launch is accompanied by our recent launch of our online blog, podcast series and event series.

In this edition, Adora Svitak utilizes advertisements in contemporary India to understand how the discourse of development has shaped and been communicated. Bushra Samira Samimi proposes a strategic solution to the energy crisis facing South Asia by advocating for a regional consensus on energy and Janet Louie discusses how television costumes and clothing came to define femininity following the Maoist period in China. Janet Ying explores cross-strait relations between China, Taiwan and the United States. Noah Yu utilizes a framework to understand why North Korea and China diverged in their manifestations and practices of Communism. Scott Davis analyzes the unique set of “soft” diplomatic tools employed by King Mongkut of Siam, Trent Walker explores the scholastic writings of Buddhist teacher Thích Nhất Hạnh and Weng Lam Ao unpacks the relationship between the gaming environment in Macau and the environment.

As always, we would like to thank our supporters for their generous contributions of time and effort in creating this edition and look forward to a bright future as the journal’s mission grows.

—The Editorial Committee
From Nation-Building to Nation-Buying: Selling a Neoliberal Vision of Development in the “New India”

Adora Svitak

ABSTRACT

In a time when India’s economic growth is being heralded as a development miracle, it is important to consider the effects economic growth and market liberalization have had on discourse around how, exactly, to accomplish development. To answer this question, this paper considers both historical accounts and modern primary sources. Indian development discourse has experienced a profound shift in the decades since Independence, away from Nehruvian visions of heavy industry, dams, protectionism, and development as a state enterprise and toward a neoliberal vision that places greater responsibility on the shoulders of individuals and associates consumption with modernity.

This paper primarily references the articles of Arvind Rajagopal and Shoveling Smoke: Advertising and Globalization in Contemporary India by William Mazzarella. These writers have previously detailed Indian “consumer nationalism” in depth, lending significant evidence to this paper’s discussion of the linkages between messages in popular culture (including advertising and political speech intended for mass media coverage) and changing perceptions of what it means to “develop.” Also considered are primary sources, such as various advertisements made for Indian audiences (from companies Air Deccan, EMW Group, and Airtel) and a speech in San Jose by Prime Minister Narendra Modi. Ultimately, by connecting the attainment of individual goods to the attainment of national progress, ad agencies and politicians alike have contributed to the de-stigmatization of consumer culture and redefined the government’s role in development.

Author Suketu Mehta writes,

Long before the millennium, Indians such as the late prime minister, Rajiv Gandhi, were talking about taking the country into the twenty-first century, as if the twentieth century could just be leapfrogged. India desires modernity; it desires computers, information technology, neural networks, video on demand. But there is no guarantee of a constant supply of electricity in most places in the country… the country is convinced it can pole-vault over the basics.¹

Mehta’s depiction of the dominant discourse in India is astute, but his assumption of a fixed time sequence of development fails to account for one thing: more than ever, the Indian media is liberating rich and poor alike from the sense of a fated development trajectory, of “basics” as prerequisites for explosive growth and unfettered materialism. Indian media has both redefined modernity and aligned modernity with consumption.² This creates a discourse that focuses on the most ostentatious markers of modernity, and individual more than infrastructural attainment. In this paper, I will evaluate advertising and political rhetoric and identify how it influences mainstream visions of development. I argue that ad agencies and politicians alike are promoting a neoliberal approach to achieving progress. In this pervasive narrative, development is no longer solely a state enterprise, but an individual one that consumers can essentially buy with their rupees.

The shift that advertising in India has undergone over the course of the decades since Independence reflects the nation’s shift toward a focus on individual attainment as a means of achieving national progress. Early television advertising in India reflected the tenacious remnants of British colonial influence and the lack of a localized approach. Contrastingly, later ads appropriated more regional imagery and often connected consumption with some larger national goal (e.g., unity, preservation of values, progress, modernity). An example of one such advertisement comes from Bangalore-based Orchard Advertising’s 2005 ad “The Old Man and the Sky,” for (the now defunct) low-cost airline Air Deccan. The advertisement was both popular and critically acclaimed, winning numerous ad-

2 Ruchira Ganguly-Scrase and Timothy Scrase, Globalisation and the Middle Classes in India: The social and cultural impact of neoliberal reforms (London: Routledge, 2010), 155.
vertising awards. In the ad, an elderly man, Hariram, receives an airplane ticket from his son in Delhi. He has a flashback of his young son running up to him after school and showing him a flashcard with the image of an airplane. Enamored with the image, the boy stays up late “flying” it around in his hand. When the boy falls asleep, Hariram carves a wooden model plane for his son. As the video comes back to the present day, Hariram goes to the airport. The viewer realizes that he has never flown before. His baggage goes through the X-ray machine and a security official squints perplexedly at the contents: carefully stowed in the bag is the plane the man carved for his son. The ad then cuts to the Air Deccan logo and a narrator saying, “For millions of Indians, flying is no longer a dream. Air Deccan.”

What does this have to do with neoliberal development? This narrative is supposed to resonate with multitudes of people by presenting a story arc made believable by faith in upward social mobility and private enterprise affording opportunities to all socioeconomic strata. A corporation is the hero of this story, with airplane travel providing a golden ticket to modernity—even if logically, the boy’s state-subsidized education was probably far more responsible for his social uplift. William Mazzarella writes that “tension between individualism and standardization was justified in terms of equity: equal access to the dream of self-transformation…The new advertising, then, positioned itself as a democratizing force, theoretically opening the infinite transformations of consumption to all comers.”

This is highly visible in the Air Deccan advertisement, and many others.

Bollywood legend Amitabh Bachchan starred in an advertisement for India’s EMW Group saying at turns that he would “love to be” various countries’ citizens (“I’d love to be an American, and enjoy the power that my country holds,” etc.) but concluding with the statement that he would “love to make people envious just by saying I’m Indian. I’d love to make you believe it’s possible. I’d love to make you believe in yourself.” This advertisement associates the EMW Group brand with a desire for development and progress that supports the idea of consumerism as “a unique means of self-transformation, even of liberation…from the world that is.” Such advertising also serves an additional purpose: it liberates people from the constraints of the historical model of development, the kind of model that expects a fixed sequence of events (e.g., needing reliable electricity before you can have video on demand).

Consider the 2011 ad “Idea 3G—Population,” made by the Mumbai-based Mullen Lowe Lintas Group to promote telecommunications company Airtel. Starring Bollywood star (and son of Amitabh) Abhishek Bachchan, the humorous advertisement begins with a man asking a potentially politically fraught question in voiceover, as lights flicker out in an Indian street and home windows go dark: “Why is India’s population so high?” His friend responds, “I’ll explain. There’s no electricity, so there’s no TV, so there’s only the wife.” The fast-paced following scenes show the wife walking out of the bedroom pregnant, as well as several shots of classic overpopulation (hospitals filled with crying babies, schoolrooms filled with rowdy children, and streets filled with busy people). This could be a grim portrayal of underdevelopment, except for the ad’s sudden turn with the introduction of Airtel 3G. Mod-

5 Ibid, 159.
ern technology enables people to divert themselves without making babies—suddenly, the characters are lying in bed together playing games and watching YouTube using mobile data instead. The hospitals, schoolrooms, and streets magically and instantly depopulate. Here, modern consumer technology (inexplicably, not modern contraception) serves as the hero of a modernization story. This ad, like its Air Deccan and EMW Group counterparts, allows Indians to depart from “the world that is” and imagine (with the help of a consumer good) the world that can be.

Such marketing messages not only change perceptions of brands and products, but also of the role of the consumer in the development narrative, with the removal of guilt once associated with consumption. Nehru wrote, “there was no lack of violence and suppression in the capitalist world, and I realized more and more how the very basis and foundation of our acquisitive society and property was violence.” Today, Indian attitudes around consumption are the polar opposite. They have gone from austerity to neutrality to encouragement, with consumption fueling economic growth, and economic growth painted as the engine of progress in the “India shining” narrative. Increasing openness to global markets, starting with expansive market liberalization under Prime Minister Narasimha Rao’s finance minister (and later PM) Manmohan Singh, meant Indian consumers had access to a new world of products. It also meant a cultural move away from the austerity advocated by earlier Indian leaders. Indeed, one of the expressions of Gandhi’s definition of swaraj (self-rule) was a fight against mindless consumption: protesting the purchase of Manchester cloth for its role in putting money into the hands of the British oppressors. His protest against the intoxicating evils of civilization and modernity would have been at odds with the modern-day celebration of consumptive excess and belief that “To liberalize is to be liberated.” The televised images of luxury and consumption, like the scions of Indian elites partying in ostentatious hotels, provide dizzying views of frenetic consumption that elicit aspirational desires from the Indian middle class. Nobel Prize-winning economist Amartya Sen writes that the media’s hyperbolic focus on the rich “gives an unrealistically rosy picture of the lives of Indians in general.”

Furthermore, television plays the role of universalizing aspirations, shifting them en masse away from the swaraj and swadeshi (self-sufficiency) espoused by Mahatma Gandhi. Bollywood films, known today for lavish party scenes and extravagant sets, presented very different ideals in pre-1990s India, when they often delivered strict moral messages and glorified characters in poverty. Contrast this with modern-day media messages, which conflate the fulfillment of individual desires with progress for all. In this landscape, the satisfaction of the “consumer-citizen” is a prerequisite for the achievement of modernity. This elevates consumption from a sin (in the early days of the nascent nation) to a choice (in days of market liberalization) to a civic responsibility.

Due to this positioning of consumerism as civic contribution, there are new heroes in the development narrative, and they come from the private sector, not governments’ bureaucratic planning commissions. The Indian media has perpetuated the glorification of self-reliance and entrepreneurialism by helping middle and upper-class Indians “interpret their upward mobility in terms of a pro-business mindset.” But this interpretation of India’s trajectory is not without criticism; Amartya Sen has pointed out that economic growth does not necessarily benefit everyone, and exhorts the privileged not to interpret growth as such. Yet it is easy to think that economic growth is a sort of democratic tide to lift all boats, especially because market liberalization is appealingly cast as a means of circumventing the inefficiencies of politics; the terms and expectations of the market are gaining popular appeal and replacing “Neh-
ruvian understandings of the collective good.”

Indian political history supports this claim. In the decades since Independence, India’s fractious politics have moved away from the left—Congress ceased being the socialist party of the Nehruvian era, and the BJP assumed the role of the Hindu right. This political reality reflects a resignation to the idea that economic growth is the only viable catalyst for development, with private enterprise being the only fuel for economic growth. Government, associated with inefficiency and corruption, is seen in this equation as a roadblock to the magical abilities of the private sector. Thus, middle and upper-class Indians increasingly exhibit “negative attitudes toward government intervention, labor unions and left-leaning politicians” and look positively at “the private sector, markets, technocracy, businessmen as self-made heroes, and...pragmatic, “non ideological” politicians and thinkers.”

In this culture (which easily evokes Silicon Valley), the entrepreneur is king, and making money is celebrated “in the same way India had once venerated public service or spiritual renunciation.”

The current pro-business regime actively supports this neoliberal approach, perhaps a wise political tactic in a nation where market liberalization and recent explosive economic growth have most benefited the powerful middle and upper classes. Prime Minister Narendra Modi is a politician uniquely suited to this capitalist climate. His pro-business regime encourages wholesale buy-in to this message of private sector figures as development saviors and the promise of “consumer modernity.” The Nehruvian approach to development, focusing on consumer austerity and expansive state programs, is quickly becoming outdated and unpopular as it clashes with the attractive consumerism-as-development proffered to the Indian middle classes. This has significant ramifications for Indian state and national government administrations, which are moving away from the development-central (at least in name) campaigns of the Nehru-Gandhi dynasty (e.g., Indira Gandhi’s Garibi hatao, “end poverty”). Indeed, the ruling party is actively challenging the planning and welfare infrastructure built up by previous regimes. The Modi government dissolved India’s Planning Commission, which had been responsible for creating the nation’s Five-Year Plans, and replaced it with a policy think tank. And in a trip to his Lok Sabha constituency, Prime Minister Modi directly critiqued Congress leaders’ emphasis on poverty and welfare, saying that skill development, not welfare, was crucial for helping people emerge out of poverty. This focus on skill development is a hallmark of the neoliberal state. It is cheaper and less labor-intensive for government-supported anti-poverty programs to deliver intangibles (i.e., “empowerment”) rather than goods, something that is aligned with right-wing efforts to cut government spending. One rousing line of the BJP website’s “Development” page reads, “Our model of development will...[mean] even the weakest Indian has a just and fair chance of making it big through sheer dedication and determination.”

This neoliberal, pull-yourself-up-by-your-bootstraps ideal also conveniently shifts the onus of responsibility for upward social mobility and self-improvement to the impoverished individual, rather than the state. By “actively pursuing an IT agenda as the path to progress,” the Indian state can maintain a seemingly contradictory identity: of being focused on social uplift while simultaneously encouraging consumerism and economic growth even in the face of widening inequality. Nowhere was support for this neoliberal, techno-optimist “IT agenda” more evident than in San Jose in September, where Prime Minister Modi spoke at a Digital India event. There, he said, “The traffic lights that need to work the best are on Cisco routers...The most fundamental debate for our youth is the choice between Android, iOS or Windows.”

The event, which received abundant coverage both in the US and

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21 Kohli, 35.
22 Ibid.
23 Mazzarella, 75.
24 Kohli, 51.
26 Ganguly-Scrase and Scrase, 152.
30 Narayan, 90.
India, emphasized a sense of transcending the fixed time sequence of development that had typified Nehruvian understanding of the development trajectory. After all, Modi is the prime minister of a nation with countless areas without paved roads, not to mention working traffic lights; for him to say that Cisco routers’ traffic lights were of utmost importance showed the extent to which “the liberalizers’ discourse [was] a rejection of the historical stalemate that the developmentalist/modernizing paradigm had bequeathed.”32 His rhetoric, like the rhetoric of Indian advertising, does not align with the developmental belief that you must first have equitable access to basic infrastructure before you can have the shiniest trappings of modernity. Advertising and the equity of “the dream of self-transformation”33 allowed Indian consumers to reject the limitations of time and teleological assumptions of progress’s steps, to “pole-vault” in the words of Suketu Mehta.34 Furthermore, Modi’s speech expressed the extent to which the language of the market has become dominant in development discourse when he said, “Customers, more than creators, are defining the use of a product. The world may be driven by the same ancient impulses.”35

Of course, the world is driven by impulses more ancient than even market forces, a reality that the pro-business, optimistic, neoliberal vision of development blithely ignores. That vision has made a successful incursion into the Indian collective consciousness through messages in popular culture emphasizing the role of consumerism in development. This has had effects through all sectors of Indian society. By equating the purchases of goods with the purchase of modernity, media messages liberated consumers from the guilt historically associated with consumerism. This liberation of guilt evolved to become something else: a veritable celebration of consumption, as the narrative of middle and upper-class success was amplified in pro-business media and political messaging to become the dominant narrative of Indian success. The Nehruvian, planning-centric vision of development is now buried in the dust of that era’s grand construction schemes. It is impossible to foretell if the current Indian development paradigm of neoliberal growth will stand the test of time, or if the seemingly unbounded lucre that has kept the gleam in “India Shining” will soon begin to rust.

32 Mazzarella, 89.
33 Ibid.
34 Mehta, 24.

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IS A REGIONAL AGENDA FOR COOPERATION ON ENERGY IN SOUTH ASIA A SUSTAINABLE AND PRAGMATIC SOLUTION TO THE ENERGY CRISIS?

Bushra Samira Samimi

ABSTRACT

The South Asian region is crippled by an energy crisis that has stunted its economic growth immensely. Inadequate energy infrastructure leaves many countries in the region unable to meet the growing demands of its populace. As a result, South Asia is plagued with power outages and minimal access to electricity especially in the rural areas. It is ironic that despite having vast energy reserves, countries are suffering from energy shortages. For South Asia to overcome this barrier, it must walk towards the path of energy security and stability. The question then becomes, how is this attainable? The purpose of this discourse is to propose that the strategic solution to the energy crisis is a sectorspecific regional consensus on energy. This does not presume broader forms of cooperation on other issues as it is not a politically homogenous region. With a collective effort, South Asia will be more technologically and economically equipped to not only harness, conserve and distribute energy but to develop longterm sustainable energy infrastructure. This research paper explores the merits of a collaborative effort on energy only. It also builds an operable framework for cooperation that is context specific to the unique political, economic, historic and social conditions of the region. Therefore, making the foundation for cooperation strong enough to facilitate trade and joint multilateral efforts to increase energy security. Finally, this paper will examine why challenging the current status quo of limited regional partnerships and increasing cooperation among countries in South Asia can efficiently defeat energy constraints.
Fundamentally, society is dependent on energy because it is central to human progress and a pivotal instrument in advancing development. On July 31, 2012 India suffered from one of the largest power outages, impacting the lives of over 670 million people. Cities were paralyzed by the power shortage, with citizens stuck in public transportation and hospitals forced to use their backup generators. This serves to illustrate the role of energy in the macro and micro levels, ranging from the basic household unit to the commercial and industrial sectors as well as transportation. Even more alarming is the fact that a country considered to be a rising power who possesses a GDP growth rate of 5% with one of the fastest expanding service sectors, can be immobilized by something as simple as an energy deficiency. India, however, is not unique in this narrative as countries all over the South Asian region experience similar energy problems, in spite of their vast energy potential. Inadequate energy infrastructure and a failure to secure, manage and maintain energy facilities has culminated into an energy crisis which is currently eclipsing the development capabilities of the region.

This begets the question, what can the South Asian region do to tackle the energy crisis with a viable and sustainable solution? How can the countries meet the energy demand of their respective populace while promoting energy security and stability? The answer is to pursue a regional agenda of cooperation and integration in the energy sector. Even though the current energy crisis is a product of countries’ inability to harness, conserve and distribute energy at optimum levels, it is essentially a shared problem. Strictly speaking, the South Asian region has shared interests in the form of an absence in energy security. Thus a greater level of cooperation involving the entire South Asian region can be one of the most effective ways to deal with the power deficit. Given the intraregional differences, it would be difficult for these nationalist and dominant countries to join forces on multiple objectives. However, energy sectorspecific cooperation in South Asia is an ideal strategy. The underlying cornerstone of this regional integration is that a cooperative framework helps the region cope with the global economic and political forces while attaining energy sustainability and security. I argue that a framework for regional cooperation within South Asia based on shared interests focusing solely on energy is the most optimum means of improving energy security and effectively dealing with the crisis. This essay will be divided into four sections: 1. deconstructing the energy capabilities and issues of the region, 2. illustrating why cooperation is the ideal strategy in the context of the South Asian region, 3. building the framework that will facilitate cooperation, 4. and outlining why a regional agenda based on energy is necessary.

A dialogue revolving around regional consensus on energy security in South Asia requires an understanding of the parameters of energy security as it is a broad concept with many definitions. Energy security, as defined by the International Energy Agency, is “the uninterrupted availability of energy sources at an affordable price”. Expressly, this entails the existence of efficient energy infrastructure and technology capable of producing sustainable energy, assuring access to energy supply and having a coherent energy policy. Pursuing this point further, energy security distinguishes between short and long term objectives. Short term energy security emphasizes the capability of countries’ to efficiently respond to immediate fluctuations in the energy supply and demand chain, whereas long term energy security focuses on the countries’ ability to maintain an environmentally and economically sustainable energy supply system. There is an absence of energy security in South Asia due to a lack of infrastructure, the low quality of energy, sparse electrification in the region, crossborder conflicts over resources, and unfinished energy development projects. Energy contributes to the production of goods and services, which directly impact the economy and the ability of the government to function. Therefore, without energy security, countries suffer from stagnant


4 Ibid.
economic growth and the producers’ ability to generate income is stifled. Limited growth leads to insecurity because countries are more susceptible to financial risk. This reduces access to capital resources which inhibits countries from pursuing profit-generating interests and hinders their ability to protect themselves against internal and external threats.

**Why is cooperation the ideal strategy?**

Before delving into describing the framework for regional consensus on energy, it is crucial to evaluate whether collaboration in this sector is better than no cooperation or previous forms of cooperation in the region. In the international realm, countries are rational agents who pursue their self-interest. From the set of preferences available, countries will choose the course of action they perceive will yield them optimum utility at the lowest cost and with minimal risk. In other words, if all parties involved cooperate they will all receive a higher payoff. If all parties except for one cooperates the payoff is lower and if all parties defect, they receive a lower reward (but not lower than if they had defected themselves). This follows that a collective action problem exists, where countries receive higher payoff from acting cooperatively, but defect from the cooperative strategy because the costs associated with other parties making selfish choices can bring about bigger losses that they are willing to risk. Regardless of the collective action problem, countries within South Asia are more likely to collaborate on the energy sector given the existing international conditions, globalization, the internal threats to energy security, and growing norms for bilateral partnership.

Owing to the recent trend towards globalization, the world and in particular South Asia is greatly more interconnected than it was twenty years ago. India and Pakistan, the two largest countries in the region realize that a policy of isolation is not possible as the economies are rapidly changing and the desire to gain access to the market is increasing. This can help explain why South Asia did not have reason to cooperate before. At first these countries were focusing on their internal growth but they began to develop economies of scale and garner global attention through their involvement internationally. Additionally, countries in South Asia, particularly India, are feeling overshadowed by China’s advancements in the region. China invested in Nepal’s power plants and construction of the country’s first eight lane highway. India is discernibly concerned because if China encroaches further, it will gain access to the 6,000 rivers in the Himalayan Glaciers. These sources, if harnessed, can produce 80 gigawatts of power, which is approximately enough to power onethird of India’s populace. Additionally, there were cross-border disputes regarding resources like the Teesta Dam and the Indus River. Recognizing the need to bridge the countries and promote understanding, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka founded the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in 1985. Additionally, Afghanistan was allowed to join in 2007 to facilitate an environment of cooperation. SAARC is intended to foster economic development and collective self-reliance through cooperation. What this implies is that countries within South Asia are interacting with each other a lot more. As a result of continuous interface with one another, the expected payoffs of a noncooperative strategy are lower and thus cooperation becomes the preferable choice. If an institutional basis for cooperation exists in the region, then cooperation has higher payoffs.

Another reason why cooperation is a more profitable strategy than no cooperation is that by collaborating with each other on the energy sector, South Asian nations can effectively cast a safety net. A form of shared risks is ideal for South Asia especially in light of their susceptibility to threats of energy security.

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7 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
For example, Nepal has the potential to generate 42,000 MW of hydropower but can only produce 800 MW\textsuperscript{11}. Not only is Nepal unable to meet its country’s own demand of 1,400 MW, but it cannot utilize its hydropower potential as a source of income\textsuperscript{12}. In turn, India and Pakistan could have bought the surplus energy for their vastly growing demand and hunger for energy\textsuperscript{13}. Instead, all three countries are adversely affected by the unavailability of supply, thereby perpetrating energy security issues and causing crisis like power blackouts afflicting the area. Clearly the incentives and the stakes of the situation are high enough that the expected gain from cooperating is greater and the defecting from the cooperative outcome is less likely. Specifically, cooperation on energy, is more likely to occur and is the better option because it allow countries to address an issue that can affect every aspect of their lives. An excellent example is the European Coal and Steel Community, created in 1951\textsuperscript{14}. To put this in perspective, the countries who signed on were enemies pitted against each other in both WWI and WWII. Yet, in spite of this antagonism and years of enmity, six European countries came together to cooperate on shared concerns over energy security. This cooperative structure served to be the foundation for the European Union. Of course, one cannot make a perfect comparison between European and South Asian political dynamics. Nevertheless, both regions possess similar characteristics: countries in both regions have strong and sometimes conflicting identities, there is a history of tension between the countries, and they have to face huge challenges to energy security that can only be assuaged through a regional forum.

