Institute of East Asian Studies

Kennette Benedict
The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists
Doomsday Clockwork: Toward a Nuclear Weapons Free World

One legacy of Hiroshima and Nagasaki was the fear that knowledge about nuclear bombs and their delivery systems would give the other side an edge in the arms race, which has resulted in a level of state secrecy in the United States and other nuclear weapons states that makes a mockery of our democratic aspirations.

But another legacy, of democratic determination, is a gift from the Manhattan Project scientists’ habit of openness and their faith in democratic action, as exemplified by Doomsday Clock on the cover of the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

In the struggle against secrecy and in efforts to inform the public, the scientists of the Manhattan project and their intellectual descendants give citizens the knowledge to participate as equals in decision making about nuclear weapons and nuclear power. This is a legacy worth cherishing and deepening as we seek a world free of nuclear weapons.

Cathryn Carson
Associate Professor, UC Berkeley - History
Science, Politics and Ethical Choices: Berkeley and the Opening of the Nuclear Era

Already before Hiroshima and Nagasaki, scientists found themselves grappling with ethical and political questions about the new age they saw was about to open. It seems safe to say that none foresaw, and none could have foreseen, the complexity of the world they ushered in. Starting in Berkeley before the bomb, this talk explores the challenges faced by scientists and other technical experts in imagining the long-term societal entanglements of the exploitation of nuclear fission. It highlights the question of ethical conduct in light of the unknowability of the future and the profound power of unexpected consequences.

Sylvain V. Costes
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory
The DOE Low Dose Program at the Berkeley Laboratory: Where We Are and Future Directions

In this presentation, Costes will review some of the key concepts in health effects from ionizing radiation with an emphasis on recent developments at the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory where scientists investigate how cells, tissue and organisms respond to radiation. Modeling and imaging approaches will be discussed and put into the context of how one can extrapolate risk from high to low dose.

Jay Davis
The Hertz Foundation
The Utility of Technology in Reducing the Nuclear Threat

In solving any problem in the national security or military world, technology, policy, and operations are coupled in a mutual trade space. Raising or lowering the use of one component may be compensated for by an equivalent adjustment in another. Ideally, future adjustments in nuclear inventories should reduce the number of weapons, improve security and safety, avoid proliferation from one state to another, avoid technology or materials leakage from the nuclear power industry, and increase deterrence against the use of nuclear weapons. Who develops and tests the various candidate verification technologies, who actually uses them in verification activities, and the intrusiveness of them are all significant issues to be addressed, as are the operational costs of verification activities. Finally, technology tools and operational agreements may be acceptable between one pair of antagonists, e.g. the US and Russia, but not between another pair, such as India and Pakistan. Lessons learned in successful conventional force reduction and stability increasing treaties such as the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty and the Open Skies Treaty offer benchmarks to consider for application in nuclear force reductions. Similarly, the evolution of operations under the new P5+1 – The Republic of Iran Agreement will hint at what may be possible going forward. Finally, the role of technology in assuring stability in a hypothetical world in which weapons states possibly approach parity in numbers of weapons will be critical, if at present only guessable.

Jacques Hymans
University of Southern California
70 Years after: Explaining Nuclear War and Nuclear Peace

In August 1945, the United States dropped two bombs that changed the image of war. Why did the US do it? The “orthodox” view is that the US dropped the bombs on Hiroshima and Nagasaki to avoid the mass slaughter of American GIs that would have occurred if an invasion of the main Japanese islands had been attempted. The “revisionist” view is that the US dropped the bombs to send a message to the Soviet Union that it would not be pushed around at the postwar negotiating table.

More recently, the historian Michael Gordin has argued that both the orthodox and the revisionist arguments are guilty of hindsight bias. In other words, both depend on the assumption that the US made its choices in the full awareness that dropping the bombs would end the war and change the world. But did the US really believe that the stakes were so high? Gordin says no; and in Hyman's own research, he has found that UK Prime Minister Winston Churchill also did not understand the magnitude of the decision being taken until after he had already given the US the green light.

This new interpretation of the history leading up to August 1945 greatly helps to explain why no nuclear attacks have occurred since then. Truman and Churchill decided to drop the bomb on Japan without thinking that the decision they were making was all that special. Since Hiroshima and Nagasaki, however, it was impossible to make such a choice so casually. Most observers have attributed the remarkably long nuclear peace to the workings of nuclear deterrence, but even if one assumes that deterrence has been effective in preventing nuclear conflict between nuclear-armed states, it cannot explain why there were no nuclear attacks against non-nuclear-armed states either, such as the US not using them in Vietnam or the Soviet Union not using them in Afghanistan. Instead, it is hard to disagree with Thomas Schelling, who—despite having made his fame as a deterrence theorist—attributes the long nuclear peace primarily to three reasons other than deterrence: first, the horror that was engendered by the original bombings; second, a great deal of dumb luck, especially during the early days of the nuclear age; and third and most importantly, the sheer passage of time without another Hiroshima, which greatly magnified the perception that to conduct such bombings was to transgress a moral taboo.