12 Ibid.


**Energy Profile of South Asia**

South Asia is an extremely diverse region with countries situated on all points of the welfare spectrum. South Asian nations vastly differ in their historical backgrounds, ethnic makeup, domestic politics, culture and state objectives.

However, they do converge upon common goals, which consist of alleviating the current energy crisis and attaining energy security. These targets are approachable and achievable through regional cooperation. In this section, I will analyze the issues that are severely constricting South Asia’s ability to harness, supply, manage, and distribute energy. This section will also include a brief overview of the energy status for each country that will detail which energy sources are used most, and their potential to produce power. Although each of the countries are different, they have similar characteristics in regards to their energy sector. Hence, when discussing the main aspects and causes of the energy crisis, I will be looking at the region as a whole rather than at each individual country. This is not to say that each country within the region is completely the same, but due to the limited scope and availability of data, a broad approach is just as insightful in understanding South Asia.

Geographically the regional energy hub is divided into two areas bridged by India. The eastern part of the region includes Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka and the western part of the region consists of Afghanistan, Pakistan\textsuperscript{16}. Currently extensive levels of trade are absent. Each country is endowed with its unique reserves of energy sources. In terms of large gas reserves, India, Pakistan and Bangladesh take the lead as is prevalent in Bangladesh where 88% of its power plants use natural gas\textsuperscript{16}. Owing to its diverse terrain, India has an abundance of natural resources from coal, hydropower, and gas. Like India, Pakistan also has huge energy potential in coal, hydropower and gas, but their major source...
of energy is gas. Although India and Pakistan have hydropower capabilities, the countries with the highest potential are Nepal and Bhutan as these countries have hydropower access to vast water sources like rivers.

One of the many challenges the current energy sector in South Asia faces is the lack of adequate infrastructure in the form of power projects and grids. Poor infrastructure and no energy market increase the costs of acquiring energy. Low financial resources also act as an impediment to the construction of technology capable of harnessing, distributing, and transmitting the energy supply to both urban and rural areas. This also limits access to energy sources and increases the region’s reliance on foreign oil. Coupled with internal issues such as high population growth and elevated poverty levels, the energy crisis is exacerbated. South Asia is experiencing unprecedented population growth and that translates to energy scarcity, specifically in rural areas. Additionally, there is a mismatch between the reserves of energy available and the actual harnessing of the energy. A prime example of this is Pakistan whose coal reserves can generate 100,000 MW of power and yet account for only 0.07% of its power generation. Also, in 2012 Pakistan produced only 6,716 MW of hydropower when it could easily have produced 40,000 MW of hydropower. Nepal is another country that does not maximize its energy sources as although it has a hydropower potential of 83,000 MW, only 600 MW has actually been developed. The issue does not solely rest upon poor infrastructure, but also the poor quality in the transmission and transportation of energy. For instance, transportation of fuel through Afghanistan’s and Pakistan’s due borders is inefficient due to political border disputes, conflicts and rebel groups. The final sources of the energy crisis lie in the domestic governance practices that impose high tariffs on trade and put up bureaucratic barriers to energy development projects.

**Framework for Regional Cooperation**

A key ingredient of ensuring the success of a regional agenda on energy is building the appropriate system for facilitating cooperation among the countries within South Asia. Diversity of the countries in the region coupled with a legacy of mistrust has slowed the adoption of a collaborative structure. Be that as it may, standard energy conditions and the desire to rapidly grow, have pushed these countries to move towards a regional consensus. Additionally, unity in South Asia on energy is conceivable due to a historical basis for cooperation in the form of SAARC. The purpose of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation was to use public diplomacy to express international and local security concerns. Chaotic political conditions, rising oil prices, border disputes and ongoing friction between Pakistan and India convinced these countries that pursuing a regional forum would allow them to resolve their issues. It was a unique dynamic for the smaller, less powerful countries in the region such as Bhutan and Sri Lanka as it enabled them to assert their security interests without being overpowered by India. SAARC has highlighted several areas of emphasis: education, terrorism, democracy, youth, women, poverty as well as energy. Under SAARC, South Asian nations have been able to promote economic cooperation by reducing high tariffs, and have attempted to establish a free trade zone, and bring forth agreements that would increase connectivity in energy and road infrastructure. Although SAARC was important in taking the initial steps and building mutual trust among the countries in the region, it has failed to effectively act and accomplish its objectives. For example

22 Dash, Kishore C. “The Political Economy of Regional Cooperation in South Asia.” Pacific Affairs 69, no. 2
an annual summit has not been held continuously due to tensions between Pakistan and India. Therefore, despite all the multilateral agreements raving about opening market access, SAARC is bereft of actual enforcement mechanisms. As a result, countries commit to these agreements very loosely and largely perceive aspects of it to be voluntary depending on their own selfinterests. In essence, nullifying any positive effects of cooperation. Furthermore SAARC is incapacitated because it cannot assuage the hostility caused by regional power plays. The region is an amalgamation of countries with very strong identities and narratives centered on fierce antagonisms directed at other countries, as is the case with India and Pakistan. Furthermore, neighboring countries fear that by cooperating, they will help India become stronger and exercise dominance in the region.

Another problem with the organization is that it is nestled on broad objectives. Countries are neither culturally nor institutionally prepared for the intense level of cooperation and interdependency that SAARC requires. It is very ambitious in the sense that it tries to tackle too many issues all at once rather than focus on one or two underlying issues that all countries will unite on. More importantly, it does not address the most important crisis in the region: energy deficiency. Energy is the engine of human society. It drives industry and production and spurs economic growth. The absence of a sustainable and effective energy infrastructure severely paralyzes these countries’ ability to survive and increase their security. One of SAARC’s objectives does include energy, it was not given significant enough attention to address South Asia’s energy issues. A fusion of all these factors makes it evident that SAARC is weak and cannot function as a meaningful model of cooperation on energy security. Thus, South Asia must look for solutions beyond SAARC revolving around a form of integration powerful enough to incentivize parties involved to cooperate on energy.

It is imperative that South Asia expand upon these existing institutions of mutual trust by creating a newly functionally integrated cooperative structure solely aimed at advancing the energy sector. The primary objectives are threefold: fostering cross border energy trade, investment in energy development, and energy conservation. In addition to annual summits, there should be monthly meetings between the committees to update investors, contractors and countries on the progress of energy infrastructure development projects. At its inception and for the first ten years, it is advisable that there should only be a maximum of five projects proposed, approved and implemented at any given point in time. This is a mechanism intended to accommodate for the limited financial resources and experts in South Asia. Even more so it is designed to ensure that energy projects be executed to completion. Under the umbrella of this organization, there will be various committees centered on accountability, transparency, operations, management, liaising to the government and research and development. By eliminating organization barriers to efficiency, this organization can function smoothly and direct their focus to energy projects. Having a finite number of energy projects means that more realistic goals can be set. Each project constructed should have a budget, strict timeline of its operation date, be closely monitored throughout the entire process from construction to maintenance, and be consistently analyzed through impact assessment.

It is evident that a functional based network solely prioritizing the energy sector is more operable and more likely to allow all stakeholders to act cooperatively. Furthermore, it will reduce the possibility of the construction of energy development projects with conflicting objectives. It can even mitigate political tension that result from countries vying for investment rights on power plants or hydropower production by creating a diplomatic forum for countries to work together to capture these resources. Due to its simplicity and small scope, a cooperative network is better equipped to collectively address energy concerns without encroaching upon the sovereignty of the countries involved. Another important component of this collaborative network is the establishment of harsh and strict punishment standards. This safeguards cooperation as an optimum outcome by reducing incentives to unilaterally defect. Pursuing this point further, higher penalties should act as a deterrent to uncooperative behaviors. As history indicates, the South Asian region is not known to adhere to or partake in regional cooperation.


much stronger regional consensus as it fosters stability, security and legitimacy.

This framework for regional cooperation can be further entrenched in forward and backward linkages such as the ones that exist in ASEAN (The Association of Southeast Asian Nations). Backward linkages occur when an increase in Country X’s inputs are caused by growth and Country Y’s rising use of Country X’s inputs. Forward linkages, on the other hand, are when Country X’s rising industrial output increases the inputs in Country Y, therefore generating growth in Country Y. These linkages are one of the facets that increase the chances of a successful regional agenda on energy because it binds countries to each other. In effect, it makes cooperation the Nash equilibrium. The East Asian production networks in the electronics industry prompted by ASEAN, show that functional integration is a feasible solution to promoting cooperation. Suppose that the regional production network is an assembly line where countries like Malaysia, Singapore and Philippines specialize in one area of production. This type of regional synergy increases trade, reduces tariffs, and creates strong linkages between Singapore and Thailand, for example. The more ingrained they became in coordinating this production of electronics, the more they become bilateral linkages which are transformed into a matrix of interdependency and collaboration. ASEAN paved the way for quick industrialization effectively to a large scale because the objectives of the regional partnership were clear and centered on one field: electronics.

Additionally, the informal channel of communications proposed allows leaders flexibility to balance their domestic and regional interests. Essentially this is a strong commitment to respecting each country’s political sovereignty which will make each country more inclined to actively cooperate on energy. Under current circumstances, South Asian nations have not interacted with each other apart from within the joint bilateral energy development projects. What this indicates is that countries need to interact more in a less formal setting. Forming a regional energy network can move along much faster if countries operate through rules and informal talks that can alleviate tension caused by hypersensitive issues. It can provide private and tolerant spaces where countries can speak more freely about their concerns. It also creates opportunities for reconciliation among countries. Thus incorporating both formal and informal characteristics in the organization can forge a much stronger regional consensus as it fosters stability, security and legitimacy.

South Asia is a very complex and dynamic environment, with an abundance of energy potential and high expectations for rapid economic growth. However, it also has several identity issues and retains a relatively fresh memory of colonization. All of these factors makes countries in the region wary of cooperating with one another. For example Pakistan is hesitant about collaborating with other countries in the region in the energy sector, fearing that it might further India’s political dominance. The best way of alleviating these concerns over sovereignty is designing regional cooperation by manifesting characteristics of both formal and informal channels. The organization must have a set of codified rules for decisionmaking, dispute settlement, and procedures that quickly adapt to dealing with emergencies. The decisionmaking body will comprise of leaders from the member nations and a majority vote will determine the approval of a project. Furthermore, political aggression should be addressed through peaceful intermediation distinguished by a process of dialogue, negotiation and impartial consultation. By setting up this system, the organization will be able to effectively decrease tensions between countries, which is an impediment to the ability of SAARC to address its main objectives.

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ASEAN’s East Asian production networks in the electronics sector indicate that cooperation concentrated on one arena pertinent to all parties involved can lead to complex connections across the region. This type of structure lends itself to a gradual adoption of regional integration by fostering interdependency. Developing countries realize that they do not have the financial resources nor the expertise to be able to handle the entire production process themselves, therefore the East Asian countries resorted to this form

27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
of a cooperative network. The result is that these countries are so tightly bound by these linkages that the risks are shared as well as the costs. This raises the stakes of the situation which makes them more likely to engage in public diplomacy. The lessons from the East Asian production networks can be applied to South Asia as well. Adhering to a functional regional network on energy can help South Asia gradually become intensely interconnected in such a way where cooperation offers higher payoffs. This can overcome the barriers to cooperation and make the proposed framework viable. Also, the far more powerful countries in the region like India and Pakistan must make concessions to the smaller countries. Doing so will convince the less dominant countries of Pakistan and India’s commitment to a regional solution without the ulterior motives of hegemonic aims. All in all, a sophisticated web of linkages in the energy sector throughout South Asia increases productivity, setting up a strong market. This increases interdependence and lays the groundwork for collaboration and multilateral engagement in South Asia.

Why do we need regional consensus on energy?

There are opportunities for a regional integration on energy and the most cogent example of that is the Bangladesh-India Electrical Grid Interconnection Project supervised by the Asian Development Bank. It equipped Bangladesh with over 500 extra megawatts of electricity imported from India. Both countries collaborated together to construct transmission lines between electricity states in Bheramara, Bangladesh and Baharampur, India. The energy issue was so prevalent that even the capital city, Dhaka, experienced 12 hour power disruptions. This alleviated the burden of the electricity deficit that Bangladesh was undergoing by providing access to affordable and efficient energy. The energy issue was so prevalent that even the capital city, Dhaka, experienced 12 hour power disruptions. The government could not tap into their domestic sources, such as power plants, because the infrastructure was not capable of providing the necessary quantity of energy and would result in high costs. Driven to such a dire position, Bangladesh worked alongside India to build an intergrid connection. This project inherently reflected how vital it is for the region to rely upon self-constructed multilateral networks on energy. Both India and Bangladesh received high payoffs, while Bangladesh tapped into an adequate energy supply to meet domestic demands, India profited from revenues through the sale of its surplus energy. On a deeper level, this sets the precedent for increased cooperation and paves the way for interdependency in the energy sector. Another example is India providing financial assistance to Bhutan for hydropower projects like Chukha (336 MW), Tala (1020 MW) and Krichu (60 MW).

The shift towards energy integration is important to opening up dialogue among countries and removing barriers to energy trade and development. This is relevant especially considering that South Asia is at a critical nexus where it can choose to stubbornly stick to its noncooperative behavior and be eclipsed by China and the rest of the world or it can cooperate on energy thus accelerating growth. Current energy capacity is unable to meet the increasing demands of the local population, particularly in rural areas. Increasing access to cheap energy could improve the livelihoods of people. From a longterm perspective, cooperation can reduce trade and investment barriers, and standardize regional utility codes which will bring to existence a regional energy market. Envision an interconnected network that can not only meet growing demands for energy but can optimize on maximum energy potential through collaborative efforts on preservation, development and trade. Integration on energy can capitalize on India’s coal, Pakistan’s gas and Sri Lanka’s hydropower potential. By way of illustration, a possible scenario of a regional energy hub involves Bangladesh importing hydropower from Bhutan and Nepal while India charges energy transmission fees as energy in eastern India can be exported to Western Bangladesh, and Pakistan can develop simultaneously technology to harness natural gas power. Naturally the benefits extend beyond the immediate effects of increasing intraregional trade and power sharing to research and development. Pooling resources leads to more investment opportunities as well as the exchange of information, research and expertise. Tapping into these fundamental resources can lead to the

30 Ibid.
31 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid.
discovery and maximization of energy sources in places like Pakistan where only 6,716 MW of 40,000 MW of hydropower potential is harnessed. More cooperation will bring forth highly constructive, communicative and cordial interactions within South Asia. Flourishing political stability, surging economic growth and a new energy market lead to energy security. Crossborder linkages drastically transform the political realities South Asian nations face. A case in point is the TAPI (Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan-India) pipeline, where lines and pipelines will be constructed across three South Asian countries. Because all three countries are invested in the pipeline project, they each have a vested interest in the development and stability of each other’s countries. This lesson can be applied to understand how regional connectivity can lead to more opportunity for growth. Each country will play a bigger role in impacting the region, thus increasing political leverage across borders. Due to the emergence of multilateral partnerships, countries cooperate efficiently leading to more completed energy projects, thereby increasing economic growth.

This culture of interdependent networks and regional integration on energy gives South Asia an opportunity to develop its infrastructure, preserve its energy and maximize its vast potential energy sources, all of which are vital elements of energy security. To briefly draw a sketch of the current energy status of South Asia, India is known for its large reserves of coal deposits, Bangladesh has natural gas, countries along the Hindu Kush and Himalayas have large hydropower potential due to being close to rivers and Pakistan possesses a lot of natural gas. It is evident that each country is endowed with unique energy sources and if they engaged in power sharing agreements and energy trade, regional deficits of energy would become a problem of the past and South Asian nations can meet energy demands and guarantee complete rural electrification. This is beneficial to the economy and can generate more wealth. On the more governance front, tackling energy deficiencies will increase energy security and by extension a rise in national security. A critical aspect of national security is growth, trade, and access to markets. All of these facets of national security can be achieved if South Asia willingly strives for energy security through regional connectivity. In addition to access, a cooperative system can alleviate the burden of bearing future risks. Furthermore, investment in the development of stable energy infrastructure diversifies energy sources. Diversification prepares South Asia for energy shortages and provides the region with a surplus of energy that can then be utilized to build a powerful energy market.

Another benefit to South Asian cooperation on energy security is that it will increase stability and open up possibilities for foreign direct investment. According to a paper published by the Institute of Developing Economies, high political risk attracts less FDI. Political stability coupled with strong high quality institutions decreases uncertainties. Investors feel more secure in their investments knowing that there are mechanisms in place to not only protect their wealth, but to utilize it to induce greater profit margins. Strong institutions reduce the costs associated with information symmetry because they can gather, collect and synthesize accurate information. Moreover, unlike weak institutional bodies, well built institutions lower operational costs. Investors do not have to deal with lengthy bureaucratic processes of gaining permission to do projects, corrupted public officials, taxes, hiring police protection against rebel antigovernments. A regional cooperative framework can mitigate against these costs because it stabilizes the region, gives country access to more capital through the availability of cheap energy. In short, a regional energy network lowers political risk and encourages foreign direct investment.

**Critiques of the Regional Framework**

As valuable and profitable as regional cooperation appears to be, it is not without its own set of complications and shortcomings. Acknowledging and addressing possible obstacles to the regional energy network in South Asia is imperative to providing a sustainable solution to the regional energy crisis. The foremost concern is that a cooperative

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35 Ibid.
system is not truly comprehensive enough to account for and resolve regional conflicts. Bitter border disputes exist between India and Bangladesh as well as between India and Pakistan. India and Bangladesh both have stakes on rivers between them and so it is natural for resource related contention to exist39. In 1983, an adhoc water sharing agreement between India and Bangladesh stipulated that water from the Teesta River was to be allocated equally between the two countries40. The bilateral agreement was never approved because the Chief Minister of West Bengal was concerned that the northern region of Bangladesh would not get enough water during the drier seasons41. As a result of the water dispute, both countries have been suffering from water shortages and embroiled in tense relations.

India is also engaged in a water dispute with its longstanding rival Pakistan. After the British partition of India in 1947, Pakistan and India signed the Indus Water Treaty to allocate control over the east and west rivers42. Since the agreement was formed to serve the special circumstances of that time, its terms gradually became less relevant particularly due to the escalating animosity in India-Pakistan relations. Furthermore, internal domestic groups within the respective countries exploit strife to further their own agenda. In India, the Hindu right-wing groups oppose the Indian government sharing the water source with Pakistan and prefer to keep the Indus River to themselves43. Similarly, Islamist radicals in Pakistan aim to launch a “water jihad.” Domestic public opinion is tightly lodged in the broader context of a tumultuous political relations. These two examples serve to illustrate that a regional agenda is necessary, but not easy to accomplish. In fact it is these domestic forces that partially explain why a strong cooperative system on energy has not even been attempted thus far.

The problem of regional conflicts expands to spillovers of ethnic conflicts such as Nepal’s Tamil insurgency groups entering India. Furthermore, countries come to the negotiating table with their own objectives. These may conflict with other country’s objectives thus making it difficult to even come to a consensus, let alone work together on cross-border energy projects. Another reason is that South Asia is devoid of a competitive regional power sharing market. This seem like the possibility of an operational cooperative energy network is bleak, but all of these complications only delineate the necessity for a regional agenda. The desire to propel economic growth, gain legitimacy and strengthen institutions is powerful enough to incentivize countries in South Asia to cooperate with one another. Energy security is the first step in gaining transnational security and increasing stability. Cooperation is a tough and demanding course of action. However, it is achievable because energy security is a mutual interest and development of energy infrastructure will benefit the region. Additionally, there is pressure on South Asia to pursue a regional agenda from external forces. If South Asia itself is having difficulty cooperating, international organizations like the Asian Development Bank can step in as intermediary and facilitate the environment for unified action on energy. In fact, SASEC (South Asian Subregional Economic Cooperation) is an effort under the supervision of the Asian Development Bank, which serves as a vehicle for better connectivity and cross border trade and has been successful in implementing 33 regional projects across multiple sectors like energy, communications and technology44.

Conclusion

Without challenging the current status quo on regional partnerships, South Asia will remain stagnant. Thus overcoming these energy constraints, is dependent on a move towards a strategy of collaboration and multilateralism. The key to designing such a successful architecture of energy cooperation is to incorporate hard and soft law. It must include concise procedural rules as well as the flexibility to accommodate for non-binding agreements45. There is no telling how long it would take for such a strategy to be implemented but it can undoubtedly transform the region. As a result of laying the groundwork for mutual trust and multilateral action, the energy infrastructure will be capable of meeting energy demands and creating surplus energy for a diversified power
sharing market. Regional cooperation can become a reality but it will face a lot of adversity and in time, South Asia will take united action on energy.

Works Cited


FEMININITY AND COSTUMES IN THE 1987 ADAPTATION OF HONG LOU MENG

Janet Louie

ABSTRACT

Since the 1980s, popular TV costume dramas have garnered a large and widespread fan base in China. They were also heavily influential. For many, the dramas were lessons in history and literature—a gateway to a different understanding of China’s historical past and culture as compared to the Maoist vision of a mythical “national past.” Hong Lou Meng (The Dream of the Red Chamber, 1987) in particular, presented changes to commonly held ideas about gender as well as the Chinese national and cultural identity. In this essay, I will examine how costumes in the costume drama—despite often being anachronistic and inaccurate—served to create a newly diversified set of images of Chinese femininity for audiences following the Maoist period. The drama’s costumes thus reflected changes to perceptions of the Chinese national identity in the post-reform and opening period, as well as highlighting new approaches in the narrative representation of history. This paper therefore, also examines how shifting media forms like costume dramas present alternative images of the Chinese female, while also serving as a dynamic but often elusive connection to the historical past.

Introduction

In late December of 2014, news was released announcing the sudden cancellation of Wu Zetian, otherwise known as The Empress of China. This historical drama on the life of the eponymous female Empress Wu Zetian was met with enthusiasm and excitement not only due to its all-star cast but the extravagance of its production. It was thus quite a shock when the series was pulled after only one episode because of “technical difficulties.” However, not much clarification was necessary to understand why the series had been pulled. Prior even to the series release, the drama had been dubbed “The Saga of Squeezed Breasts” by netizens online for its costumes that appeared to reveal a racy amount of décolletage. When the series was re-aired at the beginning of January 2015, viewers saw a notable difference—the extravagant costumes had in effect, “disappeared” from the historical epic. In late January, it was explained that Wu Zetian had been pulled for re-edit on account of the drama’s “unhealthy images,” as stated by Tian Jin, the deputy director of the State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television. The drama, which had marketed itself as a knowingly self-indulgent and lavish retelling of Wu Zetian’s ascent from concubine to sovereign ruler of China during the Tang Dynasty, had lost a fundamental aspect of the production—its costumes—through this censorship. Close up shots of the individual actors’ faces replaced wide-angle shots making the costumes almost impossible to see clearly.

This incident of censorship which, in effect, shielded the bodies of the individuals wearing the clothing from view, alerts us to the significance of costumes in television dramas. Following this line of thinking, there are thus significant links to be made between Chinese society and the series’ production, development, and reception. It is possible then to look at the larger genre of guzhuangpian (“historical costume dramas”) of which Wu Zetian is an example as reflections of larger themes, ideas, and phenomena. In the case of Fan Bingbing’s period piece, censorship is

2 Ibid.
linked to more widely prevalent ideas about sex, gender, and free expression, and their proper limits. As diverse as these ideas are, in this case, they revolve around a particular object of attention: costumes.

In this paper, I will be drawing on ideas about costume and performance in order to further an analysis of the Chinese historical drama with respect to its costumes and their social meanings in everyday life. Costumes are, as Patrice Pavis, a scholar and expert on performance and theater, states, performance pieces that serve to define an assumed identity. He also points to the essential role of costumes in aiding the movements of an actor in their performances and hints at the dialectical relationship between a costume and the performer, as well as between the costumed performer and the observer. He writes, “A body is ‘worn’ and ‘carried’ by a costume as much as a costume is worn and carried by the body.” The concept that a costume inevitably informs a role or “identity” in a play, film, or television show is seemingly obvious—after all, one does not wear a horse costume when playing the part of a fairy princess. However, problems begin to unfold when one begins to consider how to connect on-stage or on-air performances to a more expansive concept of performance within everyday life.

Judith Butler, perhaps one of the most well-known scholars in this realm, writes about this notion of performativity specifically in relation to gender. In Gender Trouble she uses the rudimentary example of drag to explain the concept of “gender performance.” She states that through “imitating gender, drag implicitly reveals the imitative structure of gender itself—as well as its contingency.” I will be using these ideas on costume theory in conjunction with Judith Butler’s concept of gender performativity to examine how costumes in these guzhuangpian serve to define the “female” gender—like Butler, I am using the term “female,” “woman,” “feminine,” and all such cognate words loosely to define a general category of the “female.” Here, it must be noted that the idea of “man” and “woman” are in and of themselves social constructs, but it is for this same reason that there are different histories, cultures, and norms which are connected to the theoretical male and female. As such, my choice to focus on the feminine is one based on the historical complexities of the female and the images of the female in mainstream Chi-

ese media, particularly during the post-reform era. I have thus chosen to examine Hong Lou Meng (1987). This adaptation of the popular novel is widely considered a classic and is popular to this day as a hallmark of Chinese television history. It also marks an important transition from the Maoist era to the reform era and the “opening up” of China. As such, it can be seen as a predecessor, a forerunner to Wu Zetian in that they are somewhat radical in nature as well, though in a different way.

However, in researching the history of television in China during the post-Communist period, it became apparent that not much research had been done on TV dramas produced and aired during the 1980s. This lack of attention to the 1980s, however, does not suggest that this period is not any less worth studying. In fact, the significance of examining this period of transition in particular, lies in the fact that the Eighties marked a period where TV became more influential than ever as television ownership increased rapidly, growing from 4,850,000 in 1979 to 27,610,000 in 1982. At the same time, the number of Chinese TV stations were growing alongside an increase in broadcasting hours. This all followed a series of decisions by political leaders to expand the medium’s reach—this would give leaders a new tool and media platform to use. This development also appeared to “echo… the impetus for reform, modernization, and nation building of the new China under Deng Xiaoping.”

The question of how historical dramas in particular fit within this larger socio-political framework though remains unanswered. At first glance, they may appear almost like exceptions to the general atmosphere of modernization and post-reform nationalism. Some scholars offer that these dramas, largely Hong Kongese, “worked as an education in the spirit of unification by showing traditional dynastical culture that emphasized the unification of nation” as in the case of Hong Lou Meng. These dramas also bring to life alternative visions of China be it historical or fantastical. These guzhuangpian were bringing to the average TV viewer

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5 Pavis, Analyzing Performance: Theater, Dance, and Film, 175.
ments on the changes that were occurring during this period are nonetheless relevant. She notes that the market showed “visible manifestations of a fundamental shift in the Chinese gender regime from an ideal of androgyne, under which the communists de-emphasized gender differences, to a new ideal that emphasizes gender differences and associates beauty with femininity.”

These differences also signify a gap that emerges between the period of the Cultural Revolution and the post-reform era. However, not only do ideals and begin to change, there begins to appear a growing awareness of another type of gap, one between the Chinese and their historical past. The post-Reform period meant a movement away from the “people’s past” of the Communist Era which was “a retrospective reconstruction of the past from a present vantage point.” The consequence of this “reconstruction” was the erasure of the pre-Maoist history as the post-reform era marked attempts to rediscover the Chinese historical past after a long period of disconnect from it. Eric Hobsbawm addresses this through the idea of “invented tradition” or “a set of practices, normally governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature, which seek to inculcate certain values or norms of behavior by repetition, which automatically implies continuity with the past.”

Dawei Guo further suggests, “The way...that the audience relates to [a] certain historical representation and its contemporary meanings largely reflect[s] particular attitudes they take towards the social formation...where the production of that representation takes place.” In examining these dramas, the relationship between the audience and the show is perhaps just as important as that between the producer and the show. As such, I will be looking at the impact of Hong Lou Meng on popular culture in addition to analyzing the ideology behind the cos

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17 Ibid., 287.
18 Hung Wu, Remaking Beijing: Tiananmen Square and the Creation of a Political Space (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2005), 99.
tumes in the show. In this way, I will also look to connect the idea of the costume drama to its role in the narration of a “Chinese” history. Just as costumes are vital in the creation of the “feminine” in these dramas, the dramas themselves are essential in connecting the Chinese to the Chinese historical past.

In looking at the history of popular dramas in Chinese history, there is much to be said about how figures like Fan Bingbing’s Wu Zetian compared to ones like Yan Jinxuan’s “WhiteHaired Girl.” It is apparent however, that costumes share a multivalent link with portrayals of gender in the media. Shifting forms of media and changes in their subject matter are dialectically linked. In this case, I will be looking at costumes and how they specifically effect ideas of femininity during the 1980s. Through this, I also hope to see how a drama can connect the Chinese to the Chinese historical past and act as a means of transporting and connecting ideas old and new during this time.

**Hong Lou Meng**

In 2010, a TV adaptation of one of China’s “four classic novels,” Hong Lou Meng by Cao Xueqin, was released, not without a fair share of controversy. As only one of two TV series adaptations of the book in the post-Reform period, news of the remake was originally met with excitement and curiosity. However, with the multiple issues during pre-production and the subsequent replacement of the original director Hu Mei with the Fifth Generation director Li Shaohong, the drama had already garnered a significant amount of unwanted publicity and attention. This reached a climax with the decision to use costumes designed by Academy awardwinning costume designer Tim Yip—responsible for designing the costumes of Crouching Tiger, Hidden Dragon—and influenced by the Hong Kong art director Ye Jintian. Ye’s advocacy for using costumes inspired by Kun opera, led to widespread disapproval by critics and audiences alike. According to “an online survey of 16,670 netizens at the popular tianya.cn website,” it was revealed that “75.8 percent believed the costumes [were] too far off from the book’s description.”21 Netizens also began to refer to the looks of the female characters as “coin heads.”22

Another major point of criticism pertained to the casting choices, in particular to the actresses chosen to play the roles of two of the main female characters: Lin Daiyu and Xue Baochai.

Here, it is worthwhile to note that much of the disapproval and negative commentary about the new series was done with reference to how accurately the director adapted the original novel. In his essay, “Remakes and Cultural Studies,” Robert Eberwein says: “Viewed from the fuller perspective of cultural analysis over time, the original must be seen as still in process in regard to the impact it had or may have had for its contemporary audience and, even more, that it has for its current audience. A remake is a kind of reading or rereading of the original. To follow this reading or rereading, we have to interrogate not only our own conditions of reception but also to return to the original and reopen the question of its reception.”23

Hong Lou Meng is no different. Commonly known in the West as Dream of the Red Chamber or The Story of the Stone, it has been the focus of countless adaptations through plays, operas, films, and television. It was the latter, however, that was the most pervasive in popular culture and society in China during the post-Reform period. In her essay “The Story of the Stone on Television,” Xueping Zhong writes that the director of the 1987 series Wang Fulin was inspired by a trip to the United Kingdom in the early 1980s and hoped to create a televised retelling of the novel after the “opening up” of China in 1978.24 She comments that he essentially saw this as an opportunity for a mutual cultural exchange between the West and China.25 From this, it is possible to understand how conscious Wang was of the instability and uncertainty surrounding the nature of all things “Chinese” at the time. It also points to a desire to define or perhaps rede-

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22 Xiaolu Han, “Dreams of Timeless Beauties: A Deconstruction of the Twelve Beauties of Jinling in Dream of the Red Chamber and an Analysis of
redefine Chinese traditions, history, and culture for a new era.

Returning to the controversy surrounding the 2010 remake then, it is important to recognize how strong the opposition was with regard to how the story and characters were portrayed. Though the 1987 remake was also met with criticism such that an entire issue of The Journal of Stone Studies was dedicated to debates and discussions about the series’ casting, scripting, costuming, and music, it is not often mentioned now. Wang keenly observed, in conversation with Li to encourage her following the debacle of the 2010 remake, that “time” proved his work a “masterpiece,” as would hers. This comment suggests a consciousness that his work is a creative fashioning of history and culture as well as a retelling of one of China’s most famous novels. However, there is an irony to all this that cannot be dismissed.

The steady fan base of the 1987 adaptation of Hong Lou Meng and the belief that this series was the more accurate representation of the novel are all ironic insofar as they gesture to the problems at the heart of historical storytelling as well as storytelling in general. That is, there can be no infallible retelling of Hong Lou Meng just as there is no fully objective way to talk about the historical past.

In the case of the TV adaptations of the famous novel, it is interesting to look at how they were attempts at not only retelling a fictional story but also a largely historical one. Taking place in the Qing period—although the costumes indicate a mixture of styles from different dynasties—the story revolves around the rise and fall of the Jia family. It is also widely considered a novel about the decline of feudalism, “mak[ing] direct commentary on the economics, politics, culture, education, law, ethics, religion, and marriage system of the time. Many believe that Dream of the Red Chamber is [also] a semi-autobiographical account of Cao’s own life, one that reflects the rise and fall of his own family.” The complex nature of the work is perhaps most evident in the interaction between the hundreds of characters in the story. In particular, the relationship between the “Twelve Beauties of Jinling” and Jia Baoyu, the primary protagonist, has been the center of much attention ever since its original print publication in 1791. Among these Twelve Beauties however, Lin Daiyu and Xue Baochai are perhaps the most recognizable characters and the ones that will be the focus of the following sections here.

However, as a consequence of this, the Qing dynasty costume drama became a malleable medium by which the Chinese media chose to project specific principles and ideas. Huike Wen, in his book Dazzling the Eyes: Television and the Modernization Ideal in 1980s China, comments on how audiences through these dramas, “gained confirmation that their modern lives were better than those of people in feudalist or even pre-PRC society.” Other themes communicated through these dramas included ones connected to gender, specifically the idea of femininity. Because of the nature of the 1980s as a period of transition in the aftermath of Communism and the Economic Reform, however, discussing gender becomes a difficult topic. Ravni Thakur, in her book, Rewriting Gender: Reading Contemporary Chinese Women, explains that during this time, “the new orthodoxy on gender relations [was] a curious mix of patriarchy and socialism, where the tensions between women’s productive and reproductive roles remain[ed] unresolved.” In this way, Wen comments, “While the socialist government was blaming feudalism for its abusive treatment of women, media representations of gender were displaying a strong criticism of the construction of masculinity and femininity in 1980s China and a nostalgic view of the more ‘traditional’ gender norms.”

In regards to Hong Lou Meng, this is yet another layer of irony in that the book presents many instances of the way in which gender is fluid and ultimately performed, challenging this idea of a rigid separation between genders. Yet in both the TV adaptation and the book, it is still apparent there are certain ideals of femininity embodied in the characters of Lin Daiyu and Xue Baochai. Costumes, in turn, become a powerful means by which their individual femininities are performed in Hong Lou Meng. Lin Daiyu

28 Han, 3.
29 Wen, 163.
31 Han, 9.
33 Ibid., 46.
34 Edwards, 45.
35 Edwards, 45.
Lin Daiyu, one of the most famous figures in Chinese literature, has been portrayed in a diverse number of ways throughout the past century. The most well-known incarnations, however, are undoubtedly Mei Lanfang’s in the Kun opera Lin Daiyu Buries the Flowers and the late Chen Xiaoxu’s in the 1987 TV adaptation. To audience members born during the later half of the twentieth century, the latter is perhaps the more recognizable Daiyu on account of the popularity of the TV series which was “re-aired more than 700 times on a host of different syndicated channels in Mainland China, Hong Kong, Taiwan and various other countries in the Asian Pacific as well as South East Asia.” In this way, although the 1987 adaptation of Hong Lou Meng is not necessarily the favorite adaptation of the book—particularly not for Redologists by any stretch—its impact on popular culture is undeniable.

During the twentieth century, for example, critics saw the book as both historical and sociopolitical allegory. Republican Era scholars saw “Daiyu being the Ming dynasty and Baochai the Qing,” as “Daiyu, like the Ming dynasty was weak and dying, while Baochai ha[d] qualities that were associated with the Qing, those being strength and robustness.” However, opinions changed during the Maoist period when Marxist scholars Lan Ling and Li Xifan “argued that the two women were diametrically opposed and represented progressive and regressive social forces. Daiyu was credited with being an anti-feudal rebel while Baochai was regarded as a conservative upholder of feudalism.” Furthermore, in an “important speech on class struggle, Chairman Mao Zedong even mentioned the heroine by name, saying: ‘Lin Daiyu did not belong to the four great families,’” associating her with a resistance against feudal values.

As demonstrated here, critics have had a history of pitting Daiyu against Baochai, understanding them as separate characters on opposite ends of an ever-changing spectrum of ideas. Yet in doing so, there is the potential of creating a too rigid binary for analysis of these characters. It is important, therefore, to understand Lin Daiyu not simply as an entity in and of herself but in terms of her relationship to other characters, specifically Baochai who acts as a foil to her. Moreover, according to David Hawkes, the latest translator of the English version of the story, the two characters are intended to “represent two complementary aspects of a single ideal woman.” As such Louise P. Edwards, in her book Men and Women in Qing China, comments on how “in their tumultuous relationships with Baoyu, Daiyu invokes the more feminine values and Baochai the more masculine” —insofar as Baochai often demonstrates qualities associated with yang, a masculine element, including activeness, energy, and leadership. While Edwards’ analysis of the two women is not necessarily a definitive one, it is nonetheless important to recognize that Wang Fulin’s characterization of Lin Daiyu and Xue Baochai are based on his own reading of them. From this, it is apparent then that there is no one correct way of characterizing or portraying these characters.

In the 1987 adaptation of the book, a similar interpretation, regardless of its validity, is made manifest in the contrasting costume designs of the two women. While most of the female characters in the show tend to wear a mix of Manchu and Han costumes and accessories, Daiyu wears mostly hanfu and the accompanying accessories. Though at first seemingly anachronistic, “Han Chinese women, except for those whose husbands or fathers were connected with the court in Beijing, were not required to wear any official attire.” Because of this, it was not too unusual to continue to wear more Han influenced clothing. Nevertheless, her clothing makes her the center of attention for audiences because of how different it looks in comparison to the other characters.

When she first appears she is shown crying, grieving over the death of her mother and struck by the sudden news that she must leave her home in Suzhou for the capital Beijing. Her costume is typical of dress from the Ming Dynasty as it consists of a “short, front-button jacket with a high collar” and a “long flowing skirt which trail[s] on the ground.” This is accompanied by a lavender bei zi—light colors were especially popular during the early period of the Ming Dynasty—which is the outermost layer and characteristic of hanfu as well. Her unique image is only emphasized when she arrives at the Jia compound, stand-
Wang Fulin and Chen Xiaoxu's interpretation of Lin Daiyu is one of “hy-pre-Mao society and in the contemporary reality.” With this in mind, woman constitutes the biggest difference between being a woman in the Huike Wen suggests that the “consciousness of oneself as a post-Maoist China as contrasting with the image of the “Iron Girl.”

of itself, it can be understood within the historical context of what Dore J. Levy, in her book Ideal and Actual in The Story of the Stone, describes as a “grace and beauty” evoked by “images of a flower reflected in the water and…wind-stirred willow shoots.” Xueping Zhong however argues that the “oversimplification of Daiyu in terms of symbolic representation through bamboo and her blue attire”—in addition to a lightness of color in her dress overall—“makes her appear too sentimental without addressing the root cause for this sentimentality.”

Nonetheless, it is the differences in dress that make Daiyu metaphorically distant from the women around her. In one of the most memorable scenes in the story, Daiyu weepingly buries fallen flower petals as she identifies with them. The scholar Jeanne Knoerle comments on how “the flowers, like [Daiyu], are a manifestation of her delicateness of nature in addition to her vulnerability at the mercy of the elements.” In the TV series, Daiyu is often filmed standing under a blossoming tree, playing with flowers, and wearing flowers as well. The flower burial scene shows dressed in a pink beizi in a similar color to the blossoms on the trees with a pink flower in her hair as well. As she begins to cover the petals in a makeshift grave, she is shown then in a skirt and jacket in white and light blue. The undressing and the subsequent stripping of color from her wardrobe only further compounds the connections between her, the flowers, and her past life as the Crimson Pearl Flower. She almost blends into the landscape, with the colors of her dress drawing inspiration from the palette of the nature around her. It is clear here that she is purposely set apart from the other women, if not a little heavy-handedly so. Her femininity is therefore understood to be one that is delicate by way of the idea that “fragility is beautiful,” according to the scholar Cho Kyo. While this idea is complicated in of itself, it can be understood within the historical context of post-Maoist China as contrasting with the image of the “Iron Girl.”

Huike Wen suggests that the “consciousness of oneself as a woman constitutes the biggest difference between being a woman in the pre-Mao society and in the contemporary reality.” With this in mind, Wang Fulin and Chen Xiaoxu’s interpretation of Lin Daiyu is one of “hy-

As a mirror to Daiyu, Baochai, according to Xiaolu Han, is “painted as someone whose filial qualities and innate precocity seem to stem from responsibilities forced upon her during her youth.” Consequently, “Baochai, in many ways, becomes a type of feminine ideal [and]… is able to gain the immediate approval and favor of the majority of the Jia family.” While Daiyu’s clothing is both representative of a romanticization of a more distant past and an allusion to her being something non-human and therefore disjointed from normal human time or “normal” ideals, Baochai’s costumes show her conformism with “traditional” Confucian ideals about femininity.

When she first appears in the show, she makes a similar entrance in a palanquin but in an altogether different outfit than Daiyu’s. She wears a cloak as well although it is a noticeably brighter and more luxurious fabric and print than the one Daiyu wore. There is a signal here of Baochai’s wealth, her higher social status, and her character. The red of her cloak is energizing and correlates with the brightness of the clothing of other active figures like Wang Xifeng in the show. Red is also a color with a long history in Chinese society, often being a “safe” color insofar as it is generally associated with positive feelings, ideas, and values. This is significant as Daiyu seldom, if ever, wears bright colors like red while Baochai and the other characters wear them on a daily basis. As such, Baochai represents an ideal of femininity associated with tradition, family, and groundedness.

The redness of her cloak also matches the red of Baoyu’s outfit in the scene, alluding to the fact that they are a “match between gold and jade.”

47 Han, 47.
48 Ibid., 43.
49 Ibid., 40.
This is a reference to the fact that both Baoyu and Baochai have carried precious stones that bear engravings that complement each other since childhood. While Baoyu was born with a piece of jade in his mouth which was originally left over from when the Wall of Heaven was repaired by the Goddess Nüwa, Baochai carries with her a golden locket.

It is worth noting here that in spite of Baochai’s grandiose entrance in the 1987 series, because it “attempts to understage the love triangle and instead focus...on Baoyu and Daiyu’s love story, many of Baochai’s key moments are missing.” As such, she plays a slightly smaller role than in the book. However, one element of Baochai’s character that is translated to the screen is her attitude towards poetry.

Unlike Daiyu, who relies on poetry as her sole form of true self-expression, Xiaolu Han comments: Baochai is aware of poetry in a more technical fashion...her attitude toward poetry is also steeped in a sense of conflict. She recognizes that she has a great talent for composition as well as an awareness of poetic theory; however, at the same time she recognizes that women outside of their small community within the garden do not practice poetry. In the episode featuring Daiyu’s death scene, Baochai is shown criticizing Daiyu for not resting after discovering her “wasting” her energy writing poetry. While the fact that a difference in authorship of the later events in Hong Lou Meng must be taken into account when discussing the characters—there are occasional and unsettling changes in character—in these scenes, nonetheless it is important how the scene here is staged to contrast Baochai with Daiyu. Baochai is shown wearing what appears to be a dress that appears to be a later Ming-Qing Dynasty Han gown whereas Daiyu’s resembles an early Ming, if not earlier, gown. This suggests again, the disconnect between Daiyu and the society and time around her, whereas Baochai is clearly very present. In addition, the colors of the two gowns also are purposely set apart from one another. While Daiyu’s is a lifeless, fading and pale blue and white, Baochai’s is a glossy pink. Her gold locket only adds to the brightness and very material nature of her outfit which contrasts with the airiness and lightness of Daiyu’s.

This particular scene also makes clear the differing makeup choices and the subsequent types of beauty that are intentionally highlighted for each woman. While the makeup is anachronistic as it is catering still to a 1980s Chinese standard of beauty, it is all the more relevant for understanding the differing femininities represented each of these characters.

Daiyu is typically shown with very pale skin and muted, ashy eyeshadow and dark eyeliner with a copper red lipstick. Her eyebrows, which earned her the nickname Pinpin, or “Frowner,” are drawn faintly and curving downward as this name suggests. All of these elements highlight Daiyu’s ever constant state of delicacy, appearing similar to a fading bloom. In contrast, Baochai’s makeup which emphasizes large eyes, rosy cheeks, and red lips suggest energy, strength, and health.

In these many ways, Baochai represents a femininity quite different from Daiyu’s although both contrast with the Maoist ideal of androgyny, at least in regards to fashion. While Daiyu is more obviously different, Baochai is a complicated example of femininity presented in post-Reform China as she both conforms to and contradicts the Socialist figure of the Iron Girl. She is often a leader in the Jia household—many of the women are, for that matter—and in this case, she is more traditionally masculine. Nonetheless, her duties are based in a Confucian model of femininity, which is markedly in opposition with Socialist and Communist principles. The complexities located here gesture to the difficulties in deciphering the function, role, and the very definition of femininity in post-Communist China.

**Conclusion**

Xiaolu Han points to how, “curiously, since [Hong Lou Meng] came out, male critics have either aligned themselves with ‘team Daiyu’ (Yong Daiyu pai) or with ‘team Baochai’ (Yong Baochai pai),” despite no such divide truly existing among female scholars. This phenomenon suggests an interesting reality in the discussion of the feminine and femininities in Chinese society. That is, the pitting of different women, and thus different female archetypes against one another is indeed a misreading of the text itself and quite problematic.

As such, it is perhaps more important to look at these different female figures presented within the media as alternative femininities in a post-Maoist, post-Communist world. The figures of Lin Daiyu and Xue Baochai are for all intents and purposes “two sides of the same coin” and act as mirrors to one another within Hong Lou Meng. From a broader perspective, their incarnations on television screens across the world in the 1980s also offered insight into the Chinese historical past, whether or not it was accurate to history or the original book source.
The 1980s, for many people in China, marked a period of unprecedented intellectual and creative freedom most clearly represented in the rise of Fifth-Generation Chinese film. This was also an era in which Chinese film began to reach international acclaim with movies like the Zhang Yimou’s Red Sorghum in 1988. However, for those who were native Chinese, it was often television dramas that were the most profoundly influential in their daily lives. This reality is significant and demonstrates the way in which memories of the historical past can never truly be accessed objectively after the fact.

In recent years time travel dramas (chuan yue) such as Bu Bu Jing Xin, or Scarlet Heart—a romantic drama about a young woman from the 21st century who time jumps and finds herself in the body of a Manchurian princess from the Qing Dynasty—have been popular among young audiences. This has led to not only urban legends about time portals in the Forbidden Palace, but a temporary ban by the government on the genre of time travel in 2011. These recent events exemplify the power that historical dramas have on the economy, society, politics, and more.