If the social dynamics of the nuclear taboo are such that it only grows stronger the further we get from the original bombings, then perhaps one could conclude that after 70 years of nuclear non-use, humanity is now safe and need not worry about nuclear war anymore. But the existence of nuclear weapons confers extraordinary power on a very small number of people. Therefore the nuclear peace remains extremely fragile, as a single reckless leader could rain untold devastation on this planet. Even more worryingly, the global taboo itself could begin—perhaps even has begun—to falter. In a video game and CGI world saturated with images of destruction, the grainy images of Hiroshima may be gradually losing their power to shock. The only chance of attaining complete security from the threat of nuclear holocaust is to pursue universal nuclear disarmament.

Atsushi Moriyama
University of Shizuoka
Why Japan Decided to Enter the War with U.S.: From the Perspective of Japan's Decision-making Process

The origins of the Pacific War remain difficult to clarify. In 1991, at the International Conference Fifty Years After, the Pacific War Reexamined, held at Yamanakako, Shin’ichi Kitaoka noted the absence of antagonism concerning national interests between Japan and the United States. Certainly, these two countries stood in opposition due to their principles. The United States demanded the application of Hull’s four principles in the Pacific, while Japan put forth the Greater East Asia Co-prosperity Sphere. However, nobody was convinced that these propositions should be fulfilled at any cost.

War against the United States was not the aim Japan had pursued; rather it was an alternative to be avoided if at all possible. Avoiding war was the only way out of the maze in which Japan found itself. If so, why was this alternative taken? To understand the reason, it is necessary to examine the process of decision-making in Japan.

In the prewar era, Japan’s decision-making system was characterized by ryōron-heiki that incorporated the interests of all the mutually opposing government institutions and hikettei (evasion of decision-making) that evaded the making of decisions in order to avoid conflict. Even the prime minister could not override the interests of the various government organs. This was due to a structural flaw in the Meiji Constitution. Every actor had a veto, because each was directly responsible to the Emperor, not to the Cabinet or to the Parliament. This lack of leadership made it difficult for the government to adopt crucial policies. Consequently, many equivocal national policies (kokusaku) were adopted by the Imperial Headquarters-Government Liaison Conference (Daihon’ei-Seifu Renraku Kaigi), only to be rapidly abandoned in response to changes in domestic and international situations. Japan’s political instability was plainly evident.

The mystery deepens. How could such a vulnerable Japanese system decide on war with the United States? Moriyama examines the process of kokusaku-saikentō (reconsideration of national policy) executed by the Tōjō cabinet, and uncovers the features of the Japanese leaders’ assessment of the situation and their psychology.

Masakatsu Ota
Kyodo News
The Japanese Nuclear Enigma — The Secret Nuclear Pact with the U.S. and the Nuclear Shadow She Has Feared

Japan, the sole nation to have ever suffered from the actual military use of nuclear weapons against human beings, has relied on the “Nuclear Umbrella” provided by her security ally, the United States. This national security policy has forced a series of Japanese administrations to balance the realities of Japan’s security during the Cold War with domestic anti-nuclear sentiments influenced by the atomic bombs and later experiences with nuclear testing. Facing these realities, Japan made a secret deal with the United States, called the “Secret Nuclear Pact" (核密約).

Since the historical investigation undertaken by the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) government in 2009-10, triggered by Ota and other journalists, thousands of newly declassified governmental documents have revealed why Japan’s policy makers took the complex course that led to the Secret Pact.

Why did Prime Minister Nobusuke Kishi, a grandfather of the current Prime Minister of Japan, make the secret deal that still allows the U.S. military to use Japanese airspace for nuclear strikes? Why did later governments stick to the Pact and deceive its own citizens with statements such as: “The U.S. has never brought nuclear weapons into Japanese territory”? Why did Prime Minister Eisaku Sato, Kishi’s younger brother, declare his famous “Three Non-Nuclear Principles" (非核三原則) to the Japanese nation and the world, even though he knew of the Pact’s existence? Furthermore, what changes have taken place within the Japanese nuclear policy landscape since the DPJ’s investigation?

Ota will shed new light on these questions and explain the “enigma” of Japanese non-nuclear policies, which rely on nuclear deterrence but try to evade the shadow of the nuclear bomb. In addition, Ota will analyze current and future trends in Japanese nuclear policy after the Fukushima nuclear disaster.

Atsuyuki Suzuki
University of Tokyo
Japan’s Development of Technologies for the Peaceful Use of Nuclear Power

The development of nuclear technology in Japan illustrates the inevitability of an interaction between science and society. Such interactions happens in many scientific arenas across the world. However, there seem to be several nuclear-specific and Japan-specific aspects to interactions between science and society on this issue.