In relation to the dramas of the 1980s, they also have a very particular influence on concepts of femininity as well. As a period of transition, immediately following the Communist period and the Economic Reform of 1978, dramas produced and aired during the Eighties provided relatively new ideas about the role and performance of the female and femininity. Hong Lou Meng, one of the most popular dramas of the period, presents alternative femininities through its very different characters. This suggests a kind of experimentation with regard to redefining beauty and femininity in a post-Maoist world.

The examination of the costumes in these historical dramas becomes a tangible means by which to understand these transformations in ideas from an ideal of androgyny to one of beauty as femininity. These observations also point to a larger conception of the fluidity of gender, and the subjectivity of historical accounts of the past as well. Perhaps this is the reason why audiences return time and time again to the historical costume drama. That is, they find that each time they rewatch an episode or start watching a new series, they learn a little more about not only China’s national and cultural history but about their own connection to the past as well. The costume drama, at most times fairly inaccurate and anachronistic, is an examination or even the catalyst for the examination of history and the people part of it all. These shows do not strive to be an objective retelling of the past. Rather, they are a means of time and space travel. They connect people across generations and across borders in an almost Wellsian way, making viewers time travelers if only for an instant.
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China’s greatly expanded economy and military agenda now challenge the future of cross-strait relations. Rapid military modernizations such as asymmetric capabilities, cyber espionage, and sophisticated defense weaponry advance Chinese political objectives beyond its peripheries. Under these seemingly “zero-sum” conditions, China’s military caliber exacerbates Taiwan’s already eroding defensive capacities. Chinese pressures and threats of unification through force generate increasing concerns as problems with Taiwan’s defensive measures, such as a looming fighter jet gap and large sustainability costs, become a frightening reality. This policy memo examines the implications of cross-strait relations as China’s military expansion threatens Taiwanese security and the role the U.S. plays in securing peace. The paper concludes with policy recommendations for maintaining stability in the region. I use two major research strategies: (1) testimonies presented by experts during congressional hearings and seminars and (2) a qualitative and quantitative analysis of defensive arms data for Taiwan and China. The policy memo reveals that the strengthening of U.S.-Taiwan relations is imperative to reducing cross-strait tensions and rebalancing power. Clear U.S. commitment under the Taiwan Relations Act to assist Taiwan militarily will boost Taiwanese confidence and deter Chinese aggression from unilaterally changing the status quo. Although a resolution will not come quickly, the impetus for further dialogue and diplomacy will help Taiwan and China to confront security issues and address their differences constructively. Cross-strait relations remain complex and critical and require continued monitoring. By avoiding parochial approaches, the U.S., Taiwan, and China can foster trilateral cooperation, but more importantly, prevent miscalculations.
Introduction

The rise of China as a large economic and militaristic force has become one of the major challenges that Taiwan faces in this century. As the Chinese economy continues to grow by increasing its manufacturing sectors, bolstering its asymmetric brigades, and rapidly advancing in technological innovations, a rising Chinese power may threaten the peace and stability of cross-strait relations. With the second largest economy in the world, China claims the second largest military budget and maintains formidable military capabilities. China’s economic model has been successful in promoting significant military modernization that further advances its political objectives beyond Chinese peripheries.

Since the conclusion of the Chinese Civil War in 1949, relations between China and Taiwan have been relatively tense, but have shown considerable improvements over the past 65 years. After the Chinese Nationalist Party lost the war against the Communist Party and was exiled to Taiwan, the Taiwanese populace has been under incessant threats of reunification with the Mainland. Because China does not recognize Taiwanese sovereignty, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) continues to maintain the view of the “One China Policy” in which there is only one “Chinese state.” Likewise, after the 2005 Anti-Secession Law, China’s strengthened its determination to use “non-peaceful” means as a last resort to prevent Taiwan from establishing official independence, reinforcing China’s political commitment to the eventual unification of Taiwan. With the subordination of the Taiwanese government being a paramount driving force, the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA) modernization program progresses relentlessly. Ultimately, China’s increasing military strength threatens maritime security in the Asia-Pacific region.

Although not diplomatically recognized by the U.S., Taiwan contributes unparalleled economic, political, and moral support to the U.S. and the world. Historically, the U.S. aided in Taiwan’s economic development and political liberalization from an authoritarian government to a dynamic democracy. As a leading innovator of information technology (IT) products, Taiwan manufactures 94 percent of the world’s notebook PCs while the Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company (TSMC) produces most of the IT chips used by U.S. companies like Nvidia and Qualcomm. Furthermore, both Taiwanese brands, including Acer and Asus, and companies, such as Wistron and Quanta, have gained international recognition, entered global supply chains, and represent major original design manufacturers (ODMs) for many global PC brands.1 With a robust alliance already based on shared interests, securing strong U.S. commitment to assist Taiwan will prevent miscalculations and help stabilize the Asia-Pacific region.

Clear geostrategic reasons also demonstrate the need for more robust U.S. support for Taiwan, a long-time democratic ally and friend. As China increasingly pressures countries in the Asia-Pacific, weakening commitments may enhance the geopolitical position of China in the region and threaten the security of the U.S. and its allies, who consider the U.S. as a dependable security partner and a supporter of democratization. Without this assurance, diminishing support for the small island democracy will not only undermine American credibility, but also precipitate unnecessary arms race, as each country develops their respective military in efforts to balance power.2 Therefore, U.S. commitment serves as a critical beacon for securing stability in the region.

China’s Rapidly Modernizing Military

It is China’s deceivingly weak military that precisely makes it dangerous. The PLA is considered a “party army,” or the armed division of the Communist Party. Because the army allocates more time politically indoctrinating the PLA soldiers than training them for combat, the PLA is deliberately designed to administer risk-averse actions because an army that spends too much time training is not spending enough time in political indoctrination. The CCP’s biggest fear is if the PLA forgets that its main goal is to protect CCP leaders from enemies, especially if those “enemies” are domestic students protesting for democratic rights, like in 1989 and 1999. At the expense of training, PLA officers spend approximately 30 to 40 percent of their service time on “political work,” such as CCP propaganda and singing patriotic songs. For instance, PLA Air Force (PLAAF) pilots receive ten hours of flight time, which is significantly less than regional standards. Also, only since 2012 were pilots able to submit their own flight plans because formerly overbearing regulations prevented

them from independently departing the runways. Therefore, China’s inexperience in combat makes the PLA potentially very dangerous. With no true combat experience since the Korean War, the PLA is more likely to act hawkish and precipitate skirmishes in the Asia-Pacific, including the territorial disputes in the East and South China Seas.

Due to the PLA’s weakness and its inability to use conventional warfare tactics to compete with the United States and its allies, the army relies on asymmetric strategies to compensate for its lack of personnel experience and traditional weapons. As a result, the PLA intends to improve insufficient areas as an integral part of its military modernization program. For example, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) has fully committed to addressing weak areas. By enhancing Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems and long-range anti-ship cruise missiles, China’s counter intervention forces have substantially expanded beyond the Taiwan Strait and into the Philippine Sea and South China Sea. The PLAN has made one of the most significant advancements in developing its anti-surface warfare (ASuW) power, the suppression of surface combatants in naval warfare, such as incorporating extended range weapons and enhanced maritime reconnaissance systems like anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM). Within the next ten years, the PLAN is also likely to make considerable advancements in anti-submarine warfare (ASW) programs, including upgraded sensors and operator expertise.

Moreover, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) has also modernized rapidly. The major objective of the PLAAF is to increase air power capacities, such as enhancing defensive and offensive strike capabilities through the development of fourth generation multirole aircrafts and fifth generation fighters. With greater emphasis on fourth generation fighters, the PLAAF has developed electronically scanned array (ESA) radars that provide pilots with extreme precision leverage. These radars have long-range detection capabilities that yield highly accurate and automatic targeting for air combat engagements with minimal pilot operation. The Second Artillery Corps and PLAAF are also committed to upgrading their

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6 Ibid., 9.

Challenges for Taiwan

As discussed above, the increase in China’s military power threatens Taiwan’s security. Withholding the One China Policy, China utilizes psychological warfare as a tactic to compel Taiwanese leaders that military procurement and arms sales are futile. It also seeks to restrain Taiwanese interaction with other foreign powers while convincing allies that military exchanges and assistance are also useless. Simply the sheer size of China’s missile capacity puts Taiwan at a large disadvantage (Appendix A). Consequently, these major security challenges may significantly hamper Taiwan’s efforts in deterring Chinese threats and coercion. Several factors include the eroding block obsolescence and operational readiness of weapon systems, the widening fighter gap, and Chinese opposition to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Therefore, it is imperative for Taiwan to rebalance its military capabilities in order to maintain the confidence and strength in future political negotiations with China.

Specifically in the Taiwan Air Force (TAF), one paramount challenge is the widening “fighter gap,” which is the shortage in the number of operationally available front-line combat aircrafts within the next decade. Several factors, including the block obsolescence of the F-5 fleet and material availability of the Mirage 2000-5E/DI fleet, exacerbate this gap. Block obsolescence is concerned with the simultaneous depreciation of a large group of facilities in a short period of time. Firstly, the block obsolescence of the F-5s is causing the fleet to approach the end of its service time. These aircrafts were the last U.S. fighters sold to Taiwan in 1982 during the Reagan Administration, reflecting the fleet’s obsolete technology. Additionally, the increasing severity of functional and structural problems affects the operational safety of pilots. For instance, issues with the vertical tail and horizontal stabilizers have reduced F-5F fighter trainers from 36 to 4 in 2009. In one F-5F incident, the eroding functionality of this aircraft resulted in the crash of five fighters and the death of those pilots in 2004.8

Furthermore, the deprecating F-5s hamper the operational readiness and training of pilots, forcing the TAF to dramatically decrease the amount of lead-in fighter training (LIFT) hours, which was originally located at 100 hours. The reduction in flight training will ultimately affect the operational readiness of pilots transitioning to operational squadrons and pilot proficiency. Although the Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense (MND) has considered an upgrade program for these fighter jets in order to extend the service time and improve capabilities, such modernization efforts are not cost-effective. With the expensive upgrades, the F-5s are not expected to serve past the 2017-2018 period and will not provide sufficiently qualitative power to deter PLA air capabilities.9 Hence, reduced flight training and the obsolescence of current F-5 fighter jets dramatically suppresses Taiwan’s defensive character against PLA ballistic military infrastructure.

As mentioned earlier, the Mirage 2000-5E/DI fighters suffer from minimal material availability because of extremely large Operations and Maintenance (O&M) costs. Mirage O&M costs are substantially higher than those of other TAF fleets. For example, according to data obtained from the Legislative Yuan’s Foreign Affairs and National Defense Committee (FANDC), the cost per flight hour for the Mirage fleet is estimated to be five times the cost of F-16A/Bs and three times the cost of the indigenous F-CK-1A/B (IDF) jets.10 Even more, although the Mirage 2000s only represents 17 percent of Taiwan’s front-line fourth generation combat aircrafts, the cost to maintain operation exhausts almost 60 percent of total O&M expenditures for all three fighter jets. Due to greater personnel funds for Taiwan’s proposed restructuring to an all-volunteer force, addressing this high O&M cost will be difficult for the TAF because of tightening budgets for O&M shares. The MND has considered storing several Mirage fighters to not only relieve O&M costs, but to also utilize the saved funds for other programs. However, instead of resolving the fighter gap problem, this proposed action will worsen the fighter gap at an expedientious rate due to less operationally available front-line fighters.

Since the first U.S. arms sale to Taiwan in 1992, Beijing has been sensitive to further military assistance from the U.S. to Taiwan, especially the sale of F-16C/Ds. Due to the ending service life of TAF fleets described above, the MND has consistently been submitting Letters of Request (LOR) to the U.S. for the sale of F-16C/Ds since July 2006. Taiwan decided to request these fighters in hopes of replacing the F-5 aircrafts. The F-16C/D, a fourth generation fighter, yields capabilities that the deprecating F-5 lacked, such as very short takeoff and landing (VSTOL)

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9 Ibid.
10 Ibid.
Without modern air combat capabilities, Taiwan will be unable to fully resist Chinese coercion. Therefore, under the provisions of the TRA, U.S. commitment to providing Taiwan with defensive military systems is imperative. However, because of strong Chinese opposition to these arms sales, prospects for the sale still remain uncertain. There are four theoretical reasons behind China’s objections of arms sales:

1. China views the military exchanges as a form of U.S. support for Taiwanese independence. From the Chinese perspective, no arms sales should be conducted without the consent of Beijing, the primary authority.

2. China believes that the dealings between the U.S. and Taiwan will decrease the incentive for Taiwan to pursue negotiations with Beijing, increasing the demand of de jure independence.

3. China views the arms sales as a threat to China’s national security and as a method of containment and restraint on Chinese modernization. Yet, one could argue that Taiwan would not require a missile defense program in the first place if more than 1,300 SRBMs and land attack cruise missiles (LACMs) were not targeted at Taiwan (Appendix C).

4. Beijing asserts that U.S. military assistance to Taiwan contradicts anti-proliferation policies for ballistic and cruise missile technologies. Therefore, some claim that China expanded its military proliferation agenda after the U.S. sold F-16A/Bs to Taiwan in 1992. Thus, the success of U.S. arms sales to Taiwan without strong Chinese retaliation is crucial for modernizing the TAF’s aviation programs and deterring coercion from China.

Although China strongly opposes U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, U.S. defense policymakers predict that Chinese retaliation is unlikely to precipitate in the near future. Rather, the manipulation of bilateral military-to-military, or mil-to-mil, exchanges has become an important means of protest. For instance, in October 2008, Beijing suspended military exchanges in protest against the Department of State’s release of items for notification to Congress, including Javelin, Harpoon, PAC-III, and Apache, totaling US$6.463 billion. However, the suspension ceased shortly after, and military exchanges resumed in June 2009. The PLA views military exchanges with the U.S. as largely symbolic, and therefore, easily expendable. Consequently, China has initiated strategies to complicate U.S. decision making. For instance, due to the attractiveness of the Chinese market, China successfully exploits foreign business interests through tacit and direct measures, such as encouraging businesses to advocate against military sales to Taiwan and imposing sanctions against foreign businesses in China, respectively.

This pressure has been borne by countries like Germany and France. After the sale of Mirage 2000-5 fighters from France to Taiwan in November 1992, French companies cited discrimination in China at the time, and China prohibited French participation in a US$1 billion subway joint venture project in Guangzhou. Consequently, concerned about potential negative reactions from Chinese authorities, France established a joint agreement with China to limit arms sales to Taiwan in January 1994. Furthermore, Abraham Denmark, Vice President for Political and Security Affairs at the National Bureau for Asian Research, and Randy Schriver, President and CEO of the Project 2049 Institute, agreed that if economic and cultural engagement with Taiwan is hindering Beijing’s goal of unification, then force may become more appealing since the U.S. is not fulfilling the security needs of Taiwan through arms sales. With less military assistance from other foreign powers and the delaying of potential unification from bilateral exchanges with Taiwan, the possibility of military confrontations may increase.

Implications for Taiwan and the U.S. on Cross-Strait Relations and Policy Recommendations

Both Taiwan and the U.S. play critical roles in maintaining peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. In order to address major issues like China’s continual threats of reunification through its military expansion

and Taiwan’s progressively obsolete military systems, not only does Taiwan need to take immediate action in modernizing its indigenous military structures and defenses, but the U.S. should also deepen commitments to provide military assistance under the provisions of the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). Under the TRA, the U.S. has obligations to respond to Chinese intimidation toward Taiwan, such as:

- considering any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area and of grave concern to the United States;
- providing Taiwan with arms of a defensive character; and
- maintaining the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security of the people on Taiwan.

Therefore, the continual reaffirmation of the TRA will not only emphasize U.S. commitment to militarily assist Taiwan, but it will also boost morale among Taiwan. Through Congress, a bill can be referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs reaffirming U.S.-Taiwan relations, including strengthening the support for Taiwan’s security, like through arms sales, and Taiwan’s inclusion in regional trade agreements. Moreover, a TRA reaffirmation bill reinstated every five years further endorses the pending sale of F-16C/Ds. This bill may assist the Obama Administration by reflecting U.S. commitment to its obligations under the TRA, specifically on deciding in favor of Taipei’s LOR by confirming the arms sale, which will help modernize Taiwan’s already depreciating fighters.

Another important recommendation that should be considered would be to prioritize preserving the qualitative edge that both Taiwan and the U.S. have had over China in terms of technology and organized professionalism among personnel, respectively. However, this edge has begun to slowly erode over the past couple years due to China’s rapid economic growth. Taiwan’s role in maintaining its qualitative edge remains within the professionalism and training experience of its military personnel. Even though the PLA has made significant progress in improving its personnel combat skills, some notable deficiencies still persist, such as limited joint training and tactical trainings. For example, because the PLAAF strongly emphasizes electronic warfare, it disregards important training sessions that would help pilots optimize their capabilities with aircraft and weapon platforms. By refining their respective qualitative skills, Taiwan and the U.S. would have the defense character to counter Chinese aggression.

Nonetheless, Taiwan’s potential godsend to resisting Chinese intimidation would be its formidable personnel organization and experience. The TAF possesses one of the most well-trained repair crews in the world. Within the past ten years, Taiwan has completely modified rapid runway repair (RRR) capabilities through the comprehensive training of staff members. The continuation of these RRR and pilot trainings is vital to the survivability of Taiwan’s defense. With more ample RRR tools and investments in other passive defenses, such as camouflage and runway hardening, monthly training sessions, and realistic combat scenarios, Taiwan can further enhance its swiftness in repairing damaged runways during combat. Furthermore, unlike the PLAAF, which does not stress pilot development trainings, the TAF has executed numerous pilot training programs that have prepared pilots with the necessary skills for aircraft operations. Thus, although Taiwan’s military power cannot surpass China’s sheer strength, its experience in personnel training and RRR will aid in resisting possible Chinese attack.

Likewise, the large technological edge that the U.S. established is diminishing. Although the U.S. defense budget has significantly increased over the past decade, it is still unrealistic to overcome the rapidly advancing military framework of China by “throwing more money at it.” After federal budget deficits and substantial spending in the Afghanistan and Iraq wars, another formidable increase in defense expenditure is not likely to occur within the remainder of this decade. Rather, by properly appropriating current funds, the Department of Defense can analyze the efficiency and survivability of existing weapons and future platforms. Although the thorough scrutiny of military programs through research and development (R&D) may be lengthy and trivial, it will prove to be cost effective in avoiding the use of valuable R&D on more vulnerable and inefficient forces. To balance military power, the quality of weapon systems is more important than the quantity. For instance, in terms of aircrafts, because of the limited capacity to base jets, it may be more efficient for the U.S. to have fewer fighters overall, such as having one high performance jet over two mediocre-performing carriers. By allocating current funds, the U.S. can not only develop more high quality weapon platforms while minimizing costs, but it can also drastically reduce O&M costs through

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upgrade programs, as opposed to incurring new debts from the procurement of new weapons. Perpetuating that technological edge the U.S. had will reinforce American primacy and its major role in enhancing security in the Asia-Pacific.

All in all, as the narrative of a rising China continues, political and security issues of cross-strait relations remain complex and critical. Though the PLA seems deceptively weak, its hawkishness and considerable efforts to bridge inadequate areas are factors that make its forces lethal. These rapid improvements challenge Taiwanese sovereignty and exacerbate the eroding conditions of Taiwan’s military capabilities, specifically the TAF’s depreciating fighters. A reaffirmation bill could boost Taiwan’s confidence in the U.S. commitment to assist militarily through arms sales, while preserving the qualitative edge for both the U.S. and Taiwan to help stabilize the region and rebalance maritime power. By avoiding parochial approaches, the continued efforts of dialogue and diplomacy remain an essential part of trilateral relations in order to prevent political and defensive ramifications and resolve issues peacefully.

Works Cited


Appendices

Appendix A
Table 1: Comparison of Approximate Principal Combat Aircraft Strength


Appendix B
Table 2: Estimated Fighter Numbers Through 2023

This paper examines why the two Asian Communist states, China and North Korea, diverged in a key aspect of their political institutions, namely the leadership succession system, when they initially presented marked similarities: the dynastic cycle in the pre-modern era, Confucianist background, and establishment of Communist regimes in their postcolonial periods. Chinese succession has been resolved through informal competition while North Korea has gone through hereditary succession. Although there have been comparative studies conducted to account for successions in communist regimes with focus on Soviet Bloc member nations and those in China and North Korea individually, there has been no comparison of evolvement of leadership succession in these two most similar states. To account for their divergence, I introduce and test a hypothesis that the longer and more exhaustive Japanese colonization of Korean territory than that of Chinese land generated more favorable conditions – passivity of the people, lack of coherence among the leadership, and greater vulnerability to postcolonial foreign intervention - for Kim Il Sung than Mao Zedong in securing power for his desired successor. Kim Il Sung, who was installed by a foreign patron and thereby possessed disproportionate power over other factionalized elites, could secure succession to his son without challenge from the mass who were politically passive. On the other hand, Mao Zedong’s designated succession to Hua Guofeng could not last since Deng Xiaoping, a member of the cohesive leadership, rose to power through support from his revolutionary colleagues as well as that from the politically active mass.
through indigenous struggle, rose to power with support from his longtime associates as well as that from the general people.

Comparing the evolvement of leadership succession system in China and North Korea provides variation and control, as they are alike in many other respects besides the colonial experience. In the pre-modern era until the fall of their last dynasties - Qing in China and Joseon in Korea - both countries repeated the rise and decline of dynasties; The official state philosophy upon which their governance apparatuses were erected was Confucianism; Also, in the first half of the twentieth century, both were colonized by its imperialist neighbor, Japan, and communist regimes were established in both countries when Japan had left their respective territories. All these similarities allow us to focus on few differences among them, namely the intensity of Japanese colonization, to account for divergence in a key aspect of their political institutions, the leadership succession system.

The analysis section will investigate the effect of varying degree of colonization on the divergent evolvement of leadership succession systems in two states. In doing so, this paper will distinguish three conditions that affect the leaders’ ability in securing succession to his desired heir: passivity of the people, lack of coherence among the leadership, and high vulnerability to foreign intervention in postcolonial period - for Kim Il Sung in securing succession to his son.

However, the proposed effect of Japanese colonization on the evolvement of hereditary succession in North Korea can only be illuminated when its effect is compared to that on the evolvement of leadership succession in China which also experienced Japanese colonialism but only in a much lesser degree. Japanese colonization of China was less exhaustive than that of Korea in several respects. Japan colonized only the Northeast region of China and it was also only for a little longer than a decade. Also, due to the sheer size of the land that it had to control in China, Japan’s command in the area was much less severe, allowing the mass to organize and the Chinese forces to stage guerrilla warfare against its rule. Such semi-colonization1 of China engendered unfavorable conditions - active mass as participants in politics, coherent leadership, and less vulnerability to foreign intervention in postcolonial period - for Mao Zedong in securing his succession to his desired heir, Hua Guofeng, who eventually was eclipsed by Deng Xiaoping who, in absence of foreign influence and thereby

ship succession systems in two countries. Through the analysis, I conclude that the causal relationship holds and thereby argue that the institutionalization of hereditary succession in North Korea can be attributed to Japan’s comprehensive colonization of Korean territory and society.

**Literature Review: Connecting the two dots – Colonialism and Succession**

This paper examines two disparate topics: succession and colonialism. Although there have been copious amount of studies done on both topics, the existing literature reveal their limitations and illuminate the ways in which this study can contribute to the scholarly debate on both subjects.

Previous studies done on succession have broadly investigated leadership succession in autocracies. Since successions in pluralist democratic societies depend on well-known rules of competitive elections and are openly conducted, they are both predictable and institutionalized. However, in autocracies, succession is secretly conducted and not formally institutionalized. Thus, studies on modern leadership succession have focused on accounting for how leaders are changed in autocracies, mainly in communist regimes.

Studies that examined leadership succession in communist regimes have grouped Eastern European Soviet Bloc member nations to account for similarities and differences in how communist regimes change their rulers. By doing so, insightful theories such as the effect of the relative power of the party over other institutions on succession have been generated. However, only scant attention has been paid to succession systems in Asian communist regimes - China, North Korea and Vietnam - which can contribute to better understanding of succession in communist regimes as a distinct category of regimes themselves. Also, although succession in China and North Korea have been investigated individually, there have not been studies conducted to compare the succession in those two similar countries as to examine what can account for the divergence.

Moreover, the existing literature on succession in autocracies has disproportionately focused on the role of the elite-leader relationship in succession. Some of the theories generated from such kinds of studies are chronological precedence of the party over the leader and vice versa affecting which of those two resolves future succession and the elites’ role in allowing hereditary succession to take place only when it secures their power. However, in doing so, they have largely left out a major factor that affects succession: people. In post-Stalin Eastern European countries as well as throughout the human history, people took active role in replacement of their leaders including China in post-Cultural Revolution era. This study supplements limitations to past studies done on succession by examining the passivity of the people as one of the three major conditions affecting the leader’s ability to resolve future succession.

Meanwhile, the literature on the legacy of Japanese colonialism in former colonies has focused colonization’s role in introducing the modern bureaucratic system and in the industrialization of previously agricultural societies. Although they may have implied colonialism’s impact on the trajectories of political systems in South and North Korea, the existing literature themselves are not sufficient to draw a conclusion Japanese colonization directly gave way to evolvement of an uniquely monstrous hereditary succession of North Korea. This paper will particularly focus on the unintended but devastating legacy of Japanese

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otherwise similar countries, then the number of factors attributable to these differences will be sufficiently small to warrant explanation in terms of those differences alone.” In comparing two polities that share significant similarities but show divergence in a particular aspect, the Most Similar System Design helps to narrow down features that may account for such a divergence. Table 1 shows the application of the methodology to the two most similar states that this study will examine: North Korea and China.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Similarities</th>
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<th>China</th>
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<tr>
<td>Pre-colonial governance structure</td>
<td>rise and decline of dynasties</td>
<td>Confucianism</td>
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<tr>
<td>Pre-colonial governance philosophy</td>
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<td>Geographical location</td>
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<td>Postcolonial governance structure</td>
<td>communist regime installed in late 1940s after the end of WW2</td>
<td>communist regime installed in late 1940s after the end of WW2</td>
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Assessment and Analysis

Independent Variable: Japanese Colonialism

This section examines the degree of Japanese colonization of Korea and China. This comparison will serve as the basis on which the rest of the analysis will build upon. The comparison is illustrated in Table 2.
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First condition: Passivity of the People

This section will examine the effect of the intensity of Japanese colonization on the first condition that affects the leader’s ability in resolving succession: the passivity of the people. It is proxy-measured by the opportunities provided for mass-participation in politics. The mechanism for such a proxy measurement is that the less the opportunities that people were given to participate in politics and to gain experience in voicing themselves politically, the more passive they become because people are either less inclined to participate in a new political event due to historical trauma of repressive colonialism or simply are not competent in mobilizing themselves from lack of such experiences hitherto. Consequently, passive mass will likely to condone succession that the leader will resolve while active mass will resist if proposed succession is against their interests. The relationships that this section will examine are illustrated in Figure 2.

Before proceeding with examination of the variables, it is important to note that Korea and China had similar starting point prior to Japanese colonization with regards to degree of passivity of the people. In fact, people in neither country were passive. From late nineteenth century to the fall of dynasties in both countries in early 20th century, both countries saw dynamic mass movements. The Joseon Dynasty in Korea, founded in 1392, were seeing preludes to its fall through a series of

nationalist movements at the turn of the twentieth century. The movements took off with the Kapsin Coup of 1884 which established a short-lived new government under the slogan of “independence and modernization of the nation.” Then, a series of mass movements - Kabo Peasant War, Tonghak movement, The Patriotic Enlightenment Movement and even establishment of the People’s Assembly - were led by intellectuals and the general people up until the fall of the Dynasty in 1910. Likewise, in China, there were also abundant mass movements such as Taiping, Nian, and Miao Rebellions, Boxer Rebellion and Self-Strengthening Movement where people participated in politics through violent as well as peaceful means. Both countries had witnessed a series of mass movements through which people voiced their discontent and actively participated in politics.

However, such political dynamism that two countries witnessed near the fall of their dynasties did not share similar trajectories in post-dynastic era as a new exogenous variable had intervened in unfolding their histories: Japanese colonialism. In post-dynastic era, varying degree to which Japan occupied their respective territories significantly affected the political opportunities of the people. With only the Northeast region occupied, on the vast remainder of its territory free of foreign control, Chinese people were given opportunities to engage in politics, and in turn, voice their support and opposition to particular governance structures or ideologies. Following the fall of Qing by an indigenous Xinhai revolution, China went through what we call the Republican Era from 1912 to 1949. During that period, Chinese people were involved in the May 4th movement that exposed them to democratic principles, peasant revolutions pivoting around communist leadership that challenged traditional vested interests such as landlords, and clash of ideologies through the two Civil Wars between the KMT and CCP. All of these together were a series of opportunities for them to participate and gain experience in mass-politics.

Meanwhile, Korean people, with their entire territory under repressive control of Japan, were preemptively prohibited to engage in any collective political activities. Although the March 1st movement in 1919 was a collective political movement in which two million Korean people actively took part to challenge Japanese colonial rule, and in turn, served as an opportunity for people to collectively organize their political voice, its goal was strictly confined to national independence. Even that was violently suppressed by Japanese police, and Korea had seen no other mass movements until its liberation in 1945. Exhaustive Japanese colonization had deprived the people of their opportunities to nurture themselves as participants in politics.

In an extension of their decades-long participation in politics, during the succession period from Mao to Hua and then to Deng, the Chinese people had played major role in Deng’s rise over Hua. The political dynamism during the Republican Era had made its comeback when Mao had initiated the Cultural Revolution. During the Cultural Revolution, people were encouraged to challenge the party authorities and actively participate in politics. However, people who had become tired of the longevity of the turmoil - 10 years from 1966 to 1976 - preferred a leader who could bring greater order to the society. Consequently, when Deng was rising under Hua, people showed support for Deng instead of Hua who was the heir apparent of the Cultural Revolution. With the presence of politically active people that had been nurtured in the land free of Japanese control and by Mao himself through the Cultural Revolution, Mao had little to no control over as to how the leadership succession would evolve following his death since people also shared power with him in shaping the nature of such a process.

In contrast, in an extension of political passivity under Japanese rule, North Korean people remained marginalized from the political process and conformed the hereditary succession from Kim to his son. Since 1958, when Kim had consolidated his power firmly by having obliterated all opposition, he had started to prepare for hereditary succession by extending the cult of personality to his son. Kim II Sung’s birthday officially became a national holiday in 1972, and then the period from 1958-1980 was known as The Hermit Kingdom.

14 Yong Hwan Kil, North Korea in 1983: Transforming “the Hermit Kingdom”?
February 16, Kim Jong Il’s birthday, to April 15, Kim Il Sung’s birthday, was celebrated as the “Loyalty Festival Period” in 1976.\textsuperscript{14}

Few years later in 1980, in the midst of such an overt attempt to return to dynastic succession, the North Korean people remained silent, giving way to institutionalization of hereditary succession.

**Second Condition: Coherence among the leadership**

This section will examine the effect of the intensity of Japanese colonization on the second condition that affects the leader’s ability in resolving succession: the coherence among the leadership. It is proxy-measured by extent to which common experience was shared within the leadership and the variety of groups that shared exclusive common experience only among themselves. The mechanism for such a proxy measurement is that the greater the proportion of the entire leadership having shared common experience with each other, the more cohesive they are for they will be emotionally and ideologically more attached to each other; Also, the more diverse the groups that shared exclusive common experience only among themselves, the less the entire leadership will likely to be cohesive since distinctive factions may arise among the groups that shared exclusive common experience. Consequently, the leader of a cohesive body of leadership may implement less severe purge on his long-time associates while that of a body of leadership with distinctive factions and alien experiences might feel impelled to resort to more relentless purge against his opposition to secure his power. The outcome of those two types of purge could mean leaving potential for the rise of or completely eliminating future opposition who might influence the succession that the leader has designated. The relationships that this section will examine are illustrated in Figure 3.

The varying degree to which Japan colonized Korea and China had significant impact on the relationship among the leaders. Since the establishment of the party in 1921 and until that of the communist state in 1949, the CCP leadership was able to cultivate party-wide common experience on the land free of Japanese colonial repression. In fact, the major foe of the CCP was the KMT which staged the Five Encirclement Campaigns on them.\textsuperscript{15} To circumvent the aggression, the CCP leadership left for The Long March to the Northwest region where neither the KMT nor Japanese influence was present. The Long March from 1934 to 1935 serves as a case in point for building party-wide common experience in the land free of Japanese colonization. The Long March had renewed the sense of mission and built participants had survived the journey.\textsuperscript{16} The Long March had served to form one cohesive body of collective leadership by cultivating common experience among the participants such as Mao, Zhou Enlai, and Deng. The network and bondage that Deng built - during The Long March and through other political struggles in the land free of Japanese control - with his colleagues whom later became high ranking officials in the party, government and military was significant to his rise to power over Hua, the designated successor of Mao, who lacked such a network.\textsuperscript{17} Hua had joined the party after 1938 and senior party cadres who had shared with Deng the experience of building the party and the state from the scrap supported him over Hua who was in their sight an inexperienced upstart.\textsuperscript{18}
In contrast, due to the exhaustive Japanese colonization of the entire Korean peninsula, Korean communists had to flee to foreign bases such as the USSR, China, and Japan, being unable to cultivate party-wide common experience and a sense of solidarity. In fact, the form of common experience that they built was faction-wide, limited to each group affiliated with a foreign base. Korean communist movements began by exiled groups with “resistance against and independence from Japan” as their primary purpose. Staring from establishment of a Korean communist organization in Tokyo in 1917, separate communist organizations even within one foreign country such as those in Shanghai and Manchu of China, and those in the far-east in Russia as well as one near Moscow, were established sporadically. According to Comintern’s ‘one country-one party’ doctrine, these separate entities grew belligerent to each other as they tried to get their organization registered to the Comintern.

Repressive and exhaustive Japanese colonization had not only dissipated indigenous political leaders to various foreign bases but also made them feel hostile to each other which in turn weakened the coherence of the entire leadership.

These leaders from disparate entities later came back to Korea after liberation and composed distinct factions within the North Korea Workers’ Party. Consequently, Kim Il Sung had eventually deracinated every faction other than his own to secure his power among disparate leadership.

16 Ibid., 35. 17 Ibid., 431. 18 Vogel, Ezra F. Deng Xiaoping And the Transformation of China. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011. 19 Although the CCP leadership did split themselves in the occupied land under Japanese rule during the resistance war from late 1930s to early 1940s, it was after they had already built party-wide common experience and it was voluntary split for the common cause of victory of the communist party and China. For more information on split among the CCP leadership during the resistance war against Japan, see Dittmer, Lowell. “Power And Personality in China: Mao Tse-Tung, Liu Shao-Ch'i, and the Politics of Charismatic Succession.” Studies in Comparative Communism 7.1-2 (1974): 21-49. Web. 20 Hyung Chul, Shin “A study on North Korean Political Elites.” The Journal of International Relations Vol. 1 (1998): 61-90. Web. 21 Ibid. 22 In the wake of the August Faction Incident which is considered to be the last internal challenge posed to Kim by other factions, with regards to the nature of NKWP leadership, Kim said in 1956 that “Cadres of our party came not only from the north but also from the south, Soviet, inland as well as the northeast region of China, and even Japan. Thus, they have various past and it is difficult for them not to commit wrongs” (Shimotomai). 23 For more information on distinctive factions of NKWP in its early years, see Shimotomai, Nobuo.,1945-1961 = Moscow and Kim Il Sung. Print.

facations that he neither shared personal nor ideological affinities and thus felt as potential threats to his power. Notable factions in the early stage of the communist North Korean state were the CCP affiliated Yan’an faction, Soviet Koreans, South Korean Workers’ Party members, and the Ppalchisan faction led by Kim Il Sung. Eventually, the lack of common experience among the leaders and sense of difference that they felt for each other gave rise to development of Juche Thought, self-reliance and emphasis on values that are indigenous to Korea, which justified Kim’s purge on other factions that had foreign roots; The second ranked leader and the head of the South Korean Workers’ Party, Park Hun Young, was stigmatized as ‘American Spy’ and was executed in the aftermath of the Korean War; Heo Ga Yi, the leader of the Soviet faction and director of party organization, was relegated and then committed suicide. By the time the last internal revolt - the August Faction Incident in 1958 – was quelled, Kim had eliminated all factions that posed potential challenge to his absolute power.

On the other hand, the party-wide common experience of the CCP leadership was precisely what had saved the lives of future leaders who were not subjected to lethal purge by Mao, their revolutionary colleague. Although the senior party cadres such as Liu Shaoqi and Deng Xiaoping were relegated and sent to the countryside during the Cultural Revolution the purge staged on the dissenting leadership in general was by no means as severe as that staged against the opposition in NKWP. Deng Xiaoping, although considered as a “capitalist roader” and did not share the same ideological inclination as that of Mao and thereby was sent to reeducation camp during the Cultural Revolution the dissenting leadership in general was by no means as severe as that staged against the opposition in NKWP. Deng Xiaoping, although considered as a “capitalist roader” and did not share the same ideological inclination as that of Mao and thereby was reinstated at Mao’s will. While utter annihilation of all factions in NKWP had drained out every potential challenger to the succession, the opposition leaders within the CCP having maintained their lives and the prospect for reinstatement meant preserving a rich source of prospective leaders who could later challenge the designated successor.

Third Condition: Vulnerability to foreign intervention in postcolonial period

This section will examine the effect of the intensity of Japanese colonization on the third condition that affects the leader’s ability in resolving succession: the vulnerability to foreign intervention in postcolonial period. It is proxy-measured by three different variables: 1) the viability of indigenous political apparatus, 2) the strength of indigenous armed forces, and 3) preservation of independent diplomatic representation during the colonial period. The mechanism for such proxy measurements are explained below as they are more closely examined. The relationships that this section will examine are illustrated in Figure 4.

For Korea, Japanese colonization had led to high vulnerability to foreign intervention in postcolonial period in three ways. First, repressive colonization precluded development of a viable indigenous political apparatus that could prevent foreign intervention in postcolonial period. Under repressive Japanese control of the peninsula, a viable Korean indigenous political force could not be formed within its territorial boundary.


Second, under repressive and exhaustive Japanese colonial rule, Korea could not develop indigenous armed forces that could deter armed intervention by foreign powers upon Japan’s withdrawal. Within its territorial boundary, Korea had no means to develop military capacity under strong Japanese police and military presence in the peninsula. There were structured Korean military organizations formed in China starting from the late 1930s, notably the Independence Army that was approved by Chiang Kei-Shek, the President of Republic of China, and established in 1938. However, its size in its inception was around 300 soldiers and it never exceeded a few hundred in number. Ultimately, its attempted invasion of Korean peninsula was preceded by the Soviet Red Army in August 12th, 1945 from the north and the U.S. army from the south.27 At the onset of the postcolonial period, Korean army was simply not powerful enough to preclude intervention of foreign army in the peninsula.

Third, Japan’s complete annexation of the Korean state deprived Korea of its diplomatic rights and independent political representation at the international level for 35 years thereby prevent Korea from claiming credible independence.28 Korea was deprived of its diplomatic rights since the signing of Japan-Korea Protectorate Treaty in 1905. Although the Emperor Gojong of the Korean Empire had sent the ‘Hague Secret Emissary’ to the 2nd International Peace Conference to divulge the nullity of the protectorate treaty, with Japan’s interruption and the other nations’ connivance, the Emissary could not participate in the Conference.29 Although Chiang Kei Shek had acknowledged the Provisional government in Shanghai. However, even that was neither politically viable in scale and structure to fill the massive power vacuum in the peninsula that Japan had left behind nor acknowledged by the Great Powers as one capable of doing so. Upon liberation, the provisional government in Shanghai came back to Korea in the midst of power vacuum. However, since it was poorly funded and had a history of contentious internal struggles during its years in Shanghai, it was considered by many other indigenous leaders who were not affiliated with it to be inept to be the legitimate government of the liberated Korea. Unlike China, ideological conflicts were not yet resolved and various factions from other locations of foreign bases challenged its legitimacy as the government of the liberated nation.26 In the midst of struggles between indigenous factions and in absence of a preeminent political force being able to claim its legitimacy as the governing body for the liberated nation, foreign powers filled the power vacuum that Japan had left behind.
Government of Korea in Shanghai, it was disregarded by all other major countries. In absence of international diplomatic representation of Korea, the Great Powers made a plan to fill the foreseeable power vacuum in the peninsula. At the Yalta Conference in early 1945, the USSR and the US had decided upon the fate of the postcolonial Korea: “ruled under the trusteeship for considerable period.” The plan was executed and postcolonial Korea was subsequently shaped by the foreign powers.

On the other hand, for China, less repressive and partial colonization of its territory had led to low vulnerability to foreign intervention in postcolonial period in three ways. First, in the land free of Japanese control, Chinese leaders could nurture viable indigenous political apparatuses that obviated the need for foreign intervention in postcolonial period. From early 1920s to 1945, the CCP and KMT have individually developed viable political apparatuses through interactions with the people and in turn have garnered political support from the mass. The two major political forces had already fought to gain dominance in non-colonized land and when Japan left, they fought to expand their sphere of influence to fill the power vacuum that Japan had left behind. When indigenous political forces vied for domestic control through another fierce Civil War in postcolonial period, there was no room for a direct foreign intervention without armed conflict with the Chinese political forces.


28 Upon its victory in Russo-Japanese War in 1905, Japan had started its process of annexing Korea by forcing it upon signing the Japan-Korea Protectorate Treaty which deprived Korea of its diplomatic rights. Although the Emperor Gojong of Korean Empire had sent Hague Secret Emissary to the 2nd International Peace Conference to disclose the nullity of the treaty, with Japan’s interruption and the other nations’ silence, the Emissary could not participate in the Conference. 29 Likewise, when a civilian Korean representative Kim Gyu Sik was sent to Paris Peace Conference in 1918, with Japan’s diplomatic maneuver, his petitions were simply ignored. For more information on Korean diplomatic efforts to gain independence during the colonial period, see Yun, Pyong Suk, “The Second Hague Peace Conference and the Historical Significance of the Korean Special Envoy.” The Journal of Korean Independence Movement Research Vol.29 (2007): 1-56. And Lee, Ee-Hwa, Story of Korean History 21: If the day of Liberation Comes. Seoul: Hangilsa, 2004. Print.

Foreign Intervention in formation of the state and the leadership

In absence of direct foreign intervention at the onset of postcolonial period, Chinese political forces that were developed in ‘free China’ extended its power to the restored Chinese territory and continued what it had already been practicing: indigenous competition for power. In the midst of power struggles within the CCP during the Republican era, Mao himself was able to rise to power through competition with almost no foreign intervention. According to a historian Meisner, “Mao had achieved political supremacy in defiance of Stalin” during the Long March by replacing twenty-eight Bolsheviks who had returned to China after having been educated in Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow. Through the struggles over strategies and policies as to how to lead the party, and later the state, the Great Powers made a plan to fill the foreseeable power vacuum in the peninsula. At the Yalta Conference in early 1945, the USSR and the US had decided upon the fate of the postcolonial Korea: “ruled under the trusteeship for considerable period.” The plan was executed and postcolonial Korea was subsequently shaped by the foreign powers.

Third, semi-colonization had allowed China to be acknowledged by the international society as a sovereign nation during and after the colonial period. Unlike Korea, China maintained independent political representation in the international arena. For example, in contrast to Korea’s inability to voice its sovereign rights, China had actively raised its voice in rectifying foreign powers’ self-claimed rights in Chinese territory. Although Japan’s voice was as large as China, the Great powers such as the United States sympathized with China’s situation under the self-determination doctrine propounded by President Woodrow Wilson. Then, when Japan withdrew, with its sovereignty acknowledged by the international society, Chinese political forces restored its pre-colonial territory and gained complete independence.

In absence of direct foreign intervention at the onset of postcolonial period, Chinese political forces that were developed in ‘free China’ extended its power to the restored Chinese territory and continued what it had already been practicing: indigenous competition for power. In the midst of power struggles within the CCP during the Republican era, Mao himself was able to rise to power through competition with almost no foreign intervention. According to a historian Meisner, “Mao had achieved political supremacy in defiance of Stalin” during the Long March by replacing twenty-eight Bolsheviks who had returned to China after having been educated in Sun Yat-sen University in Moscow. Through the struggles over strategies and policies as to how to lead the party, and later the state, the Great Powers made a plan to fill the foreseeable power vacuum in the peninsula. At the Yalta Conference in early 1945, the USSR and the US had decided upon the fate of the postcolonial Korea: “ruled under the trusteeship for considerable period.” The plan was executed and postcolonial Korea was subsequently shaped by the foreign powers.

Third, semi-colonization had allowed China to be acknowledged by the international society as a sovereign nation during and after the colonial period. Unlike Korea, China maintained independent political representation in the international arena. For example, in contrast to Korea’s inability to voice its sovereign rights, China had actively raised its voice in rectifying foreign powers’ self-claimed rights in Chinese territory. Although Japan’s voice was as large as China, the Great powers such as the United States sympathized with China’s situation under the self-determination doctrine propounded by President Woodrow Wilson. Then, when Japan withdrew, with its sovereignty acknowledged by the international society, Chinese political forces restored its pre-colonial territory and gained complete independence.
the ideas that resulted in successful performance of the party or state won over those rendered poor outcomes. The failure of the CCP in the cities resulted in the fall of the twenty-eight Bolsheviks from their power, the very group who led unsuccessful mobilization of urban workers. Later during the Great Leap Forward, the failed attempts at communization and premature industrialization in the rural areas resulted in the power shift to the 2nd front faction whom advocated for a pro-capitalist route.39 In China, the fall and rise of factions and shift in power were largely the result of how successful the policies of a group of political leaders were and how well they resonated among the people rather than that of foreign intervention. Deng’s rise was partly due to the support from the intellectuals and general people who had been inflicted by chaotic aspects of the Cultural Revolution and thereby preferred him over Hua who rose to power as an adherent of the Cultural Revolution.40 For the CCP leadership, it was the people and what the leaders stood for that gave them the legitimacy, not the foreign patrons.

However, in North Korea, foreign intervention in postcolonial period led to the establishment of a satellite state of the USSR and foreign installation of the paramount leader who was granted disproportionate political power over others. When Korean peninsula was temporarily divided under the US-USSR military occupation following the liberation, Stalin subsequently decided to establish a satellite state in the north.41 Stalin nominated Kim Il Sung as the leader of a new communist state among several candidates because he thought Kim seemed to fit to serve him the best as a military expert who can implement his orders from Moscow. 42 With the backing of the patron, Kim had leverage that could not be easily challenged by other indigenous elites.43 As it was in the cases in countries under direct sphere of influence of the USSR such as Poland, Hungary, and Czech, the approval from Moscow was a necessary and sufficient condition for removal of the leader in early stages of their regimes.44 In North Korea, with such initial leverage of power, Kim gradually eliminated and established absolute dictatorship that went unchallenged in subsequent years since late 1950s. In fact, the support that he had from Stalin in early stages of the establishment of the state gave him leverage not only over other factions, but also over leaders within his own faction who rallied behind him to secure their interests and power.45

Conclusion

This paper started out by drawing an analogy between Frankenstein’s creation of a monster and Japanese colonialism’s effect on engendering conditions favorable for the evolvement of hereditary succession in North Korea. Then throughout the paper, I have examined whether the hereditary succession from Kim Il Sung to his son was - when compared to Chinese succession from Mao to Hua - unintentionally generated by exhaustive and repressive Japanese colonization of Korean territory. The conclusion of this paper intends to recapitulate the main findings and emphasize why studying succession matters for understanding North Korea, the most understudied nation on earth.