First, not only the government alone but also the Japanese public as a whole enthusiastically supported the decision to launch the national nuclear development program, although at the time not more than a decade had elapsed since the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombings. To Japan, the atomic bomb appeared to be “the greatest marvel” of science, useful not only for military applications but more broadly as a new energy source substitutable for oil and coal, thereby resolving the nation’s vulnerability as a country poor in energy resources.

Second, Japan is a pacifist state. Its nuclear program is strictly dedicated to civil purposes only, being subjected to rigorous international safeguards. Such social requirements have provided good opportunities for Japan to develop and deploy nuclear technologies that might be internationally applicable, on one hand, and have led to challenges dealing with so-called ‘weaponizable’ technologies on the other. The fact that an extremely lengthy time period is needed for a pacifist state to develop breeder reactor technologies, for instance, is indicative of those challenges. This is particularly true in Japan, because the eventual aim of its nuclear program is to develop non-fossil-fuel energy, the availability of which depends on the capacity of technology rather than the amount of natural resources.

Third, nuclear safety is a sensitive issue in Japan, one that cannot be managed without social considerations. The issue is closely related to public perceptions of nuclear risks emerging originally from Hiroshima and Nagasaki, even though to a certain extent the radiation dose effects that were scientifically observed were overestimated. What is taking place in Japan after the Fukushima Daiichi Accident is apparently being interpreted in connection with this Japan-specific context. It is hoped that the challenge raised for Japan in the aftermath of the accident will create innovative solutions to a trans-scientific question: how safe is safe enough? Suzuki's presentation is intended as a look at the lessons Japan has learned from developments and experiences in nuclear technology over the last half a century, and to explore ways to make use of nuclear power while meeting the demands of non-proliferation treaties.

Tatsujiro Suzuki
Nagasaki University
Role of Japan toward a Nuclear-free World

Japan, as the only country to have suffered the complete destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki by the atomic bombs 70 years ago, has a special responsibility and mission to aid in the realization of a nuclear-free world. The average age of the victims of the atomic bombs (“Hibakusha”) is now over 80 years old and time is running out. Japan has also a special mission to transmit their voices and experiences to the next generation to further a nuclear-free world. But Japan is now facing two serious dilemmas. One is its dependence on a “nuclear umbrella” for its security policy, and the other is its large stockpile of plutonium for civilian nuclear fuel cycle. One possible solution for the first dilemma proposed by the RECNA research team is to establish a Northeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free-Zone (NEA-NWFZ) in which Japan, as well as DPRK and ROK, no longer need a nuclear umbrella. For the second nuclear dilemma, Japan needs to review its nuclear fuel cycle policy and should commit to reduce its stockpile through higher transparency under a possible international scheme. Japan should and can play a much greater role in realizing a nuclear-free world if it does not depend on nuclear deterrence and on the plutonium fuel cycle.

Naoko Wake
Michigan State University
Views from the Ground, Voices from America

Survivors of Hiroshima and Nagasaki have unfailingly provoked historical fascination. In particular, recent scholarship has highlighted, often with little connection to local contexts, how survivors were helpless “guinea pigs” at U.S. scientists’ disposal or “keloid girls” whose beauty could be retrieved from scarring only by America’s advanced medical technologies. Much of the scholarly attention, too, has focused on institutional medicine such as the scientific research conducted at the Atomic Bomb Casualty Commission (ABCC). Wake's inquiry into the approximately 1,000 survivors who reside in America today—U.S.-born, U.S. citizens of Japanese ancestry who happened to be in Japan in 1945, in addition to the Japanese who came to America after the war and became citizens at some point—challenges these one-dimensional, institution-based views of survivors, exploring a history outside established medical and national categories such as “Japanese = victims = patients” and “Americans = victors = doctors.” Such exploration helps us discover lost local settings for understanding the bomb’s human costs, including long-term radiation illness that continues to affect survivors today. Using oral histories that Wake and others have collected, she will first look at a range of folk medicines and treatments that Japanese Americans offered to each other at the cities’ ground zero. Then, Wake examines U.S. survivors’ resistance to the research conducted by the ABCC. Finally, Wake examines the rise of a U.S. survivors’ attempt in the 1970s and 1980s to bring medical treatment to all survivors in America. In quiet yet adamant resistance to the medical establishment’s scientific focus on cancer, mutation, and malformation, Japanese Americans pursued access to regular, locally available medical checkups and consultations, and to community meeting places where they could share their difficult experiences being injured by their own government. These boundary-crossing aspects of U.S. survivors’ effort reveal an understanding of their approach to long-term radiation illness underexplored by the scholarship. As their oral histories show, U.S. survivors have been resourceful makers of medical care that suits their needs, not simply helpless patients or subjects of medical science.