The analysis section examined a set of relationships between the varying degree of Japanese colonization of Korea and China and the three conditions: passivity of the people, coherence among the leader-40 Ibid., 36
41 Stalin was initially not interested in fixating the division of the peninsula but he veered and decided to keep North Korea under its sphere of influence when North Korea’s rich deposit of Uranium served his interest in building nuclear weapons. For more information on change in the Soviet’s stance on the division of the peninsula, see Shimotomai, Nobuo. - 945-1961 = Moscow and Kim Il Sung, n.d.
42 Ibid., 42. Kim had served in the Soviet Red Army starting from early 1940s until he was sent back to the peninsula to lead the satellite state that Stalin had decided to establish.
43 Ibid., 12. According to Andrei Lankov, the degree to which Soviet Union intervened in the formation of the Communist state in North Korea was greater than the way it did in Eastern European countries.
and vulnerability to foreign intervention in postcolonial period. Then, I presented the mechanism in which the varying degree of the solidity of the three conditions can explain the divergent evolvement of leadership succession in China and North Korea. The passive North Koreans condoned - while the active Chinese people challenged - the designated leadership succession from taking place in their respective countries. Although both countries shared equally dynamic mass-policies before the fall of their dynasties in early twentieth century, different degree of Japanese colonization had impact on the people in cultivating consciousness as active participants in politics. Chinese people who were provided abundant opportunities to voice themselves through politics in the land free of Japanese control, resisted succession to Mao’s designated heir, Hua. On the contrary, the North Korean people who were deprived of their opportunities to participate in politics during the colonial period condoned dynastic succession from Kim to Kim.

The coherence among the leadership affected the succession by altering the relationships between the leaders. Due to repressive colonization by Japan, Korean indigenous political leaders had to flee to foreign bases. Leaders at each base cultivated common experience exclusively among themselves. On the contrary, Chinese communist leaders cultivated party-wide common experience in the land free of Japanese control. The Long March serves as a case in point where the participants had gone through deadly experience together and built solidarity. Such a party-wide common experiences have contributed to resisting a source of opposition to Mao’s designated succession because Mao led non-lethal purge against the opposition leaders whom were his long-time colleagues. On the other hand, the faction-wide common experience built among the North Korean leaders and the consequent formation of distinct factions were stimulants to Kim Il Sung’s utter annihilation of the opposition, enabling him to secure succession to his son without notable challengers.

The vulnerability to foreign intervention in postcolonial period affected succession by either allowing or precluding indigenous power struggle from resolving the succession process. China, in the land free of colonization, cultivated viable political apparatus, indigenous armed forces, and preserved diplomatic representation in the international realm that precluded foreign intervention in the postcolonial period. On the contrary, Korea could not prevent foreign intervention in the postcolonial period because not only was it unable to form a viable political apparatus and strong indigenous armed forces under repressive control of Japan, but also because it could not preserve diplomatic independence which was deprived by Japan. With direct foreign intervention in formation of the communist state and the leadership, the paramount leader of North Korea was installed by a foreign patron, Stalin.

With the patron’s backing, Kim was difficult to challenge or replace which allowed him to resolve succession at his will. However, in China, free of foreign intervention in formation of the state, leaders continued indigenous struggle for power which enabled succession to take the form of competition, allowing Deng Xiaoping to win the competition over Hua Guofeng, the designated successor of Mao Zedong.

Examining what had caused the divergence in leadership succession in North Korea and China is especially important because it may account for their other divergences. Despite their significantly similar start as communist states in Northeast Asia, two states followed disparate trajectories on domestic performance as well as in the international realm. During the three-generation hereditary succession, North Korea adamantly preserved the only complete planned economic system in the world that led to the Arduous March in 1990s which killed over 3 million people from starvation. In the international realm, it has constantly disrupted the world and regional stability by initiating frequent military aggression to its neighbors and developing nuclear weaponry. However, in China, what had coincided with the competitive collective leadership was its rise as a Great Power. Given such simple correlation, it is perhaps, in the benefit of the stakeholders in Korean peninsula to examine under what conditions hereditary succession had evolved. One can only undo something when one figures out how it was done in the first place. For such reason, delving deeper to understand how hereditary succession of North Korea came about might deserve a little more attention than it has hitherto generated.
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“Soft” Weapons: An Investigation of the Diplomatic Tactics of King Mongkut of Siam Leading up to the “Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between Siam and Great Britain” in 1855

Scott Phillip Davis

ABSTRACT

The diplomacy of King Mongkut surrounding the negotiations of the “Treaty of Friendship and Commerce between Siam and Great Britain” (known today as the “Bowring Treaty”) in 1855, created the strategic framework for Siamese diplomatic engagements with foreigners during the era of Siamese modernization in the late 19th century. However, existing historical narratives overlook Mongkut’s utilization of diplomatic tactics in communications prior to the negotiations of the Bowring Treaty. By examining primary sources from British representatives and King Mongkut leading up to the Bowring Treaty negotiations, this paper identifies and interprets a unique arsenal of “soft” diplomatic tools King Mongkut deliberately used in his diplomatic communications. The tools identified are (1) the adoption of the English language in diplomacy, (2) the befriending of diplomatic envoys and personalization of diplomatic dialogue, and (3) and the active exhibition of Siam as a country eager to open diplomatic and commercial relations to the West. These findings serve to expand understandings of King Mongkut’s modifications to Siamese diplomatic practices, as well as serve to highlight the unique usage of “soft” diplomatic tools by Mongkut in the Bowring Treaty negotiations.
Foremost, Mongkut’s usage of “soft diplomacy” tactics with Great Britain must be given context and definition. Prior to his ascension to the Siamese throne, it was readily apparent that British unease with Siam was increasing and becoming more threatening. In an account from the famous Mission of Sir James Brooke to Siam in 1851, the English conception of Siam was that of an “enemy” who’s demeanor towards Europeans was “inimical” and “arrogant.”4 A political observer of Siamese politics and in heavy personal communication with Sir James Brooke, Mongkut was well aware of this English perception of Siam and the political threats it posed.5 Mongkut was highly conscious of global affairs and of Western political practice6 and took notice of the Burmese and Chinese pains that resulted from diplomatic tactics of rebuff and isolation; he was determined to not follow the same diplomatic misstep. Mongkut argued that Siam, as a “small nation,” must utilize “weapons” of the “mouth” and “heart” in the face of the “powerful [western] nations” that surrounded it.7 Mongkut sees diplomacy, and its various tools, as primary instruments for Siamese interaction with the Western foreign powers. In his communication to the British, collected in the “English Correspondence of King Mongkut,” this concept of the “weapon[s]” of diplomacy is prevalent in Mongkut’s communication with Sir John Bowring. Principally, this paper focuses on the diplomatic subtleties and informalities Mongkut utilizes in his early interactions with the British. In these communications, Mongkut refines specific formal and informal diplomatic processes in order to effectively engage with British representatives.

1. Changing the Diplomatic Language to English

Of his many diplomatic modifications, King Mongkut’s most immediately apparent alteration to Siamese diplomacy was in the language used in engaging with foreign representatives. In prior communications, diplomatic discussion necessitated translations

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5 Mongkut, “English Correspondence of King Mongkut,” 4.
7 Moffat, *Mongkut, the King of Siam*, 24–25.
into English and Siamese. Mutual intelligibility was difficult as communication relied on constant translation through foreign missionaries. In addition to the added burden of multi-language translation in diplomacy, this process, due to English envoys’ notions of Asiatic governmental inferiority, reinforced European notions of weak Siamese diplomatic order. In the private conversations of Sir James Brooke’s mission to Siam, the act of translation to Siamese established immediate “pretext for not falling in with his views.”

Upon ascending the throne, Mongkut began a process of engaging British envoys in English, not Siamese. This policy of communicating in English served to close the communication gap between British and Siamese diplomacy. As well, Mongkut’s ability to speak fluently independently raised the status of Mongkut himself in the eyes of visiting envoys. Sir John Bowring would go on to call Mongkut’s language as “perfectly intelligible” and “acceptable” to be sent directly to the English Queen herself. This “English element” to diplomatic interaction is readily apparent – the entirety of Mongkut’s writings in the “English Correspondence of King Mongkut” is written originally in English. In this modification of language, Mongkut managed to improve diplomatic communication, as well as his own perceived status.

2. Befriending the Foreign Envoys

In informal channels, Mongkut was keen to personalize his relationship to British representatives through formal and informal channels. In his interactions with Sir John Bowring, he engages in extensive “private” and “not customary” communication channels;

9 Ibid., 28.
10 Ibid., 11.
11 Ibid. Brooke describes this in conjunction with berating the Siamese “self-conceit.”
12 Mongkut, “English Correspondence of King Mongkut,” 2.
13 Ibid.
14 Bowring, The Kingdom and People of Siam With a Narrative of the Mission to That Country in 1855., 321.
Later communications with Sir John Bowring, Mongkut retains this precedence; he is the first to initiate private meetings, discussing his personal desire to make “the friendship” with Great Britain “more firm and greater than it ever has been before.”

Having made clear his intentions to further Siamese diplomatic dialogue with foreign powers, Mongkut extends this initiative into an area of discussion particularly receptive to western ears – Siamese commerce. In a letter to Sir John Bowring in 1854, Mongkut states the presence of a “change of commercial interest of the people here” prompting a renewed eagerness to “accept Your Excellency, [John Bowring], with great respects and honors.” In this, Mongkut communicates an understanding of Siam as independently eager to open its economy and diplomatic relations to foreign powers. In the same letter commenting on change in Siamese “commercial interest,” Mongkut makes direct mention of the missions from the United States and France that are to subsequently partake in such comprehensive diplomatic and economic negotiations. Through the establishment of this persona of self-initiated diplomacy and commercial relations, Mongkut was effective in encouraging multiple foreign nations to view Siam as a country eager to engage diplomatically with all countries and economies. This exhibition of a Siam eager to engage with all played a crucial role in preventing the domination of a single power over Siam. By creating this image of diplomacy in Siam as being eagerly multinational, Mongkut helped to integrate Siamese diplomacy with a web of nations. Not long after Bowring did nations from nearly every major nation engage in similar treaties with Siam. In later episodes of Siamese history, this highly diplomatically and commercially eager and integrated image of Siam allowed Mongkut to have access to diplomatic channels into other global leaders; in this, this initiation of globalized diplomatic relations through this re-imaging of Siam helped provide Mongkut future tools to prevent the domination of any single West-

3. Portrayal of Siam as Diplomatically and Commercially Eager

In contrast to the isolationist facades typically presented by many Southeast and East Asian nations, Mongkut presented himself as actively desiring and pursuing increased diplomatic and commercial relations with Western powers. Prior to his coronation in 1851, Mongkut was immediate in establishing a precedence of his personal enthusiasm for diplomatic engagement. In a letter to the Governor of Prince Wales Island on the eve of Mongkut’s coronation in April, 1851, Mongkut stated that he would “better” the “[regulation of] foreign and native people” and initiate the sending of a series of messengers laden with gifts of “golden and silver flowers.”

Even while in the midst of government formation and the limited ability to engage in diplomacy following the death of his brother, Mongkut is careful to avoid appearing isolationist. Despite unable to make adequate preparations domestically for a British envoy, Mongkut continues to share communication with the Governor of Prince Wales Island through the exchange of gifts and information on domestic developments. Mongkut is even thorough enough to propose the sending of a Siamese envoy to British India. This type of communication, prior to his coronation illustrated to the British a genuine desire for engaging in speedy diplomatic dialogue. In the

22 Jumsai, King Mongkut and Sir John Bowring, 70.
23 Ibid., 71.
24 Mongkut, “English Correspondence of King Mongkut,” 4.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid., 8.
27 Ibid., 9.

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28 Ibid., 14.
29 Ibid., 16.
30 Jumsai, King Mongkut and Sir John Bowring, 31.
Assessing Narratives of Mongkut’s Diplomatic Tactics

It is not completely unreasonable to interpret Mongkut, in these specific communications, as not directly pursuing a policy of “soft diplomacy,” but rather simply exercising his own appreciation of Western sciences in the realm of diplomacy. This analysis, while reasonable for the analysis of these texts in isolation, fails to address Mongkut’s expressed consciousness of the political threat to Siam. Mongkut was highly aware of European actions in Burma, Cochin China, and China. He specifically requests that Bowring not treat Siam as “less or lower” than the neighboring states Britain has already developed relationships with. In his first chronicled letter to Bowring, attaches a lithographed paper informing Bowring of Siam’s ongoing war with Burma, a country then in conflict with the Great Britain. His awareness of Siam within a geopolitical and diplomatic context was explicit in these communications, as he wrote, “being as we are now, surrounded on two or three sides by powerful nations, what can a small nation like us do?” Shortly after the signature of the Bowring treaty, Mongkut’s policy of deterrence became readily apparent. In a swift diplomatic move, he initiated diplomacy with dozens of nations and enacted treaties similar to the Bowring Treaty. In this, he sought to prevent any single country holding dominance over Siam by creating a system of webbed foreign interests. Mongkut’s immense consciousness necessitates that his communications with foreign diplomats be analyzed for their strategic content; in this, “soft diplomacy,” plays a distinct role within Mongkut’s greater diplomatic strategy.

Concluding Remarks

In the communications leading up to the signature of the Bowring Treaty in 1855, several of Mongkut’s diplomatic tactics can be understood as the exercising of the soft diplomacy Mongkut described in his “heart” and “mouth” metaphor. He is conscious of the position Siam is in, “surrounded on two or three sides by powerful nations,” and understands that diplomacy may be the only major tool of “real use” to Siam’s resistance against Western powers for the next several decades. From the onset of his rule, Mongkut took early efforts to interact and better understand Western diplomatic processes. Mongkut quickly became conscious of the Western conception of “international law” and its importance in diplomatic dealings. By adopting the English language as a diplomatic language of Siam, in the befriending of diplomatic envoys, and in the active exhibition of Siam as a country seeking to open diplomatic and commercial relations, Mongkut was able to improve the Siamese environment for negotiation in the Bowring Treaty of 1855. These “soft” tactics of diplomacy would continue to permeate Siamese political tactics for decades after the Bowring Treaty itself and would serve as critical tools in the preservation of Siamese sovereignty during the late 19th century. In the analysis of these soft diplomatic strategies first major appearance in Siamese politics in engaging foreign powers, it becomes possible to better comprehend the permeation of Mongkut’s initial diplomatic frameworks onto the greater landscape of Siamese diplomacy in decades after.

31 Moffat, Mongkut, the King of Siam, 24.
32 Mongkut, “English Correspondence of King Mongkut,” 15; Moffat, Mongkut, the King of Siam, 24.
33 Mongkut, “English Correspondence of King Mongkut,” 15.
34 Ibid.
35 Moffat, Mongkut, the King of Siam, 24.
36 Jumsai, King Mongkut and Sir John Bowring, 31.
37 Moffat, Mongkut, the King of Siam, 24.
38 Ibid., 25.
39 Ibid.
40 Ibid. After his coronation as King of Siam, Mongkut immediately open several diplomatic channels with foreign powers.
41 Iijima, “The ‘International Court’ System in the Colonial History of Siam,” 34.
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Cognition’s Embrace: Yogācāra Themes in the Writings of Thích Nhất Hạnh

Trent Walker

ABSTRACT

After the XIVth Dalai Lama, Thích Nhất Hạnh 釋一行 is perhaps the most famous living Buddhist teacher in the world. He is known primarily for his Buddhist-inspired peace activism in 1960s Vietnam and, especially since the 1980s, his popular books emphasizing a simple application of meditation in daily life. This article focuses instead on his rarely-discussed scholastic writings, in particular his interpretations of the Yogācāra school of Buddhist philosophy. It begins by tracing Nhất Hạnh’s narrowing hermeneutical strategies before surveying his extant writings explicitly concerning Yogācāra. Three interpretative issues salient to Nhất Hạnh’s understanding of Yogācāra are highlighted: the fate of the “storehouse consciousness” (ālayavijñāna) after the “transformation at the base” (āśrayaparāvṛtti), the tension between pivotal and progressive models of the “three natures” (trisvabhāva), and question of whether Yogācāra can properly considered a form of idealism or phenomenology. Taking his poem “Cognition’s Embrace” as an example, this article argues that Nhất Hạnh’s understanding of Yogācāra cannot be pinned down to single text but must instead be contextualized in the arc of his intellectual development over the past half-century.

I.“In the bleak midwinter they perfume the air”: Thích Nhất Hạnh’s Expression of Yogācāra Doctrines

In the bleak mid-winter, frosty wind made moan,
Earth stood hard as iron, water like a stone;
Snow had fallen, snow on snow, snow on snow,
In the bleak midwinter, long ago.

Our God, heaven cannot hold Him, nor earth sustain;
Heaven and earth shall flee away when He comes to reign.
In the bleak midwinter a stable place sufficed
The Lord God Almighty, Jesus Christ.

[...]

Angels and archangels may have gathered there,
Cherubim and seraphim thronged the air;
But His mother only, in her maiden bliss,
Worshipped the beloved with a kiss.

— “A Christmas Carol” Christina Rossetti, 1872 [as set to the “Cranham” hymn by Gustav Holst, 1906]¹

In the bleak midwinter frosty wind makes moan,
Earth is hard as iron, water like a stone.
Snow is falling snow on snow, snow on snow.
In the bleak midwinter, just like long ago.

Roots and seeds lie sleeping under mounds of snow,
Dreaming dreams of green leaves and stems where flowers grow.
The Earth will soon be soft again, water will soon flow.
Flowers wake from winter dreams, and in bright colors glow.

In the bleak mid-winter spring buds do not show,
Hiding, waiting, dreaming, in their roots below.
See the flowers through the snow, see them bright and fair,
In the bleak midwinter they perfume the air.

— “In the Bleak Midwinter,” Joseph Emet, 2009²


A longtime student of Thích Nhất Hạnh, Joseph Emet’s musical adaptations of his teacher’s poems and traditional English songs have become integral to the monastic practice at Plum Village in France and other practice centers across Nhất Hạnh’s global Buddhist organization. “I Have Arrived,” a Christian hymn set to the words of the Vietnamese Buddhist teacher, has become, in Nhất Hạnh’s words, “the seal of Plum Village. Any practice that does not include this, or is contrary to its spirit, is not Plum Village practice.” It is easy to read Emet’s “In the Bleak Midwinter” as a saccharine imitation that sucks the plaintive devotion from Rossetti’s verses. The temporal specificity of when word became flesh is gone, so too the angelic host and the virgin’s kiss. In their place emerges vague metaphors hinting that verdant life may one day poke through the alabaster expanse.

Beneath the sheen of Emet’s sunny lyrics, however, lies a central teaching of his teacher: the mind holds all the seeds that perfume habitual tendencies in the present and sow the hope of future buddha-hood. This mind is not merely the mind of conscious awareness, but rather the storehouse consciousness, or ālayavijñāna in Sanskrit, conceived by the Yogācāra school. Seed metaphors pervade Nhất Hạnh’s works. But they are far from the only trace of Yogācāra thought in the writings of a monk who Robert Sharf calls a “somewhat ‘Protestantized’” Buddhist thinker. Nhất Hạnh’s poetry also speaks to another aspect to Yogācāra thought, the non-duality of the cognizer and the cognized. He penned the poem “Vòng tay nhận thức” (*“Cognition’s Embrace”) after a powerful experience early one morning at Trúc Lâm Temple in 1964.

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3 Ibid., 8.
4 Sanskrit bīja; Chinese 種子.
5 Chinese 熨習.
6 Sanskrit vāsanā; Chinese 習氣.
8 In order to prevent confusion between my own translations of Vietnamese titles and published English translations of Vietnamese titles by others, I use the * to mark off my English translations of titles, since my own translations do not exist in the “external world.” I also use the same * to mark off a few Sino-Vietnamese terms which do not exist in Chinese proper and for reconstructed Sanskrit terms not attested in manuscripts.
10 “Bare feet” (chân không) is a homonym in Vietnamese for “true emptiness,” both of which occur throughout the poem.
11 trong lòng đêm đầu hay trong lòng bao la nhận thức.
12 tôi bồng mim coroutine hồn nhiên trước đêm sâu hồn nhiên trí thức.
Nhật Hạnh himself admits that “Cognition’s Embrace” is “a difficult poem, fit to be explained in a course on vijñānavada.” Indeed, its technical and highly symbolic language represents a much more sophisticated engagement with Yogācāra ideas than witnessed in Emet’s “In the Bleak Midwinter.” While some technical terms such as “countless yojanas” and “wondrous being” are not specifically Yogācāra terms, others such as “subject and object,” “condition-as-cognitive-object condition,” and “proximate causal object” come straight from the playbook of the Chéng wéishi lùn, the most influential Yogācāra scholastic treatise in East Asia. The central insight of Nhật Hạnh’s poem concerns the “miraculous non-duality” (duy nhất nhiệm màu) or “miraculous true emptiness” (chân không nhiệm màu) that emerges from “cognition’s infinitude” (bao la nhân thức). “Cognition’s Embrace” is one several of his poems that purportedly describe a transformative awakening experience, and it is tempting to try to trace Nhật Hạnh’s understanding of Yogācāra back to this or other early poems.

This article presents the argument that such an attempt to pin Nhật Hạnh’s understanding of Yogācāra down to a single poem cannot be done without contextualizing it within his broader intellectual development. The sections that follow trace Nhật Hạnh’s life and works and his narrowing hermeneutical strategies before surveying his extant writings explicitly concerning Yogācāra. From there the paper focuses in on three specific interpretative issues salient to Nhật Hạnh’s understanding of Yogācāra: the fate of the ālayavijñāna post-āśrayaparāvṛtti, the tension between pivotal and progressive models of the trisvabhāva, and question of whether Yogācāra can properly be considered idealistic and/or phenomenological. The conclusion revisits “Cognition’s Embrace.”

15 vô lượng do tuần無量由旬.
16 diệu hữu妙有.
17 năng sở能所.
18 sở duyên duyên所緣緣.
19 thân sở duyên duyên親所緣緣.
20 For more on the Chéng wéishi lùn and its reception in China, see Dan Lusthaus, *Buddhist Phenomenology: A Philosophical Investigation of Yogācāra Buddhism and the Ch’eng Wei-shih lun* (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002).
Embrace” in light of the Yogācāra themes present in his other works.

II. Life and Works of Thích Nhất Hạnh: A Brief Sketch

After the XIVth Dalai Lama, Thích Nhất Hạnh may be the most famous living Buddhist teacher in the world. Well over 100 books have been published under his name since 1949, largely in Vietnamese but with dozens of titles available in English, French, Chinese, German, Spanish, Italian, Finnish, Thai, Japanese, and Korean, among other languages. His fame is not without controversy, however; Nhất Hạnh’s writings were banned in his homeland from his 1967 exile until his first return to Vietnam in 2005. Still, considering the breadth of his writings and his extensive influence on the development of Buddhist modernism inside and beyond Vietnam, the secondary literature on Nhất Hạnh is surprisingly thin.

Most English-language scholarly accounts of Nhất Hạnh focus on his contributions to “engaged Buddhism,”21 a term he is widely credited for coining in his 1967 book Vietnam: Lotus in a Sea of Fire.22 Less frequently cited in Buddhist studies scholarship are his contributions to the terms “mindfulness”23 and “interbeing,”24 which are both closely associated with his teachings. Even less well-known are his influences on Vietnamese Buddhist education, Buddhist ecumenicalism, Buddhist-Christian dialogue, and historical research on Vietnamese Buddhism, including a three-volume history of Buddhism in Vietnam published in Vietnamese under a lay nôm de plume.25

A proper intellectual biography of Nhất Hạnh remains a desideratum. It is possible, however, to trace several stages in his development as a Buddhist thinker.26 Born in 1926 near Huế in Annam, French Indochina as Nguyễn Xuân Bảo, Nhất Hạnh first ordained as a novice in 1942, followed by full ordination in 1949. Having received a French education in his youth and a traditional Sino-Vietnamese education as a monk, Nhất Hạnh’s intellectual aptitude brought him to the center of Buddhist modernist reforms in post-colonial Vietnam in the 1950s. During this period, he founded a Buddhist publication house (Lá Bối), a Buddhist university (Vạn Hạnh), and became editor-in-chief of the journal of the ecumenical Unified Vietnam Buddhist Association (Giáo hội Phật giáo Việt Nam Thông nhất). It was during this period that he began to integrate his study of Buddhist doctrine with social action, founding the School of Youth for Social Service (Trường Thanh niên PhULONG Sự Xả hỏi). Of the books he published during this period, none have yet been translated from Vietnamese, save for a number of poems which were included in later anthologies of his work.

Between 1960 and 1967, Nhất Hạnh divided his time between Vietnam and the United States, where he studied and taught at Columbia and Princeton. During this period, he published a handful of books in Vietnamese that outlined his views on Buddhist doctrine, history, and modernity, asgrounded in his leadership in the Buddhist movement against the Ngô Đình Diệm regime in the Republic of Vietnam. His most forceful statement against the war, however, did not come until 1967, in his first book published in both English and Vietnamese, Vietnam: Lotus in a Sea of Fire

21 nhơn gian phật giáo 人間佛教; nhợ thê phật giáo入世佛教.
22 Although he is credited for coining “Engaged Buddhism” in English, Elise DeVido demonstrates that the Sino-Vietnamese terms he translated from were already current in Chinese and Vietnamese Buddhist circles during the first half of the twentieth century. See Elise Anne DeVido, “Buddhism for This Word”: The Buddhist Revival in Vietnam, 1920 to 1951, and Its Legacy” in Modernity and Re-enchantment: Religion in Post-revolutionary Vietnam, ed. Philip Taylor (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2007), 250–296.
23 la pleine conscience or tinh thức *醒識.
24 tương tức 相即; tương nhập 相入; duyên khởi 緣起.
Hoa sen trong Biểu Lừa. After a print run of 200,000 in Vietnam, the book was banned along with its author, who was then in the United States as a guest lecturer at Cornell. Despite the regime change that followed the fall of the Republic of Vietnam to the communist North in 1975, Nhất Hạnh remained officially unwelcome in Vietnam for the next three decades.

The next phase of Nhất Hạnh’s life, between 1967 and 1982, was spent largely in France, where he found refuge in exile to continue his writing, teaching, and aid to Vietnamese refugees. During these years Nhất Hạnh wrote some of his most important and influential books, including Phép Lạ của Sự Tỉnh Thức, Néo vào thiên hộc, and his three-volume historical work Việt Nam Phật Giáo Sư Lụan. Perhaps the most doctrinally sophisticated book of his career was published early in this period, namely his 1969 Vấn đề Nhận thức trong Duy Thức Học, which has yet to be translated from Vietnamese.

In 1982, Nhất Hạnh founded the community where he still lives today in southwest France, Village des Pruniers (Plum Village/Làng Mai). For the next quarter century, his published writings increasingly catered towards a growing community of Western followers. A handful of books from this period continued the study of Yogācāra doctrine begun in Vấn đề Nhận thức trong Duy Thức Học, including Giảng luận Duy Biểu Học (1996), The Heart of the Buddha’s Teaching (1998), Transformation at the Base (2001), and Buddha Mind, Buddha Body (2007).

II. The Rise of Thích Nhất Hạnh in Vietnam

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III. Mindfulness and Interbeing: Thích Nhất Hạnh’s Narrowing Buddhist Hermeneutics

The development of Nhất Hạnh’s writings over the past forty years, as framed by the stages outlined above, reveals a progressive narrowing of his interpretation of Buddhist teachings. By “narrowing” here I am not implying that Nhất Hạnh is focusing on a limited, highly sectarian slice of Buddhist scriptures; indeed, he has shown an increased interest in the interpretation of texts outside of the Vietnamese Zen tradition, including Nikāya/Āgama texts, the Saddharmapuṇḍarīka Sūtra, the Smaller Sukhāvatīvyūha Sūtra, secular Vietnamese literature, and even the Gospels. But Nhất Hạnh’s interpretation of these texts has increasingly rested on just two hermeneutic principles: mindfulness and interbeing.

In his early works (1949–1967) neither of these principles


33 An account of his return is given in Chapman, “The 2005 Pilgrimage and Return to Vietnam of Exiled Zen Master Thích Nhất Hạnh.”

34 Nguyễn Lang. Việt Nam Phật Giáo Sư Lụan, I-II-III. Even Cuong Tu Nguyen’s Zen in Medieval Vietnam, the most thorough scholarly volume in English on Vietnamese Zen to date, fails to connect Nhất Hạnh to his pen name Nguyễn Lang. See Cuong Tu Nguyen, Zen in Medieval Vietnam (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 1997), 342–3.

comes to the fore. Instead, Nhất Hạnh’s expository writing in Vietnamese from this period concerns the development of “engaged” and “modernized” Buddhism. His poems, novels, short stories, and plays from this period do not focus narrowly on mindfulness or interbeing either, but instead reveal an intellectually curious exploration of the continuities and discontinuities between Buddhist thought and Western existentialism, Vietnamese Buddhist literature and the broader Buddhist world, the scourge of war and the promise of youth social activism.

In the early 1970s, however, Nhất Hạnh penned two books that were among his first to be translated in English, both of which foreshadowed the prominence of mindfulness and interbeing in his later writings. The first, published in Vietnamese in 1971 as Néo vào thiền học (*Pathway into Zen Studies), was translated into French as Clefs pour le Zen in 1973 and the following year in English as Zen Keys.36 The second book was first published in English in 1974 and in Vietnamese in 1975 as The Miracle of Being Awake: A Manual on Meditation for the Use of Young Activists and Phép lạ của sự tỉnh thức (*The Miracle of Awake-Consciousness), respectively.37

Néo vào thiền học opens Nhất Hạnh’s account of his studies as novice in the 1940s, in which he emphasizes the goal of “the practitioner to enter right mindfulness”.38 In the first edition of Zen Keys, chính niệm is translated as “awareness of being,” presumably rendered from the French “conscience d’être.”39 In later editions of Zen Keys, chính niệm has been retranslated as “mindfulness,” which has since become his preferred translation when speaking in English.40

Phép lạ của sự tỉnh thức was originally published in English, though it consists of a letter Nhất Hạnh originally penned in Vietnamese for young Christian activists in the United States. The Vietnamese edition, published the following year, revealed that “being awake” was a translation of tỉnh thức, literally “awake-consciousness,” a term strongly associated with Nhất Hạnh’s teachings in Vietnamese.41 Later French and English editions of this book rendered tỉnh thức as “la pleine conscience” and “mindfulness,” respectively.42 These two terms have not only become Nhất Hạnh’s keywords when speaking in French and English but also the preferred translations for sati, smṛti, and zhēngnian throughout the modern Buddhist world.

Néo vào thiền học and Phép lạ của sự tỉnh thức establish mindfulness as the key for practicing Zen as well as sustaining the work of engaged Buddhism. In Néo vào thiền học, mindfulness is equated with sīla, samādhi, and prajñā; in other words, mindfulness is the whole of the Buddhist path.43 Drawing on the Ānāpānasati Sutta, the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta, and Tolstoy’s short story “Три вопроса” (“Three Questions”), Phép lạ của sự tỉnh thức eulogizes the power of mindfulness to see into “our true nature,” which he calls “the Buddha in us.”

But for Nhất Hạnh, mindfulness is more than a means to waking up to one’s Buddha nature. It is also the means to understanding the true nature of all things, which he calls “interbeing.” The term “interbeing” in English (inter-être in French) is Nhất Hạnh’s favorite term to translate a number of closely related terms in Vietnamese, including tướng tức, tướng nhập, and duyên khởi. The first two terms are drawn from the Avataṃsaka Sūtra, where they refer to the interdependent, interpenetrating nature of all phenomena. The third term, duyên khởi, is the standard Chinese rendering of pratītya-samutpāda. Nhất Hạnh’s conception of “interbeing” brings together these Avataṃsaka and early Buddhist perspectives on the nature of reality.

In Néo vào thiền học, Nhất Hạnh gives a clear example of his understanding of interbeing with reference to a table. A table, according to Nhất Hạnh, consists of what is not the table: the forest, the logger, the sun, the soil, the rain, etc. He writes,

The existence of the table proves the existence of everything that is not the table, or to express it differently, the whole universe. This is the meaning of “one is everything, everything is one”44

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36 Thích Nhật Hạnh (translated by Luc Decaunes), Clefs pour le zen (Paris: Seghers, 1973); Thich Nhat Hanh (translated by Albert Low and Jean Low), Zen Keys (Garden City: Anchor Press, 1974).
37 The English was reprinted in 1976 as Thích Nhật Hạnh (translated by Mobi Quynh Hoa), The Miracle of Being Awake: A Manual on Meditation for the Use of Young Activists (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1976).
38 Nhất Hạnh, Néo vào thiền học, 9–14.
41 Nhất Hạnh, Phép lạ của sự tỉnh thức.
43 Nhất Hạnh, Néo vào thiền học, 18.
44 Nhất tức nhất thiết, nhất thiết tức nhất 一即一切, 一切即一.
in the doctrine of the Hoa Nghiêm system (Avatāṃsaka). This is the principle of manifold dependent origination in this system of doctrine. The system of causality in Buddhism is the system of dependent origination.

Nhất Hạnh’s seemingly radical reworking of the trilakṣaṇa doctrine is based not only on his insistence that suffering is not omnipresent in the same way as impermanence and non-self are but also on his observation that the Chinese Saṃyukta-āgama frequently substitutes nirvāṇa in place of duḥkha (“suffering”) in its formulation of the trilakṣaṇa. It is very difficult to find a single teaching of Nhất Hạnh that veers from this hermeneutical principle of interpreting the entire Buddhist tradition (one might add the Christian tradition too!) through the lens of mindfulness and interbeing.

Although Nhất Hạnh continues to publish new books every year, it is easy to criticize his teaching for its simplistic portrayal of Buddhist teachings through the narrow lens of mindfulness and interbeing. One could further argue that this veneer of naive simplicity may discourage scholars from taking the intellectual contributions of Nhất Hạnh seriously. But however straightforward and reductive Nhất Hạnh’s teachings appear, his innovative doctrinal statements are grounded in close examination of Buddhist scriptures.

One of Nhất Hạnh’s more surprising moves as a Buddhist thinker is his statement that suffering is not a characteristic of all conditioned existence. His seemingly radical reworking of the trilakṣaṇa doctrine is based not only on his insistence that suffering is not omnipresent in the same way as impermanence and non-self are but also on his observation that the Chinese Saṃyukta-āgama frequently substitutes nirvāṇa in place of duḥkha (“suffering”) in its formulation of the trilakṣaṇa. While Nhất Hạnh’s conclusions are controversial, his methods follow the mold of medieval Buddhist exegetes, who cite the Hīnayāna āgamas to prove Mahāyāna doctrinal points.

Moreover, Nhất Hạnh explicitly sees his own work as carrying on the exegetical strategies of the commentaries. His Năm mươi Bài tụng Duy Biểu (*Fifty Verses on Manifestation-Only) illustrates this positionality. In the introduction to the 2001 English edition of Giảng luận Duy Biểu Học (*Explanation of the Manifestation-Only School), titled Transformation at the Base, he writes,

As a novice monk, I studied and memorized Vasubandhu’s Twenty and Thirty Verses in Chinese. When I came to the West, I realized that these important teachings on Buddhist psychology could open doors of understanding for people here. So, in 1990 I composed the Fifty Verses to continue to polish the precious gems offered by the Buddha, Vasubandhu, Sthiramati, Xuanzang, Fazang, and others. After you have studied the Fifty Verses, it will be easier to understand the classic works of these great masters, and you will know which work is the basis for each of the Fifty Verses.

Nhất Hạnh admits here that his Fifty Verses are derivative of past Yogācāra thinkers, but he also establishes himself in their lineage, a positionality that allows him to “continue” from where they left off and “polish the precious gems” of Vasubandhu’s Viṃśatikā and Trīṃśika-kārikā, including the commentaries on the latter by Sthiramati, Xuanzàng and Fāzàng. While acknowledging the work of past masters, he also asserts the importance of updating their teachings for modern audiences.

IV. From Cognition-Only to Manifestation-Only: Thích Nhất Hạnh’s Interpretations of Yogācāra

It is precisely in Nhất Hạnh’s exposition of Yogācāra that the intellectual workings of his hermeneutical strategies are best appreciated. To map the complex doctrines of vijñaptimātra, ālayavijñāna, trisvabhāva, and trinīṣvabhāva onto his framework of mindfulness and interbeing would be quite a feat. Yet this is exactly what Nhất Hạnh sets out to do in his various works on Yogācāra. Indeed, to a certain extent his doctrinal positions depend on his reading of key Yogācāra teachings, and as such Yogācāra is the intellectual backbone of his ostensibly simple hermeneutical strategies.

Yogācāra themes surface throughout Nhất Hạnh’s works, from his moving wartime poetry to his recent popular books catered to a Westernized public. Nẻo vào thiền học (1971) was his first book explicitly dealing

45 *duyền khởi trọng trọng*,缘起重重.

46 Nhất Hạnh, Nẻo vào thiền học, 41–2.

47 The “Three Characteristics” that mark all existence in Buddhist thought. See Thích Nhat Hanh, *The Heart of the Buddha’s Teaching*, 12–23; 131–145. For example, in volume 99 of the Taishō Shinshū Daizōkyō 大正新脩大藏經, we find the following passage: 一切行無常。一切法無我。涅槃寂滅。(T99.2.66b14), which translates as “All conditioned things are impermanent; all phenomena lack a self; nirvāṇa [alone] is peaceful.”

with Yogācāra teachings to be translated into a Western language. The abbreviated presentation of Yogācāra in this volume is based on his 1969 Vấn Đề Nhận Thức trong Duy Thức Học (*The Problem of Knowledge in the Cognition-Only School), a dense 116-page exegesis on the workings of the mind and the path to liberation according to Vasubandhu’s Trīṃśika-kārikā. The term Nhật Hạnh uses for the Yogācāra school in Vấn Đề Nhận Thức trong Duy Thức Học is duy thức, literally “consciousness-only” or “cognition-only” (vijñaptimātra). However, in his next major work on Yogācāra, his Fifty Verses and their 1996 auto-commentary titled Giảng luận Duy Biểu Học (*Explanation of the Manifestation-Only School), Nhật Hạnh drops duy thức in favor of duy biếu, a far less common term which translates literally as “manifestation-only.”

The move from cognition-only to manifestation-only reflects a broader arc in Nhật Hạnh’s interpretation of Yogācāra thought. His most recent exposition of Yogācāra doctrine occurs in a slim 2007 volume on walking meditation titled Buddha Mind, Buddha Body. In this unassuming book, Nhật Hạnh interprets Yogācāra doctrine in a way that does not deny the existence of the external world nor the possibility of free will.

As is the case with his emphasis on mindfulness and interbeing, Nhật Hạnh’s developing interpretations of Yogācāra doctrines are not without scriptural basis. The two Yogācāra texts he most frequently cites are Vasubandhu’s celebrated Trīṃśika-kārikā and, to a lesser degree, Xuánzàng’s Bāshī guījǔ sòng. I am not aware of any published translations by Nhật Hạnh of the Trīṃśika-kārikā into any language, although a Sanskrit-English-Vietnamese-Chinese version of the text, with the English credited to Thích Nhật Hạnh, is available from the Plum Village Online Monastery website. Nhật Hạnh appended his English translation of the Bāshī guījǔ sòng to Buddha Mind, Buddha Body.

For anyone who has carefully read through the Sanskrit text of the Trīṃśika-kārikā, it should be obvious that Vasubandhu’s verses are amenable to a variety of commentarial opinions, as Xuánzàng’s Chéng weíshi lùn readily attests. Three interpretive problems are particularly prominent in the Trīṃśika-kārikā: what happens to the ālayavijñāna after āśrayaparāvṛtti; whether the trisvabhāva doctrine implies—to use Alan Sponberg’s terms—a progressive model or a pivotal model of liberation; and whether or not the external world exists. In order to uncover how Nhật Hạnh uses Yogācāra doctrine to support his hermeneutical strategies, it is necessary to investigate if and how he responds to these three interpretative problems in Vasubandhu’s text. To a certain extent, these problems cannot be untangled from one another. They are also far from an exhaustive list of the hermeneutical challenges posed by the Trīṃśika-kārikā. Still, Nhật Hạnh’s responses to these problems get right to the heart of his doctrinal interpretations and innovations.

V. Paramārtha’s Ghost: What Happens to the Ālayavijñāna After Āśrayaparāvṛtti?

The Indian monk and translator Paramārtha is widely credited (or blamed, depending on your perspective) for coming up with the *amalavijñāna, a “pure” or “stainless” ninth consciousness which replaces the ālayavijñāna post-āśrayaparāvṛtti. Although Michael Radich notes that Vasubandhu indeed uses the term amalavijñāna once as a synonym for anāśrayavijñāna, it cannot be found in Sanskrit Buddhist texts in the sense used by Paramārtha, who takes amalavijñāna as a reification of āśrayaparāvṛtti. Once the ālayavijñāna and its inherent badness (dausṭhulya, consisting of both klesāvaraṇa and jñeyāvaraṇa) are removed, the amalavijñāna, which takes tathātā as its ālambana, replaces it. It is less clear whether or not Paramārtha intended the amalavijñāna to be a bridge between Yogācāra and Tathāgatagarbha doctrine, although the parallels are numerous.

As a Buddhist thinker emerging from the East Asian tradition, it is not particularly surprising that Nhật Hạnh would bring the amalavijñāna into his discussion of Yogācāra. Yet Nhật Hạnh explicitly bases his writings on Yogācāra on the works of Vasubandhu, Dharmapāla, Śhiramati, and Xuánzàng, none of whom admit the possibility of the amalavijñāna. When Nhật Hạnh uses amalavijñāna and its equivalents, is he referring to the purified ālayavijñāna (the standard Indian Yogācāra view), a new ninth consciousness which takes suchness as its object, or an inherently pure consciousness qua tathāgatagarbha?

49 Nhật Hạnh, Giăng Luận Duy Biểu Học.
50 Nhật Hạnh, Buddha Mind, Buddha Body, 79–96.
51 In Vietnamese, the Duy thức tam thập tùng 唯識三十頌 of Thế Thân 世親 and the Bát thức quy củ tụng of Huyền Trang, respectively.
The term amalavijñāna itself apparently does not appear in Nhất Hạnh’s writing. In his books not specifically concerned with Yogācāra, such as The Heart of the Buddha’s Teaching, Nhất Hạnh asserts that the ālayavijñāna becomes “Great Mirror Wisdom” (ādarśajñāna) without mentioning amalavijñāna at all. However, in his writing explicitly dealing with Yogācāra thought, such as his Năm muội Bài tụng Duy Biếu and Transformation at the Base, a different understanding of the fate of ālayavijñāna emerges. Verse 15 of Năm muội Bài tụng Duy Biếu reads,

When ignorance is destroyed, understanding arises
The storehouse transforms to become without taints
Mirror Wisdom illuminates all directions
Pure and without stain.

In his auto-commentary on this verse in English, Nhất Hạnh writes,

When free of impurities (amala vijñana), store consciousness becomes a mirror reflecting every aspect of existence without distortion. Birth, death, and suffering transform into peace, joy, awakening, and liberation. This is the “Pure Consciousness” that allows us to recognize and enter the realm of suchness in this very life.

It is difficult to read passages like these without concluding that for Nhất Hạnh, ādarśajñāna and amalavijñāna are but two names for the same thing. Even though he does not explicitly use the Sino-Vietnamese technical term for amalavijñāna, he still labels the ādarśajñāna with epithets usually attributed to Paramārtha’s ninth consciousness, including “pure” (bạch tịnh) and “without stain” (vô cau). This suggests that he thinks what emerges after āśrayaparāvṛtti is a purified ālayavijñāna that functions as a new, ninth, pure consciousness, taking suchness as its object. For Nhất Hạnh, however, the name for this consciousness is less important than the fact that it alone reflects/illuminates suchness directly. This understanding of Yogācāra doctrine needs to be borne in mind when considering Nhất Hạnh’s approach to the trisvabhāva doctrine and the problem of the external world.

VI. Interbeing and Suchness: Is the Trisvabhāva a Progressive or Pivotal Model?

The “three natures” or trisvabhāva doctrine is surely one of the most confounding aspects of Yogācāra doctrine. Alan Sponberg offers a useful dichotomy for understanding the various exegetical approaches to this doctrine: the pivotal model and the progressive model. The Trimśikā and other Indian Yogācāra texts are not always explicitly following one model or the other, so Sponberg looks to the works of Xuánzàng’s disciple Kuījī to discern these two competing models. Nhất Hạnh could be expected to follow either model, though the dominance of the progressive model in East Asia would suggest the most likely possibility.

Sponberg’s pivotal model valorizes paratantra (other-dependent) as the ontological ground. When the paratantra is wrongly grasped, it is called parikalpita (imagined) and when it is correctly perceived it is called pariniṣpanna (perfected). The revolutionary switch between parikalpita and pariniṣpanna is āśrayaparāvṛtti. The progressive model, by contrast, depicts the movement of the practitioner through the cognition of the imaginary, the other-dependent, and finally the perfected. In this model, the imaginary is the ordinary way of seeing reality as concrete objects, the other-dependent sees merely impermanent and dependent phenomena, and the perfected cognizes only tathatā, which is the ultimate ontological ground.

Similar to the way Nhất Hạnh blended Paramārtha’s and Xuánzàng’s perspectives on āśrayaparāvṛtti, his understanding of the trisvabhāva doctrine seems to fall on both sides of the pivotal/progressive dichotomy. Verses 39–40 of his Năm muội Bài tụng Duy Biếu read,

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VI. Interbeing and Suchness: Is the Trisvabhāva a Progressive or Pivotal Model?

The “three natures” or trisvabhāva doctrine is surely one of the most confounding aspects of Yogācāra doctrine. Alan Sponberg offers a useful dichotomy for understanding the various exegetical approaches to this doctrine: the pivotal model and the progressive model. The Trimśikā and other Indian Yogācāra texts are not always explicitly following one model or the other, so Sponberg looks to the works of Xuánzàng’s disciple Kuījī to discern these two competing models. Nhất Hạnh could be expected to follow either model, though the dominance of the progressive model in East Asia would suggest the most likely possibility.

Sponberg’s pivotal model valorizes paratantra (other-dependent) as the ontological ground. When the paratantra is wrongly grasped, it is called parikalpita (imagined) and when it is correctly perceived it is called pariniṣpanna (perfected). The revolutionary switch between parikalpita and pariniṣpanna is āśrayaparāvṛtti. The progressive model, by contrast, depicts the movement of the practitioner through the cognition of the imaginary, the other-dependent, and finally the perfected. In this model, the imaginary is the ordinary way of seeing reality as concrete objects, the other-dependent sees merely impermanent and dependent phenomena, and the perfected cognizes only tathatā, which is the ultimate ontological ground.

Similar to the way Nhất Hạnh blended Paramārtha’s and Xuánzàng’s perspectives on āśrayaparāvṛtti, his understanding of the trisvabhāva doctrine seems to fall on both sides of the pivotal/progressive dichotomy. Verses 39–40 of his Năm muội Bài tụng Duy Biếu read,
writes,

The opposite of the world of imaginary construction is the fulfilled self-nature, the nature of things as they are. This is not a construction of our mind nor is it subject to conceptualization. In the realm of things-in-themselves, there is no birth, no death, no one, no many, no coming, no going, no existence, no nonexistence. This is the ultimate dimension, the realm of suchness, nirvana. How do we leave the world of imaginary construction and enter nirvana? The way is through meditating on the nature of interdependence, the practice of paratantra.

Paratantra is the process of learning and training ourselves to look deeply into the nature of interdependence. When we see the interdependent self-nature of things, we are no longer caught in notions of duality. We see that samsara and suchness are one, not two. With deluded mind, we only see samsara. But when our mind is purified and becomes true mind, samsara is transformed into suchness, nirvana. Whether the ground beneath our feet is heaven or hell depends entirely on our way of seeing and walking. Samsara and suchness have the same ground—the ground of our consciousness, our mind. If we practice looking deeply into the nature of interdependence, the nature of interbeing of all things, that is paratantra. Through this insight we are able to transform delusion into illumination.77 [bold emphasis added]

This verse and Nhật Hạnh’s auto-commentary point to a progressive model in that paratantra is not “things-in-themselves,” but rather a stepping stone between parikalpita (biến kế) or parinispanna (viên thành). Although two they become one.76

Dependent origination has two aspects
Deluded consciousness and true mind
It is deluded consciousness since it is imagined
It is true mind since it is perfected.

The imagined perfumes ignorance
Bringing about the suffering of samsāra
The perfected opens to awakened wisdom
Expressing the object of suchness.

These appear to argue for a pivotal model in that paratantra (normally y tham nhan duyên here) can be perceived in two ways: parikalpita (biến kế) or parinispanna (viên thành). When the cognition of paratantra is parakalpita, he calls this “deluded consciousness” (vọng thức); when that same cognition is parinispanna, he calls it “true mind” (chân tâm) instead. In these verses, paratantra is the reality which can be seen in two different ways, not an intermediate stage of understanding as in the progressive model.

In the very next verse, however, Nhật Hạnh presents what appears to be a progressive model:

By contemplating the other-dependent nature
Ignorance transforms into awakened wisdom
Samsāra and suchness
Although two they become one.

In the English version of the auto-commentary to this verse, Nhật Hạnh

65  nhan duyên 因緣.
66  vong thuc 妄識.
67  chan tam 真心.
68  bien ke 遍計.
69  vien thanh 圓成.
70  han vo minh 黑無明.
71  lun hoi kho 輪迴苦.
72  tuoc giac 慧覺.
73  hien loc canh chan nhu 顯露境真如. Nhat Hanh, Transformation at the Base, 247.
74  quan chieu tinh y tha 視照依他性.
75  chan nhu 真如.
76  Nhat Hanh, Transformation at the Base, 248.

77  Ibid., 197–198.
It appears, however, that the issue of whether or not there is a world “out there,” i.e., external to the mind, was not as central an issue to Indian and Chinese debates about Yogācāra as it was to a European scene steeped in the works of Kant, Hegel, and Berkeley. A separate, though related issue in the contemporary academic study of Yogācāra is whether or not the doctrines it expounds were derived through phenomenological principles. Given Nhật Hạnh’s interest in Western philosophy and the writings of D.T. Suzuki, it is not surprising that he engages the issues of idealism and phenomenology in his exposition of Yogācāra.

In the opening paragraph of Nhật Hạnh’s Văn Đề Nhận Thức trong Duy Thức Học, he makes clear his position that Yogācāra is a phenomenological school that deals with cognition, which includes both the subject and object of knowledge:

The Cognition-Only School (Vijñānavāda) is a door of phenomenology that opens to see into the problem of absolute reality, that is to say, the problem of suchness (tathatā). The word “phenomenology” here can be understood in exactly the same meaning that Husserl used. People often take the word cognition to mean knowledge, comprehension, mind, or mental consciousness. But when they use these words, people continue to have the tendency to think that cognition is the subject of knowledge, the subject of thought, a mental entity existing independently from the object. However, according to the Cognition-Only School, cognition implies both the subject of knowledge and the object of knowledge.86

Taken as a whole, Nhật Hạnh’s understanding of the trisvabhāva doctrine implies that liberation requires both the knowledge of both “interbeing” and “things-in-themselves,” even if it is unclear whether a pivotal or progressive model is implied. The slippage between these two models in Nhật Hạnh’s writings suggests that he sees a perfected knowledge of interbeing/dependent origination as equivalent to the perfected knowledge of suchness, with an implied intermediate stage in which paratantra is contemplated but not yet fully realized. If this the case, then understanding how Nhật Hạnh interprets the ontological status of the external world—whether called “interbeing” or “things-in-themselves”—provides a key to understanding his whole exposition of Yogācāra.

VII. Interbeing and the Limits of Knowledge: Does the External World Exist?

Perhaps the most important question for Western scholarship on Yogācāra has been whether or not it can be properly defined as idealistic. Although, as Alberto Todeschini demonstrated recently in a public talk, the idealism debate in Yogācāra goes right back to the beginning of Buddhist studies in Europe, it still remains very much alive today, as epitomized in Schmithausen’s book-length retort to Lusthaus.87

Parikalpita, paratantra, and parinīṣpanna are in fact characteristics concomitant with states of knowledge. If knowledge is parikalpita then the object of knowledge is a parikalpita-object.81 If knowledge depends on the principle of other-dependent origination then phenomena gradually appears clearly as paratantra-svabhāva.83 If knowledge becomes absolutely clear and perfected, then the object is suchness,84 the perfected-object.86 Thus although knowledge and the object of knowledge are not two they are also not one.86

Despite its clear position on phenomenology vis-à-vis Yogācāra, Nhật Hạnh’s Văn Đề Nhận Thức trong Duy Thức Học does not immediately stake out a clear position on the ontological status of the external world. Thirty-seven years later, however, in his next major work on Yogācāra, Giảng luận Duy Biểu Học, in which duy biểu replaces duy thức, Nhật Hạnh’s Văn Đề Nhận Thức trong Duy Thức Học, 9–10.

88 Nhật Hạnh, Văn Đề Nhận Thức trong Duy Thức Học, 195.
Hạnh argues that cognition-only (duy thức) should not be confused with idealism (duy tâm):

So if someone were to think that Cognition is only Mind alone, with Mind being distinct from Matter, and mixes up Cognition-Only with Idealism, this would be quite incorrect. Cognition is a means of knowing and there are many kinds of means of knowing. There are means of knowing which manifest externally and that we can perceive, and there are means of knowing that have not yet manifest and that we cannot yet perceive.

In this passage, Nhất Hạnh not only articulates his position on the difference between Yogācāra and idealism, but also appears to affirm the existence of external manifestations. Granted, he may be using conventional language here to discuss the function of cognition rather than the ontological status of what manifests. Still, the question remains of how Nhất Hạnh deals with some of the more explicitly viññaptimātra teachings in Yogācāra, such as verse 17 of the Trīṃśika or verse 31 of his own Năm mười Bài tụng Duy Biểu, which reads:

Cognition always encompasses
The subject and the object
self/other and inside/outside
All are only mentally perceived.

Nhất Hạnh’s auto-commentary on this verse is particularly instructive, as it not only presents a clear position on the status of the external world but does so with reference to the poem “Cognition’s Embrace,” composed nearly 42 years earlier and translated at the beginning of this paper:

I know that you are still there
because I am still here

cognition’s embrace, for countless yojanas,
links death and birth, subject and object

I still remember that when I was at Văn Hạnh University I taught on Cognition-Only and near the end I read this poem, and many students said, “Just now I am able to understand your poem, Teacher.” This poem cannot be understood if we lack knowledge about Cognition-Only... Our sword of conceptualization cuts and cleaves: this is “self,” that is “other,” this is “us,” that is “them”... Therefore, if we study and contemplate and are able to go beyond ideas about self and other, about inside and outside, only then will we be able to understand Manifestation-Only.

If we pose childish questions such as “You said that there is only cognition, nothing else at all; is this correct? Outside of cognition does anything exist?” then we are stuck in ideas about inside, about outside—this is not Manifestation-Only, since real Manifestation-Only helps us go beyond such ideas about inside and outside... We are stuck in the word “cognition,” stuck in the words “Cognition-Only.” So hence “Manifestation-Only” is better and more suitable from a linguistic perspective. Viññapti translates as “manifestation” and it avoids the idea that there is only this and that that does not exist.

89 năng lượng 能量.
91 thức 識.
92 tự tha 自他.
93 ý niệm 意念. Nhat Hanh, Transformation at the Base, 247.
Nhất Hạnh himself over many decades. Though he articulates Yogācāra ideas though changing and even contradictory expressions of “sounds and images,” he continues to return to the same themes, shaped as much by his aesthetic sensibilities of interbeing as by a single moment of “bare feet on the cold floor.” And even the most vexing problem of all in Yogācāra interpretation—the problem of the external world—is put in the intimate terms of a lover: “I am here, existing for you.”

VIII. Ritornello: Revisiting “Cognition’s Embrace”

True to his own warning, Nhất Hạnh’s “Cognition’s Embrace” makes little sense outside of his interpretation of Yogācāra. This survey of Nhất Hạnh’s development as a Buddhist thinker, his hermeneutical strategies grounded in mindfulness and interbeing, and the analysis of central Yogācāra interpretative problems in his writings highlights the gradual refinement in his approach to Yogācāra over the past half-century, including the transition from “Cognition-Only” to “Manifestation-Only.” On the other hand, “Cognition’s Embrace” points to a single moment of illumination that appears to have sustained Nhất Hạnh’s evolving and at times idiosyncratic presentation of Yogācāra themes. As the final lines of his poem read,

The night remains intact  
your sounds and images return, overflowing the ground of being  
because on this night  
hands pressed on the window  
and bare feet on the cold floor  
I am here, existing for you.

This poem and its insight “remains intact,” continually cited by

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The expansion and explosive growth of the gaming industry in Macao since 2002 has brought its resurgence of interest in the structure and behavior of the local economy. The enormous financial gains that are being made by those fortunate enough to benefit from this transformation come with large social and environmental costs. Yet, local government fails to integrate environmental concern into the current practice of economic decision-making at all scales. As a result, the challenge of managing waste generation and recycling become more pressing with rising population growth and urbanization. There is an urgent need for expansion and upgrading of waste infrastructure, as poorly managed systems can lead to environmental degradation as well as health and sanitation hazards. Revitalization of the city is necessary to improve its built environment and to accommodate the growing number of population. Macao should reinvest in itself to become an economically and environmentally sustainable urban city. It should cut greenhouse gas emissions through improved solid waste management. Waste minimization, recycling and re-use are vital approaches for GHG emissions reductions. Sustainable solid waste management can effectively reduce the ecological footprint in Macao. This article will examine the rise of the gaming industry and discuss local environmental degradation due to this rapid development. It will also explore how Macao can turn the problem of waste management into an engine for future development. Hotels are an indispensable part to achieve long-term sustainability in Macao. They should proactively search for new ways to use resources more efficiently, set attainable goals and develop a robust environmental management strategy to minimize the waste generated or even move towards achieving zero waste.
HISTORY OF MACAO

For thousands of years, fishermen and farmers have been settled in Macao, which has been a stopping point for merchant ships since 5 AD.1 Macao was developed as a major settlement only after the Portuguese arrived in 1513, after trading with Gao and Malacca.2 Starting from 1534, Portuguese were allowed to anchor ships and build warehouses in Macao.3 In 1557, Portuguese successfully obtained a lease to rule Macao from China in recognition for their help in defeating the Chinese pirates.4 Macao then became the major entrepôt between the Far East and Europe. It was turned from a primitive encampment of interim buildings to a fortified city and commercial trading node, with settlers from Portugal, Japan, India, Africa, and Eurasia, while also being a place for the Christian evangelization of China being led by the Jesuit order.5

During the 17th century, several other colonial powers, in particular the Dutch made numerous attempts to conquer Macao but were being repulsed at every single time.6 The first Portuguese governor was designated to Macao in 1680, though the Chinese continued to exercise their rights - collecting land and levying custom taxes.7 By 1750, Macao had become more autonomous socially and economically.8 There was a mixed Eurasian population and the territory became a refuge for European traders and Protestant missionaries. In 1840s, Macao was weakened by its rival Hong Kong, and was less significant politically and economically.9

In 1849, the Portuguese destroyed the Chinese customs house and proclaimed Macao’s “independence”; in retaliation, the Chinese assassinated Governor Ferreira do Amaral.10 During the 1850s to 1870s, its economy depended on the coolie traffic, gambling and light industries such as matches and fireworks.11 Large number of Chinese and refugees have settled in Macao and changed its social complexion.

Macao was officially recognized as a Portuguese colony on March 26, 1887.12 The Protocol of Lisbon was signed to acknowledge the rights of Portugal over Macao under the condition that Portugal would not ceded Macao to another party without China’s approval.13 By 1950, its population was predominately Chinese, with a minority of Portuguese immigrants. Macao was characterized by gambling, corruption, opium smuggling and sexual seduction. It was a “city of sin”.14 In 1962, Stanley Ho, Henry Fok, Yip Hon and Teddy Yip bid for Macao’s gambling franchises and they finally won the public tender for its gambling monopoly.15 The company was named as Sociedade de Turismo e Diversões de Macau (STDM). It advocated greyhound, horse, and car races, and launched hydrofoils and helicopters to commute between Hong Kong and Shenzhen.16

In March 1987, an agreement was signed between Beijing and Lisbon for the transfer of sovereignty over Macao to China as a Special Administrative Region on December 20, 1999.17 On May 15th 1999, Edmund Ho was elected to be the first Chief Executive of the post-colonial Macao.18 China has agreed that under the policy of “one country, two systems,” Macao will retain its established system under a high degree of autonomy for at least 50 years after reunification. After the handover of Macao, local government decided to liberalize its gaming industry. In 2002, three concessions were granted to Sociedade de Jogos de Macau (a subsidiary of STDM), Wynn Resorts (Macao), and Galaxy Casino Company.19 Since then, Macao had radically transformed and urbanized with huge “Las-Vegas”-style casinos.
Monte Carlo of the Orient or the City of Trash?

Macao, like many other metropolitan cities, it has to find ways to balance between rapid economic growth and effective environmental protection, as well as repairing the existing damage. In Macao, land is relatively scarce, yet population is growing and there are a few available natural resources. There are around six hundred thousand people living in an area of 30.3 km² in 2014. The level of consumption and the number of construction projects has been increasing in an unprecedented speed over the last few years. As a result, more waste is being generated, and between 2004 and 2005 those levels has increased by 8.9%; in 2006 Macao has generated a total of 286,358 tons of municipal solid waste. Waste management is a fact of life in the city today.

With the liberalization of the gambling industry in 2002, large numbers of hotels and casinos have been built; with now 36 casinos in total. It is true that this significantly boosts the whole economy. In 2012, gross domestic product (GDP) has increased more than 30% in value since 2002. However, this massive economic growth brought negative consequences to the environment. Undoubtedly, construction waste has taken up a large amount of total solid waste as a result. It has skyrocketed throughout these years, from 244,930 m³ in 2002 to 3,118,253 m³ in 2007. Commercial and industrial waste has also risen from 46,308 tons to 68,786 tons during those periods. Ultimately, the solid waste will be disposed to the landfill.

With the immense amount of municipal solid waste being generated each day, there is an increasing pressure on the existing landfill sites in Macao. These landfills will soon all have reached their maximum capacities in a short period of time if not planned for extension. Macao Environmental Protection Bureau estimates that by 2020, waste generation may occupy 85% of the treatment capacity of Reuse Incineration Plant, which will put tremendous pressure on incineration facilities and operational hazards. This places an immediate need to tackle the waste disposal problem in Macao, which means that more land has to be reserved for potential landfill sites.

But Macao is a densely populated and highly urbanized city; land resources are already very limited. Since the beginning of the 20th century, Macao government has already approved numerous local land reclamation projects, maximizing its size from 11.6 km² in 1912 to its current size. Future approval of land reclamation projects are in doubt. If more land is used for landfill, this will exacerbate the existing social and economic problems. This implies that less land can be used for residential buildings. According to a report from Shanghai-based China Business News, local housing prices have increased over ten-fold during the last decade. Landowners and landlords are the main beneficiaries as the price of land for housing and rental accommodation rises to reflect the increased capacity to pay; yet, renters may be forced to move. Lack of decent, affordable housing has constantly plagued the local community. This is particularly true to the poor and they often bear a disproportionate burden of environmental problems. Households facing high housing cost burdens use more of their income for housing, and consequently have less income to save or to spend on other necessities. This has led to public discontent and fuels massive protests recently. Not only has this threatened the political stability in Macao but this have also agitated the financial markets and weakened the country’s currency. All of these will place an obstacle to the development of Macao in the future.

In addition, when construction waste is processed in the incineration...
tion facilities, it may give rise to many problems including methane generation and air pollution from uncontrolled burning that may be harmful to the health of local residents. Improper waste management and inadequate provision to monitor the disposal system can cause chemical poisoning through chemical inhalation and lead to severe diseases. In 2005, total CO2 emissions was about 1,837.17 kilotons and the emissions per capita was around 3.92 metric tons.31 Waste emits 9.7% or 208 kilotons of CO2 equivalents of Macao’s total greenhouse gas.32 Air pollution has continued to plague the neighborhood, reaching a level that is difficult to manage despite tremendous efforts from the Macao government.

The current legislation is outdated and it is not sufficient to respond to the needs of local society. There is an imbalance between economic development and environmental protection. As the Lawmaker Dominic Sio Chi Wai says, “In recent years the Macao government chose to place economic and social development as the focus, thereby ignoring the development of sustainable environmental protection.”33 The current Environmental Impact Assessments (EIA) is a nonbinding document and thus it has little legal effect.34 In addition, it is not mandatory in projects with a high risk of environmental impact. Thus, the existing law is not effective, as it does not control the amount of waste being generated in the casinos and hotels. Local government does not place a high priority on environmental planning. There is a lack of complementary guidelines and criteria for the enforcement of the environmental regime. Obviously, waste management regulations fail to catch up with the rapid social development in Macao. As a consequence, waste management is always a challenge to the government. Macao is in need of a comprehensive procedure for stringent environmental law and regulation in response to climate change. This is a critical step to improve the current situation and achieve sustainable economic development in the future.

Nevertheless, local government did concern about waste management for the past years. It has been allocating resources to develop waste collection and treatment infrastructure. For example, it has put efforts to expand the existing incineration plant and improve existing incinerators including the Macao Refuse Incineration Plant and the Special and Hazardous Waste Treatment Plant in order to reduce the negative impact during the treatment of solid waste.35 Moreover, realizing the huge amount of solid waste being generated in hotels, Macao Environmental Protection Bureau has launched the “Green Hotel Award” scheme in 2007 to raise awareness of the importance of environmental management in the hotel industry and encourage the hotels to implement environmental measures.36 Major environmental practices that hotels have undertaken include providing electronic newspapers in guest rooms to reduce waste newspaper, using recycled paper for hotels’ promotional materials and donating old uniforms to charities for recycling.37 The number of hotels participated in and received the award are increasing progressively. As of June 2012, the number of Green Hotels awarded has reached to 23 from 8 since its founding in 2007.38 Also, the average amount of waste produced by the hotels awardees went down by 17% and the total amount of recoverable waste is increased by more than 5 times.39 Though the scheme is quite successful in waste reduction, this is far from being able to deal with waste management. The scheme is a voluntary-initiated program and the measures undertaken by the participating hotels are minor so it may not be effective to reduce waste generation in the long term. Additional measures are needed to address the situation.

GREEN HOTEL AWARDEE – GEG

Galaxy Entertainment Group (“GEG”) is a leading operator of casinos, hotels and entertainment facilities in Macao. Since 2007, GEG has started to adopt green practices. It took part in the Macao SAR Office for the Development of the Energy Sector’s (“GDSE”) ‘Lights-off 1 Hour’ event. All inessential lights on the building exteriors of GEG’s flagship Star World Hotel & Casino and four City Club Casinos – Waldo, Grand Waldo, Rio and President, would be switched off for an hour during June. Ever since 2008, GEG has extended its support to the World Wide Fund (“WWF”) Earth Hour in response to the global ‘lights out’ initiative. Realizing the importance of resource conservation, Star World Hotel has equipped with energysavings light bulbs in up to 80% of its hotels, casinos and back-of-house areas. Moreover, Star World Hotel adopted storm water management technique to collect and filter water for reuse in irrigating plants and cleaning the hotel’s car-park floors.

As GEG continued to grow and expand the businesses over these few years, GEG has undertaken several major initiatives aimed at increasing the sustainability of its casinos while saving resources and operating expenses in the process. Promoting environmental sustainability has become a core priority to the business. It has recently engaged in on-going strategic planning and implementation of green measures to reduce its carbon footprint leading to significant performance in energy-saving, water-saving and waste reduction in its two flagship property, Galaxy Macao™ and Star World Hotel. In the first half of 2014, Star World Hotel has replaced 2,000 pieces of 40w Tungsten Halgen lamps from the guest rooms with 5w LED lamps, installed motion sensor light switches to low 39 “Macao Green Hotel Award 5th Anniversary Special Edition,” Environmen-
tality Protection Bureau, 27
usage areas and used energy saving devices such as chilled water pumps and CO2 sensors, resulting in energy savings of 15,360 kWh per month. Galaxy Macao™ has installed 700 pieces of water restrictors to faucets and recycled condensed water from air-conditioning systems for cleaning and irrigation purposes. This has led to approximately 1.4 million liters of water savings. To further integrate cutting edge sustainability practices into its operations, in 2014 Galaxy Macao™ even purchased a food waste decomposing machine that produced over 1,500 kg of composite for planting. And Star World Hotel has collected around 78.4 tons of cardboard and paper materials, 6.5 tons of plastic, 0.51 tons of metal and 2,800 liters of waste oil for recycling. Realizing the necessity of providing a healthier work environment, Star World Hotel has installed 64 duct-type ionizers throughout the building to improve indoor air quality of the gaming area.

Due to GEG’s commitment to sustainable development, Galaxy Macao™ received the 2014 Macao Green Hotel Award in recognition to the hotel’s green initiatives. In 2014, it was also recognized to be the first integrated resort in Macao to receive the ISO 14001 certificate for its successful environmental management system. Through investing in facility improvement and retrofit projects, such as optimization of chiller plants and boilers, use of LEDs and motion sensors, it has led to over 5 million KWh savings in 2013. Moreover, it has installed a full insulation along the building exteriors to decrease heat transmission and used T5 fluorescent tubes in back-of-house areas to lower power consumption. Aiming to minimize waste, recycling bins are placed at different parts of the building to collect waste from guests and team members.

Implementing emissions reductions strategies require thousands of dollars annually for initial costs, even when those strategies ultimately reduce overall expenses through energy savings. This financial obligation may pose a challenge to GEG and it is necessary for the company to identify a variety of financial strategies so as to achieve long-term sustainability. In the future, GEG should identify new potential projects and continue to evaluate the efficacy and value of current projects in meeting its goals. At the same time, it should explore new opportunity for collaboration with other agencies such as the Macao Environmental Protection Bureau. Better yet, GEG should compile adopted goals and strategies into a comprehensive
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